Estate of Brumbaugh, J., Appeal of: McClintock, J. , 2017 Pa. Super. 287 ( 2017 )


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  • J-A18027-17
    
    2017 Pa. Super. 287
    IN RE: ESTATE OF JOHN BRUMBAUGH                IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    APPEAL OF: JUDY MCCLINTOCK
    No. 154 WDA 2017
    Appeal from the Order of December 21, 2016
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Bedford County
    Orphans' Court at No(s): 26 for 2016
    BEFORE: BOWES, J., LAZARUS, J., and OTT, J.
    OPINION BY LAZARUS, J.:                        FILED SEPTEMBER 6, 2017
    Judy McClintock appeals from the order entered in the Court of
    Common Pleas of Bedford County, Orphans’ Court Division, sustaining
    Appellee Marjorie Brumbaugh’s appeal from the Register of Wills.       Upon
    careful review, we affirm.
    John Brumbaugh (“Decedent”) died on November 7, 2015. At the time
    of his death, he resided with McClintock, with whom he had been
    romantically involved for over nine years.   Letters of Administration were
    issued to Decedent’s mother, Marjorie Brumbaugh, on November 12, 2015.
    On January 15, 2016, McClintock filed a petition before the Register of Wills
    seeking to probate a document dated March 22, 2015 and purporting to be a
    photocopy of Decedent’s last will and testament. McClintock claimed to have
    found the document in the Decedent’s zippered bank pouch, in which he
    J-A18027-17
    kept his important papers. Brumbaugh opposed the petition, but, on May 4,
    2016, the Register issued a decision admitting the document to probate as
    the Decedent’s will and revoking Brumbaugh’s Letters of Administration. In
    her decision, the Register stated as follows:
    The document produced by Ms. McClintock and purported to be
    the decedent’s Will was notarized by Dorothy E. Lykins, formerly
    Dorothy E. Hilton, a notary public in the state of Ohio. She also
    serves as the Clerk of Courts for the City of Franklin Municipal
    Court in Franklin, Ohio. Ms. Lykins confirmed the subject Will
    was signed by the decedent in front of her and the Will sought to
    be admitted to probate was in fact the one signed by the
    decedent. She also explained the circumstances involving his
    execution of the Will and the type of writing instrument he used.
    No handwriting expert testified before me on [McClintock’s]
    behalf so as to give an opinion contesting the Will or the
    decedent’s signature thereon.
    Per the document admitted into evidence, the testimony
    presented to me at the hearing, including the Affidavit of Ms.
    Lykins, and my telephone conversation with Ms. Lykins, it
    appears that such document is the decedent’s Last Will and
    Testament and was intended so to be.
    Decision of the Register of Wills, 5/4/16, at [2].
    Brumbaugh filed an appeal to the Orphans’ Court1 asserting that the
    Register improperly admitted the photocopy to probate, absent the requisite
    proof that the original had not been revoked and/or destroyed. Brumbaugh
    ____________________________________________
    1
    A hearing on appeal to the Orphans’ Court from a decision of the Register
    of Wills is de novo, unless the parties have agreed otherwise. See 20
    Pa.C.S.A. § 776; In re Estate of Luongo, 
    823 A.2d 942
    , 960 (Pa. Super.
    2003). In a hearing de novo, the Orphans' Court does not base its decision
    on the testimony offered before the Register, but hears all evidence that
    either party desires to present and makes its own credibility determinations.
    
    Luongo, supra
    .
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    argued that the Register improperly relied on an affidavit signed by the
    notary, despite her repeated objections to the admissibility of the statement.
    Brumbaugh also asserted that the Register’s decision was based, in part, on
    an improper ex parte conversation with the notary. Brumbaugh argued that
    the document was either forged or altered and that neither the proponent
    nor the Register permitted her to submit it to a document examiner for
    analysis prior to the Register rendering its decision.
    The Orphans’ Court held hearings in the matter on August 25, 2016
    and October 7, 2016, at which time it heard the testimony of, inter alia,
    McClintock, Lykins and Khody Detwiler, a document examiner.                  On
    December 21, 2016, in open court, the court rendered its decision,
    concluding that McClintock had failed to sustain her burden of proving that
    the original will was not revoked by the testator.       Specifically, the court
    found that McClintock failed to prove that the contents of the original will
    were substantially as appeared on the copy of the will presented for probate.
