Com. v. Wisotzkey, M. ( 2020 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
MATTHEW J. WISOTZKEY :
:
Appellant : No. 245 MDA 2019
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 27, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s):
CP-67-CR-0007095-2014
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., STABILE, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED JANUARY 07, 2020
Appellant, Matthew Wisotzkey, appeals from the judgment of sentence
of seven and one-half to fifteen years of incarceration imposed after a jury
convicted him of one count of persons not to possess firearms and two counts
of possession with the intent to deliver a controlled substance.1 Specifically,
Appellant contends that he was denied his constitutional right to counsel, and
he challenges the trial court’s January 19, 2016 order permitting counsel to
withdraw and denying Appellant’s motion for appointment of co-counsel. After
careful review, we affirm.
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105 and 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), respectively.
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The underlying facts of the criminal charges against Appellant are not
relevant to the disposition of this appeal. Accordingly, we simply note that
the criminal charges were filed after searches of Appellant’s residence and a
leased garage uncovered illegal narcotics and firearms. The procedural history
as recounted by the trial court however, is germane to the outcome of this
case:
[Appellant] was formally arraigned on December 2, 2014,
and represented by privately-retained counsel, Shane Kope, Esq.
On March 10, 2015, [Appellant] filed a counseled Omnibus Pre-
trial Motion challenging the constitutionality of the search of his
home and seizure of his firearms. A hearing was scheduled to
convene on April 20, 2015, but was later moved to April 30, 2015.
On April 30, 2015, Attorney Kope withdrew the Omnibus Pre-trial
Motion and this matter was placed on the July 2015 trial docket.
On July 1, 2015, Attorney Kope filed a Motion for
Continuance indicating [Appellant] discharged him from service.
On July 9, 2015, this [c]ourt granted [Appellant] in forma pauperis
status and on July 10, 2015, during a status hearing, granted
Attorney Kope’s Motion to Withdraw as Counsel. Additionally, this
[c]ourt continued [t]rial to September 8, 2015, and informed
[Appellant] that he must retain counsel immediately as no further
continuances would be granted.
On September 3, 2015, [Appellant], pro se, filed a Motion
for a Pre-trial Conference and on September 11, 2015,
[Appellant], pro se, filed a Motion for Bail Reduction and Petition
for In Forma Pauperis status. On September 15, 2015, Joshua
Neiderhiser, Esq., a York County assistant public defender,
entered his appearance on [Appellant’s] behalf and on September
30, 2015, this [c]ourt granted [Appellant] in forma pauperis
status.
On October 14, 2015, this [c]ourt issued an Order
scheduling a hearing on [Appellant’s] bail reduction motion for
November 25, 2015. On November 25, 2015, at the conclusion
of the hearing on [Appellant’s] bail reduction matter, this [c]ourt
denied [Appellant’s] request. On December 4, 2015, Attorney
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Neiderhiser filed a Petition for Nominal Bail which this [c]ourt
denied.
On December 31, 2015, at the behest of [Appellant] who
had filed a “Motion for Waiver of Counsel,” Attorney Neiderhiser
filed a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel citing [Appellant’s] desire
to act in the capacity of co-counsel and file meritless motions. On
January 19, 2016, this [c]ourt convened a hearing on counsel’s
motion and subsequently issued an Order granting counsel’s
Motion to Withdraw but denying [Appellant’s] request for
appointment of co-counsel.
On January 20, 2016, [Appellant], pro se, filed a Motion for
Discovery and on January 28, 2016, [Appellant], pro se, filed a
Petition for Transcription of Hearing Notes of January 19, 2016.
On February 2, 2016, this [c]ourt denied [Appellant’s] request for
a transcription of hearing notes. On February 18, 2016,
[Appellant], pro se, filed a 50-page Omnibus Pre-trial Motion
essentially renewing previously-filed and disposed pro se motions.
