Deutsche Bank v. Tran, T. ( 2017 )


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  • J-S12044-17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST             :      IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    COMPANY, AS TRUSTEE FOR GSAMP            :            PENNSYLVANIA
    TRUST 2004-NC2, BY ITS ATTORNEY-         :
    IN-FACT, OCWEN LOAN SERVICING,           :
    LLC                                      :
    :
    v.                            :
    :
    TUYEN T. TRAN & SHELIA A. TRAN,          :
    :
    Appellants             :          No. 1348 MDA 2016
    Appeal from the Order entered July 19, 2016
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County,
    Civil Division, No(s): CI-03-04399
    BEFORE: PANELLA, OTT and MUSMANNO, JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.:                        FILED APRIL 19, 2017
    Tuyen T. Tran and Shelia A. Tran (“the Trans”) appeal from the Order
    granting summary judgment in favor of Deutsche Bank National Trust
    Company, as Trustee for GSAMP Trust 2004-NC2 (“Deutsche Bank”), by its
    attorney-in-fact, Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (“Ocwen”), in a mortgage
    foreclosure action with respect to real property located at 1705 Drummers
    Lane, Lancaster, Pennsylvania (“the Property”). We affirm.
    On June 29, 2004, the Trans entered into a home mortgage loan
    transaction with New Century Mortgage Corporation (“New Century”),
    wherein the Trans executed an Adjustable Rate Note (“the Note”) for
    $207,000, plus interest. The Note provides for initial monthly payments of
    $1,370.24, to commence on September 1, 2004, and an initial interest rate
    J-S12044-17
    of 6.95% per annum. The Note also specifies a “maturity date” of August 1,
    2034, at which time any outstanding balance shall be paid in full. On the
    same date, the Trans executed a mortgage on the Property to secure the
    Note, which was recorded in the Lancaster County Recorder of Deeds Office
    on August 5, 2004 (the Note and mortgage will hereinafter be collectively
    referred to as “the Mortgage”).
    On November 9, 2007, the Trans executed a Modification Agreement
    for the remaining $202,716.52 balance on the Mortgage with Deutsche Bank
    National Trust Company, as Trustee for GSAMP Trust 2004-NC2, Pooling and
    Servicing Agreement dated as of October 1, 2004 (“Deutsche Pooling and
    Servicing”). The Modification Agreement provides for monthly payments of
    $1,465.28, and an interest rate of 7.5% per annum.
    New Century assigned the Mortgage to Deutsche Pooling and Servicing
    on May 8, 2012, and the assignment was recorded on June 15, 2012.1
    On October 1, 2012, the Trans defaulted on the Mortgage by failing to
    make their monthly payment.       The Trans failed to make any subsequent
    monthly payments. On February 1, 2013, the Trans were provided an Act 6
    and Act 91 Combined Notice,2 which included a notice of default, and notice
    of intention to foreclose.
    1
    The assignment was executed by New Century, through Ocwen as its
    attorney-in-fact, and indicates that Ocwen’s power of attorney was recorded
    on September 6, 2005.
    2
    See 41 P.S. §§ 101-605; 35 P.S. §§ 1680.401(c)-1680.410(c).
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    J-S12044-17
    Deutsche Pooling and Servicing assigned the Mortgage to Deutsche
    Bank on March 19, 2013, and the assignment was recorded on April 12,
    2013.
    Deutsche Bank filed a Complaint in mortgage foreclosure on May 9,
    2013, appending thereto the Mortgage and accompanying riders, and the Act
    6 and Act 91 Combined Notice. The Trans, pro se, filed an Answer on May
    18, 2013, which consisted primarily of general denials (they admitted only
    their identities).
    On February 18, 2015, the Trans, through counsel, filed a Petition for
    Leave to Amend Answer, and a brief in support thereof. On February 19,
    2015, the trial court issued a Rule to Show Cause, instructing Deutsche Bank
    to file an answer to the Trans’ Petition for Leave to Amend within 20 days,
    and stating that “[d]iscovery shall be completed within forty-five (45) days
    of service of the [a]nswer.” Deutsche Bank did not respond, and on May 11,
    2015, the trial court entered an Order instructing the Trans to file their
    Amended Answer and New Matter within 20 days.