    Accordingly, the Orphans’ Court reversed the order of the Register and
    directed that the probate of the document in question be vacated.
    McClintock filed a timely appeal, in which she raises the following issue for
    our consideration:
    Did the Orphans’ Court below err in reversing the decision of the
    Register of Wills, which had admitted to probate the document at
    issue at the Last Will and Testament of John Edward Brumbaugh,
    on the basis it could not so qualify because of the photostatic
    nature of its non-notarial content, given the circumstances
    present?
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    Brief of Appellant, at 4.
    We begin by noting our scope and standard of review on appeal from a
    decree of the Orphans' Court adjudicating an appeal from probate:
    [T]he hearing judge determines the credibility of the witnesses.
    The record is to be reviewed in the light most favorable to
    appellee, and review is to be limited to determining whether the
    trial court’s findings of fact were based upon legally competent
    and sufficient evidence and whether there is an error of law or
    abuse of discretion. Only where it appears from a review of the
    record that there is no evidence to support the court’s findings or
    that there is a capricious disbelief of evidence may the court’s
    findings be set aside.
    In re Estate of Nalaschi, 
    90 A.3d 8
    , 11 (Pa. Super. 2014), quoting In re
    Bosley, 
    26 A.3d 1104
    , 1107 (Pa. Super. 2011) (internal citations omitted).
    Here, the document submitted for probate was not an original will, but
    a photocopy.2      Where a testator retains the custody and possession of his
    will and, after his death, the will cannot be found, a presumption arises that
    it was revoked or destroyed by the testator. In re Estate of Murray, 
    171 A.2d 171
    , 176 (Pa. 1961). In order to establish the existence of a lost will
    which was in the custody of the testator prior to his death, the proponent of
    the will must overcome the presumption that the testator destroyed or
    revoked the will. Burns v. Kabboul, 
    595 A.2d 1153
    , 1167 (Pa. Super.
    1991), citing In re Estate of Keiser, 
    560 A.2d 148
    , 151 (Pa. Super. 1989).
    In order to overcome the presumption and establish the existence of a lost
    ____________________________________________
    2
    The only portion of the document that was not photostatic in nature was
    the notarial act.
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    will, the proponent of the copy must prove that: (1) the testator duly and
    properly executed the original will; (2) the contents of the will were
    substantially as appears on the copy of the will presented for probate; and
    (3) when the testator died, the will remained undestroyed or revoked by
    him. In re Estate of Janosky, 
    827 A.2d 512
    , 519–20 (Pa. Super. 2003).
    The proponent’s evidence must be positive, clear and satisfactory.      In re
    Estate of 
    Murray, 171 A.2d at 176
    .
    Here, the Orphans’ Court concluded that McClintock failed to prove the
    second prong of the test, i.e., that the contents of the photocopied will were
    substantially the same as the original document.         In arriving at this
    conclusion, the court relied primarily on the testimony of two witnesses:
    Detwiler, the forensic document examiner, whose testimony the court found
    credible, and Lykins, the notary, whose testimony the court found not
    credible. A brief summary of these witnesses’ testimony is in order.
    Dorothy Lykins is a notary from Franklin, Ohio. Lykins’ husband, Jeff,
    is the owner/operator of a trucking company.      Decedent served as Jeff’s
    dispatcher, acquiring loads for him to haul. Although Lykins had never met
    Decedent prior to the execution of his will, she stated that she had
    previously notarized documents for him. Lykins testified that, on March 22,
    2015, Decedent called her husband’s cell phone and asked if Lykins could
    come to Zanesville, Ohio – approximately three hours away – to notarize his
    will. Lykins agreed and rode to Ohio with Jeff in his semi-truck. The couple
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    met Decedent at AK Steel in Zanesville, where Jeff was also picking up a
    load of steel.
    Lykins testified that she, Jeff and Decedent then drove to the parking
    lot of a nearby truck stop.   Lykins stated that, by that time, it was “late
    evening, early morning” and it was dark. N.T. Trial, 10/7/16, at 21. She
    testified that the Decedent “held up a document and indicated that that was
    his Will that he wanted me to [n]otarize for Judy.” 
    Id. at 22.
