Com. v. Munford, D. ( 2020 )

J-S61027-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
DARRIN JEROME MUNFORD :
:
Appellant : No. 341 EDA 2019
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 10, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-45-CR-0003018-2017
BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED MARCH 30, 2020
Appellant, Darrin Jerome Munford, appeals from the judgment of
sentence entered on December 10, 2018, as made final by the denial of
Appellant’s post-sentence motion on January 7, 2019. We affirm.
The Commonwealth charged Appellant with burglary, criminal trespass,
theft by unlawful taking, criminal attempt at involuntary deviate sexual
intercourse (“IDSI”), and two counts of indecent exposure.1 See
Commonwealth’s Information, 6/5/18, at 1-2. Appellant proceeded to a jury
trial, where the following evidence was presented.
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3502(a)(1), 3503(a)(1)(i), 3921(a), 901(a), and 3127(a),
respectively.
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L.H. testified on direct examination that, on October 25, 2017, she was
working at the Healing Touch Massage. She testified that she worked at the
shop primarily as a cleaning person and, sometimes, she would look after the
store when the owner, C.C., was busy or not present. N.T. Trial, 9/13/18, at
61. L.H. testified that, on October 25, 2017, Appellant walked up to the door
of the shop. She testified:
[At t]hat period of time the owner [of the shop, C.C.,] was
busy with something else so I was there watching the shop
for her. I did not know [Appellant] very well so I opened the
door for him. . . . Since I did not know [Appellant] very well
I called [C.C.], asked her about the person and [C.C.] told
me . . . that that’s a questionable person. He used to have
harassment activities in our store.
Id. at 51-52.
According to L.H., she then asked Appellant to leave. Id. at 52.
Appellant, however, did not leave and, instead, began to pull L.H. inside of
the shop. Id. at 53-54. L.H. testified that she fought back and “yell[ed] out
help, help.” Id. at 54. As L.H. testified, this scared Appellant and he fled.
Id.
L.H. testified that, the next day, she dumped the garbage from the store
and walked back inside to take a nap. Id. at 55. She testified that C.C. saw
that Appellant was impermissibly present in the shop and C.C. asked L.H. to
call a person named R.S., C.C.’s boyfriend. Id. at 72. L.H. testified that she
telephoned C.C.’s boyfriend and told him to come to the shop. She testified:
After I made the phone call I quickly tried to go outside then
I met this intruder. He put me – he pulled me down. He
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tried to pull me inside the room and we started some fight
with each other and he put me on the bed.
At that moment he exposed his thing and he pulled my head
towards it.
I felt he wanted to rape me so I started to fight him.
I was – at the same time I was yelling help, help and at that
time [C.C.] was outside calling the police.
At the same moment he was trying to pull[] my pants down.
I felt he was trying to rape me; that’s why I fought with him.
Id. at 55-56.
L.H. testified that “[C.C.] called the police and somebody else came so
[Appellant] was afraid” and left. Id. at 56.
During cross-examination, L.H. was confronted with her preliminary
hearing testimony. She acknowledged that, during the preliminary hearing,
she testified that, at approximately 10:00 p.m. on October 25, 2017, she and
C.C. were in the process of closing the shop for the night. L.H. acknowledged
that she testified that she went into the back room to go to bed when she
“found something on the chair.” Id. at 63. She acknowledged that she
testified at the preliminary hearing that she “pulled open the curtain,” saw
Appellant standing there, and yelled. Id. at 63 and 66. As L.H. testified
during the preliminary hearing, at this point, Appellant ran away because C.C.
was still present in the shop. Id. at 64.
C.C., the owner of Healing Touch Massage, testified next. C.C. testified:
On [the evening of October 25, 2017,] I was working [in the
shop] and [L.H.] was watching the store at the reception desk
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and at that moment she went to some room and suddenly
she yelled out. I was scared so much.
At that moment I saw [Appellant] was naked. He was
standing by the room with two beds. When I saw him like
that I yelled go, go as he was to leave.
