Commonwealth v. Leed , 2016 Pa. Super. 114 ( 2016 )

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2016 PA Super 114COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
ERIC JAY LEED :
:
Appellant :
: No. 1231 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 16, 2015
in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division
at No(s): CP-36-CR-0002136-2014
BEFORE: PANELLA, STABILE, and FITZGERALD,* JJ.
OPINION BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED JUNE 01, 2016
Appellant, Eric Jay Leed, appeals from the judgment of sentence of
twenty to sixty months’ imprisonment imposed in the Lancaster County
Court of Common Pleas for possession with intent to deliver 1 marijuana
(“PWID”). He claims a statement that a canine sweep was conducted one
year before the application for a search warrant requires all evidence against
him be suppressed. We hold that a reviewing court (1) may consider the
entirety of the affidavit of probable cause to determine whether the
challenged statement constitutes a typographical error and (2) find a
substantial basis supports the issuing authority’s probable cause
determination, notwithstanding that error. We thus affirm.
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).
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The relevant facts of this case follow. On March 21, 2014, Detective
Anthony Lombardo of the Lancaster County Drug Task Force applied for and
executed a search warrant for Appellant’s storage unit. Detective
Lombardo’s affidavit of probable cause set forth the following relevant
allegations, which we reproduce with minor alterations:
3. That during the month of September 2012, your Affiant
spoke with a Reliable Confidential Informant (CI#1),
whose information has led to at least (2) prior arrests and
convictions for felony violations of the PA Controlled
Substance, Drug, Device, and Cosmetic Act.. CI#1 related
that he/she has knowledge of a white male, [Appellant],
who is in the business of selling large amounts of powder
cocaine and Marijuana in the Lancaster City area. CI#1
additionally related that [Appellant] lives at 1223 Union St.
Lancaster. CI#1 knew this information to be true because
he/she had purchased cocaine from [Appellant] as recently
September 2012. CI#1 has demonstrated his/her
knowledge of controlled substances, to specifically include
cocaine and Marijuana, its packaging, pricing and
terminology.
4. That during the month of September 2012, your Affiant
obtained a PENNDOT photograph of [Appellant, which]
CI#1 positively identified . . . as being same individual
known to him/her as described in paragraphs #3.
5. That during the month of February 2014, Det. Gregory
Macey of the Lancaster County Drug Task Force, spoke
with a Reliable Confidential Informant (CI#2), whose
information has led to at least (1) prior arrest and
conviction for felony violations of the PA Controlled
Substance, Drug, Device, and Cosmetic Act.. CI#2 related
that he/she has knowledge of a white male, [Appellant],
who is in the business of selling large amounts of powder
cocaine and Marijuana. CI#2 has demonstrated his/her
knowledge of controlled substances, to specifically include
Cocaine and Marijuana, its packaging, pricing and
terminology.
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6. That during the month of February 2014, Det. Greg
Macey of the Lancaster County Drug Task Force obtained a
PENNDOT photograph of [Appellant, which] CI#2 positively
identified . . . as being same individual known to him/her
as described in paragraphs #5.
7. That during the month of March 2014, Agents from the
Drug Enforcement Administration Harrisburg Resident
Office spoke with a citizen in good standing within the
community. The named citizen, who wished to remain
anonymous, stated that [Appellant] was making frequent
short term trips to storage unit #503 located within Lanco
Mini Storage located at 1813 Old Philadelphia Pike,
Lancaster, PA.
8. That on 21 March 2014, Michael Neff of the Drug
Enforcement Administration spoke with the manager of
Lanco Mini Storage. The manager advised that [Appellant]
is the sole lessee of unit #503 at Lanco Mini Storage
located at 1813 Old Philadelphia Pike, Lancaster, PA and
has been so since renting the unit in August 2013. The
manager further stated that the last time that Leed
accessed the unit was on March 20, 2014.
9. That Off Billiter of the Manheim Township Police
Department, attended a six week handler and K9
certification course in Canada conducted by Baden K9 in
Apr-May 2008. Both handler and K9 receive re-
certifications and twice monthly training. They have
attended courses and certifications of both handler and K9
to include[ a Baden K9 Patrol & Narcotics recertification on
December 9, 2008, and numerous other certifications
between December 8, 2010, and February 24, 2012].
