L.W. v. D.K. ( 2020 )


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  • J-S08014-20
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    L.W.                                   :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                        :
    :
    :
    D.K.                                   :
    :
    Appellant            :   No. 1462 WDA 2019
    Appeal from the Order Entered August 29, 2019
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Family Court at
    No(s): No. FD-13-000236-008
    BEFORE: OLSON, J., McCAFFERY, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                          FILED MARCH 27, 2020
    D.K. (“Father”) appeals from the order entered on August 29, 2019. The
    subject order granted L.W. (“Mother”) permission to relocate from Pittsburgh
    to North Carolina with the parties’ four-year-old son, L.K. (“Child”), and
    modified the parties’ child custody arrangement to accommodate the
    relocation. We affirm.
    As the trial court explained:
    The parties were never married. They were involved in an
    on-again off-again relationship beginning in 2010 and were
    living together when Child was born, separating not long
    after. Their relationship was tumultuous and their first
    custody order evolved out of the settlement of a protection
    from abuse through a non-PFA consent agreement.
    Mother has always had primary [physical] custody of Child,
    with Father having approximately 100 overnights per year.
    Father, however, also exercised custody most weekdays
    while Mother was working as the parties agreed this was
    preferable to Child being in daycare.
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    Mother worked as a dental hygienist and Father is a
    self-employed personal trainer with flexible hours. Mother
    has an [11-year-old] daughter from a former relationship;
    Father has no other children. Both parties have extended
    family in the Pittsburgh area. . . .
    Approximately a year ago, Mother met [S.B.] at a wedding
    and the two began a relationship. [S.B.] lives in North
    Carolina where he is a state trooper. The two became
    engaged to be married and Mother is expecting his child. . .
    .
    [On February 6, 2019,] Mother filed a notice of proposed
    relocation[, where she requested permission to relocate with
    Child from Pittsburgh to North Carolina. Father opposed the
    relocation]. An expedited [two-hour] hearing was held on
    Mother’s petition on June 4, 2019 and [the trial court]
    permitted [Mother] to relocate by [order] dated June 19,
    2019. Mother then moved to North Carolina with Child.
    Father filed a complaint for custody as well as a motion for
    reconsideration and a full trial was scheduled. After a
    [one-and-a-half] day trial and consideration of a post-trial
    memorandum of law submitted by Father, [the trial court]
    entered [an order on August 29, 2019,] again granting
    Mother’s request to relocate and setting forth a
    comprehensive custody schedule for the parties.
    Trial Court Opinion, 11/6/19, at 2-3 (footnotes and some capitalization
    omitted).
    Father filed a timely notice of appeal.     He numbers 17 issues in his
    statement of questions involved:
    1. Did the trial court commit an abuse of discretion and/or
    error of law by failing to give proper weight and consideration
    to [Father’s] role in [Child’s] life in determining that this
    factor favors [Mother]?
    2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or make an error
    of law by failing to take into account the contacts [Child] has
    with his current status, more specifically, the relationships
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    with all of his extended family in his current area, as opposed
    to no extended family, except for a sibling, in the proposed
    relocation state?
    3. Did the trial court commit an abuse of discretion and/or
    error of law by concluding that [Mother’s] proposal provides
    to [Father], feasible opportunity to preserve the relationship
    between [Father and Child]?
    4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or make an error
    of law by concluding [Father] has attempted to turn [Child]
    against [Mother’s] fiancé that he is regularly and significantly
    late for exchanges?
    5. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or make an error
    of law in determining that [Child’s] life would be enhanced by
    allowing the relocation?
    6. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or make an error
    of law by concluding that [Father] has been aggressive in the
    past?
    7. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or make an error
    of law concluding under Factor 4 that [Child] is resilient and
    very capable of adjusting and that will create stability and
    continuity in [Child’s] life?
    8. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or make an error
    of law by concluding under Factor 5 that [Mother], though
    she has no family in North Carolina, she may be a stay at
    home mom and be with her children?
    9. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or make an error
    of law by concluding under Factor 8 that [Father] has
    discouraged [Child] from having a relationship with Mother’s
    fiancé?