He left. After he left we were not able to figure out how he
got in so we checked the video recorder. After that we
started to check every room, check all the windows including
the window of the bathroom. At last we found one particular
window in the back room. The screen was pulled up but there
is still part of it opened. There’s a flower pot that I placed
somewhere that fell down and I started to check if I had
anything missing. At that moment I did not find [] my key
[or] the landline phone – the phone set [was] missing but
later on I found those were missing. . . . The key that was
missing [was the key to] both the . . . front door and my door
of my room. . . .
[The next day, at approximately 8:00 or 9:00 in the evening,
L.H.] went to dump the trash. After that she came in.
[Appellant] was inside too. We were so surprised. I let [L.H.]
call [my boyfriend]. At that time[, Appellant] locked me
outside of [the] room. . . . I tried to open the door but I was
not able to. I heard [L.H. yelling] inside help, help.
I ran into the street, tried to find someone to help us. I also
went to the wine bar not far away from our store. I asked
them to help me. Three person[s] responded. They came
and helped me call the police. One of the individuals kicked
the door and [Appellant] came out. I grabbed him but I was
not able to fight with him and he took off.
Id. at 81-82, 83, 117, and 119 (some paragraphing omitted).
C.C. testified that Appellant stole approximately $60.00 from her shop
on the second night that he came into her property. Id. at 84.
C.C. also testified that Appellant had a history of harassing them and
that, prior to October 2017, she had photographed him multiple times. C.C.
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testified: “[I took the photographs b]ecause [Appellant] came to harass us
several times. We were afraid of him. That’s why I took the photo[graphs].”
Id. at 88. C.C. further testified that, in the spring of 2016, Appellant “came
into the shop. He took off his clothing and . . . [h]e exposed himself . . . [and]
we asked him to leave. He refused so we called the police. . . . When he
realized that we called the police he left.” Id. at 92-93.
The Commonwealth next called C.C.’s boyfriend, R.S., as a witness.
R.S. testified:
Well I think on [October 25, 2017, Appellant] came into the
shop and harassed the girls. Usually when he comes he
comes months apart. He’d come and he’d harass them and
try to take something and get fresh or whatever but this time
he came the next day. . . .
[W]e nicknamed him [NBA] . . . [b]ecause he’s a tall guy and
he always wears basketball shorts or a warm up suit so[, on
October 26, 2017, C.C.] called me [and said NBA, NBA,]
come right away, come right away. So I turned right around
and came back and also I called the cops at the same time.
...
[On] that particular day[, Appellant] locked [C.C.] out and
she was yelling out in the street. So there was some people
. . . there’s a restaurant right there . . . and some people
seen her . . . [s]o they came and [C.C.] told them that
[Appellant] was inside with the other girl . . . [a]nd I think
they called the police. So even though I called the police . .
. when I got there the police [were] already there.
Id. at 134-135 (some paragraphing omitted).
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Another individual, named Jimmy Schlier, Jr., testified that, on the night
of October 26, 2017, he had just finished eating at a nearby inn “when a lady
[ran] across the parking lot.” Id. at 145. Mr. Schlier testified:
She was very frantic. I couldn’t quite understand what she
was saying. She proceeded to have I think one of my buddies
follow her over to the building next door of the parking lot
where she had been beating on the door and very frantic
about it.
I followed over then and she kept saying danger, danger;
something along the lines of something being inside that you
know somebody was in trouble. . . . And then at that point I
put my weapon on my side and then I had started to beat on
the door. I had somebody call the cops. . . . At that point I
believe I had my weapon drawn because I didn’t know what
was on the other side of the door and what could come out.
When the gentleman came out I had told him that he needed
to get on the ground and wait for the cops to come. He kept
saying no man, it’s good and he took off running and I
holstered my weapon and waited for the cops to come.
Id. at 145-146 (some paragraphing omitted).
The Healing Touch Massage had two surveillance cameras that recorded
the events of October 25 and 26, 2017. The surveillance video was played for
the jury, with Detective James Wagner of the Pocono Township Police
Department narrating. As Detective Wagner described the video for October
25, 2017, the video showed Appellant entering the shop, by himself and
apparently with a key, and “quietly close the door as if he’s sneaking in.” N.T.
Trial, 9/14/18, at 50-51. Appellant then spent an hour and 25 minutes “off
camera in the back” of the shop. Id. at 51.