10. That on March 21, 2013, your Affiant requested Officer
Billiter and his K9 partner Ruger, of the Manheim Twp
Police Department to conduct K9 sweep of unit #503 at
Lanco Mini Storage located at 1813 Old Philadelphia Pike,
Lancaster, PA for the presence of narcotics. At approx.
1644 hrs, Officer Billiter and K9 Ruger conducted a sweep
of random storage units to include unit#503. Each and
every time Ruger alerted on unit#503 and Officer Billiter
advised your Affiant that K9 Ruger had alerted on the unit,
indicating the presence of narcotics.
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11. That your Affiant respectfully requests that a Search
Warrant be granted for Unit#503 located at Lanco Mini
Storage, 1813 Old Philadelphia Pike
Aff. of Probable Cause, 3/21/14, at ¶¶ 3-11. An assistant district attorney
approved the warrant application. Appl. for Search Warrant and
Authorization, 3/21/14, at 1. A magisterial district judge issued a search
warrant at 7:00 p.m. on March 21, 2014. Id.
Officers searched Appellant’s storage unit at 7:11 p.m. that same day
and seized approximately fifteen pounds of marijuana, $9,900, plastic bags,
and a scale. See N.T. Trial, 5/4/15, at 12-13. Additionally, officers
discovered Appellant’s personal documents, including a bank statement and
an income tax return, inside the unit. See Aff. of Probable Cause, 3/23/14,
at ¶ 3. Relying, in part, on the evidence from the storage unit, officers
obtained a second search warrant for Appellant’s bank records on March 23,
2014. See id. at ¶¶ 3, 9.
On March 31, 2014, Detective Lombardo filed a criminal complaint
charging Appellant with PWID.2 Appellant was arrested on April 2, 2014. On
April 4, 2014, officers obtained a third search warrant for Appellant’s
mother’s residence. The issuance of the third warrant was based on the
evidence obtained from the previous two searches, as well as a recorded
2
Appellant was also charged with possession of paraphernalia, 35 P.S. §
780-113(a)(32), but that charge was withdrawn before the filing of the
information.
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telephone conversation between Appellant and his mother while Appellant
was in the county jail. See Aff. of Probable Cause, 4/4/14, at ¶¶ 3, 14, 15.
The third search warrant resulted in the seizure of an additional $8,900 and
a cellphone from a safe in his mother’s residence.
On July 8, 2014, Appellant filed an omnibus pretrial motion, which
included a motion to suppress the evidence from his storage unit. On
November 24, 2014, the trial court convened a suppression hearing.
Appellant’s counsel argued the March 21, 2014 warrant for his storage unit
was “stale” and “the affidavit of probable cause fail[ed] to state specifically
enough information to warrant the [magisterial district judge] to issue the
search warrant.” N.T., 11/24/14, at 3-4. Appellant’s argument focused on
Paragraphs 3, 4, and 10 of the affidavit of probable cause. See id. at 4.
The trial court summarized Appellant’s “staleness issues” as “the indication
on the search warrant that it was March 21, 2013 that the K-9 search was
conducted[.]” Id. (emphasis added). Counsel further claimed the defect in
the March 21 warrant tainted the evidence recovered under the subsequent
warrants for his bank account and his mother’s home. See id.
The Commonwealth, over Appellant’s objection, called Detective
Lombardo to testify that the canine sweep occurred on “March 21, 2014, the
same day that [the detective] completed the search warrant or application.”
Id. at 4-5, 7 (emphasis added). When asked by the Commonwealth
whether the March 21, 2013 date in the affidavit of probable cause was “a
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typographical error,” the detective replied, “Yes.” Id. at 7. Appellant did
not cross-examine the detective or present further evidence. The court
ordered the parties to submit briefs, and both parties complied.
On February 23, 2015, the trial court denied Appellant’s suppression
motion. The court concluded it would not consider Officer Lombardo’s
testimony at the suppression hearing. Trial Ct. Op., 2/23/15, at 6-7 & n.5.