    10. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or make an
    error of law by determining under Factors 9 and 10 that
    [Father] needs to improve his relationship and behavior
    toward [Mother] when he is frustrated and not taking into
    account [Mother’s] behavior toward [Father] in providing that
    these factors favor [Mother]?
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    11. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or make an
    error of law in determining that the proximity of the parties,
    under Factor 11, in considering [Mother’s] move to North
    Carolina that the parties will be very far away, without placing
    emphasis that this would favor a non relocation?
    12. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or make an
    error of law under Factor 13, determining that [Father] has
    initiated much of the conflict between the parties?
    13. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or make an
    error of law by failing to take into account that Mother had
    indicated in her relocation petition that she was seeking
    employment, however, has changed that position, in that,
    she had substantial employment in this area?
    14. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or make an
    error of law by failing to take into consideration that Mother
    has had significant relationships over the past several years
    and had only a one-year relationship with her current fiancé,
    that she would see on a biweekly basis?
    15. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or make an
    error of law by failing to take into account the upcoming
    educational needs of [Child]?
    16. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or make an
    error of law in allowing the relocation prior to the marriage of
    the parties and significant ownership of property in the North
    Carolina area?
    17. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or make an
    error of law by failing to impartially [apply] all relevant
    statutory factors to the present case?
    Father’s Brief at 10-12 (some capitalization omitted).
    We have explained:
    In reviewing a custody order, our scope is of the broadest
    type and our standard is abuse of discretion. We must accept
    findings of the trial court that are supported by competent
    evidence of record, as our role does not include making
    independent factual determinations. In addition, with regard
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    to issues of credibility and weight of the evidence, we must
    defer to the [trial judge] who viewed and assessed the
    witnesses first-hand. However, we are not bound by the trial
    court's deductions or inferences from its factual findings.
    Ultimately, the test is whether the trial court's conclusions
    are unreasonable as shown by the evidence of record.
    We may reject the conclusions of the trial court only if they
    involve an error of law, or are unreasonable in light of the
    sustainable findings of the trial court.
    A.D. v. M.A.B., 
    989 A.2d 32
    , 35-36 (Pa. Super. 2010) (quotations and
    citations omitted).
    Section 5338 of the Child Custody Act (“the Act”) provides that, upon
    petition, a trial court may modify a custody order if it serves the best interests
    of the child. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5338. Section 5328(a) sets forth the best interest
    factors that the trial court must consider. See E.D. v. M.P., 
    33 A.3d 73
    , 80-
    81 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2011). Trial courts are required to consider “[a]ll of the
    factors listed in section 5328(a) . . . when entering a custody order.” J.R.M.
    v. J.E.A., 
    33 A.3d 647
    , 652 (Pa. Super. 2011) (emphasis omitted).
    Section 5328(a) of the Act provides as follows.
    § 5328. Factors to consider when awarding custody
    (a) Factors.—In ordering any form of custody, the court
    shall determine the best interest of the child by considering
    all relevant factors, giving weighted consideration to those
    factors which affect the safety of the child, including the
    following:
    (1) Which party is more likely to encourage and permit
    frequent and continuing contact between the child and
    another party.
    (2) The present and past abuse committed by a party or
    member of the party's household, whether there is a
    continued risk of harm to the child or an abused party and
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    which party can better provide adequate physical safeguards
    and supervision of the child.
    (2.1) The information set forth in section 5329.1(a)(1) and
    (2) (relating to consideration of child abuse and involvement
    with protective services).
    (3) The parental duties performed by each party on behalf of
    the child.
    (4) The need for stability and continuity in the child's
    education, family life and community life.
    (5) The availability of extended family.
    (6) The child's sibling relationships.
    (7) The well-reasoned preference of the child, based on the
    child's maturity and judgment.
    (8) The attempts of a parent to turn the child against the
    other parent, except in cases of domestic violence where
    reasonable safety measures are necessary to protect the
    child from harm.
    (9) Which party is more likely to maintain a loving, stable,
    consistent and nurturing relationship with the child adequate
    for the child's emotional needs.