On April 4, 2016, and April 25, 2016, this [c]ourt issued
Orders denying [Appellant’s] Omnibus Pre-trial Motion. On May
9, 2016, [Appellant], pro se, filed a motion renewing his request
for internal police documents. On May 16, 2016, [Appellant], pro
se, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of [Appellant’s] Motion in
Limine and Motion for the Production of Witnesses. On May 27,
2016, this [c]ourt continued [Appellant’s] trial to the July 2016
trial term. On June 29, 2016, [Appellant], pro se, filed a Motion
in Limine to bar the concealment of the identity of any confidential
informant.
Following a jury trial July 19, 2016, through July 21, 2016,
the jury unanimously convicted [Appellant] of all counts. On
September 23, 2016, [Appellant] prematurely filed a Post-
Sentence Motion. The [t]rial [c]ourt ordered a Pre-Sentence
Investigation and deferred sentencing to September 27, 2016, at
which time this [c]ourt sentenced [Appellant] as follows: five (5)
to ten (10) years of imprisonment in a State Correctional
Institution for Count 1; two and one half (2 1/2) to five (5) years
of imprisonment in a State Correctional Institution for Count 2, to
run consecutively to Count 1; and two (2) to four (4) years of
imprisonment in a State Correctional Institution [for Count 3], to
run concurrently with Count 2. [Appellant’s] aggregated term of
confinement is seven and one half (7 1/2) to fifteen (15) years.
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On September 27, 2016, this [c]ourt appointed Jonelle
Harter Eshbach, Esquire, to represent [Appellant] during appellate
proceedings. [Appellant], pro se, filed an Amended Post-Sentence
Motion on October 13, 2016. On April 3, 2017, [Appellant’s] Post-
Sentence Motion was denied by operation of law. [Appellant] did
not take [a] direct appeal.
On May 8, 2018, [Appellant], pro se, filed his first petition
under the Post-Conviction Relief Act. On June 4, 2018, this [c]ourt
appointed Charles J. Hobbs, Esquire to represent [Appellant] in
his PCRA litigation. On December 3, 2018, Attorney Hobbs filed a
motion requesting an extension of time within which to amend
[Appellant’s] PCRA motion which this [c]ourt granted on
December 12, 2018.
On January 4, 2019, Attorney Hobbs filed an amended PCRA
petition seeking reinstatement of [Appellant’s] direct appeal
rights. On January 14, 2019, this [c]ourt granted Appellant’s
requested relief. On February 12, 2019, Appellant, by and
through Attorney Hobbs, timely filed a Notice of Appeal to the
Superior Court.
Trial Court Opinion, 4/18/19, at 3–6.
Appellant raises the following issue for review:
Whether Appellant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived
his right to counsel and invoked his constitutional right to self-
representation where the trial court never conducted an on-the-
record colloquy in accordance with Pa.R.Crim.P. 121?
Appellant’s Brief at 4 (full capitalization omitted).
Although stated as a single question, we understand Appellant’s claim
to have two components. First, did the trial court err when it granted Attorney
Neiderhiser’s motion to withdraw? We review a trial court’s ruling on a petition
to withdraw under an abuse of discretion standard. Commonwealth v.
Magee, 177 A.3d 315, 322 (Pa. Super. 2017). Second, did the court’s failure
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to conduct a colloquy in accordance with Pa.R.Crim.P. 1212 deprive Appellant
of his constitutional right to be represented by counsel. We interpret this
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2 Rule 121 instructs:
(1) The defendant may waive the right to be represented by
counsel.
(2) To ensure that the defendant’s waiver of the right to
counsel is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, the judge or issuing
authority, at a minimum, shall elicit the following information from
the defendant:
(a) that the defendant understands that he or she has the
right to be represented by counsel, and the right to have
free counsel appointed if the defendant is indigent;
(b) that the defendant understands the nature of the
charges against the defendant and the elements of each of
those charges;
(c) that the defendant is aware of the permissible range of
sentences and/or fines for the offenses charged;
(d) that the defendant understands that if he or she waives
the right to counsel, the defendant will still be bound by all
the normal rules of procedure and that counsel would be
familiar with these rules;
(e) that the defendant understands that there are possible
defenses to these charges that counsel might be aware of,
and if these defenses are not raised at trial, they may be
lost permanently; and
(f) that the defendant understands that, in addition to
defenses, the defendant has many rights that, if not timely
asserted, may be lost permanently; and that if errors occur
and are not timely objected to, or otherwise timely raised
by the defendant, these errors may be lost permanently.
