Blucas, M. v. Agiovlasitis, P. ( 2018 )


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  • J-S03031-18
    
    2018 Pa. Super. 25
    MARC BLUCAS AND RYAN BLUCAS            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                        :
    :
    :
    PERRY AGIOVLASITIS                     :
    :
    Appellant            :   No. 2448 EDA 2017
    Appeal from the Order Entered June 29, 2017
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Civil Division at No(s):
    2012-10690
    BEFORE:    BENDER, P.J.E., PANELLA, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.
    OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                    FILED FEBRUARY 09, 2018
    Appellant Perry Agiovlasitis appeals from the Order entered in the Court
    of Common Pleas of Bucks County on June 29, 2017, at which time the trial
    court granted the Motion to Award Costs and Interest filed by Appellees Marc
    Blucas and Ryan Blucas and Ordered the Prothonotary to enter judgment in
    favor of Appellees and against Appellant in the principal amount of $8,550.00
    along with costs in the amount of $225.00, prejudgment interest in the
    amount of $2,191.18 and post-judgment interest at 6% per annum from
    November 4, 2016, until the date upon which the judgment is fully satisfied.
    Upon review, we vacate and reinstate the award of the arbitrators.
    The trial court aptly set forth the relevant factual and procedural
    background herein as follows:
    On December 20, 2012, Appellees [ ] filed a Complaint
    initiating a landlord-tenant dispute against Appellant. Complaint,
    p. 1. Appellees entered into a lease agreement with Appellant to
    ____________________________________
    * Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S03031-18
    lease the home located at 6630 Stump Road, Plumsteadville,
    Pennsylvania, from July 1, 2011, until June 30, 2012. Complaint,
    Exhibit A, lines 22-23. Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement,
    Appellees paid a security deposit and pet deposit equal in the
    amount of $10,000. Complaint, Exhibit A, line 44; Pet Addendum
    to Residential Lease, line 21. Appellees did not renew the lease at
    the end of the term and moved out of the home on June 30, 2012.
    Complaint, Exhibit B. Appellant did not return Appellees' security
    deposit. Complaint, Exhibit C. It is disputed whether Appellant
    neglected to provide a written list of damaged property within
    thirty days of the end of the lease term as required under the
    Lease Agreement. See Complaint, Exhibit A, lines 54-57; cf.
    Answer, Exhibit A.
    On February 12, 2013, Appellant filed an answer with new
    matter and counterclaim. Answer, p. 1. Appellant contended that
    Appellees damaged the leased premises and therefore breached
    the lease by failing to surrender the premises in substantially the
    same condition in which it was leased. Answer, Exhibit A.1
    The parties entered into arbitration[1] wherein Appellees' net
    award was $8,550 without mention of prejudgment interest or
    costs.2 See generally, Arbitration Award. Judgment was entered
    ____________________________________________
    1 Appellee's complaint sought damages in the amount of $10,000.00 along
    with prejudgment interest and “[s]uch other relief as the [c]ourt deems just
    and equitable.” See Complaint at ¶ 22. Thus, this was a compulsory
    arbitration pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7361(a) which provides as follows:
    (a)    General rule.—Except as provided in subsection (b), when
    prescribed by general rule or rule of court such civil matters
    or issues therein as shall be specified by rule shall first be
    submitted to and heard by a board of three members of the
    bar of the court.
    (b)    Limitations.—No matter shall be referred under subsection
    (a):
    (1) which involves title to real property; or
    (2) where the amount in controversy, exclusive of
    interest and costs, exceeds $50,000.
    42 Pa.C.S. § 7361(a), (b).
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    on November 4, 2016.[2] On November 14, 2016, Appellant wrote
    a check to Appellees in the amount of $8,550. Defendant's
    Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Costs and Prejudgment Interest,
    p. 1. The memo of the check stated that it was for "return of
    security deposit." Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for
    Costs and Prejudgment Interest, Exhibits 1 and 2.
    Appellees sought pre-judgment interest totaling $2,191.18,
    post-judgment interest at 6% per annum ($1.41/day from
    November 4, 2016), and costs in the amount of $225.00. Brief in
    Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Costs and Prejudgment Interest,
    pp. 2-3. The $225.00 was stipulated to by the parties. Stipulation.