    (10) Which party is more likely to attend to the daily physical,
    emotional, developmental, educational and special needs of
    the child.
    (11) The proximity of the residences of the parties.
    (12) Each party's availability to care for the child or ability to
    make appropriate child-care arrangements.
    (13) The level of conflict between the parties and the
    willingness and ability of the parties to cooperate with one
    another. A party's effort to protect a child from abuse by
    another party is not evidence of unwillingness or inability to
    cooperate with that party.
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    (14) The history of drug or alcohol abuse of a party or
    member of a party's household.
    (15) The mental and physical condition of a party or member
    of a party's household.
    (16) Any other relevant factor.
    23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328.
    Where a request for relocation of the subject child along with a parent
    is involved, the trial court must consider the following ten relocation factors
    set forth within section 5337(h) of the Act:
    (1) The nature, quality, extent of involvement and duration
    of the child's relationship with the party proposing to relocate
    and with the nonrelocating party, siblings and other
    significant persons in the child's life.
    (2) The age, developmental stage, needs of the child and the
    likely impact the relocation will have on the child's physical,
    educational and emotional development, taking into
    consideration any special needs of the child.
    (3) The feasibility of preserving the relationship between the
    nonrelocating party and the child through suitable custody
    arrangements, considering the logistics and financial
    circumstances of the parties.
    (4) The child's preference, taking into consideration the age
    and maturity of the child.
    (5) Whether there is an established pattern of conduct of
    either party to promote or thwart the relationship of the child
    and the other party.
    (6) Whether the relocation will enhance the general quality
    of life for the party seeking the relocation, including, but not
    limited to, financial or emotional benefit or educational
    opportunity.
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    (7) Whether the relocation will enhance the general quality
    of life for the child, including, but not limited to, financial or
    emotional benefit or educational opportunity.
    (8) The reasons and motivation of each party for seeking or
    opposing the relocation.
    (9) The present and past abuse committed by a party or
    member of the party's household and whether there is a
    continued risk of harm to the child or an abused party.
    (10) Any other factor affecting the best interest of the child.
    23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5337(h).
    “The party proposing the relocation has the burden of establishing that
    the relocation will serve the best interest of the child as shown under the
    factors set forth in [Section 5337(h)].” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5337(i)(1).
    Within Father’s brief on appeal, Father challenges the weight the trial
    court afforded the evidence and contends that the trial court incorrectly
    weighed the evidence in Mother’s favor. Essentially, Father claims that – as
    to almost every single custody and relocation factor – the trial court should
    have weighed the evidence so that the factor favored him. See Father’s Brief
    at 1-62.   However, our role as an appellate court is not to reweigh the
    evidence. Indeed, as we have explained, we may only review for an abuse of
    discretion. Further, we have observed:
    we consistently have held that the discretion that a trial court
    employs in custody matters should be accorded the utmost
    respect, given the special nature of the proceeding and the
    lasting impact the result will have on the lives of the parties
    concerned. Indeed, the knowledge gained by a trial court in
    observing witnesses in a custody proceeding cannot
    adequately be imparted to an appellate court by a printed
    record.
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    Ketterer v. Seifert, 
    902 A.2d 533
    , 540 (Pa. Super. 2006) (quotations,
    citations, and corrections omitted).
    In this case, after reviewing the briefs of the parties, the relevant law,
    the certified record, the notes of testimony and the opinions of the able trial
    court judge, the Honorable Cathleen Bubash, we conclude that Father is not
    entitled to relief and that Judge Bubash’s opinions, entered on August 29,
    2019 and November 6, 2019, meticulously and accurately dispose of Father’s
    issues on appeal.    Therefore, we affirm on the basis of Judge Bubash’s
    thorough opinions and adopt them as our own. In any future filing with this
    or any other court addressing this ruling, the filing party shall attach a copy
    of Judge Bubash’s August 29, 2019 and November 6, 2019 opinions.
    Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 3/27/2020
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Document Info

Docket Number: 1462 WDA 2019

Filed Date: 3/27/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/27/2020