Pa.R.Crim. P. 121(1)(2).
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latter contention as a challenge to the trial court’s determination that
Appellant forfeited, rather than waived, his right to counsel. Whether
Appellant forfeited his right to counsel is a question of law over which our
standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary.
Commonwealth v. Fill, 202 A.3d 133, 139 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citing
Commonwealth v. Lucarelli, 971 A.2d 1173, 1178 (Pa. 2009)).
Initially, we are compelled to address whether Appellant waived review of
his claim that Attorney Neiderhiser was improperly permitted to withdraw as
counsel. On or about December 30, 2015, Attorney Neiderhiser received a
packet of motions that Appellant directed him to file. Motion to Withdraw,
12/31/15, at ¶ 6. Included in the packet was a Motion for Waiver of Counsel
wherein Appellant averred that he and Attorney Neiderhiser “have approached
an unbridgeable impasse in communications,” and that Attorney Neiderhiser
“refuses to assist [Appellant] any further in defensive strategies.” Motion For
Waiver of Counsel Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 121(A)-(D), 1/4/16,
at ¶¶ C, D. Appellant thus requested that Attorney Neiderhiser withdraw as
counsel and that a pro bono attorney be assigned as “co[-]counsel.” Appellant
further stated the he “fully understands his rights under the Pennsylvania Rules
of Criminal Procedure: Rule 121 (A)-(D) inclusive.” Id. at ¶ G. When Attorney
Neiderhiser received a copy of Appellant’s motion, he filed a motion to withdraw
averring that he and Appellant “have irreconcilable differences [that] has made
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communication and representation nearly impossible.” Motion to Withdraw,
12/31/15, at ¶ 9.
On January 19, 2016, the trial court held a hearing on the two motions.
The testimony reveals that Appellant did not object to the trial court’s
decisions to grant Attorney Neiderhiser’s motion to withdraw and to deny
Appellant’s request for appointment of co-counsel:
THE COURT: I feel like we have been in this position before. Am
I wrong, [Appellant]?
ATTORNEY NEIDERHISER: I had to relieve Mr. Kope.
THE COURT: That’s what I thought. Are you planning to proceed
without a lawyer, because we are running out of options?
[APPELLANT]: Yes, Your Honor. I asked one to be pro bono, as
co-counsel, so we don’t have this problem again.
ATTORNEY NEIDERHISER: We have a conflict of interest, Your
Honor. He won’t allow me to submit any motions.
THE COURT: Well, when you have a lawyer, sir, you are not
allowed to submit any motions. Those are pretty simple Rules of
Procedure. When I have a motion the rules are filed by a lawyer
because last time I checked you didn’t graduate from law school,
is that correct?
[APPELLANT]: Correct.
THE COURT: You have to let your lawyer do his job.
[APPELLANT]: He refuses [to] submit any motions for me.
THE COURT: Attorney Neiderhiser?
ATTORNEY NEIDERHISER: That’s correct, Your Honor.
[Appellant] has requested numerous motions. The most
important to him the suppression motion regarding the search
warrants in this case. Your Honor, I did review those facts. I
believe they are without merit and so ethically I am not able to
file them if I would have filed them anyway because they served
no purpose, Your Honor. I wouldn’t have filed them anyway.
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THE COURT: So, I am assuming based on your motion you wish
to withdraw?
ATTORNEY NEIDERHISER: Yes, Your Honor.
* * *
THE COURT: [Appellant], I don’t have your motion to have co-
counsel in front of me, but according to what is alleged by
Attorney Neiderhiser in his motion to withdraw, I don’t think you
understand. You don’t get co-counsel. When you are not a
lawyer, you are either going to represent yourself or let a lawyer
represent you. You have chosen not to let a lawyer represent
you now on two cases.
[APPELANT]: That’s fine, Your Honor, if that’s--
THE COURT: I have to say, I believe we had this same issue with
Attorney Kope. So, even if I took the time and the County’s
money to get you another lawyer, I suspect he’s going to have
the same response to you that he’s not going to file your motion
to suppress.