    On May 13, 2015, the Trans filed an Amended Answer and New
    Matter, alleging that Ocwen does not possess a valid power of attorney; the
    assignment of the Mortgage to Deutsche Bank is invalid; and an unrelated
    federal lawsuit against Ocwen, and the resulting Consent Judgment, gives
    rise to the inference that the individual who verified the Complaint in this
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    case did not have personal knowledge of the allegations.          Deutsche Bank
    filed a Reply on July 16, 2015.
    On July 21, 2015, Deutsche Bank filed a Motion for Summary
    Judgment, alleging that there were no genuine issues of material fact
    regarding the Trans’ default on mortgage payments, the assignments of the
    Mortgage, or Deutsche Bank’s entitlement to enforce the Mortgage.             The
    Trans filed a brief in response, and requested oral argument. On February
    3, 2016, following oral argument, the trial court entered an Order granting
    the   parties   90   days   to   complete   additional   discovery,   and   submit
    supplemental briefs and exhibits. Neither party filed any additional briefs or
    exhibits.   On July 19, 2016, the trial court granted summary judgment in
    favor of Deutsche Bank, and awarded Deutsche Bank an in rem judgment
    against the Trans in the amount of $273,818.51, together with interest,
    costs and charges collectible.
    The Trans filed a timely Notice of Appeal and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P.
    1925(b) Concise Statement of matters complained of on appeal.
    On appeal, the Trans raise the following questions for review:
    1. Does [Deutsche Bank’s] failure to respond to factual
    allegations in [the Trans’] New Matter create genuine issues of
    material fact precluding the grant[] of summary judgment?
    2. Are there genuine issues of material fact as to whether
    [Deutsche Bank] is the real party in interest as assignee of the
    original [M]ortgage?
    Brief for Appellants at 5 (issues renumbered).
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    Our standard of review of an order granting a motion for summary
    judgment is well-settled:
    We view the record in the light most favorable to the non-
    moving party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine
    issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party.
    Only where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
    it is clear that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
    matter of law will summary judgment be entered. Our scope of
    review of a trial court’s order granting or denying summary
    judgment is plenary, and our standard of review is clear: the
    trial court’s order will be reversed only where it is established
    that the court committed an error of law or abused its discretion.
    Daley v. A.W. Chesterton, Inc., 
    37 A.3d 1175
    , 1179 (Pa. 2012) (citation
    omitted). Further, in mortgage foreclosure proceedings, “[t]he holder of a
    mortgage is entitled to summary judgment if the mortgagor admits that the
    mortgage is in default, the mortgagor has failed to pay on the obligation,
    and the recorded mortgage is in the specified amount.” Bank of America,
    N.A. v. Gibson, 
    102 A.3d 462
    , 465 (Pa. Super. 2014).
    In their first claim, the Trans argue that they raised an affirmative
    defense in the New Matter regarding ownership of the Mortgage. Brief for
    Appellants at 14. The Trans state that they attached a Notice to Plead to
    their Amended Answer and New Matter.      
    Id. at 13.
      The Trans claim that
    Deutsche Bank’s Reply was untimely, and therefore, the factual allegations
    contained in the New Matter are admitted as a matter of law. 
    Id. at 13-14.
    The Trans contend that “[b]y virtue of these admissions, [Deutsche Bank]
    cannot prove that it possesses an ownership interest in the [M]ortgage to
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    maintain its Complaint[,] and its request for summary judgment must be
    denied.” 
    Id. Pennsylvania Rule
    of Civil Procedure 1026 provides that “every
    pleading subsequent to the complaint shall be filed within twenty days after
    service of the preceding pleading, but no pleading need be filed unless the
    preceding pleading contains a notice to defend or is endorsed with a notice
    to plead.” Pa.R.C.P. 1026; see also Louis v. Clark, 
    323 A.2d 298
    , 299 (Pa.
    Super. 1974) (stating that “[s]ince the reply is a pleading, it should be filed
    (assuming there is an endorsement giving notice to plead) within twenty
    days after service of the answer raising the new matter.”). However, “it is
    within the sound discretion of the court to permit a late pleading to be filed
    where the opposing party will not be prejudiced and justice so requires.”
    
    Clark, 323 A.2d at 299-300
    ; see also Pa.R.C.P. 126 (providing that “[t]he
    court at every stage of any such action or proceeding may disregard any
    error or defect of procedure which does not affect the substantial rights of
    the parties.”).