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When Appellant next reappeared on camera, it was because L.H.
discovered Appellant in the shop. Id. at 56. As Detective Wagner described:
[The video shows L.H.] going back inside the kitchen. And
then [L.H.] comes out of the kitchen and there is [Appellant].
. . . At some point during this interaction . . . I know that
[R.S.] gets called. We heard that testimony and I knew that
through the investigation that [R.S.] was called and that’s
where the [NBA] communication started. . . . [When
Appellant appears on camera, h]e’s leaning over towards
[L.H.] He unlocks the door, gestures to her maybe to be
quiet, tries to lean over and kiss her. She locks the deadbolt
and the doorknob.
Id. at 56-57.
Detective Wagner described the video from October 26, 2017 in the
following manner:
That’s [Appellant] coming back a second day. You can see
what it looks like him removing a potential key [to] the door.
. . . He appears to lock the doorknob.
He pulls his cell phone out of his pocket and he’s
communicating with someone down the hallway. This is a
customer who leaves. Clearly he’s unlocking the door,
[Appellant] locked, he goes out and you’ll see [C.C.] as she
testified she goes out to try to get help.
And then watch. [Appellant r]ushes to the door, locks [C.C.]
out. He turns into the kitchen.
...
[L.H.] is obviously off screen, she’s in the back room.
[Appellant is] in there snooping around the kitchen area.
And again this is all significant in my investigation because
this is not normal activity for invited in guests.
Now [Appellant is] in the back where [L.H.] is in the back.
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...
[The exterior camera shows that C.C.] leaves, comes outside.
She went right. [Appellant] closes the door. She’s now
locked out and she’s trying to get in the door. She’s looking
in – there’s a window over here on the side. You can see her
leaning over. That’s the window into the kitchen area. . . .
She’s locked out of her business.
...
[C.C.] appears still trying to get into her business. She’s
frantically now going out to the road . . . trying to flag down
help. And obviously there’s no cars actually coming by.
The whole time that this is happening [Appellant] is still in
the back and [L.H.] is in the back.
[C.C.] now runs over to the parking lot of the [nearby inn].
...
This is [C.C.] running to the door with [the friends of Jimmy
Schlier, Jr. This is consistent with Mr. Schlier’s testimony that
they] came over first. Mr. Schlier eventually . . . pull[ed] in
[with his truck]. . . . [C.C.] is over here with her hands,
she’s trying to communicate.
...
Mr. Schlier, as he testified, tried to break in the door and
actually pounded on the door.
...
[Next we see Appellant] letting himself out and [L.H.] is
following behind. . . . It looks like [L.H. is] pulling up her
pants. [C.C.] went after [Appellant] and that’s when Mr.
Schlier encounters him off camera.
Id. at 61-66.
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Appellant’s fingerprints were found on the inside of the shop’s
windowsill. Id. at 172. Further, Detective Wagner testified that the
fingerprints he found on the window were oriented in a way that was
“consistent with . . . if someone had reached over, [and] pulled themselves
up and through the window.” N.T. Trial, 9/14/18, at 35-36.
Over Appellant’s objection, the Commonwealth introduced evidence
that, in 2003, Appellant committed multiple prior bad acts. First, Chief Brian
Biechy of the Lehighton Borough Police Department testified that Appellant
admitted to the following:
[Appellant] stated [that] on June 9, 2003[,] . . . he was at
the Mahoning Inn with friends who rented the room at the
motel for a race weekend. After the race everyone checked
out and left. [Appellant] did not leave and stayed in the
room.
[Appellant] stated he did undress and was lying on the bed
naked so the cleaning lady would find him like that.
When the cleaning lady did find [Appellant] naked on the bed
she left and [Appellant] left the motel.
...
We received a similar complaint in August of the same year .
. . [when Appellant] went to the same place and did the same
thing.
Id. at 152-153 and 155.
Chief Biechy testified that the complainant declared that Appellant was
found “naked on the bed masturbating at the time.” Id. at 149. Further,
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Appellant told the Chief that he knew that he did not have permission to be in
the room at the time. Id. at 151.
