Commonwealth v. Coleman ( 2019 )

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2019 PA Super 54COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
v. :
:
BLAINE ELLIOT COLEMAN, :
:
Appellee : No. 1789 WDA 2017
Appeal from the Order November 14, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County
Criminal Division at No.: CP-43-CR-0000621-2017
BEFORE: STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., and NICHOLS, J.
OPINION BY DUBOW, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 22, 2019
The Commonwealth appeals from the November 14, 2017 Order entered
in the Mercer County Court of Common Pleas granting the Motion to Suppress
filed by Appellee, Blaine Elliot Coleman. After careful review, we conclude that
the court erred as a matter of law and, thus, reverse.
We glean the underlying facts from the suppression court’s November
14, 2017 Opinion, and our review of the evidence presented at the suppression
hearing. Briefly, on March 30, 2017, Farrell Police Department Detective
Sergeant Charles Rubano and his partner Officer Michael Murphy were
investigating a recent arson that had killed a woman. Suspecting Appellee’s
involvement, they went to Appellee’s mother’s home in Farrell, Pennsylvania.
They were armed and in plainclothes. After identifying themselves and asking
Appellee if he could talk, Appellee allowed the officers to come into the home.
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Inside, the officers told Appellee they wanted to speak with him at the
nearby police station, which was about 150 yards away. Appellee responded
that he would come down to the police station later when he could get a ride
because it was raining at the time. When the officers offered Appellee a ride,
Appellee agreed and grabbed his insulin kit.
Appellee entered the back seat of the officers’ unmarked car. The
officers did not frisk, handcuff, or restrain Appellee, and the car did not have
a cage inside. Detective Sergeant Rubano and Officer Murphy drove Appellee
to the police station.
After the two-minute drive, they arrived at the Farrell Police Station,
which also contains a regional lockup facility, and entered the garage through
a sally port. The three walked inside the building, past jail cells, and into an
interview room. The officers did not restrain Appellee and permitted him to
keep and use his overcoat, his hat, and his insulin kit, which contained
syringes and insulin. The officers informed Appellee he was free to leave at
any time.
The officers activated an audio/video recording system 1 and read
Appellee Miranda2 warnings. Appellee read the Miranda warnings but
declined the officers’ request to sign the waiver form. Detective Sergeant
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1 The Commonwealth offered into evidence, and the trial court admitted
without objection, the 24-minute recording.
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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Rubano then informed Appellee that he wanted to ask questions about the
arson. After about one minute, Appellee explained that he did not have
anything to say about the arson. Appellee explicitly, clearly, and
unequivocally said he did not want to talk to the police. See Trial Court
Opinion, 11/14/17, at 9, citing Commonwealth Exhibit 1 (video recording of
interview).
Detective Sergeant Rubano and Officer Murphy ignored Appellee’s
statement and continued speaking to Appellee.3 They explained to Appellee
that he was not in custody and he was free to leave at any time. The officers
then advised Appellee that he was a suspect, along with an individual named
Brandon Gilchrest. N.T., 10/4/17, at 5-6; Trial Court Opinion, 11/14/17, at
4.
The officers told Appellee that they wanted to show him some things “to
see if it change[d] [his] mind.” N.T., 10/4/17, at 25 (quoting Commonwealth
Exhibit 1 (video recording of interview)). They showed Appellee blown-up
pictures of the crime scene and the victim’s body. They told Appellee details
about evidence and information they had obtained about the arson and who
was involved. They showed Appellee video from a gas station showing
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3 In its Opinion, the trial court stated that, based on their reactions clearly
visible on the video recording, the officers “obviously understood that
[Appellee] was exercising his right to remain silent when they hesitated before
they decided to tell [Appellee] in effect that they would not ask him any
questions, but that they just wanted to show him what they had.” Trial Court
Opinion, 11/14/17, at 9.
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Appellee present in a vehicle where Appellee and his co-conspirators allegedly
obtained gasoline for the arson. The officers also told Appellee disturbing
details about the burnt corpse and emphasized that the victim’s children did
not have a mother. See N.T., 10/4/17, at 24-25, 34; Trial Court Opinion,
11/14/17, at 4.