    She asked
    him for his driver’s license and he provided her with a state I.D.    Lykins
    indicated that she was familiar with Decedent’s signature because she
    deposited the checks with which Decedent paid her husband.       She stated
    that she notarized the document and took a photograph of it with her cell
    phone. Lykins testified that she did not actually see the Decedent write or
    sign the will, but that she had seen him strike out the misspelled name of
    Muskingum County and handwrite the correctly spelled name on the
    document. Lykins testified that she had provided a copy of the photograph
    she took of the executed will to McClintock’s counsel after Decedent’s death.
    However, she had since obtained a new phone and had lost access to the
    original picture.
    On     cross-examination,   Brumbaugh’s     counsel   raised    certain
    discrepancies between Lykins’ in-court testimony and the affidavit she had
    previously prepared for submission to the Register of Wills.         Notably,
    although Lykins had testified at trial that the only word she actually
    witnessed the Decedent hand-write on the will was the correction for
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    Muskingum County, her affidavit stated that Decedent “complet[ed] and
    sign[ed] the document in his own hand” and that “[i]mmediately prior to
    signing his name he wrote the name of Judy McClintock.”             Affidavit of
    Dorothy E. Lykins, 2/4/16.
    Khody Detwiler also testified.          Detwiler has been employed as a
    forensic document examiner since 2008. Based upon toner particles present
    on the document, Detwiler concluded that, while the notarial act contained
    on the document was original, “[t]he printed text in the body of the
    document as well as the signature of John Brumbaugh is a photocopy
    reproduction[.]” N.T. Trial, 8/25/16, at 59-60. Detwiler also concluded that
    the name “Judy McClintock” in the center portion of the document – that
    portion of the document that purports to dispose of “[a]ll other money and
    properties” belonging to the Decedent, see Purported Will, 3/22/15 – was
    also a photocopy reproduction and not original ink. See N.T. Trial, 8/25/16,
    at 61.    Detwiler noted an extraneous mark attached to the name “Judy
    McClintock,” as well as “trash marks”3 surrounding the name, which can only
    ____________________________________________
    3
    A “trash mark” or “artifact” results from repeated reproduction of a
    document. Detwiler testified as follows:
    [B]asically when you have artifacts on the document, it comes
    from the copying process when the document is copied over and
    over and over and over. Again, different machines, whether or
    not it’s scanned, sent in an E-mail, and then printed out, and
    then copied again.
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
    -7-
    J-A18027-17
    be found in that particular portion of the document. Detwiler testified that
    “if [the] document was all created at the same exact time, you would expect
    those trash marks to be everywhere else as well.”       
    Id. at 63.
      Detwiler
    concluded that “having this many artifacts around that particular portion,
    and nowhere else, I can’t eliminate the possibility that that didn’t come from
    a separate document, and was incorporated into this document.” 
    Id. at 65.
    In other words, Detwiler could not rule out that McClintock’s name had been
    cut and pasted into the document.
    Detwiler also noted peculiarities in the document’s layout.          In
    particular, Detwiler testified:
    [T]he thing that really really strikes me is the very last, almost
    full line of printed text, there’s a very large void at the end of
    the line. But then when you look right beneath it, the name
    Judy McClintock is indented almost an inch, and it’s also
    squeezed right up against the bottom of the last line.
    ...
    If you look at – for example the vertical spacing between each
    line, it’s fairly consistent as you go up the page.
    _______________________
    (Footnote Continued)
    If it’s faxed, you’re going to pick up marks. You’re going to pick
    up marks from the machine, whether or not there’s a mark on
    the drum, a mark on the glass. That they get put on the
    document, and then they get copied again over and over and
    over.
    The other thing that can create trash marks is if the document
    isn’t perfectly flat on the glass when you’re making a photocopy.
    N.T. Trial, 8/25/16, at 64.
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    But it’s not consistent here between the name Judy McClintock
    and the last full line. Now if you look at the left and right
    margins. Again, you see that the writer goes essentially the
    whole way from the left to the right. And every single sentence,
    except for the last one, they stop short. And then all of a
    sudden the Judy McClintock name, is indented almost an inch.
    And then it’s just the name squeezed in.
    
    Id. at 70,
    72.
