Commonwealth v. Yale , 2016 Pa. Super. 242 ( 2016 )

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2016 PA Super 242COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
EDWARD YALE
Appellant No. 3678 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence November 19, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-45-CR-0001540-2013
BEFORE: BOWES, J., OTT, J., and SOLANO, J.
OPINION BY OTT, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 10, 2016
Edward Yale appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed on
November 19, 2015, in the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County,
following his conviction by jury on the charges of third-degree murder and
tampering with evidence.1 He received an aggregate sentence of 20 – 40
years’ incarceration plus restitution and costs. In this timely appeal, Yale
raises six issues. The first three issues address different aspects of
testimony and jury instruction regarding the Commonwealth’s rebuttal
witness, Dr. Wayne Ross. In issues four and five, Yale claims the trial court
erred in allowing the Commonwealth to cross-examine defense witness,
Robert Vandercar, beyond the scope of direct examination and in allowing
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1
18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2502(c) and 4910(1), respectively.
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Commonwealth witness, Philip Barletto to testify as an expert in crime scene
reconstruction when he had not been qualified in that field. Finally, Yale
argues the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury on the crimes of
voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. After a thorough review of the
certified record, submissions by the parties and relevant law, we affirm.
The facts and history of this matter are quite complex and comprise
greater than 16 pages of the trial court’ Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion. We have
confirmed those facts and history as being supported by the certified record.
We distill that information provided by the trial court herein.
On March 22, 2001, Yale’s wife, Joan Yale, was found at the foot of the
staircase leading from the kitchen to the garage. Mrs. Yale had suffered
massive injuries to her head and chest, resulting in her death. Initially, the
medical examiner ruled Mrs. Yale had died from blunt force trauma, but
made no determination regarding the manner of death. Yale, an ex-police
chief of Upper Mount Bethel Township and former boxer, was not charged
with a crime.
Many years later, for reasons unexplained in the record, the state
police reexamined the evidence and asked Dr. Marianne Hamel, M.D., a
board certified forensic pathologist, to review the medical evidence. She
concluded that the trauma suffered by Mrs. Yale was not consistent with a
fall down the steps. Rather, she believed Mrs. Yale had, essentially, been
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“stomped” to death.2 Yale was subsequently charged with the murder of
Joan Yale, his second wife.
Consistent with the prosecution of a more than decade old murder,
both the prosecution and defense relied heavily on their respective medical
experts. All parties agreed the cause of death was blunt force trauma; it
was the manner of death, accidental or homicide, that was at issue. As
noted above, Dr. Hamel testified for the Commonwealth giving her opinion
that Mrs. Yale had been stomped to death. The defense called Dr. John J.
Shane, M.D., and Dr. Charles C. Catanese, M.D. Dr. Shane opined Mrs. Yale
died as a result of accident, specifically, from injuries suffered from falling
down the 11 steps to the basement/garage. Dr. Catanese also concluded
the manner of death was accidental, but that Mrs. Yale most likely stumbled
toward or at the foot of the staircase and her injuries were then caused by
pitching forward into a pile of firewood. On rebuttal, the Commonwealth
also presented the testimony of Dr. Wayne Ross, M.D. Dr. Ross opined Mrs.
Yale had been murdered. He testified she had been strangled and beaten.
He could not specifically state how she had been beaten, but could not rule
out having been stomped/kicked for at least some of the time.
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2
Dr. Hamel described the injuries as “stomping injuries.” See N.T. Trial
10/15/2015 at 105.
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Mrs. Yale was approximately 5’6” tall and weighed approximately 290
pounds. Although there were many objects on the staircase leading to the
garage, including a coffee can full of golf balls, an uncovered can of nails, a
pair of boots, and fire extinguisher box, they were largely undisturbed. A
single nail was found outside of the can. No trace elements such as blood or
fibers from Mrs. Yale’s red boiled-wool coat were found on the stairs.
Although Yale was in the home during the entire time in question, he
testified he did not hear his wife fall down the steps. Rather, he claimed
that approximately 20 minutes after she said she was leaving the house to
go to a hair appointment, he realized he had not heard the garage door
open. When he went to investigate, he found his wife at the foot of the
stairs. He further testified he tried to give aid, he rolled her onto her back,
but realized she had died. He then telephoned for help.