    ____________________________________________
    2     The arbitrators’ award and notice pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1307 was
    entered on the docket on July 13, 2016. Specifically, the docket entry
    states:
    Arbitration award in favor of [Appellees] in the sum of
    $10,000 for [Appellant] on the counter claim [sic] in the
    sum of $1450.00. Net award to [Appellees] is $8550.00
    EO DIE, Notice of Entry of Award mailed on 07/13/2016.
    (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
    In addition, a docket entry for November 4, 2016, indicates “Judgment
    on Award entered in favor of [Appellees] & against [Appellant] in the sum of
    $8,500.00 Notice 236 sent on 11-4-2016.” (unnecessary capitalization
    omitted).
    In Stivers Temporary Personnel, Inc. v. Brown, 
    789 A.2d 292
    (Pa.Super. 2001), this Court noted:
    Upon entry of the compulsory arbitration award on the docket and
    appropriate notice, the award took the force and effect of a final
    judgment. This procedure differs substantially from statutory or
    common law arbitration, which provides that a party must petition
    the trial court to confirm the award thirty days or more following
    the date of the award. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 7313, 7342(b). As
    this case involves a compulsory arbitration award, neither party
    was required to praecipe the prothonotary to enter judgment on
    the award. See 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 7361(d).
    
    Id. at 294.
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    _____
    1Specifically, Appellant alleged that Appellees badly damaged the
    wood floors, upstairs carpeting, failed to clean the home, among
    other things.
    2 Appellees were awarded $10,000 and Appellant was awarded
    $1,450 for the counterclaim.
    Trial Court Opinion, filed 10/5/17, at 1-2.
    In his brief, Appellant presents the following issue for our review:
    Whether the lower court abused its discretion and/or
    committed a clear error of law by opening the judgment and
    modifying the arbitration award well outside the applicable time
    imposed by Pa. R.C.P. 1307(d).
    Brief for Appellant at 2. In support of this claim, Appellant posits that:
    [t]he order in question, with just a few words and some
    simple math, not only rendered the arbitration hearing and
    unappealed award in this case meaningless, but also, and more
    importantly, undermined the entire compulsory arbitration
    process and disregarded our well-established jurisprudence and
    expectations as they pertain to the finality of judgments.
    Without any appeal having been taken by either party within
    thirty (30) days after entry of the arbitration award on July 13,
    2016, [Appellant], in strict accordance with all applicable rules of
    civil procedure, properly entered the Judgment upon it nearly four
    months later on November 4, 2016. Except for the $10.41 that
    had accrued since entry of the Judgment on November 4, 2016,
    [Appellant] tendered full payment of the arbitration award
    ($8,550.00) on November 14, 2016. The lower court had no right
    or authority to open the Judgment nearly 7 months later and
    modify the arbitration award to give [Appellees] an award of pre-
    judgment interest that the arbitration panel might or might not
    ha[ve] already given them in the award entered July 13, 2016
    from which neither party sought ay relief within 30 days of its
    entry.
    Brief for Appellant at 6.
    Initially, we must consider whether the trial court had jurisdiction to
    consider Appellees’ Motion for Costs and Prejudgment Interest. In its Opinion
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    filed pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), the trial court recognizes that “[t]he
    motion at issue on appeal was filed beyond the thirty-day period to appeal.”
    Trial Court Opinion, filed 10/5/17, at 3 n. 4.       Nevertheless, without citation
    to any authority, the court opines that the arbitration panel could not make a
    ruling on prejudgment interest because such claim did not amount to a “claim
    for relief” pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1306.3 The court asserts it was, therefore,
    required to modify the arbitration award “with the compelling reason of
    respecting Appellees rights” in light of this Court’s and the Pennsylvania
    Supreme Court’s previous holdings that an award of prejudgment interest is
    a matter of right. 
    Id. at 4.
          In support of its decision, the trial court relies
    upon Thomas H. Ross, Inc. v. Seigfreid, 
    592 A.2d 1353
    (Pa.Super. 1991),
    wherein this Court held, inter alia, that the trial court did not have discretion
    to suspend prejudgment interest from the close of a nonjury trial through the
    ____________________________________________
    3   This rule provides:
    The board shall make an award promptly upon termination of the
    hearing. The award shall dispose of all claims for relief and shall
    be substantially in the form set forth in Rule 1312. If damages for
    delay are awarded under Rule 238, the amount shall be separately
    stated. The award shall be signed by the arbitrators or a majority
    of them. A dissenting vote without further comment may be noted
    thereon. The award shall be filed with the prothonotary
    immediately after it is signed.