Nevertheless, it found that “when reviewing the four corners of the
application in a common sense and realistic fashion, it is clear that the K9
sweep took place on March 21, 2014 and that the indication that it occurred
on March 21, 2013 reflects an obvious typographical error.” Id. at 11. The
court cited numerous cases in which our courts “have infused common sense
into their review of affidavits submitted in support of search-warrant
applications.” Id. at 8-10. The court acknowledged the case law was not
“precisely on-point with the facts of the instant case . . . .” Id. at 11.
However, it applied “guiding principles” to determine the existence of a
typographical error and find the canine sweep occurred on March 21, 2014,
the same day Detective Lombardo applied for the first search warrant. Id.
Thus, the court determined that “the magist[erial] district judge . . . could
reasonably have concluded that there was sufficient probable cause to issue
the warrant” to search Appellant’s storage unit. Id.
On May 4, 2015, Appellant proceeded to a stipulated nonjury trial at
which the trial court found him guilty. On July 16, 2015, the court
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sentenced Appellant to twenty to sixty months’ imprisonment for PWID and
granted his motion for bail pending appeal. Appellant timely filed a notice of
appeal and complied with the court’s order to submit a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
statement.
Appellant presents the following question for review:
Whether the [trial] court erred as a matter of law when it
determined a magisterial district justice had a substantial
basis to conclude that the affidavit of probable cause for a
storage unit warrant contained sufficient facts amounting
to probable cause when any finding of probable cause
required ignoring or changing an explicit date contained in
the warrant’s affidavit?
Appellant’s Brief at viii.
Appellant presents three arguments in support of his claim of error.
First, he contends “the affidavit of probable cause for the [March 21, 2014]
warrant at issue [did] not provide probable cause to believe, at the time of
its issuance, that contraband would be located at [his] storage unit . . . .”
Id. at 18. Appellant observes “the only allegation of any sales being made
to a specific informant” was two years old. Id. at 15. Further, the face of
the March 21, 2014 affidavit of probable cause indicated that the canine
sweep occurred in March 2013, which was (1) “prior to when Appellant was
even the lessee of the unit[,]” (2) “without any suspicion related to the
storage unit itself or a connection to Appellant[,]” and (3) “one year prior to
the application and issuance of the search warrant.” Id. The remaining
allegations from February and March 2014, he notes, consisted of general
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reports that he was selling drugs, regularly visited the storage unit, and was
the lessee of the unit. Id. at 16-17. Thus, Appellant claims the allegations
were stale and did “not provide specific information regarding the presence
of contraband at the storage at the time the warrant was issued.” Id. at 16.
Second, Appellant contends there was “no specific factual support
contained within the affidavit’s four corners to conclude exactly when or if a
canine sweep was conducted at any time other than was explicitly and
specifically represented in the affidavit of probable cause.” Id. at 20. He
emphasizes that the contents of the affidavit must be “sworn to before the
issuing authority” and taken as true. Id. at 19-20 (citing Pa.R.Crim.P.
203(B)). Therefore, he asserts an issuing authority—and implicitly, a
reviewing court—cannot be permitted to “edit the contents of an affidavit.”
Id. at 20. He further suggests that “permitting a magist[erial district
judge] to act as a rubber stamp for the Commonwealth by allowing [the
issuing authority] to ‘gloss over’ an affidavit’s contents and simply issue a
warrant would deny [a defendant’s] state and federal protections.” Id. at
20, 27. Appellant also distinguishes the case law regarding omissions and
mistakes cited by the trial court. Id. at 22-24. In so doing, he proposes
that a court may “fill gap(s) left by omitted information,” but cannot “edit or
change” the allegations to find probable cause. Id. at 24.
Third, in a single paragraph, Appellant states the search warrants for
his bank account and his mother’s residence were tainted by the illegality of
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the March 21st warrant. Id. at 27. He concludes that “the warrants
subsequently executed on [his] savings account and on his familial residence
were direct results of the seizures occurring from the storage unit search on
March 21, 2014.” Id.
The Commonwealth responds by citing the principle that “[a] search
warrant affidavit ‘is to be tested by the court with a common sense and a
realistic manner, and not subjected to overly technical interpretations; the
magistrate’s determination of probable cause is to be accorded great
deference on review.’” Commonwealth’s Brief at 9 (citations omitted).