Yale’s first three claims all involve the testimony of the
Commonwealth’s rebuttal witness, Dr. Wayne Ross. Dr. Ross testified as to
the cause and manner of Mrs. Yale’s death. With regard to his first two
issues, Yale argues this evidence should have been introduced in the
Commonwealth’s case in chief. As such, Yale claims the trial court erred in
allowing Dr. Ross to give opinion testimony on the cause and manner of
death and then compounded the error by denying his request for mistrial.
In support of this claim, Yale cites Daddona v. Thind, 891 A.2d 786 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2006) which states in relevant part:
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“Rebuttal evidence” is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary (5th
ed.1979) as ‘[e]vidence given to explain, repel, counteract, or
disprove facts [as opposed to opinions] given in evidence by the
adverse party.’ ” Feingold v. Se. Pa. Transp. Authority, 339
Pa. Super. 15, 488 A.2d 284, 290 (1985), aff’d, 512 Pa. 567,
517 A.2d 1270 (1986). “A party cannot, as a matter of right,
offer in rebuttal evidence which is properly part of his case in
chief, but will be confined to matters requiring explanation and
to answering new matter introduced by his opponent.” Clark [v.
Hoerner], 525 A.2d [377] at 382-83. Indeed, as explained by
our Supreme Court:
It is an elementary proposition that the plaintiff must
prove during his case in chief all essential elements of his
action as to which he has the burden of proof, and that he
may not as a matter of right introduce evidence in rebuttal
which is properly part of his case in chief. The trial court
has discretion in excluding as rebuttal evidence that which
is properly part of the case in chief.
Downey v. Weston, 451 Pa. 259, 268-69, 301 A.2d 635, 641
[(1973)](emphasis added) (citations omitted). A trial court may
properly exclude evidence offered on rebuttal if it is cumulative
of evidence already presented. Estate of Hannis v. Ashland
State Gen. Hosp., 123 Pa.Cmwlth. 390, 554 A.2d 574 (1989).
Repetitive testimony is improper rebuttal. Kline v. Behrendt,
396 Pa.Super. 302, 578 A.2d 526 (1990).
Daddona, 891 A.2d at 813-14. 3
These cases provide no support for Yale’s argument. The
Commonwealth did produce testimony regarding the cause and manner of
death of Mrs. Yale in its case in chief. Dr. Hamel provided lengthy testimony
regarding her expert medical opinion that Mrs. Yale had been murdered and
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3
Additionally, Yale independently cited the quote from Clark v. Hoerner,
525 A.2d 377 (Pa. Super. 1987), found in Daddona, thereby emphasizing
that point.
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that the genesis of her injuries was not an accidental fall down the steps, but
was from being stomped to death.4
In his defense, Yale provided two experts who contradicted Dr.
Hamel’s conclusions regarding the manner of death and genesis of the blunt
force trauma. The doctors provided detailed testimony regarding how they
believed Mrs. Yale had suffered her fatal injuries. Although Drs. Catanese
and Shane held differing opinions on where Mrs. Yale had fallen, they both
agreed that the catastrophic injuries she suffered were the result of an
accident and not inflicted by another human. In rebuttal, Dr. Ross provided
his medical opinion on why Drs. Catanese and Shane were incorrect, which
opinion necessarily included addressing the very issues of manner of death
and genesis of the blunt force trauma. Dr. Ross primarily opined why the
injuries were unlikely to have been caused by the accidental means
described by the defense experts and, secondarily, the most likely method
by which the injuries occurred. This testimony allowed the jury to fully
consider and compare the opinions of the defense experts and the bases of
those opinions. Accordingly, there was nothing improper about the subject
of Dr. Ross’s testimony, nor the scope of that testimony. In light of this, we
find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Dr. Ross to testify
as to the cause and manner of death.
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4
Since there was no error in allowing Dr. Ross’s substantive testimony,
there was no error in the trial court’s denial of Yale’s request for mistrial.
