Com. v. Hoyle, K. ( 2020 )


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  • J-S04013-20
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                           :
    :
    :
    KENNETH HOYLE                             :
    :
    Appellant              :   No. 443 EDA 2019
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 19, 2018
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-51-CR-0008019-2017,
    CP-51-CR-0008020-2017
    BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and MURRAY, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                        FILED MARCH 27, 2020
    Appellant, Kenneth Hoyle, appeals from the October 19, 2018 judgment
    of sentence of two consecutive terms of life incarceration, without the
    possibility of parole, imposed after a jury convicted him of two counts of first-
    degree murder and possessing an instrument of crime. After careful review,
    we are compelled to quash this appeal.
    A detailed summary of the facts of Appellant’s case is not necessary to
    our disposition. We only note that in the early morning hours of July 16, 2017,
    Appellant shot his neighbor, Robert DePaul, and DePaul’s female companion,
    August Dempsey, after a verbal altercation. Appellant was arrested on July
    17, 2017, and charged in two separate cases (pertaining to each victim) with
    the above-stated crimes. His cases were consolidated and, at the close of his
    jury trial on October 19, 2018, he was convicted of each offense with which
    J-S04013-20
    he was charged.    Appellant was sentenced that same day to the term of
    incarceration set forth supra. He filed a timely post-sentence motion, which
    was denied on February 6, 2019.
    On February 9, 2019, Appellant filed a single notice of appeal listing both
    docket numbers of his two underlying cases. On November 13, 2019, this
    Court issued a rule to show cause order, directing Appellant to explain why
    we should not quash his appeal based on his failure to comply with
    Commonwealth v. Walker, 
    185 A.3d 969
     (Pa. 2018) (holding that “where
    a single order resolves issues arising on more than one docket, separate
    notices of appeal must be filed for each of those cases”). On November 17,
    2019, Appellant filed a response, claiming that his case is “completely
    distinguishable from … Walker” because he “was convicted for killing two
    victims during one shooting incident[,] and the only reason for separate case
    numbers being issued was the Commonwealth’s decision to use two separate
    numbers for the different victims….” Appellant’s Response, 11/17/19, at 1 ¶
    2 (pages unnumbered). On November 27, 2019, this Court discharged the
    rule to show cause order and referred the Walker issue to the merits panel.
    We now determine that we must quash Appellant’s appeal. As this Court
    explained in Commonwealth v. Creese, 
    216 A.3d 1142
     (Pa. Super. 2019):
    The Official Note to Rule 341(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of
    Appellate Procedure, which was amended in 2013, provides:
    Where, however, one or more orders resolves issues arising
    on more than one docket or relating to more than one
    judgment, separate notices of appeals must be filed.
    Commonwealth v. C.M.K., 
    932 A.2d 111
    , 113 & n.3 (Pa.
    -2-
    J-S04013-20
    Super. 2007) (quashing appeal taken by single notice of
    appeal from order on remand for consideration under
    Pa.R.Crim.P. 607 of two persons’ judgments of sentence).
    Pa.R.A.P. 341, Official Note.
    Until recently, it was common for courts of this
    Commonwealth to allow appeals to proceed, even if they failed to
    conform with Rule 341. See, e.g., In the Interest of P.S., 
    158 A.3d 643
    , 648 (Pa. Super. 2017) (noting common practice to allow
    appeals to proceed if the issues involved are nearly identical, no
    objection has been raised, and the period for appeal has expired).
    In … Walker, however, our Supreme Court held
    unequivocally that “prospectively, where a single order resolves
    issues arising on more than one docket, separate notices of
    appeal must be filed for each case.” Walker, 185 A.3d at 971
    (emphasis added). The Supreme Court observed that the Official
    Note to Rule 341 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure
    “provides a bright-line mandatory instruction to practitioners to
    file separate notices of appeal,” and accordingly, determined that
    “the failure to do so requires the appellate court to quash
    the appeal.” Id. at 976-77 (emphasis added). Because this
    mandate was contrary to decades of case law, the Supreme Court
    specified that it would apply only to appeals filed after June 1,
    2018, the date Walker was filed. Id.
    Id. at 1143 (emphasis added in Creese).
    The Creese panel construed Walker as mandating that “we may not
    accept a notice of appeal listing multiple docket numbers…. Instead, a notice
    of appeal may contain only one docket number.”           Id. at 1144. While we
    “recognize[d] the severity of this application[,]” we reasoned that,
    if we consistently apply Walker by quashing any notice of appeal
    filed after June 1, 2018[,] that contains more than one docket
    number, consistent with Walker, and regardless of what occurred
    in the actual filing of that notice of appeal below, it will ultimately
    benefit appellants and counsel by providing clear guidance on how
    to satisfy Walker and Rule 341(a). Conversely, if we create
    exceptions to Rule 341 and Walker to avoid a harsh result, we
    will return to a scenario that the amendment to the Official Note
    -3-
    J-S04013-20
    and Walker sought to abrogate. In addition, we will do a
    disservice to appellants and counsel by applying the rule in a
    manner that is both confusing and inconsistent, the latter of which
    would be patently unfair.
    Creese, 216 A.3d at 1144.
    Here, Appellant essentially asks us to create an exception to the bright-
    line rule of Walker by assessing the facts of his case, rather than the face of
    his notice of appeal. Under Creese, we cannot do so. Instead, we must quash
    Appellant’s appeal, as it was filed after June 1, 2018, and it listed two docket
    numbers.1
    Appeal quashed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
    ____________________________________________
    1 See also Commonwealth v. Nichols, 
    208 A.3d 1087
     (Pa. Super. 2019)
    (quashing a counseled appeal that listed three trial court docket numbers and
    was filed after the Walker decision); Commonwealth v. Williams, 
    206 A.3d 573
     (Pa. Super. 2019) (quashing a pro se appeal that listed four trial court
    docket numbers and was filed after the Walker decision).             But see
    Commonwealth v. Stansbury, 
    219 A.3d 157
     (Pa. Super. 2019) (declining
    to quash a pro se appeal because the order disposing of his petition under the
    Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541-9546, amounted to a breakdown
    in the operations of the court). We observe that Appellant made no argument
    that our decision in Stansbury, involving a pro se notice of appeal, should be
    applied to his counseled appeal in this case.
    -4-
    J-S04013-20
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 3/27/2020
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 443 EDA 2019

Filed Date: 3/27/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/27/2020