    Here, the Trans filed their Amended Answer and New Matter on May
    13, 2015.    Deutsche Bank filed its Reply on July 16, 2015, beyond the
    twenty-day deadline established by Rule 1026.
    Because the Trans did not file a motion with the trial court to obtain
    judgment against Deutsche Bank, the trial court deemed this issue waived.
    See Trial Court Opinion, 10/7/16, at 4.      Notwithstanding, the trial court
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    considered the Trans’ first claim, and concluded that “nothing suggests that
    the substantial rights of either party were affected by allowing [Deutsche
    Bank’s] late [R]eply….   [The Trans] were not prejudiced by this untimely
    filing and have made no claim that they were.” 
    Id. at 3;
    see also 
    id. n.1 (stating
    that the Trans “appear willing to overlook the fact that their
    [A]mended [A]nswer and [N]ew [M]atter was filed after the passage of a
    much longer period of time.”). Additionally, the trial court concluded that no
    response was necessary because the Trans failed to set forth facts to
    support an affirmative defense, and instead, stated conclusions of law
    relating to a lawsuit filed against Ocwen in federal court.    See 
    id. at 3-4;
    see also Gotwalt v. Dellinger, 
    577 A.2d 623
    , 626 (Pa. Super. 1990)
    (stating that “[i]f a party’s new matter does not contain facts supporting an
    affirmative defense, but rather contains merely conclusions of law, no denial
    is required because such averments are deemed to be denied.”); Pa.R.C.P.
    1029(d) (providing that “[a]verments in a pleading to which no responsive
    pleading is required shall be deemed to be denied.”).         Upon review, we
    discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s determination that
    Deutsche Bank’s untimely Reply did not result in admissions of fact such that
    would create genuine issues of material fact, thereby precluding the entry of
    summary judgment. Accordingly, the Trans’ first claim is without merit.
    In their second claim, the Trans assert that Deutsche Bank has not
    proven it is the valid assignee of the original Mortgage. Brief for Appellants
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    at 11. The Trans claim that New Century’s assignment to Deutsche Pooling
    and Servicing was recorded by Ocwen in 2012 as New Century’s agent. 
    Id. The Trans
    also state that New Century filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in
    2007, and accordingly, New Century’s assets were under the jurisdiction of
    the bankruptcy court at the time of the purported assignment. 
    Id. at 11-12.
    The Trans argue that “[t]here are no documents in New Century’s
    bankruptcy case which permitted New Century … to alienate any of its
    property. As such, there was simply no authority for Ocwen as agent under
    power of attorney for New Century to [] assign the [M]ortgage during the
    pendency of the bankruptcy.”       
    Id. at 12.
       The Trans contend, in the
    alternative, that they entered into a Modification Agreement with another
    entity in 2007. 
    Id. at 12-13.
    While the Trans concede they are unable to
    prove that the Modification Agreement resulted in a valid assignment, “as no
    documentation has ever been provided that would show such[,]” they assert
    that the Modification Agreement could create an inference that the Mortgage
    had been assigned prior to 2012. 
    Id. at 13.
    3
    The Trans’ second claim challenges Deutsche Bank’s standing to bring
    the foreclosure action.    In a foreclosure action, the plaintiff can prove
    standing either by showing that it (1) originated or was assigned the
    mortgage, or (2) is the holder of the note specially indorsed to it or indorsed
    3
    We note that the Trans’ discussion of this claim includes only one citation
    to authority.   See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (requiring that each point in an
    argument contain “such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed
    pertinent.”). Nevertheless, we will consider the Trans’ claim.
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    J-S12044-17
    in blank. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Murray, 
    63 A.3d 1258
    , 1267-
    68, 1268 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2013); see also CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Barbezat,
    
    131 A.3d 65
    , 69 (Pa. Super. 2016) (stating that “[w]here an assignment is
    effective, the assignee stands in the shoes of the assignor and assumes all
    of his rights.”).