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Yale’s third argument regarding Dr. Ross is a claim the trial court erred
in failing to give a limiting instruction to jury regarding the doctor’s rebuttal
testimony. Specifically, he wanted the trial court to instruct the jury as
follows:
You have heard the testimony of Dr. Wayne Ross, offered by the
Commonwealth in rebuttal. This testimony can only be offered
to explain, repel, contradict or disprove facts or opinions
submitted by the defense experts. You cannot consider his
testimony as evidence of Mr. Yale’s guilt or innocence; rather,
the Commonwealth must prove his guilt in its case in chief, that
is the evidence presented before the Defendant’s case. It would
be improper for you to consider this rebuttal evidence as proof of
the essential elements of the charges against Mr. Yale. See
Dadonna [sic] v. Thind, 891 A.2d 786, 813 (2006).
Appellant’s Brief at 18.
“[O]ur standard of review when considering the denial of jury
instructions is one of deference—an appellate court will reverse a court's
decision only when it abused its discretion or committed an error of law.”
Commonwealth v. Janda, 14 A.3d 147, 163 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation
omitted).
Initially, we note there is no suggested standard jury instruction
regarding the admission or use of rebuttal testimony. Our review of
Daddona, as well as prior relevant case law,5 also leads us to conclude
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5
See also, Downey v. Weston, 301 A.2d 635 (Pa. 1973), Potochnik v.
Pittsburgh Rys. Co., 108 A.2d 733 (Pa. 1954); Clark v. Hoerner, 525
A.2d 277 (Pa. Super. 1987).
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there is no absolute rule regarding the use and application of rebuttal
testimony.
Additionally, our Supreme Court has stated:
However, it is equally true that it is within the discretion of the
trial court to permit evidence, in rebuttal, which should have
been given in chief, provided only that the action of the trial
court in this regard is not arbitrary or capricious.
Potochnik v. Pittsburgh Rys. Co., 108 A.2d 733, 739 (Pa. 1954) (citation
omitted).
In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, the trial court explained:
The defense objection seems to center on the fact that Dr. Ross
not only suggested why the defense experts were wrong, but
that he had his own theory of how Joan Yale received her
extensive injuries. However, for the jury to understand why Dr.
Ross felt the defense explanations were wrong, they needed to
know his analysis of what did happen. It would not have been
proper to restrict him from giving his own opinion of the
causation of the injuries. His opinion was similar to that of Dr.
Hamel, but he did not narrow the cause down to strangulation
and stomping as she did. He opined that Joan Yale was
strangled, her head was struck by a log and/or her head was
taken and slammed down and scraped.[6] This testimony directly
contradicted the defense experts.
Trial Court Opinion at 22-23.7
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6
Dr. Ross also opined that several of Mrs. Yale’s injuries were consistent
with being stomped or kicked, as Dr. Hamel opined. See N.T. Trial,
10/21/2015, at 89, 96, 119-122.
7
Although this quote is taken from the section of the trial court opinion
addressing the jury charge, we note it is equally applicable to Yale’s first two
issues regarding Dr. Ross as well.
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The trial court’s admission of that portion of the rebuttal evidence
addressing the manner of death, even if it should have been admitted in the
case in chief, was neither arbitrary nor capricious. Potochnik, supra (trial
court action in allowing rebuttal testimony may not be arbitrary or
capricious). Therefore, the trial court’s charge regarding expert witnesses
was proper and the trial court did not err in refusing to give Yale’s proposed
charge limiting the use of rebuttal evidence. Accordingly, Yale is not entitled
to relief on this issue.
Next, Yale claims the trial court improperly allowed the Commonwealth
to cross-examine defense witness, Robert Vandercar, beyond the scope of
his direct examination. As provided by the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence, 8
in general, the scope of cross-examination is limited to the subject matter of
the direct examination and matters of credibility. However, the rule
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8
Specifically, Pa.R.E. 611(b) states:
(b) Scope of Cross-Examination. Cross-examination of a
witness other than a party in a civil case should be limited to the
subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting
credibility, however, the court may, in the exercise of discretion,
permit inquiry into additional matters as if on direct examination.
