Commonwealth v. Waugaman , 2017 Pa. Super. 222 ( 2017 )

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2017 Pa. Super. 222
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
RICK ALAN WAUGAMAN,
Appellant No. 170 MDA 2017
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence November 30, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Union County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-60-CR-0000296-2015
BEFORE: OLSON, J., MOULTON, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
OPINION BY OLSON, J.: FILED JULY 13, 2017
Appellant, Rick Alan Waugaman, appeals from the judgment of
sentence entered on November 30, 2016, following his jury trial conviction
for escape, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5121. Upon review, we affirm.
The trial court summarized the facts of this case as follows:
On September 12, 2015, [Appellant] was incarcerated in the
Union County Prison. The [trial] court had granted him
work-release status. Prison officials released [Appellant] from
the work-release section of the prison to go to work on that date
at approximately 3:00 a.m. [Appellant] did not go to work.
Instead, [Appellant] went to his girlfriend’s house. He then
returned to the prison around 8:00 a.m. that same day. Later,
prison authorities revoked [Appellant’s] work-release status.
Trial Court Opinion, 2/17/2017, at 2 (unpaginated).
Procedurally, the case proceeded as follows:
[The Commonwealth charged Appellant with escape based upon
the same facts that supported his removal from work release
status.] On October 6, 2016, a jury convicted [Appellant] of
[e]scape[.] On November 30, 2016, [the trial] court sentenced
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[Appellant] [to] a period of incarceration in a state correctional
facility [to] not less than one year nor more than four years.
[Appellant] filed his [p]ost-[s]entence [m]otion on Monday[,]
December 12, 2016[.] [The trial] court denied [Appellant’s]
motion on that same day. [Appellant] filed his [n]otice of
[a]ppeal on January 12, 2017. [The trial] court ordered
[Appellant] to file a [s]tatement of [errors] [c]omplained of on
[a]ppeal. In his [s]tatement filed on February 2, 2017,
[Appellant] claimed [the trial] court erred when it denied his
[pretrial motion].
Id. at 1-2 (unpaginated). The trial court issued an opinion pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on February 17, 2017.
On appeal, Appellant presents the following issues for our review:
1. Did error occur in [the] denial of Appellant’s [o]mnibus [m]otion,
specifically where [the] prosecution for [e]scape was improper
as there was no showing that Appellant attempted to remove
himself from official detention?
2. Did error occur in [the] denial of Appellant’s [m]otion in [l]imine,
as his behavior was addressed by removal of work release
privileges, thus making prosecution in this matter a double
jeopardy violation?
Appellant’s Brief at 5.
In his first issue presented, Appellant contends that the trial court
abused its discretion by denying his omnibus pre-trial motion wherein he
challenged the Commonwealth’s ability to prove he intended to remove
himself from official detention, one of the required elements in establishing
escape.1 Id. at 8. Appellant claims that, “while not going to work, [he]
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1
We note that Appellant filed a pre-trial motion essentially challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence before the case went to trial. “It is clear that the
proper means for testing the finding that the Commonwealth has sufficient
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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maintained contact with both employer and prison[,] stated his intention to
return to jail[, and] followed through on his word, voluntarily coming back to
the Union County Prison.” Id. at 9. Appellant relies upon our 1991
decisions in Commonwealth v. Edwards, 595 A.2d 183 (Pa. Super. 1991)
and Commonwealth v. Hall, 585 A.2d 1117 (Pa. Super. 1991) for the
proposition that his actions did not constitute a substantial deviation from
his travel route necessary to prove escape. Id. at 8-9.
Our standard of review is well-settled:
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in
the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient
evidence to enable the fact–finder to find every element of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we
may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the
fact–finder. In addition, we note that the facts and
circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not
preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a
defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact–finder unless the
evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no
probability of fact may be drawn from the combined
circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of
proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt
by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in
applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and
all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the
finder of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
evidence to establish a prima facie case is to petition the trial court for a writ
of habeas corpus.” Commonwealth v. Morman, 541 A.2d 356, 357 (Pa.
Super. 1988). However, Appellant has maintained consistently that there
was not sufficient evidence to support his conviction. Hence, we will treat
his claim as a sufficiency challenge.
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the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part
or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Williams, 153 A.3d 372, 375 (Pa. Super. 2016).
“A person commits an offense if he unlawfully removes himself from
official detention or fails to return to official detention following temporary
leave granted for a specific purpose or limited period.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5121.
There is no dispute that “a prisoner's participation in a work release program
[constitutes] official detention.” Commonwealth v. Edwards, 595 A.2d
183, 184 (Pa. Super. 1991) (citation omitted). Prior interpretation of
Section 5121 requires a substantial deviation from official custody to support
a conviction. In Edwards, Edwards was late returning to prison from work
release twice, six minutes on one occasion and seven minutes another time,
and admitted to drinking alcohol on one occasion. Id. at 183. We also
examined Hall in Edwards. In Hall, when released from prison for work,
Hall stopped at his house with his girlfriend for an hour before proceeding to
his place of employment. Id. at 184. In examining the two cases, we
ultimately concluded, “the escape statute does not encompass a situation
where a prisoner does not substantially deviate from a prescribed travel
route, goes to work and returns to official custody as prescribed by his
work release program.” Id. (emphasis added).
In this case, the trial court determined:
[…Appellant’s] conduct [w]as clearly distinguishable from that of
Hall and Edwards. Here, [Appellant] never went to work, unlike
Hall and Edwards. He stayed at his girlfriend’s house, for some
time, and then left the house. He did not return to prison for
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about five hours. The amount of time during which [Appellant]
was not where he was supposed to be, five hours, far exceeds
the amount of time cited in both [Hall and Edwards].
Trial Court Opinion, 2/17/2017, at 2 (unpaginated).
Upon review, we conclude the Commonwealth presented sufficient
evidence of escape. Here, although Appellant maintained contact with his
work and the prison, he never went to work. N.T., 3/28/2016, at 5.
Moreover, Appellant also stipulated that after he left the prison, he went to
his girlfriend’s house for one hour, and left that location where his
whereabouts were unknown for approximately three hours. Id. at 6, 10.
We conclude that such actions constituted a substantial deviation from his
work-release program to establish the offense of escape. Moreover, the trial
court properly distinguished this case from Edwards and Hall. Accordingly,
Appellant’s first issue fails.
In his second issue presented, Appellant argues that he was
sanctioned for his “behavior by removal of work release privileges[, he] was
already punished for the same event[, and] this prosecution should be
barred” under the principle of double jeopardy. Appellant’s Brief at 10.
Appellant concedes, however, that there is “case law contrary to this
notion[.]” Id. Indeed, our Supreme Court has concluded that “prison
disciplinary action [] imposed for infractions of prison regulations within the
confines of the authorized administrative scheme, [] falls within the range of
predictable punishment under the original sentence and can be justified on
the basis of safe, orderly or efficient institutional administration, [and] it
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does not implicate the constitutional proscription against subsequent
criminal prosecution based upon double jeopardy.” Commonwealth v.
McGee, 744 A.2d 754, 759 (Pa. 2000). Here, the prison sanction of
removing Appellant from the work release program simply did not bar the
Commonwealth’s subsequent criminal prosecution for escape. As such,
Appellant’s second issue lacks merit.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/13/2017
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