Chief Biechy testified that Appellant was charged with criminal trespass
and indecent exposure for both acts and he pleaded guilty to the charges.
See id. at 155-156.
Detective Sergeant Kenneth E. Lenning, III of the Pocono Mountain
Regional Police Department testified regarding three additional prior bad acts
Appellant committed in 2003. As Detective Sergeant Lenning testified:
The allegations [against Appellant] were he had went to a
motel called the Sullivan Trail Motel . . . and he was there on
three occasions. . . . On the last occasion which was August
16th he was apprehended inside one of the rooms.
Two prior occasions, one being on July 31, 2003 and then
another occasion on August 5, 2003 he had gone to the
motel. He was trespassing in a room that he had no business
being in. . . . [T]hrough the investigation it was determined
he had confronted one of the chamber maids. He was nude
at the time. He was lying in the bed that was closest to the
door in the room that he wasn’t supposed to be in . . . and
he was masturbating at the time.
...
[As to the August 16, 2003 incident, Appellant admitted] that
he had stolen the [hotel] key on August 5, 2003 and then
used it on August 16th when he returned to that room and
went into the room and was waiting for someone to come . .
. [t]o find [him] naked and exposed.
Id. at 159-161.
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As a result of these actions in the Sullivan Trail Motel, the
Commonwealth charged Appellant with indecent exposure, theft, criminal
trespass, and burglary. Id. at 163.
At the conclusion of Appellant’s trial in the case, sub judice, the jury
found Appellant guilty of burglary, criminal trespass, and theft by unlawful
taking; the jury also found Appellant not guilty of attempt to commit IDSI and
both counts of indecent exposure. Id. at 255-256. On December 10, 2018,
the trial court sentenced Appellant to serve an aggregate term of 54 to 108
months in prison for his convictions. N.T. Sentencing, 12/10/18, at 11.
The trial court denied Appellant’s post-sentence motion on January 7,
2019 and Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. He raises five claims in
this appeal:
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by permitting [L.H.]
to testify to hearsay evidence?
2. Did the trial court err in explaining the charge of criminal
trespass and the meaning of “authorized person”?
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by admitting
evidence of [Appellant’s] prior bad acts?
4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it denied
[Appellant’s] post-sentence motion [for judgment] of
acquittal on the burglary count as he was not convicted of the
underlying offense claimed in the criminal information?
5. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by sentencing
[Appellant] to an aggravated sentence based upon the
unproven allegations of the criminal information?
Appellant’s Brief at 6 (some capitalization omitted).
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First, Appellant claims that the trial court erred in admitting portions of
L.H.’s testimony, as the statements constituted inadmissible hearsay.
As this Court has stated:
our standard of review for evidentiary rulings is a narrow one:
when we review a trial court's ruling on admission of
evidence, we must acknowledge that decisions on
admissibility are within the sound discretion of the trial court
and will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion or
misapplication of law. In addition, for a ruling on evidence to
constitute reversible error, it must have been harmful or
prejudicial to the complaining party. A party suffers prejudice
when the trial court's error could have affected the verdict.
Commonwealth v. Tyack, 128 A.3d 254, 257 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quotations,
citations, and corrections omitted).
According to Appellant, the trial court erred in allowing L.H. to testify as
to certain statements C.C. made to her. Specifically, Appellant claims the trial
court erred in allowing L.H. to testify that, when Appellant initially arrived at
the shop on October 25, 2017, L.H. called C.C. and C.C. told her “that that’s
a questionable person. He used to have harassment activities in our store.”
See N.T. Trial, 9/13/18, at 51-52; Appellant’s Brief at 13-14. Appellant claims
that the quoted statement constitutes inadmissible hearsay and that it caused
him “overwhelming prejudice.” Appellant’s Brief at 15. Appellant’s claim fails
because, even if the statement constituted inadmissible hearsay, the
admission of the testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained:
an erroneous ruling by a trial court on an evidentiary issue
does not require us to grant relief where the error was
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harmless. The Commonwealth bears the burden of
demonstrating harmless error.