* * *
In the case of Commonwealth versus [Appellant], docketed
at 7095 of 2014. This matter was on the trial list this morning.
In addition, there are a number of motions outstanding, including
a motion to dismiss counsel and a motion for counsel to withdraw.
We grant Attorney Neiderhiser’s motion to withdraw as counsel
in this case, as clearly the parties are not able to work together
to move this case forward . . . .
[Appellant’s] motion for appointment of co-counsel is
denied.
N.T. (Motion Hearing), 1/19/16, at 2–6.
After the January 19, 2016 hearing, Appellant filed a number of pro se
motions and represented himself during trial. Appellant does not reference
any occasion in those proceedings wherein he objected to his pro se status or
the trial court’s refusal to appoint co-counsel.
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“Where the parties fail to preserve an issue for appeal, the Superior
Court may not address that issue sua sponte.” Commonwealth v. Colavita,
993 A.2d 874, 891 (Pa. 2010) (quoting Steiner v. Markel, 968 A.2d 1253,
1257 (Pa. 2009)). However, this prohibition is not absolute. Commonwealth
v. Markun, 185 A.3d 1026, 1038 (Pa. Super. 2018). Specifically, this Court
has held that “‘as a general rule, failure to raise an issue in a criminal
proceeding does not constitute a waiver where the defendant is not
represented by counsel in the proceeding. This rule does not apply where the
defendant knowingly and intelligently waived representation by counsel.’”
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 158 A.3d 117, 121 (Pa. Super. 2017) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Monica, 597 A.2d 600, 603 (Pa. 1991)). Applying these
principles to the instant matter, wherein it is acknowledged that a formal
waiver colloquy was not conducted, we will address Appellant’s withdrawal of
counsel issue.
Initially, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s order
granting counsel’s motion to withdraw. Notably, counsel’s request to
withdraw was precipitated by Appellant’s earlier motion for waiver of counsel.
Both Appellant and appointed counsel agreed that their working relationship
had deteriorated to the point of unmanageable impasse. Additionally, after
the trial court explained that Appellant was not entitled to co-counsel,
Appellant indicated his desire to represent himself. Under these
circumstances, the trial court’s decision to grant the motion to withdraw was
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supported by the record and grounded in the law, and there is no reason to
conclude that the court’s ruling was based on bias, ill will, partiality, prejudice,
manifest unreasonableness, or misapplication of the law. See
Commonwealth v. Ramos, 936 A.2d 1097, 1100 (Pa. Super. 2007) (trial
court abuses its discretion when in “reaching a conclusion the law is overridden
or misapplied or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the
result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will,” as shown by the record
evidence.).
We turn to whether the trial court correctly concluded that Appellant
forfeited his right to counsel. Appellant contends chiefly that he did not
voluntarily waive his right to counsel because the trial court did not conduct a
waiver of counsel colloquy in accordance with Pa.R.Crim.P. Rule 121.
The trial court conceded that it did not conduct a Rule 121 colloquy, but
reasoned that the waiver colloquy was unwarranted because Appellant had
forfeited his right to counsel. See Commonwealth v. Kelly, 5 A.3d 370, 378
(Pa. Super. 2010 (colloquy requirements of Pa.R.Crim.P 121 do not apply to
situations where forfeiture is found). The trial court relied upon the following
reasoning in reaching its forfeiture conclusion:
A defendant forfeits the right to counsel when he engages in
extremely serious misconduct or extremely dilatory conduct.
Kelly, supra. For example:
[I]n Lucarelli, [supra], the defendant failed to retain
counsel despite having more than eight months to
prepare for trial and the financial means to hire a
lawyer. He had privately retained counsel on several
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occasions, but the trial court allowed counsel to
withdraw when the attorney-client relationship
deteriorated. Five weeks before trial, the trial court
gave the defendant access to funds to retain counsel,
but he failed to do so by the start of trial and had no
explanation for not having done so. The Supreme Court
concluded that the defendant had engaged in
“extremely dilatory conduct” such as to amount to a
forfeiture of his right to counsel.
Commonwealth v. Fill, 202 A.3d 133, 139 (Pa. Super. 2019).