    Pa.R.C.P. 1306.
    -5-
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    date of final judgment, even where the two-year delay in the entry of
    judgment was due to the court's own neglect in dealing with the case.
    In compulsory arbitration, the board of arbitrators conducts the
    hearing as a judge would conduct a trial without a jury, ruling on
    legal as well as factual matters. Conner v. DaimlerChrysler
    Corp., 
    820 A.2d 1266
    , 1269 (Pa.Super. 2003). Whether the harm
    sustained is capable of apportionment is a question of law.
    Capone v. Donovan, 332 Pa.Super. 185, 
    480 A.2d 1249
    , 1251
    (1984). Apportionment is a practical inquiry into the specific
    circumstances and depends on the unique context of each case.
    Glomb v. Glomb, 366 Pa.Super. 206, 
    530 A.2d 1362
    , 1365–66
    (1987) (en banc), appeal denied, 
    517 Pa. 623
    , 
    538 A.2d 876
          (1988). Allocation of liability among distinct causes is possible
    when the injured party suffers discrete harms or a reasonable
    basis exists to define the contribution of each cause to a single
    harm. 
    Id. at 1365.
    Once the trier of law's decision to apportion
    liability is made, the trier of fact then decides how to allocate the
    fault. Voyles v. Corwin, 295 Pa.Super. 126, 
    441 A.2d 381
    , 383
    (1982).
    Hairston v. Allen, 
    153 A.3d 999
    , 1002 (Pa.Super. 2016), reargument denied,
    (Feb. 22, 2017), appeal denied, 
    170 A.3d 1028
    (Pa. 2017).
    When a board of arbitrators issues its award and disposes of each claim
    before it, its decision is final unless and until it is appealed. Connor v.
    DaimlerChrysler Corp., 
    820 A.2d 1266
    , 1272 (Pa.Super. 2003). “If a party
    is dissatisfied with a compulsory arbitration award, he has the right to appeal
    for a trial de novo within thirty days. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7361(d); Pa.R.C.P.
    1308. If no appeal is filed within thirty days, the prothonotary, upon praecipe,
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    shall enter judgment on the arbitration award as rendered. See Pa.R.C.P.
    1307(c).” Hairston, supra at 1002.4
    In the instant case, the arbitration decision was rendered and entered
    on the docket and the proper notices were mailed on July 13, 2016. Appellees
    failed to file a petition with the Court of Common Pleas to vacate or modify
    the arbitrator’s award within thirty days of that award. In fact, there is no
    petition to vacate or modify the award in the certified record, for Appellees’
    Motion for Costs and Prejudgment Interest cannot be confused with a timely
    petition to vacate or modify the arbitration award pursuant. See Lowther v.
    Roxborough Memorial Hospital, 
    738 A.2d 480
    , 485 n. 3 (Pa.Super. 1999).
    In Stivers this Court addressed the issue of whether the trial court had
    jurisdiction to review the appellant's petition to vacate the arbitration award
    which was filed fifty-eight days after the prothonotary had entered the
    arbitration award on the docket and sent the required notice. 
    Stivers, 789 A.2d at 295
    . In doing so, we opined:
    In compulsory arbitration, once an award is issued, it is sent
    to the prothonotary for entry on the docket and publication to the
    parties. Pa.R.C.P. 1306; 1307; 1308(a); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7361(d)
    (stating “In the absence of appeal the judgment entered on
    the award of the arbitrators shall be enforced as any other
    judgment of the court.”). Here, the arbitrators forwarded the
    award to the prothonotary on November 20, 2000, for entry on
    ____________________________________________
    4 The Explanatory Comment accompanying Pa.R.C.P. 1307 stresses that “[i]f
    the award is unintelligible or ambiguous or unclear or subject to alternative
    interpretations, an aggrieved party can only appeal.” 
    Id., Explanatory Comment-1981
    at ¶ 9.
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    the docket, and the prothonotary notified the parties of the award
    on the same day. See Pa R.C.P. 1307.
    Once entered, a compulsory arbitration award may only be
    challenged by a timely appeal to the Court of Common Pleas for a
    trial de novo. Pa.R.C.P. 1308(a); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7361(d).
    Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1308(a) provides in pertinent
    part:
    (a) An appeal from an [arbitration] award shall be taken by
    (1) filing a notice of appeal in the form provided by Rule 1313
    with the prothonotary of the court in which the action is
    pending not later than thirty days after the day on which the
    prothonotary makes the notation on the docket that notice of
    the entry of the arbitration award has been provided as
    required by rule 1307(a)(3).
    Pa.R.C.P. 1308(a). This Court has stated:
    The procedure for taking an appeal from a compulsory
    arbitration award is clear. A party to a compulsory arbitration
    may take an appeal from the award by seeking a trial de novo
    in the Court of Common Pleas. 42 Pa.[C.S.] § 7361(d). Rule
    of Civil Procedure 1308(a) provides that an appeal from an
    arbitration award must be taken “not later than thirty
    days after the entry of the award on the docket....” The
    Explanatory Note to Pa.R.C.P. 1307 states:
    These Rules contemplate that the board will disperse
    after rendering the award, not to reconvene and not to
    hear any motions or applications to amend modify or
    change the award. If any party is dissatisfied with any
    aspect of the award, the sole remedy is an appeal for
    a trial de novo. (emphasis added)
    The rules provide only one exception to this procedure.
    Subsection (d) of Rule 1307 provides that the court of
    common pleas may mold an award where the record discloses
    obvious errors in either the mathematics or language of the
    award. The court's power to mold is specifically limited
    to correction of such patent errors and is the same as the
    power of a trial court to mold a jury verdict. Pa.R.C.P.
    1307(d). The rule is aimed at the corrections of formal
    errors that do not go to the substance and merits of
    the award.
    -8-
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    Lough [v. Spring, 
    556 A.2d 441
    , 442–43 (Pa.Super. 1989)],
    (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). Additionally,
    Timeliness of an appeal, whether it is an appeal to an
    appellate court or a de novo appeal in common pleas
    court, is a jurisdictional question. Where a statute fixes
    the time within which an appeal may be taken, the time
    may not be extended as a matter of indulgence or grace.
    Lee v. Guerin, 
    735 A.2d 1280
    , 1281 (Pa.Super.1999), appeal
    denied, 
    561 Pa. 659
    , 
    747 A.2d 901
    (1999).
    
    Id. at 295-97
    (some emphasis added; some citations omitted).
    As previously mentioned, the arbitrators’ award herein was entered on
    the docket and notices were given pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1307 on July 13,
    2016.      Neither party perfected an appeal for a trial de novo pursuant to
    Pa.R.C.P. 1308(a); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7361(d). To the contrary, on
    November 4, 2016, Appellant entered judgment on the award in favor of
    Appellees and against himself in the amount of $8,550.00 and ten days later
    tendered a check in that amount to Appellees as payment in full.
    Over five months later, on April 17, 2017, Appellees filed their Motion
    for Costs and Prejudgment Interest wherein they did not request that the trial
    court correct a typographical or mathematical error in the arbitration award;
    rather, they asked the trial court to award them prejudgment interest and
    costs.     In doing so, Appellees relied upon PNC Bank, N.A. v. Unknown
    Heirs, 
    929 A.2d 219
    , 227 n. 3 (Pa.Super. 2007) for the proposition that a trial
    court has the power to modify a judgment upon the proper application to the
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    court for amendment.       5   However, as stated above, Appellees’ filing of their
    untimely motion did not constitute compliance with the procedures applicable
    to the filing of an appeal from an arbitration award and the requested relief
    cannot be considered to be a “molding” thereof. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7361(d);
    Pa.R.C.P. 1307, 1308(a); 
    Stivers, 789 A.2d at 295
    -97.
