Buchanan, S. v. Buchanan, H. ( 2020 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
SHARON L. BUCHANAN : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
HARRY W. BUCHANAN IV : No. 2186 EDA 2019
Appeal from the Order Entered July 9, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County Domestic Relations at
No(s): Docket No. DR-00-00546,
PACSES No. 400102086
BEFORE: BOWES, J., MURRAY, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED MAY 26, 2020
Sharon L. Buchanan (“Mother”) appeals the July 9, 2019 order
sustaining the exceptions filed by Harry W. Buchanan (“Father”) to the
recommended support order directing him to make monthly support payments
for his nineteen-year-old daughter, Bonnie Buchanan. After careful review,
we affirm.
This contentious support litigation precedes the April 2000 birth of
Bonnie, who was added to Mother’s then-pending petition for support for
herself and Bonnie’s older sibling.1 During 2014, Bonnie contracted the
Epstein-Barr virus and a streptococcal infection that caused a cascading array
____________________________________________
1 The spousal support obligation terminated effective October 1, 2008. The
sibling was removed from the support order effective November 10, 2016,
having attained the age of majority.
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of symptoms and neurological conditions that were not diagnosed properly for
several years. Her most recent diagnoses revealed the contraction of Lyme
disease and postural orthostatic tachycardia syndrome.
Bonnie attained the age of majority in April 2018 and graduated from
high school two months later. On December 13, 2018, and January 24, 2019,
a domestic relations hearing officer heard evidence concerning Mother’s
position that her daughter’s mental and physical health conditions permitted
her to rebut the presumption of emancipation embodied in 23 Pa.C.S.
§ 4321(3), which provides, “Parents may be liable for the support of their
children who are 18 years of age or older.” Specifically, the hearing officer
considered testimony from Bonnie and her psychiatrist, Lantie Elisabeth
Jordanby, M.D., who has treated Bonnie since April 2018. Dr. Jordanby
testified that Bonnie suffers from, inter alia, headaches, light sensitivity, low
blood pressure, and neurocognitive symptoms such as depression, anxiety,
and attention deficit. These conditions impact Bonnie’s executive functioning
and ability to complete everyday tasks. Dr. Jordanby explained, “she’s not
able to really maintain good short-term memory. She has periods where . . .
she’ll have brain fog where she just has difficulty clearing her head, thinking
clearly, being able to focus well . . . [and] difficulty maintaining concentration
on projects.” N.T., 12/13/18, at 24. Dr. Jordanby continued that Bonnie has
tolerated treatments and made modest improvements “with her overall
status.” Id. at 33. She opined, “it’s going to take a while for her to really
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beat all. In fact, I’d imagine probably by April of next year [(2019)] we’ll see
significant improvement.” Id.
Bonnie testified about her problems with fatigue, dizzy spells, chest
pain, and gastrointestinal complications. N.T., 1/24/19, 10-11. As it relates
to the reasons that she has never sought employment, Bonnie stated that she
cannot look at screens or read print for more than ten minutes. Id. at 19.
She also indicated that she cannot stand in one place for longer than a couple
minutes without getting dizzy, suffering migraines, or experiencing chest
pains. Id. Notwithstanding these impediments to employment, Bonnie
declined to file for disability insurance, stating “my mom and I just have an
understanding that I’m too sick to work and that’s as far as our discussions
go.” Id. at 35. Nevertheless, she stated a desire to work fulltime after she
attains her college degree “and maybe even more school after that.” Id. 37.
Father did not present any evidence, ostensibly, because the
presumption favored terminating the child support obligation. On March 1,
2019, the hearing officer issued a report finding in favor of Mother, and on
March 7, 2019, the trial court entered a child support order that, inter alia,
directed Father to pay $4,181.66 per month in child support and $420.00 for
arrears. Father filed timely exceptions, and after argument and the filing of
briefs, the trial court sustained Father’s exceptions, vacated the March 7, 2019
child support order, and terminated Father’s support obligation effective June
14, 2018.
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This timely appeal followed. As Mother and the trial court both complied
with Pa.R.A.P. 1925, the appeal is ripe for our review. Mother presents one
compound issue on appeal:
Did the trial court commit an error of law and abuse its
discretion in its order of court entered on July 9, 2019, by failing
to place sufficient weight on the findings of the domestic relations
support hearing officer, . . . and did the trial court commit an error
of law and abuse its discretion in its order of court originally
entered on July 9, 2019, by failing to place sufficient weight on
the testimony of [Mother’s] witness, the child’s doctor, Lantie
Jorandby M.D.[?]
Mother’s brief at 6 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
We review child support matters for an abuse of discretion, which occurs
if the law is misapplied or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable,
or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will, as shown by the evidence
of record. T.M.W. v. N.J.W., --- A.3d ---- (Pa.Super, 2020), 2020 PA Super
17, 2020 WL 502527, *2. The issue of a child’s “[e]mancipation is a question
of fact to be determined by the circumstances presented in each case.”
