Com. v. Vanzant, E. ( 2020 )


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  • J-S09023-20
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    ERIK VANZANT                               :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 1102 EDA 2019
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 15, 2019
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-51-CR-0507511-1988
    BEFORE:      SHOGAN, J., LAZARUS, J., and COLINS, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:                              FILED MARCH 27, 2020
    Erik Vanzant appeals from the amended judgment of sentence, entered
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, after a jury convicted
    him of first-degree murder,1 robbery,2 burglary,3 theft by unlawful taking,4
    and theft by receiving stolen property.5 After careful review, we affirm.
    Vanzant committed the above-mentioned crimes on April 14, 1988,
    when he was 14 years old. A jury convicted him in October of 1989. On
    ____________________________________________
    *   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    1   18 Pa.C.S. § 2502.
    2   18 Pa.C.S. § 3701.
    3   18 Pa.C.S. § 3502.
    4   18 Pa.C.S. § 3921.
    5   18 Pa.C.S. § 3925.
    J-S09023-20
    February 20, 1991, the court sentenced him to life imprisonment plus a
    consecutive aggregate sentence of 20-40 years’ imprisonment.          Vanzant
    unsuccessfully pursued relief on direct appeal and filed multiple Post-
    Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) petitions, all of which were denied. On December
    30, 2013, Vanzant filed another amended PCRA petition, arguing a change in
    the law rendered his prior sentence illegal.    The court vacated Vanzant’s
    judgment of sentence and resentenced him on September 21, 2018, to a
    period of 31 years’ to life imprisonment. The court also ordered Vanzant to
    complete sex offender treatment and that sex offender status be a condition
    of any possible parole.
    On October 16, 2018, Vanzant sought permission to file post-sentence
    motions nunc pro tunc, which the court allowed. On March 15, 2019, the court
    amended the September 21, 2018 judgment of sentence. The court granted,
    in part, Vanzant’s post-sentence motion, eliminating the requirement of sex
    offender status as a condition of parole and limiting sex offender treatment to
    one year. However, the court denied Vanzant’s request to eliminate the life
    tail on his sentence. On April 12, 2019, Vanzant filed this timely appeal.
    On appeal, Vanzant claims it is unconstitutional to sentence a person to
    a mandatory lifetime period of parole for a juvenile offense. He argues that
    Miller v. Alabama, 
    567 U.S. 460
     (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana,
    
    136 S. Ct. 718
     (2016), require a court resentencing a juvenile to fashion an
    individualized sentence, which is contrary to Pennsylvania’s requirement that
    the maximum sentence be life imprisonment.
    -2-
    J-S09023-20
    In Miller, the United States Supreme Court found unconstitutional
    mandatory life-without-parole sentences for minors. Miller, 
    567 U.S. at 479
    .
    In Montgomery, the United States Supreme Court clarified that its ruling in
    Miller was retroactive. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 732. The Pennsylvania
    Supreme Court subsequently interpreted Miller and held:
    Miller neither barred imposition of a life-without-parole sentence
    on a juvenile categorically nor indicated that a life sentence with
    the possibility of parole could never be mandatorily imposed on a
    juvenile. Rather, Miller requires only that there be judicial
    consideration of the appropriate age-related factors set forth in
    that decision prior to the imposition of a sentence of a life
    imprisonment without the possibility of parole on a juvenile.
    Commonwealth v. Batts, 
    66 A.3d 286
    , 295-96 (Pa. 2013) (Batts I)
    (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court went
    on to state that once a sentencing court evaluates the criteria identified in
    Miller and determines a life-without-parole sentence is inappropriate, it must
    impose a “mandatory maximum sentence of life imprisonment as required by
    [s]ection 1102(a), accompanied by a minimum sentence determined by the
    common pleas court upon resentencing.” Batts I, 66 A.3d at 297 (citing 18
    Pa.C.S. § 1102(a)). After the Pennsylvania Supreme Court heard argument
    on Batts I, but prior to publishing its opinion, the Pennsylvania General
    Assembly codified the Miller factors. 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102.1. However, section
    1102.1 only applies to convictions that occur after June 24, 2012. Four years
    later, the Court reaffirmed its ruling. See Commonwealth v. Batts, 
    163 A.3d 410
    , 439-41 (Pa. 2017) (Batts II).
    -3-
    J-S09023-20
    This Court has followed our Supreme Court’s rulings and upheld
    maximum       life   sentences    for   juveniles   convicted   of   murder.    See
    Commonwealth v. Ligon, 
    206 A.3d 1196
    , 1200-01 (Pa. Super. 2019)
    (finding sentencing court statutorily required to sentence juvenile defendant
    convicted of first-degree murder, prior to Miller, to maximum term of life
    imprisonment); Commonwealth v. Seskey, 
    170 A.3d 1105
    , 1008-09 (Pa.
    Super. 2017) (holding trial court required to impose maximum life sentence
    when it resentenced juvenile defendant convicted of first-degree murder prior
    to Miller).
    Based on the above-precedent, it is clear that Vanzant’s argument that
    “the sentencing [c]ourt erroneously believed it was required to impose a
    mandatory lifetime parole tail” is incorrect. Appellant’s Brief, at 5.         Under
    Batts I, Batts II, Ligon, and Seskey, the sentencing court was statutorily
    required pursuant to section 1102(a) to sentence Vanzant to a maximum term
    of life imprisonment.6      Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    ____________________________________________
    6 The Commonwealth argues that we should adopt the reasoning in Songster
    v. Beard, 
    201 F. Supp. 3d 639
     (E.D. Pa. 2016), arguing that a maximum
    sentence of life imprisonment, regardless of the minimum term, does not
    reflect individualized sentencing. Appellee’s Brief, at 4. However, Songster
    is not binding on this Court. Furthermore, the Commonwealth recognizes that
    this Court has repeatedly upheld the sentencing of juvenile defendants
    convicted of first or second-degree murder to maximum sentences of life
    imprisonment. Id. at 5.
    -4-
    J-S09023-20
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 3/27/2020
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1102 EDA 2019

Filed Date: 3/27/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/27/2020