    Detwiler further testified that the correction of the spelling of
    Muskingum County was also a photocopy reproduction and not originally
    written on the paper. Detwiler concluded this based on the fact that “there’s
    no bleed through on the back of the document which you would expect to
    find.     There’s no impressions or indentations here [under the word
    “Muskingum”], but you can feel them [w]here there is original writing.” N.T.
    Trial, 10/7/16, at 109.     Detwiler also noted toner deposits around the
    corrected word “Muskingum.” Detwiler concluded that he “[a]bsolutely” had
    questions about the validity of the document. N.T. Trial, 8/25/16, at 73.
    McClintock concedes that the will is a copy. However, she speculates
    that the Decedent, himself, “made a copy, either at the steel company site
    or at the convenience store, of the original document first shown at the steel
    site to [Lykins], and that he substituted the photocopy for the original as a
    less messy and clearer representation of his Will for her to notarize[.]” Brief
    of Appellant, at 8. McClintock argues that Detwiler, the document examiner,
    “did not testify that any ‘doctoring’ had in fact occurred in reproducing the
    document from the original.” 
    Id. at 11
    (emphasis in original).
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    McClintock asserts that this matter is controlled by our Supreme
    Court’s decision in Estate of Ervien, 
    233 A.2d 887
    (Pa. 1967). There, the
    decedent and her husband executed wills on the same day with virtually
    identical dispositive provisions.   Decedent’s husband predeceased her,
    leaving her his share of his family business, which in turn formed the bulk of
    decedent’s estate upon her own death. Prior to her death, and in the course
    of moving from her house to an apartment, decedent, who had weak
    eyesight and was extremely careless about her personal effects, had gone
    through her personal papers and disposed of a great deal of trash. Following
    her death, an unsigned copy of her will was located in an envelope also
    containing an unsigned copy of her husband’s will, her apartment lease, and
    other printed material given to her by her landlord.      The envelope was
    addressed to her brother-in-law, whose daughter and grandson were the
    beneficiaries of decedent’s will. The envelope was found in a desk drawer on
    which decedent’s brother-in-law had placed a lock to help decedent
    “preserve her things from her carelessness.”       
    Id. at 889
    (Roberts, J.,
    dissenting).
    Following the decedent’s death, the Register of Wills of Montgomery
    County refused to probate the unsigned copy of the decedent’s will. After a
    hearing de novo, the Orphans’ Court reversed and ordered that the
    - 10 -
    J-A18027-17
    document be admitted to probate.               The lower court’s reasoning was
    summarized by Justice Roberts in his dissent4 as follows:
    From the fact that no less than a year before her death
    [decedent] placed the unsigned copy of her will in the same
    envelope with a copy of her husband’s will and with her lease,
    the orphans’ court concluded that she deemed it of great value
    at that time.      Then the court proceeded to reason that
    [decedent] could hardly have considered the copy of her will to
    be of value if she had destroyed the original [a]nimo revocandi.
    In addition, the opinion of the court seems to suggest that
    [decedent’s] poor eyesight, carelessness and moving explain the
    absence of the will from her effects and that the source of her
    property[, i.e., her husband’s family business,] the situation in
    which she made her will[, i.e., at the same time as her husband
    and with virtually identical dispositive provisions,] and her
    relationship to [her brother-in-law] make it unlikely that she
    would have deliberately acted to prevent her estate from passing
    to [her brother-in-law’s] descendants.
    
    Id. The Supreme
    Court, without explication, affirmed the decision of the
    Orphans’ Court.
    McClintock analogizes the instant matter to Ervien, as she testified to
    having found the purported will with Decedent’s other valuable papers.
    McClintock asserts:
    The same question asked in Ervien should be asked in this case.
    If [Decedent] destroyed the original of his Will with the intent of
    revoking it, why would he have preserved the document at issue
    for more than 7½ months after its notarization until his death?
    Like the decedent in Ervien, he kept it together with other
    financial items in one contained enclosure which he carried with
    ____________________________________________
    4
    The majority’s brief opinion discusses neither the evidence adduced in the
    Orphans’ Court nor the applicable law. Rather, the Court simply noted its
    review of the record and concluded there was no abuse of discretion by the
    lower court. Accordingly, we rely on the facts recited in the dissent.
    - 11 -
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    him in going from location to location. In this case, unlike in
    Ervien, those other items were current by their very nature,
    i.e. his checkbook with blank checks and registers. Why should
    the document at issue be assigned any different character as to
    its nature?