Kotzbauer v. Kotzbauer, 937 A.2d 487, 493 (Pa.Super.2007) (citation
omitted). “[T]he test is whether the child is physically and mentally able to
engage in profitable employment and whether employment is available to that
child at a supporting wage.” Id. at 490 (quoting Hanson v. Hanson, 625
A.2d 1212, 1214 (Pa.Super. 1993)).
While the principal goal in child support matters is to serve the best
interests of the children through the provision of reasonable expenses,
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the duty to support a child ends when the child turns eighteen or
graduates from high school. However, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.
§ 4321(3), a parent may be required to support a child who, upon
reaching the age of majority, has a mental or physical condition
that prevents the child from being self-supporting.
Id. at 489-90 (Pa.Super. 2007) (cleaned up). As we have stated, “The adult
child . . . bears the burden of proving the conditions that make it impossible
for her . . . to be employed.” Heitzman-Nolte v. Nolte, 837 A.2d 1182,
1184 (Pa. Super. 2003). Furthermore, “a parent is only called upon to support
an adult child to the extent the child cannot aid him or herself.” Crawford v.
Crawford, 633 A.2d. 155, 161 (Pa.Super. 1993).
Mother asserts that the trial court “cavalierly disregard[ed]” the hearing
officer’s factual findings and conclusions and discounted the testimony
presented by Dr. Jordanby, who testified as an expert in psychiatry. Mother’s
brief at 11. Mother’s argument is founded on the proposition that the trial
court could not disturb the determination of the child support hearing officer
absent an abuse of discretion. While Mother cites Johnson v. Johnson, 529
A.2d 1123 (Pa.Super 1987) to support this argument, her reliance upon
Johnson, is inapt because that equitable distribution case does not address
a trial court’s reverence for a hearing officer’s determination. To the contrary,
that case simply reiterated the well-ensconced standard of review that this
Court applies to the trial court as the ultimate arbiter of fact. Id. at 412.
(“Under this standard, we do not usurp the hearing court’s duty as factfinder.
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Rather, we apply the legislative guidelines of the Divorce Code to the record
to determine whether or not the hearing court has abused its discretion.”).
In actuality, the findings of a child support hearing officer are “only
advisory and not in any way binding on the trial court.” Ewing v. Ewing, 843
A.2d 1282, 1286 (Pa.Super. 2004) (quoting Goodman v. Goodman, 544
A.2d 1033, 1035 (Pa.Super. 1988)). Rather, “it is the sole province and the
responsibility of the court to set an award of support and even if the evidence
before the Support Hearing Officer is adequate to support her
recommendation, the trial court need not adopt it.” Id. (cleaned up). Stated
another way, the trial court is required to make an independent assessment
of the hearing officer’s report and recommendations. Kohl v. Kohl, 564 A.2d
222, 224 (Pa.Super. 1989). “The reviewing court must consider the evidence,
its weight and the credibility of the witnesses, de novo. The . . . report is not
controlling, either on the lower court or on the appellate court.” Rothrock v.
Rothrock, 765 A.2d 400, 404 (Pa. Super. 2000). The one often-stated
exception to this rule, which relates to credibility determinations, is best
described as follows: “not to say that the master’s conclusions regarding
credibility are binding on the reviewing court, but where the record alone does
not indicate which party’s testimony should be credited, the determination of
the master can tip the balance.” Id.Instantly, the trial court accepted the hearing officer’s factual findings
in performing its independent assessment of the hearing officer’s report and
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recommendations. Indeed, while the trial court reached a different outcome
as to the question of emancipation, a non-deferential legal question, the trial
court did not make any independent factual findings or credibility
determinations. As outlined below, the trial court adopted the hearing officer’s
factual summary. Thus, we reject Mother’s contention that the trial court
abused its discretion by ruling contrary to the hearing officer’s ultimate
conclusion.
We also reject Mother’s assertion that the trial court disregarded Dr.
Jordanby’s testimony because she did not specifically opine about Bonnie’s
ability to work. Mother’s brief at 17. The trial court considered all of Mother’s
evidence, including Dr. Jordanby’s description of Bonnie’s numerous ailments
and their effect on her ability to perform daily tasks. Specifically, the trial
court noted,
the Domestic Relations Hearing Officer relied on the testimony of
Bonnie’s psychiatrist regarding symptoms of chronic fatigue,
cluster headaches, chronic immune deficiency, depression,
anxiety and poor executive function. The psychiatrist testified
regarding the diagnosis of Lyme disease. While Bonnie’s
psychiatrist testified that Bonnie’s treatment plan is complex and
she has difficulties with day-to-day activities, the psychiatrist did
not opine that any of these issues prevent Bonnie from being self-
supporting or make it impossible for her to be employed. In fact,
while the psychiatrist testified that Bonnie has difficulty with day-
to-day activities, difficulty getting to school, difficulty maintaining
a level of energy she went on to offer “[i]t isn’t that she isn’t able
to do these things, but it takes significant effort.” At many points
in the psychologist’s testimony she referred to the “difficulty”
Bonnie experiences with things like clearing her head, thinking
clearly, being able to focus well, maintaining focus, and
maintaining concentration on projects. However, while the
psychiatrist opined that Bonnie has “difficulties,” none of the
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psychiatrist’s testimony amounts to evidence that it is impossible
for Bonnie to maintain employment. In fact, the psychiatrist went
on to express some of the medicines and treatments administered
and that Bonnie has had some modest improvement with her
overall status. The psychiatrist offered “[i]n fact, I’d imagine
probably by April of next year we’ll see significant improvement.”