Similarly, in Kelly, supra, the Superior Court found the defendant
engaged in serious misconduct as, “the defendant was
uncooperative with all three lawyers appointed to represent him .
. . because they refused to argue his view of the law.” Id.
Further, the Superior Court found the trial court’s actions
reasonable when it refused to appoint further counsel after the
defendant requested another continuance and appointment of a
fourth attorney. Id.
[Appellant] is similar to the defendants in Lucarelli and
Kelly as he too engaged in extremely serious misconduct and/or
dilatory conduct. First, while represented by Attorney
Neiderhiser, [Appellant] continued to file pro se motions. (See,
Motion for Continuance and Pre-trial Discovery, filed 11/16/15;
see also, Motion to Compel, filed 11/30/15). [Appellant] also filed
of public record correspondence he addressed to Attorney
Neiderhiser. (See, Correspondences to Attorney Neiderhiser,
filed 11/4/15 and 11/5/15).
Second [Appellant] addressed correspondence to the Clerk’s
office which was filed of record wherein he indicated that he
wished to move forward with his Bail Motion and that he would be
“conjoining the assistance” of Attorney Neiderhiser. (See,
Correspondences to Clerk of Court, filed 10/14/15). [Appellant]
has been unequivocal in his desire to act in the capacity of lead
counsel in his matters. (N.T. Hearing, 1/19/16, p. 2.).
Third, while Attorney Neiderhiser filed the Motion to
Withdraw as Counsel on 12/31/15; it was [Appellant] who initiated
this chain of events by filing a “Motion for Waiver of Counsel.”
(See, Motion to Withdraw as Counsel, filed 12/31/15). By his
actions, [Appellant] essentially asked the court to permit Attorney
Neiderhiser to withdraw and appoint a different attorney to act as
co-counsel to [Appellant] while [Appellant] would continue to
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represent himself pro se. After granting Attorney Neiderhiser’s
Motion to Withdraw, the trial court indicated its belief that
appointing new counsel would be futile as [Appellant] would likely
lodge the same complaints as he had done in the past—an
assertion to which [Appellant] did not refute. (N.T. Hearing,
1/19/16, p. 5). Moreover, [Appellant] stated that he was “fine”
with representing himself during trial proceedings. (Id., p. 4.).
On January 19, 2016, when this [c]ourt granted Attorney
Neiderhiser’s Motion to Withdraw, [Appellant] continued to renew
previously filed motions and failed to secure private counsel in the
six months preceding trial. On two separate occasions,
[Appellant’s] relationship with his legal counsel deteriorated
ultimately because counsel declined to file what they assessed to
be meritless motions. [Appellant] is not permitted to engage in
extremely serious misconduct and/or dilatory conduct only to later
claim an absence of waiver.
The extensive record reflects that [Appellant] actively
chooses when he wants to exercise his right to counsel and when
he chooses to forfeit that right. During Appellant’s sentencing
hearing, the following exchange took place:
Court: Sir, again I would offer you the opportunity to
make application for counsel to assist you with your
appeal. That’s up to you whether you wish that
opportunity.
[Appellant]: For my appeal, I will, yes, Your Honor.
(N.T. Sentencing Hearing, 9/27/16, p. 7). In this instance,
[Appellant] accepted the [c]ourt’s offer to appoint counsel to
represent him on appeal. While the court appointed Attorney
Eshbach on September 27, 2016, to represent [Appellant] in his
post-sentence litigation, [Appellant] continued to move pro se.
(See, Amended Post-Sentence Motion, filed pro se 10/13/16).
Based on the foregoing, this [c]ourt believes that
[Appellant’s] actions preceding his trial amount to intentional
forfeiture and/or forfeiture of his right to counsel.
Trial Court Opinion, 4/18/19, at 7–10 (emphasis in original).
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Appellant’s only retort to this reasoning is that the trial court never
advised Appellant that “he was engaging in ‘extremely serious misconduct’ or
‘dilatory conduct,’ by filing motions with the court and proceeding pro se.”
Appellant’s Brief at 16. Appellant also complains that the trial court did not
caution him “about his conduct during any of the hearings before it, or in any
of its written orders denying him relief.” Id.