A party witness in a civil case may be cross-examined by an
adverse party on any matter relevant to any issue in the case,
including credibility, unless the court, in the interests of justice,
limits the cross-examination with respect to matters not testified
to on direct examination.
Pa.R.E. 611(b)
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specifically notes the trial court retains the discretion to admit other inquiry
as it deems proper.
Vandercar testified on behalf of Yale that he had known Joan Yale for
approximately 45 years, Yale for four years, and had been their neighbor for
four years. He testified he had not heard the Yales arguing. In its Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a) opinion, the trial court characterized this testimony as leading “the
jury to believe that a person who was very familiar with Joan and Ed Yale
and their marriage was unaware of any marital strife.” Trial Court Opinion,
2/16/2016 at 27. Cross-examination by the Commonwealth attempted to
establish just how well he knew the family and the opportunities he had
actually had to overhear the Yales. The most significant aspect of the cross-
examination was eliciting the testimony that prior to her death, Joan Yale
had told Vandercar she was afraid her husband would kill her. Vandercar
had revealed this statement to Yale when Yale first approached him to
discuss the fact the police had reopened the investigation. Although a prior
panel of our Court had ruled the statement was inadmissible to show the
victim’s state of mind,9 the trial court allowed the statement into evidence to
show its effect on Yale.10 Additionally, the trial court gave a prompt limiting
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9
See Commonwealth v. Yale, 116 A.3d 697 (Pa. Super. 2014)
(unpublished memorandum).
10
Vandercar testified that after he told Yale what his wife said, Yale
“[S]macked himself in the forehead, and he said to me twice, This is a
setup. This is a setup.” N.T. Trial, 10/19/2015 at 80.
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instruction to the jury, explaining they could not consider the evidence for
the truth of the statement, but only for its effect on Yale during the course of
his conversation with Vandercar.
More importantly, the trial court found that through Vandercar’s direct
testimony, the defense sought to infer that a close friend of the Yales,
especially of Joan Yale, was unaware of any marital discord. We find that
Vandercar’s statement that Joan confided she was afraid of her husband
provided a stark contradiction of that inference. Accordingly, the statement
was both relevant and admissible. See Commonwealth v. Spenny, 128
A.3d 234, 251 (Pa. Super. 2015) (the law is clear that we may affirm the
trial court's decision on any proper basis).
Reading Vandercar’s testimony in toto, we find the cross-examination
of Vandercar was reasonably related to the subject matter and inferences
raised by the defense during the direct examination. Specifically, Joan Yale’s
statement to Vandercar was not offered to demonstrate her state of mind,
but to contradict the inference that Vandercar was unaware of any trouble
between the Yales, and to demonstrate Yale’s reaction to the statement. As
such, the trial court committed no error in allowing said cross-examination
to proceed.
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At trial, the Commonwealth offered Philip P. Barletto as an expert in
both blood spatter analysis and crime scene reconstruction.11 Yale’s
penultimate issue is a claim the trial court erred in accepting Barletto as an
expert in the field of crime scene reconstruction. At trial, Yale accepted
Barletto as an expert in blood spatter analysis, but challenged his
qualification as a crime scene reconstructionist. However, in his 1925(b)
statement, Yale claimed the trial court erred in accepting Barletto as an
expert in the field of blood “pattern” analysis, not crime scene
reconstruction. As such, the issue is arguably waived.
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11
The standard for expert qualification is well settled.
The qualification of a witness as an expert rests within the sound
discretion of the trial court, and the court's determination in this
regard will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. See
Commonwealth v. Serge, 837 A.2d 1255, 1260 (Pa. Super.
2003). As stated by this Court:
The standard for qualification of an expert witness is a
liberal one. The test to be applied when qualifying an
expert witness is whether the witness has any reasonable
pretension to specialized knowledge on the subject under
investigation. Commonwealth v. Wallace, 817 A.2d 485(Pa. Super. 2002).... A witness does not need formal
education on the subject matter of the testimony, and may
be qualified to render an expert opinion based on training
and experience. Id.Commonwealth v. Malseed, 847 A.2d 112, 114 (Pa. Super.