Further, it notes this Court has held that “‘[t]he chronology established by
the affidavit of probable cause must be evaluated according to a common
sense determination.’” Id. (citations omitted). According to the
Commonwealth, “[c]ase law supports the [trial] court’s reasoning” and the
court properly interpreted the chronological indicators in the affidavit of
probable cause to conclude that “the K9 sweep took place on March 21,
2014” and “the indication that it occurred on March 21, 2013 reflects an
obvious typographical error.” Id. at 10 (citing Trial Ct. Op. at 11-12).
For the reasons that follow, we discern no error of law in the trial
court’s use of a common sense and realistic approach to conclude that
probable cause existed within the four corners of the challenged affidavit.
See Trial Ct. Op. at 11. Furthermore, the record supported the court’s
factual findings that the reference to “March 21, 2013” was a typographical
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error and the canine sweep occurred on March 21, 2014. We reject
Appellant’s suggestion that the requirement that the affiant swear to the
statements in the affidavit precludes a reviewing court from (1) discerning
the existence of a typographical error and (2) evaluating the circumstances
surrounding the error to determine an issue of fact material to probable
cause.
The following precepts govern our review:
Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to
the denial of a suppression motion is limited to
determining whether the suppression court’s factual
findings are supported by the record and whether
the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are
correct. . . . Where, as here, the appeal of the
determination of the suppression court turns on
allegations of legal error, the suppression court’s
legal conclusions are not binding on an appellate
court, whose duty it is to determine if the
suppression court properly applied the law to the
facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts
below are subject to our plenary review.
Commonwealth v. Hoppert, 39 A.3d 358, 361-62 (Pa. Super. 2012)
(citation omitted).
“Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the
affiant’s knowledge and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information
are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the
belief that a search should be conducted.” Id. at 362.
[A]ge of the information supporting a warrant application
is a factor in determining probable cause. If too old, the
information is stale, and probable cause may no longer
exist. Age alone, however, does not determine staleness.
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The determination of probable cause is not merely an
exercise in counting the days or even months between the
facts relied on and the issuance of the warrant. Rather,
we must also examine the nature of the crime and the
type of evidence.
Id. at 363 (citation and emphasis omitted).
As to Appellant’s initial staleness claim, the record reveals the
allegations from 2014 included a confidential informant’s report that “he/she
ha[d] knowledge of [Appellant], who is in the business of selling large
amounts of powder cocaine and Marijuana.” Aff. of Probable Cause,
3/21/14, at ¶ 5 (relating the report of “CI#2”). A citizen also reported that
Appellant “was making frequent trips” to his storage unit. Id. at ¶ 7. Police
obtained information that Appellant was the sole lessee of the unit since
August 2013 and last accessed the unit on March 20, 2014. Id. at ¶ 8.
However, the last reported observation of Appellant selling a controlled
substance dated back to September 2012. Id. at ¶ 3 (asserting “CI#1 knew
this information to be true because he/she had purchased cocaine from
[Appellant] as recently September 2012”).
Therefore, had the canine sweep occurred on March 21, 2013—five
months before Appellant leased the unit and one year before the application
for the search warrant—the logical connection between Appellant’s alleged
criminal conduct in 2014 and the possibility that his storage unit contained
evidence would be untenable. Accordingly, Appellant’s first argument—that
the information on the face of the affidavit was stale—has arguable merit.
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Further, the timing of the canine sweep constitutes an issue of fact material
to the question of probable cause.3
We thus turn to the crux of this appeal, namely, the trial court’s
determinations that the March 21, 2013 date was a typographical error and
the magisterial district judge could find probable cause notwithstanding that
error. As noted by the parties and the trial court, there is ample case law
holding that a warrant may be upheld notwithstanding (1) a magisterial
district judge’s typographical errors, see Commonwealth v. Swint, 389
A.2d 654, 656-57 (Pa. Super. 1978) (discussing error in the magisterial
district judge’s dating of the issuance of the warrant); Commonwealth v.
Chinea, 371 A.2d 944, 945-46 (Pa. Super. 1977) (same), (2) incorrect
addresses of the places to be searched, see Commonwealth v.