Further reliance by the Domestic Relations Hearing Officer was
given to Bonnie’s testimony that she suffers from blurry vision,
light sensitivity, has a hard time reading for more than a few
minutes at a time, feels discomfort after looking at a computer
screen for any appreciable amount of time, gets dizzy and vomits.
While Bonnie testified that it is hard for her to focus or read a book
for more than ten minutes and that lights bother her, she did not
indicate that it was impossible or that she was unable to do such
tasks.
Trial Court Opinion, 7/9/19, at 3-4 (citations to record omitted).
In addition, the trial court considered Bonnie’s testimony that, while she
never attempted to work, she was “a really good college student[, who does
not] miss classes,” even enduring lighting that bothers her vision. N.T.,
1/24/19, 24, 29. It also noted Mother’s explanation for neglecting to apply
for disability benefits for her daughter, i.e., “Bonnie won’t allow [it because
she] does not want to be labeled.” N.T., 12/13/18, at 45.
While Mother was not required to present expert testimony regarding
her employability, she was required to demonstrate that Bonnie could not
support herself with the available employment opportunities. The obvious
implication of Dr. Jordanby’s testimony regarding Bonnie’s difficulties was that
Bonnie’s conditions would impact her ability to complete potential work-
related tasks. Contrary to Mother’s protestations, however, the testimony did
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not establish that the health disorders prevented Bonnie from earning a
supporting wage.
Our decision in Kotzbauer supra, which both parties cite in their
respective briefs, informs our review. In that case, we upheld the trial court’s
determination that Kaitlin, a nineteen-year old woman with brain
malformations, was not emancipated even though she was cable of attending
college, maintaining employment, and engaging in certain leisure activities.
At the time of the hearing in Kotzbauer, Kaitlin was a full-time student at a
local community college, in part, so that she could remain on her father’s
health insurance. She suffered three to four debilitating headaches per week,
including migraines, and the headaches got significantly worse in the six
months preceding the evidentiary hearing. Kaitlin’s condition made it difficult
to complete school work, and she struggled to maintain the minimum of
twelve credit hours that full-time students were expected to complete. She
resided with her mother, who provided food, clothing, shelter, and medication.
She was anxious about living independently because she required supervision
and assistance with her medical treatment.
In addition to attending community college, Kaitlin worked part-time at
a retail store earning $7.38 per hour. Her employer did not offer her a full-
time position, and it suggested that she take a leave of absence due to her
health concerns. While Kaitlin declined that offer, she applied for social
security disability benefits, but had not received a decision as of the hearing.
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The treating physician in Kotzbauer testified that Kaitlin’s continued ability
to work was dependent on the frequency and severity of her headaches and
observed that Kaitlin remains at risk for seizures, which is consistent with
patients who suffer from her condition.
In light of the forgoing facts, the trial court determined that the nineteen
year-old was not an emancipated child. We affirmed, reasoning, in part,
it was undisputed that [Kaitlin] underwent brain surgery after
developing seizures, and three lay witnesses, Kaitlin, Mother, and
[her work supervisor], testified that Kaitlin cannot maintain full-
time employment because she suffers from acute migraine
headaches that frequently interfere with her existing work
schedule.
Kotzbauer, supra at 491.
The facts of the case at bar do not align with the facts that drove our
rationale in Kotzbauer. Unlike the adult child in that case, who struggled to
maintain the minimum level of college credits and was totally dependent on
her mother, Bonnie is capable of exceling at college, albeit with substantial
effort. She lives independently in a dormitory, and although her numerous
health problems encumber her daily routine, those conditions are improving.
Moreover, while the adult child in Kotzbauer attempted employment and
failed, which is confirmation of her lack of self-sufficiency, Mother neglected
to present similar evidence that Bonnie was incapable of self-support. In sum,
while the clear implication of Dr. Jordanby’s testimony is that employment
would be physically and mentally demanding, Mother did not adduce evidence
that Bonnie was incapable of engaging in profitable employment, nor did she
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establish that employment was not available to Bonnie at a supporting wage.
Hence, she did not rebut the presumption of emancipation. Id. at 490;
Hanson, supra at 1214 (“test is whether the child is physically and mentally
able to engage in profitable employment and whether employment is available
to that child at a supporting wage.”).
Accordingly, we see no reason to disturb the order in question.
Order affirmed.
Judge Murray joins the memorandum.
Judge McLaughlin concurs in the result.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/26/2020
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