2004) (emphasis in original) (quoting Serge, supra.).Commonwealth v. Toritto, 67 A.3d 29, 37 (Pa. Super. 2013).
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Nonetheless, the trial court determined Barletto was qualified to testify
as a blood spatter expert. The trial court found Barletto had been qualified
as an expert in Pennsylvania courts in the fields of crimes scene processing,
fingerprint analysis, blood spatter analysis, and crime scene reconstruction.
Barletto spent 14 years in the forensic services unit of the Pennsylvania
State Police. He investigated more than 300 deaths and took a variety of
specialized classes, including crime scene reconstruction. The trial court
stated, “[Barletto] had a reasonable pretension to specialized knowledge on
this subject [blood spatter] due to his extensive experience and training.”
Opinion, at 31. The certified record reflects this reasoning is equally
applicable to Barletto’s qualifications as a crime scene reconstructionist.
Even if the issue had not been waived, the trial court committed no error in
accepting Barletto as an expert in either field.
Yale’s final issue is a claim the trial court erred in failing to charge the
jury on the crimes of voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. On this
issue, we rely on the able analysis of the Honorable Arthur L. Zulick, who
opined:
[Yale] requested a charge on voluntary and involuntary
manslaughter. Mr. Yale was charged with a single count of
criminal homicide in Count I of the information. The parties
agreed that the jury would be charged on first degree murder
and third degree murder. The Commonwealth objected to the
charge on voluntary manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter
because there was no evidence in the case suggesting that Joan
Yale’s killing was done in the heat of passion or in a grossly
negligent fashion. The defense request for the charge was
denied.
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The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently stated:
[d]efendants are generally entitled to instruction that they
have requested and that are supported by the evidence.
We have explained that the reason for this rule is that
“instructing the jury on legal principles that cannot
rationally be applied to the facts presented at trial may
confuse them and place obstacles in the path of a just
verdict.” A criminal defendant must, therefore, “establish
that the trial evidence would ‘reasonably support’ a verdict
based on the desired charge and may not claim
entitlement to an instruction that has no basis in the
evidence presented during trial.”
Commonwealth v. Hairston, 624 Pa. 143, 84 A.3d 657,
668 (Pa. 2014).
The issuance of lesser-included homicide offenses must be
“firmly grounded in logic and policy,” and cannot be justified “as
giving a jury discretion to dispense mercy.” Commonwealth v.
Williams, 415 A.2d 403, 404-05 (Pa. 1994). The Williams
court cautioned:
To instruct a jury on possible verdicts that are unsupported
by any evidence can serve only to pervert justice: Not only
may the jury be confused by what appear to be irrelevant
instructions, and thereby possibly reach a mistaken
verdict, but a conviction for the lesser offense may occur
out of discriminatory favor for the defendant or out of
animosity for the victim, or the jury might substitute its
own visceral reaction for the classification established by
the legislature.
Id.The elements of a voluntary manslaughter charge are as follows:
A person who kills an individual without lawful justification
commits voluntary manslaughter if at the time of the
killing he is acting under a sudden and intense passion
resulting from serious provocation by:
(1) the individual killed.
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18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2503.
The elements of an involuntary manslaughter charge are as
follows:
Involuntary manslaughter is defined as a killing that occurs
when, “as a direct result of the doing of an unlawful act in
a reckless or grossly negligent manner, or the doing of a
lawful act in a reckless or grossly negligent manner, [an
individual] causes the death of another person.”
18 Pa.C.S. § 2504(a).
Here there was no evidence of any sudden or intense passion
which incited Edward Yale to kill his wife. No one was present in
the basement that day before the EMT arrived, other than
Edward Yale and Joan Yale. The entire defense case was that
Edward Yale was watching television, not killing his wife in the
basement. There was not a scintilla of evidence of a serious
provocation made by Joan Yale to incite her murder. Likewise,
there was no evidence that she killed in a reckless or grossly
negligent fashion. The evidence that she was murdered
consisted of her injuries and the condition of the scene.
Trial Court Opinion at 24-25.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Yale’s requested jury
charges for voluntary and involuntary manslaughter.
In light of the foregoing, Edward Yale is not entitled to relief.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/10/2016
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