Washington, 858 A.2d 1255, 1247-48 (Pa. Super. 2004) (discussing error
in the affiant’s notation of the address of the premises to be searched);
Commonwealth v. Belenky, 777 A.2d 483, 487 (Pa. Super. 2001) (same),
or (3) omissions regarding the timeframe of the alleged criminal activity.
See Commonwealth v. Baker, 518 A.2d 802, 804 (Pa. 1986) (discussing
omissions regarding when an informant observed criminal activity);
Commonwealth v. Murphy, 916 A.2d 679, 685-86 (Pa. Super. 2007)
(same); Commonwealth v. Haggerty, 564 A.2d 1270, 1271 (Pa. Super.
3
Indeed, the Commonwealth does not argue that probable cause could be
found even if Detective Lombardo’s references to the canine sweep were
omitted.
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1989) (same); accord Commonwealth v. Ruey, 892 A.2d 802, 811, 815
(Pa. 2006) (applying “common-sense distinction between the absence of
probable cause and the mere lack of a full and complete articulation of the
same” to hold affiant’s omissions of references regarding the credibility and
reliability of EMS personnel and hospital at which the defendant was
admitted did not negate the magisterial district judge’s probable cause
determination).
However, as Appellant and the trial court recognized, the above-cited
cases involved (1) “technical” errors that did not affect the issuing
authority’s determination of probable cause, (2) omissions resolved upon the
presumption that the underlying allegations of criminal activity were recent,
and (3) errors that were cured by other allegations in the affidavit of
probable cause. Those differences, however, do not give rise to a
meaningful legal distinction in light of the guiding principles governing a
probable cause determination.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Commonwealth v. Gray, 503
A.2d 921 (Pa. 1985), adopted the “more practical” test for probable cause
set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
213 (1983). See Gray, 503 A.2d at 925-26 (discussing Gates, Spinelli v.
United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108(1964)). Recognizing that probable cause is based on “the factual and
practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent
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men, not legal technicians, act,” both the United States and the
Pennsylvania Supreme Courts have emphasized that “probable cause
determinations must be based on common sense non-technical analysis.”
See id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). Thus,
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a
practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the
circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him,
including the “veracity” and “basis of knowledge” of
persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found in a particular place. And the duty of a reviewing
court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a
“substantial basis for . . . conclud[ing] that probable cause
existed.”
Id. (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39).
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court recognized “the informal,
often hurried context in which [a test for probable cause] must be applied . .
. .” See Gates, 462 U.S. at 236.
[A]ffidavits are normally drafted by nonlawyers in the
midst and haste of a criminal investigation. Technical
requirements of elaborate specificity once exacted under
common law pleading have no proper place in this area.
Likewise, search and arrest warrants long have been
issued by persons who are neither lawyers nor judges, and
who certainly do not remain abreast of each judicial
refinement of the nature of probable cause.
Id. at 235 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Further,
after-the-fact scrutiny by courts of the sufficiency of an
affidavit should not take the form of de novo review. A
magistrate’s determination of probable cause should be
paid great deference by reviewing courts. A grudging or
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negative attitude by reviewing courts toward warrants[ ] is
inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment’s strong
preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant;
courts should not invalidate . . . warrant[s] by interpreting
affidavit[s] in a hypertechnical, rather than a
commonsense, manner.
Id. at 236 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Instantly, Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the affidavit of probable cause recited
the qualifications of the affiant, Detective Lombardo, and the general
practices of “[p]ossessors and sellers of illegal drugs.” Aff. of Probable
Cause, 3/21/14, at ¶¶ 1-2. However, Paragraphs 3 and 4 referred to the
report by CI#1 and the identification of Appellant in September of 2012. Id.
at ¶¶ 3-4. Notably, the reference to the canine sweep did not follow the
information obtained in September of 2012.
Paragraphs 5 and 6 referred to the reports by CI#2 and the
identification of Appellant in February 2014. Id. at ¶¶ 5-6. Paragraph 7
contained the a citizen’s report, in March of 2014, that Appellant made
numerous trips to the storage unit. Id. at ¶ 7. Paragraph 8 stated an
investigator spoke with the manager of the storage facility on March 21,
2014, and confirmed Appellant was the lessee of the storage unit since
August of 2013. Id. at ¶ 8.