    Here, the Trans admit their identity and their execution of the
    Mortgage in 2004 to secure the $207,000 loan. See Amended Answer and
    New Matter, 5/13/15, at ¶¶ 2, 3. Paragraph 7 of the Complaint alleges that
    the Mortgage is in default “as a result of the failure to pay the monthly
    installments … due on October 1, 2012 and on the same day of each month
    thereafter[,]” and Paragraph 8 details, by line item, the total due on the
    Mortgage. Complaint, 5/9/13, ¶¶ 7, 8. The Trans denied both allegations as
    conclusions of law. See Amended Answer and New Matter, 5/13/15, ¶¶ 7,
    8. But see Brief for Appellants at 10 (wherein the Trans admit that “they
    have not made a mortgage payment for a long time.”). As to Paragraph 8,
    the Trans also indicated that “there is insufficient detail to determine the
    various line items of alleged sums due.” Amended Answer and New Matter,
    5/13/165 ¶ 8; see also Pa.R.C.P. 1029(c) Note (stating that “[r]eliance on
    subdivision (c) does not excuse a failure to admit or deny a factual allegation
    when it is clear that the pleader must know whether a particular allegation is
    true or false.”); 
    Gibson, 102 A.3d at 467
    (stating that “general denials by
    mortgagors that they are without information sufficient to form a belief as to
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    the truth of averments as to the principal and interest owing on the
    mortgage must be considered an admission of those facts.”) (citation,
    quotation marks, and brackets omitted). Further, the Trans admit that the
    assignment from New Century to Deutsche Pooling and Servicing, and the
    subsequent assignment from Deutsche Pooling and Servicing to Deutsche
    Bank, exist in the Lancaster County Recorder of Deeds Office. See Amended
    Answer and New Matter, 5/13/15, ¶ 4.
    Deutsche Bank attached to its Motion for Summary Judgment a copy
    of both assignments identified in the Complaint. See Motion for Summary
    Judgment, Exhibit 2A. Deutsche Bank also attached to its Brief in Support of
    Summary Judgment copies of the relevant limited powers of attorney
    appointing Ocwen as Deutsche Bank’s attorney-in-fact (the first became
    effective as of June 7, 2012, and the second became effective as of
    November 18, 2013).       See Brief in Support of Motion for Summary
    Judgment, Exhibit 10.   Each limited power of attorney identifies Deutsche
    Bank as Trustee for various trusts, including GSAMP Trust 2004-NC2, and
    grants Ocwen authority to pursue mortgage foreclosures on its behalf. See
    
    id. In its
    Opinion, the trial court concluded that the Trans’ admission
    regarding the assignments from New Century to Deutsche Pooling and
    Servicing, and from Deutsche Pooling and Servicing to Deutsche Bank,
    conferred prima facie standing on Deutsche Bank as a party in interest. See
    - 10 -
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    Trial Court Opinion, 8/7/16, at 5. Regarding the Trans’ alternative argument
    that the Modification Agreement alienated New Century’s interest in the
    Mortgage, the trial court concluded that even if New Century had alienated
    its interest in the Mortgage, it had done so in favor of Deutsche Bank. See
    
    id. at 6;
    see also 
    id. (stating that
    the Trans acknowledged Deutsche Bank’s
    interest in the Mortgage by signing the Modification Agreement). The trial
    court also concluded that “the mere existence of the bankruptcy filing does
    not create a genuine issue of material fact.”). 
    Id. at 7.
    Upon review, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion. Although the
    Trans challenge Deutsche Bank’s standing to assert foreclosure rights under
    the Mortgage, the evidence of record establishes that Deutsche Bank
    properly holds the Mortgage by way of assignment, and is the party in
    interest in the foreclosure action. See 
    Murray, supra
    . The Trans failed to
    offer evidence, in opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment, that
    establishes a genuine issue of material fact regarding the validity of the
    assignments.   See Gerber v. Piergrossi, 
    142 A.3d 854
    , 860 (Pa. Super.
    2016) (concluding that, where the evidence of record established that
    appellees held the mortgage by valid assignment, and appellants offered no
    evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact, the trial court did not
    err by granting summary judgment in favor of appellees). Moreover, despite
    receiving 90 days to conduct additional discovery, the Trans failed to file any
    additional supplemental briefs or exhibits in support of their allegations.
    - 11 -
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    Accordingly, the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in granting
    Deutsche Bank’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 4/19/2017
    - 12 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Deutsche Bank v. Tran, T. No. 1348 MDA 2016

Filed Date: 4/19/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024