    Although it involved review of a common law arbitration award, this
    Court’s prior decision in F.J. Busse Co., Inc. v. Sheila Zipporah, L.P., 
    879 A.2d 809
    (Pa.Super. 2005) is instructive herein. In that case, the appellee
    ____________________________________________
    5 We find the facts of PNC Bank, N.A. v. Unknown Heirs, which involved a
    mortgage foreclosure action, to be distinguishable from those presented
    herein. There, this Court found a trial court could modify an unappealed order
    within thirty days after its entry under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505 and had the
    authority to open a judgment by default under applicable Pennsylvania Rules
    of Civil Procedure. Specifically, we stated:
    it is well settled that “a court upon notice to the parties may
    modify or rescind any order within 30 days after its entry ... if no
    appeal from such an order has been taken or allowed.” 42
    Pa.C.S.A. § 5505. “Under section 5505, the trial court has broad
    discretion to modify or rescind an order, and this power may be
    exercised sua sponte or invoked pursuant to a party's motion for
    reconsideration.” Haines v. Jones, 
    830 A.2d 579
    , 584
    (Pa.Super.2003). “[T]he trial court may consider a motion for
    reconsideration only if the motion for reconsideration is filed
    within thirty days of the entry of the disputed order.” 
    Id. “The mere
    filing of a motion for reconsideration, however, is insufficient
    to toll the appeal period.” Valley Forge Center 
    Associates, 693 A.2d at 245
    . “If the trial court fails to grant reconsideration
    expressly within the prescribed 30 days, it loses the power to act
    upon both the [motion] and the original order.” 
    Id. Id. at
    226.
    - 10 -
    J-S03031-18
    filed a petition to modify the amount of an arbitrator’s award with the trial
    court to include an additional award of counsel fees and costs.6 The appellee
    contended that fees and expenses were mandatory under the Contractor
    Payment Act because he had been the substantially prevailing party in the
    action and the failure to award counsel fees pursuant thereto constituted a
    procedural irregularity by the arbitrators.
    The trial court agreed that the award of counsel fees and expenses was
    mandatory and entered an order directing the arbitrators to determine the
    amount of counsel fees due to the appellees. The trial court then stayed all
    proceedings pending an appeal wherein the appellant argued that the
    arbitrators' failure to award counsel fees did not constitute an irregularity
    under Pennsylvania law which would require the vacating or modification of
    the arbitration award. Instead, the appellant contended the arbitrators' failure
    to award counsel fees and expenses was merely an error of law on their part
    and, thus, did not form a basis for modifying the common law arbitration
    award. 
    Id. at 810-12.
    This Court agreed and in doing so reasoned as follows:
    [T]his claim is actually a contention that the arbitrators made an
    error of law by ignoring the relevant provision of the Contractor
    Payment Act. As set forth above, a common law arbitration award
    is not reviewable for an error of law. Therefore, regardless of
    whether the arbitrators committed an error of law, the arbitrator's
    award cannot be vacated on this basis.
    ____________________________________________
    6The timeliness of the petition was not discussed as part of the factual and
    procedural history.
    - 11 -
    J-S03031-18
    ***
    Here, although appellee claims that there was an irregularity in
    the process employed by the arbitrators, his allegations in fact
    assert that the arbitrators made an error of law by not awarding
    attorney's fees under the Contractor Payment Act. As we
    previously indicated, an error of law by the arbitrators is not a
    basis upon which a trial court, which is reviewing an arbitration
    decision, may modify that decision. Thus, . . . we conclude that
    the trial court in the present case abused its discretion in ordering
    modification of the arbitrator's decision. Accordingly, we must
    reverse the Order on appeal and reinstate the award of the
    arbitrators.
    
    Id. at 812
    (citations omitted).
    Presently, the panel of arbitrators made no specific findings of fact or
    conclusions of law; however, its award indicates it believed aspects of both
    parties’ arguments, as neither party received the entire amount of damages
    that it had requested. In addition, although claims for prejudgment interest
    and costs had been presented to the arbitrators, the arbitration award in favor
    of Appellees was unclear as to whether it included a portion of the security
    and pet deposits along with prejudgment interest and costs or was comprised
    of the security and pet deposits alone. Thus, in light of the foregoing, we
    conclude that because Appellee did not file a timely appeal from the
    arbitrator’s award, the trial court was without authority to revisit the issue of
    prejudgment interest.     See 
    Hairston, supra, at 1004
    . The arbitrators’
    decision was final and the subsequent judgment on the award was entered
    correctly and should not be disturbed. 
    Id. - 12
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    Accordingly, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider Appellees’
    Motion for Costs and Prejudgment Interest. Therefore, we reverse and vacate
    its June 29, 2017, Order, reinstate the arbitrator’s award entered on July 13,
    2016, and direct the parties to comply therewith.
    Order vacated. Arbitrator’s award reinstated. Jurisdiction relinquished.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 2/9/18
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