Appellee initially denied his involvement after the officers explained their
version of the crime based on the evidence they had at the time. The officers
showed Appellee a photograph of Gilchrest at the gas station and explained
that, based on what they had heard, the officers believed Appellee had started
the fire. The officers told Appellee, “you know who did this, and whoever
comes in first, that is how the story will be told.” Trial Court Opinion,
11/14/17, at 5 (quoting Commonwealth Exhibit 1 (video recording of
interview)).
Appellee eventually “started to reveal names and information about a
vehicle and who the owner of the vehicle was and where that individual lived,
and eventually told the police that he pointed out the house that he thought
the alleged target lived in, and that Brandon Gilchrest lit the place up.” Id.(describing Commonwealth Exhibit 1 (video recording of interview)).
The officers gave Appellee some paper in case he wanted to make a
statement and then left the room for three minutes. While the officers were
not in the room, Appellee used his insulin kit and did not provide a written
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statement. Immediately after returning to the room, the officers arrested
Appellee.
The Commonwealth charged Appellee with Second-Degree Murder,
Aggravated Arson,4 and related offenses.
Appellee filed a Motion to Suppress his statements to police. On October
4, 2017, the court held a hearing on the Motion to Suppress at which Detective
Sergeant Rubano testified consistent with the above facts.5 See N.T.,
10/4/17, at 4-40.
On November 14, 2017, the court filed an Opinion and Order, with
formal findings of fact and conclusions of law, granting Appellee’s Motion to
Suppress. The court concluded that Appellee “clearly and unequivocally
invoked his right to remain silent after he was given his Miranda warnings at
the Farrell Police Station.” Trial Court Opinion, 11/14/17, at 7. The court
observed that the officers ignored Appellee’s invocation of his right to remain
silent in order to elicit incriminating statements. Id. at 7. Significantly, the
court also explicitly concluded that Appellee “was not subjected to custodial
interrogation.” Id. at 8.
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4 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(b) and 18 Pa.C.S. § 3301(a.1)(2), respectively.
5Detective Sergeant Rubano was the only witness to testify at the suppression
hearing.
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On December 1, 2017, the Commonwealth filed an interlocutory appeal
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311(d).6 Both the Commonwealth and the court
complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
The Commonwealth presents three issues for our review:
1. Whether Appellee’s right to remain silent was violated even
though he was not in custody or detained?
2. Whether a defendant’s rights under Miranda and its progeny
automatically execute upon Miranda warnings being read by
police officers, regardless of what the defendant’s status of
custody was at the time of questioning?
3. Whether Appellee’s Fifth Amendment rights self-execute
despite Appellee not being in custody or detention?
Commonwealth’s Brief at 4.
Our standard of review applicable to suppression determinations is well
settled. “When reviewing the grant of a suppression motion, we must
determine whether the record supports the trial court’s factual findings and
whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct.”
Commonwealth v. Ennels, 167 A.3d 716, 718 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation
and quotation marks omitted). “We may only consider evidence presented at
the suppression hearing.” Id.____________________________________________
6 Pa.R.A.P. 311(d) provides that “the Commonwealth may take an appeal as
of right from an order that does not end the entire case where the
Commonwealth certifies in the notice of appeal that the order will terminate
or substantially handicap the prosecution.”
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“In addition, because the defendant prevailed on this issue before the
suppression court, we consider only the defendant’s evidence and so much of
the Commonwealth’s evidence as remains uncontradicted when read in the
context of the record as a whole.” Id. at 718-19 (citation omitted). “We may
reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn from the facts are in error.” Id. at
719.
Importantly, “[o]nce a motion to suppress evidence has been filed, it is
the Commonwealth’s burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the challenged evidence was not obtained in violation of the defendant’s
rights.” Commonwealth v. Wallace, 42 A.3d 1040, 1047-1048 (Pa. Super.
2012) (en banc) (citation omitted); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(H).
The Fifth Amendment provides “no person ... shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself[.]” U.S. Const. amend. V. “This
prohibition not only permits an individual to refuse to testify against himself
when he is a defendant but also privileges him not to answer official questions
put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where
the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.”