We agree with the trial court that Appellant forfeited his right to counsel
through his pattern of refusal to accept his attorneys’ stewardship, beginning
with his relationship with his privately-retained counsel, Shane Kope, Esq. On
December 5, 2014, Attorney Kope entered his appearance on Appellant’s
behalf. On June 30, 2015, Appellant filed a self-styled “Ineffective Assistance
of Counsel” document requesting that Attorney Kope be removed as counsel
because, inter alia, he refused to “raise exigent points pertinent to the case”
and “submit an omnibus motion.” Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 6/30/15,
at ¶ 4(a)(b). On July 1, 2015, Attorney Kope filed a Motion for Continuance of
Appellant’s trial scheduled to begin on July 5, 2015, citing Appellant’s
notification that he was discharging Attorney Kope. Motion for Continuance,
7/1/15, at ¶ 3. A few days later, on July 10, 2015, Attorney Kope filed a motion
to withdraw, averring that his conflict with Appellant over the validity of the
search warrant issued in this matter resulted in a “breakdown of
communications such that the [attorney/client] relationship has become
acrimonious.” Motion to Withdraw as Counsel, 7/10/15, at ¶11. That same
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day, the trial court held a hearing on both motions. In its order granting the
motions, the trial court stated: “We have made it clear to [Appellant] that he
needs to seek counsel immediately if he intends to do that as we will not grant
him a further continuance for that purpose.” Order, 7/10/15, at 1–2.
Despite this admonition from the trial court, Appellant did apply to the
York County Public Defender’s Office until September 2015 when Attorney
Neiderhiser entered his appearance on Appellant’s behalf. Appellant continued
to file pro se motions after Attorney Neiderhiser’s appointment. The
relationship between Appellant and appointed counsel was fraught with conflict
over the merits of motions that Appellant requested to be filed, culminating in
Appellant’s motion for waiver of counsel and Attorney Neiderhiser’s motion to
withdraw. At the hearing on these motions, the trial court explained that
Appellant was not entitled to co-counsel and advised him that his remaining
options were representation by a lawyer or self-representation. Appellant
confirmed that he would proceed pro se, and he represented himself through
the trial. As a result of Appellant’s insistence on usurping his attorneys’ legal
guidance and his copious pro se filings, trial did not commence until July 19,
2016, one year after the trial court informed Appellant that no further
continuances would be granted.
As detailed above, Appellant’s refusal to cooperate with either his
privately retained and/or his appointed counsel, his expectation that his
counsel should execute the unmeritorious legal strategies he proposed, his
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numerous pro se filings, his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing
to pursue his flawed legal arguments, and his stated desire to proceed pro se
amounted to conduct sufficiently obstructive to mandate a conclusion of
forfeiture.
We further reject Appellant’s contention that the trial court was required
to advise him that his conduct could result in forfeiture of this right. No such
notice is necessary in forfeiture cases. See Lucarelli, 971 A.2d at 1179
(“‘Forfeiture can result regardless of whether the defendant has been warned
about engaging in misconduct and regardless of whether the defendant has
been advised of the risks of proceeding pro se.’”) (quoting United States v.
Goldberg, 67 F3d. 1092, 1101 (3d Cir. 1995)). Where, as here, “a
defendant’s course of conduct demonstrates his or her intention not to seek
representation . . . , a determination that the defendant be required to proceed
pro se is mandated because that defendant has forfeited the right to counsel.”
Lucarelli, 971 A.2d at 1179. Appellant’s uncooperative behavior
demonstrated his clear intention not to follow counsel’s advice, and no further
hearing was necessary to develop this aspect of Appellant’s misconduct.3
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3 We also note that Appellant’s waiver of counsel motion declared that he
understood his rights under Rule 121. Motion For Waiver of Counsel, 1/4/16,
at ¶ G. While we do not view this averment as a substitute for a Rule 121
colloquy, it is further indication that Appellant viewed himself as a pro se
litigant.
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Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion when it permitted Attorney Neiderhiser to withdraw. Further,
the trial court’s finding that Appellant forfeited his right to counsel did not
constitute a violation of Appellant’s constitutional right.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/07/2020
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