Harmless error exists where: (1) the error did not prejudice
the defendant or the prejudice was de minimis; (2) the
erroneously admitted evidence was merely cumulative of
other untainted evidence which was substantially similar to
the erroneously admitted evidence; or (3) the properly
admitted and uncontradicted evidence of guilt was so
overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the error was so
insignificant by comparison that the error could not have
contributed to the verdict.
Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 889 A.2d 501, 521 (Pa. 2005) (quotations and
citations omitted).
Here, the admission of L.H.’s testimony was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt because it was “merely cumulative of other untainted
evidence which was substantially similar to the erroneously admitted
evidence.” See id. To be sure, C.C. also testified at trial and C.C. specifically
testified that, prior to the October 2017 incidents, she had taken multiple
photographs of Appellant because “he came to harass us several times. We
were afraid of him.” N.T. Trial, 9/13/18, at 88. Further, R.S. testified that
Appellant had a history of harassing L.H. and C.C. See id. at 131 (“[t]hey
were having problems with a young man coming in and out and stuff like that
and harassing them”) and 134 (“on [October 25, 2017, Appellant] came into
the shop and harassed the girls. Usually when he comes he comes months
apart. He’d come and he’d harass them and try to take something and get
fresh or whatever but this time he came the next day”).
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Therefore, even if the trial court erred in permitting L.H.’s hearsay
testimony, the trial court’s ruling did not prejudice Appellant, as both C.C. and
R.S. testified that Appellant had a history of harassing L.H. and C.C.
Appellant’s first claim on appeal thus fails.
Next, Appellant claims that the trial court erred when it “fail[ed] to
adequately recharge the jury . . . [on] the elements of criminal trespass.” See
Appellant’s Brief at 16-17 (some capitalization omitted).
“When a court instructs the jury, the objective is to explain to the jury
how it should approach its task and the factors it should consider in reaching
its verdict.” Commonwealth v. Chambers, 980 A.2d 35, 49 (Pa. 2009)
(quotations omitted). “In examining jury instructions, our [standard] of
review is to determine whether the trial court committed a clear abuse of
discretion or an error of law controlling the outcome of the case.” Id. at 50
(quotations omitted). “A charge will be found adequate unless the issues are
not made clear, the jury was misled by the instructions, or there was an
omission from the charge amounting to a fundamental error.” Id. Moreover:
“[i]n reviewing a challenge to a jury instruction the entire charge is
considered, not merely discrete portions thereof. The trial court is free to use
its own expressions as long as the concepts at issue are clearly and accurately
presented to the jury.” Commonwealth v. Eichinger, 915 A.2d 1122, 1138
(Pa. 2007) (quotations omitted).
On appeal, Appellant broadly claims that the trial court erred when it
recharged the jury on the elements of criminal trespass. This recharge
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occurred after the trial court originally charged the jury on the elements of
criminal trespass, without objection, and was done in response to a jury
question. In the words of Appellant:
[the trial court’s] recharge neither adequately nor accurately
reflected the law, by failing to provide the jury with a full
explanation of intent, mistake, and the reasonableness of the
mistake, and was therefore insufficient to guide the jury
through accurate and adequate deliberations.
Applying the standard that [the Superior] Court must view
the error in recharge and apply a reasonable doubt standard
to it, in light of the jury’s expressed confusion about the
elements of criminal trespass, [the Superior] Court cannot
determine beyond a reasonable doubt that that confusion did
not also go to the defense of lack of intent through mistake
or a reasonable belief of facts which, even if not ultimately
and subsequently determined to be true, were reasonable
when held by [Appellant] at the time of the alleged acts.
Thus, clearly, the [trial] court’s error on recharge was not
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as it did not provide
the jury with sufficient information to allow it to deliberate
properly and accurately.
Appellant’s Brief at 17.
Appellant does not point to any particular language or gap in the trial
court’s recharge that, allegedly, failed to “adequately [or] accurately reflect[]
the law.” See id. Further, Appellant has not explained how the trial court
“fail[ed] to provide the jury with a full explanation of intent, mistake, and the
reasonableness of the mistake” and Appellant has not provided this Court with
a specific and cognizable claim of error on this appeal. See id. This failure
impedes our ability to conduct meaningful appellate review of this claim and,
as such, Appellant’s claim is waived. See Commonwealth v. Kane, 10 A.3d
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327, 331 (Pa. Super. 2010) (“when defects in a brief impede our ability to
conduct meaningful appellate review, we may dismiss the appeal entirely or
find certain issues to be waived”) (quotations and citations omitted).