Commonwealth v. Cooley, 118 A.3d 370, 375 (Pa. 2015) (citations and
quotation marks omitted).
“The United States Supreme Court has held that, before law
enforcement officers question an individual who has been [] taken into custody
or has been deprived of his freedom in any significant way, the officers must
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first warn the individual that he has the right to remain silent, that anything
he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the
presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be
appointed.” Commonwealth v. Yandamuri, 159 A.3d 503, 519-20 (Pa.
2017) (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478–79).
“However, these special procedural safeguards are required only where
a suspect is both taken into custody and subjected to interrogation.” Id. at
520 (citations omitted). See also Commonwealth v. Witmayer, 144 A.3d
939, 948 (Pa. Super. 2016) (“Our law is well settled that an individual is
entitled to Miranda warnings only when he is subject to a custodial
interrogation.”). “Statements not made in response to custodial interrogation
are classified as gratuitous and not subject to suppression for lack of Miranda
warnings.” Yandamuri, 159 A.3d at 520 (citation omitted).
The procedural safeguards of Miranda do not apply to police
interactions less intrusive than custodial detentions, such as investigatory
detentions and mere encounters. Commonwealth v. Smith, 172 A.3d 26,
31-32, 34 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2017). Importantly, administering Miranda
warnings does not automatically transform non-custodial questioning of a
defendant into an arrest or custodial detention. Yandamuri, 159 A.3d at 522.
In its first issue, the Commonwealth asserts the trial court erred as a
matter of law in concluding that the officers violated Appellee’s right to remain
silent because, as the court noted, Appellee was not in a custodial
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interrogation based on the totality of circumstances. See Commonwealth’s
Brief at 11-17, 21.
Assuming Appellee was not in a custodial interrogation under the
applicable standards governing Miranda, the procedural safeguards of
Miranda were not yet in force. See Smith, 172 A.3d at 31-32, 34 n.6
(distinguishing custodial detention from other less intrusive levels of police
interactions where Miranda does not apply, such as investigative detentions
and mere encounters).
The record amply supports the court’s factual finding that Appellee was
not in custody for Miranda purposes. Appellee voluntarily accompanied the
officers to the police station and kept his insulin kit the entire time. The
officers did not show, use, or threaten to use force. They did not transfer
Appellee against his will. They did not frisk or restrain Appellee. They were
armed, but dressed in plainclothes and drove an unmarked car. Finally, they
reminded Appellee that he was not under arrest and that he was free to leave
at any time.
Because he was essentially free to leave, chose not to leave, and
continued to listen and then speak with the officers, notwithstanding his initial
silence and invocation of his right to remain silent, Appellee’s statements were
“gratuitous” under Yandamuri. Appellee was free to remain silent the entire
time, but he voluntarily decided to change his mind at some point during the
interaction with the officers. Although the officers provided Miranda
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warnings, this did not automatically trigger Miranda protections or transform
the interaction into a custodial detention or an arrest. Yandamuri, 159 A.3d.
at 522.7,8
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the court erred as a matter of
law in suppressing Appellee’s March 30, 2017 pre-arrest statements to police.9
Order reversed. Case remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this Opinion. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
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7 This factor would be relevant under the totality of circumstances inquiry
about whether police have subjected a defendant to a custodial interrogation.
However, this factor is not significant to our analysis here since the parties
have not challenged the court’s finding that this was not a custodial
interrogation.
8 Seeming to recognize certain deficiencies in its analysis and the absence of
case law directly supporting its conclusions, the court attempted to rest its
findings on a freestanding pre-arrest right to remain silent apart from
Miranda. See Trial Court Opinion, 2/21/18, at 4 (citing, inter alia,
Commonwealth v. Cooley, 118 A.3d 370, 375 (Pa. 2015)). We have
reviewed the cited cases and conclude that they are either distinguishable or
not relevant because they involve custodial interrogations or address other
incomparable circumstances, such as commenting on pre-arrest silence.
9 In light of our resolution, we will not address the Commonwealth’s remaining
issues.
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Date: 2/22/2019
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