    Brief of Appellant, at 21 (emphasis in original).
    This argument, however, misses the mark. In particular, it assumes
    that the Orphans’ Court found credible McClintock’s claim that she
    discovered the alleged will with Decedent’s other important documents.
    Indeed, the court found just the opposite:
    I understand that Ms. McClintock’s testimony that she found the
    will with the decedent’s other important documents is important
    evidence and I do consider that. But I do not find it to be
    especially credible given the other circumstances
    surrounding the will[.]
    N.T. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 12/21/16, at 12. Based upon
    the foregoing, it is apparent that the court did not, in fact, believe that
    McClintock discovered the photocopied document amongst the Decedent’s
    important papers, and, thus, the holding in Ervien garners McClintock no
    relief.
    McClintock also argues that the court erred in relying on document
    examiner Detwiler’s testimony to conclude that the document in question
    was doctored or fraudulently altered.          McClintock asserts that, in fact,
    Detwiler testified that his examination was “inconclusive” as to whether the
    document had been altered. This argument mischaracterizes both Detwiler’s
    testimony and the burden of proof applicable to McClintock in this matter.
    - 12 -
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    In order to probate a copy of a lost will, the proponent must overcome
    the presumption that the testator destroyed or revoked the will by positive,
    clear and satisfactory evidence. Estate of 
    Murray, supra
    . While Detwiler
    did testify that his examination of the document was inconclusive, it does
    not follow that the trial court committed error by relying on his testimony to
    conclude that the burden as to the second prong of that test – that the
    contents of Decedent’s will were substantially as appears on the copy of the
    will presented for probate – had not been met.            Detwiler testified that,
    because the document he examined was a photocopy, he could not
    conclusively determine the significance of the various anomalies within the
    document without examining the original.          See N.T. Trial, 8/25/16, at 92.
    In other words, by the very nature of the only available document, a
    definitive conclusion as to its authenticity was impossible.            However,
    Detwiler did point out numerous anomalies, such as isolated trash marks
    and toner particles, the presence of white-out, and the inconsistent spacing
    of Judy McClintock’s name, which raised serious questions as to the
    document’s authenticity. On this basis, the Orphans’ Court was well within
    its discretion to conclude that McClintock did not meet her heavy burden of
    proof.
    Finally, we briefly address McClintock’s argument regarding the
    testimony of Dorothy Lykins.       As noted above, the Orphans’ Court found
    Lykins to be an incredible witness.            McClintock challenges the court’s
    credibility assessment as follows:
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    As not only the Notary Public but also the Chief Clerk of the City
    of Franklin Municipal Court for the State of Ohio, Dorothy Lykins
    is an authority figure whose word/testimony is to be and should
    be respected. There is nothing in the record to indicate anything
    that would or could have biased or impeached her testimony on
    these key facts.      Therefore, even if her Affidavit was not
    completely in line with her testimony, that is of no significance
    whatsoever.
    Brief of Appellant, at 26.
    The notion that Lykins’ testimony is not to be questioned because of
    her status as a public official is both dangerous and absurd and, as such,
    may be dismissed out of hand. The testimony of an elected official in a court
    of law is entitled to no greater presumption of credibility than that of any
    other citizen; to suggest otherwise is to begin a journey down a slippery
    slope.
    In sum, the Orphans’ Court’s decision in this matter was based largely
    on credibility determinations which, based upon our review, are clearly
    supported in the record.      
    Nalaschi, supra
    .    Moreover, we can discern no
    error of law in the court’s conclusion that McClintock failed to establish by
    positive, clear and satisfactory evidence, 
    Murray, supra
    , that the contents
    of Decedent’s will were substantially as appeared on the photocopied
    document presented for probate. 
    Janosky, supra
    . Accordingly, we affirm
    the order of the Orphans’ Court.
    Order affirmed.
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    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 9/6/2017
    - 15 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Estate of Brumbaugh, J., Appeal of: McClintock, J. No. 154 WDA 2017

Citation Numbers: 170 A.3d 541, 2017 Pa. Super. 287, 2017 WL 3882435, 2017 Pa. Super. LEXIS 675

Judges: Bowes, Lazarus, Ott

Filed Date: 9/6/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/26/2024