Paragraph 9 was an anomaly. Similar to Paragraphs 1 and 2,
however, Paragraph introduced the magisterial district judge to a police
officer, Officer Billiter, and recited his qualifications to conduct a canine
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sweep. Id. at ¶ 9. Paragraph 9 also contained an extensive recitation of
the certifications Officer Billiter received between 2008 and 2012. Id.
In Paragraph 10, Detective Lombardo alleged that Officer Billiter and
his canine partner, Ruger, conducted a sweep around the storage unit. Id.
at ¶ 10. Paragraph 10 contained the language at issue in this appeal: “on
March 21, 2013, your Affiant requested Officer Billiter and his K9 partner
Ruger, of the Manheim Twp Police Department to conduct K9 sweep . . . .”
Id. That sweep occurred at 4:44 p.m., and Ruger alerted to the presence of
narcotics. Id.
Notably, the essential allegations regarding Appellant’s criminal
activity in Paragraphs 3 through 8 and 10 were set forth in chronological
order. See id. at ¶¶ 3-8, 10. Paragraph 10, however, was the only
paragraph containing an express reference to the time of day when an event
occurred. See id. at ¶ 10. Moreover, it was the final substantive paragraph
before the request for the warrant in Paragraph 11.
The trial court’s finding that Detective Lombardo’s statement the
canine sweep occurred on March 21, 2013, was a typographical error is thus
supported by an application of common sense. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 238;
Gray, 502 A.2d at 925-26. It is reasonable to believe the error escaped
detection by the detective, the reviewing assistant district attorney, and the
magisterial district judge, in light of chronological structure of the affidavit
and its placement on the last page of the affidavit immediately before the
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request for the warrant. Considering “the informal, often hurried context” of
the application process, we do not fault the parties for overlooking the error.
Cf. Gates, 462 U.S. at 236.
We also agree with the trial court that the affidavit of probable cause
contained sufficient chronological milestones to believe that the canine
sweep occurred immediately before Detective Lombardo applied for and
obtained the search warrant at 7:00 p.m., on March 21, 2014. The
allegations, as well as the indication that the sweep occurred at a specific
time, all suggest that the canine sweep was the final event before the
detective sought the search warrant. Indeed, it would defy common sense
to believe Detective Lombardo squandered police resources on a sweep of
the storage unit in March 2013, one year before the allegations Appellant
was visiting his storage unit frequently and the March 21, 2014 interview of
the facility’s manager that confirmed Appellant’s link to the specific unit.
Thus, we discern no abuse of discretion or error in the trial court’s
conclusions that the reference to “March 21, 2013” was a typographical error
and that the error did not invalidate the warrant. See Gates, 462 U.S. at
235-36, 238-39. The court was entitled to consider the totality of the
circumstances set forth in the affidavit of probable cause. See id. at 238-
39; Gray, 503 A.2d at 925. As the record supports the court’s findings of
fact and its conclusion that the issuing authority had a substantial basis
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reveals no error of law, we discern no basis to disturb the court’s
determinations. See Hoppert, 39 A.3d at 361-62.
As to Appellant’s remaining arguments, we find his reliance on the
“sworn to” requirements of the affidavit unpersuasive. Appellant’s
suggestion that the presumption that an affiant’s allegations must be
considered true to preclude a court from recognizing a typographical error is
hypertechnical. Moreover, it fails to accommodate for the practical
considerations that underlie the well-settled common sense approach. See
Gates, 462 U.S. at 235-36. Similarly, Appellant’s argument that the trial
court’s recognition of typographical errors diminishes the role of the issuing
authority as a neutral arbiter is belied by the precept that a reviewing court
should not take a grudging approach to warrants. See id. at 236. Indeed,
where, as here, the circumstances suggest the error was overlooked,
Appellant’s assertions that the issuing authority abdicated its proper role as
a neutral arbiter and acted solely as a “rubber stamp” are baseless.
Finally, because Appellant has not demonstrated that the March 21,
2014 search warrant was improperly issued, no relief is due on his claim that
the subsequent two warrants for his bank account and his mother’s
residence were tainted.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/1/2016
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