For his third claim on appeal, Appellant contends that the trial court
erred in admitting evidence of his prior bad acts.
“Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a
person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person
acted in accordance with the character.” Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1). However, as
Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides, this evidence “may be
admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of
accident. In a criminal case this evidence is admissible only if the probative
value of the evidence outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice.” Pa.R.E.
404(b)(2). Although not included within the enumerated list of permissible
uses in Rule 404(b)(2), prior bad acts evidence may be admitted to assist in
“proving the existence of a common scheme.” Commonwealth v.
Arrington, 86 A.3d 831, 842 (Pa. 2014).
Our Supreme Court explained:
Evidence of other crimes is admissible when it tends to prove
a common scheme, plan or design embracing the commission
of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of
one tends to prove the others or to establish the identity of
the person charged with the commission of the crime on trial,
– in other words where there is such a logical connection
between the crimes that proof of one will naturally tend to
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show that the accused is the person who committed the
other.
[The Pennsylvania Supreme] Court has often cited
McCormick, Evidence, § 190 (1972 2d ed.), wherein evidence
of other crimes is said to be admissible:
To prove other like crimes by the accused so nearly
identical in method as to earmark them as the handiwork
of the accused. Here much more is demanded than the
mere repeated commission of crimes of the same class,
such as repeated burglaries or thefts. The device used
must be so unusual and distinctive as to be like a
signature.
[MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §
190 (2d ed. 1972); see] Commonwealth v. Morris, 493
Pa. 164, 425 A.2d [715, 720-721 (1981) ] (“[T]here must be
such a high correlation in the details of the crimes that proof
that the defendant committed one makes it very unlikely that
anyone else but the defendant committed the others.”).
Commonwealth v. Bryant, 530 A.2d 83, 85-86 (Pa. 1987) (emphasis and
some quotations, citations, and corrections omitted); see also
Commonwealth v. Hicks, 156 A.3d 1114, 1128 (Pa. 2017) (plurality)
(declaring that it is not enough for the Commonwealth to present “insignificant
details of crimes of the same class, where there is nothing distinctive to
separate them from, for example, common street crimes”).
“A determination of whether evidence is admissible under the common
plan exception must be made on a case by case basis in accordance with the
unique facts and circumstances of each case.” Commonwealth v. Smith,
635 A.2d 1086, 1089 (Pa. Super. 1993) (quotations, citations, and corrections
omitted).
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Regarding the degree of similarity between the crimes, we have
explained:
[w]hen ruling upon the admissibility of evidence under the
common plan exception, the trial court must first examine
the details and surrounding circumstances of each criminal
incident to assure that the evidence reveals criminal conduct
which is distinctive and so nearly identical as to become the
signature of the same perpetrator. Relevant to such a finding
will be the habits or patterns of action or conduct undertaken
by the perpetrator to commit crime, as well as the time,
place, and types of victims typically chosen by the
perpetrator. Given this initial determination, the court is
bound to engage in a careful balancing test to assure that the
common plan evidence is not too remote in time to be
probative. If the evidence reveals that the details of each
criminal incident are nearly identical, the fact that the
incidents are separated by a lapse of time will not likely
prevent the offer of the evidence unless the time lapse is
excessive.
Id. (quotations and citations omitted).
Further, as to the balance between the probative value of the evidence
and its potential for unfair prejudice, we have held:
the trial court must assure that the probative value of the
evidence [outweighs] its potential prejudicial impact upon the
trier of fact. To do so, the court must balance the potential
prejudicial impact of the evidence with such factors as the
degree of similarity established between the incidents of
criminal conduct, the Commonwealth's need to present
evidence under the common plan exception, and the ability
of the trial court to caution the jury concerning the proper
use of such evidence by them in their deliberations.
Id. (quotations and citations omitted).
Other than citing to the general law regarding prior bad acts evidence,
Appellant’s entire argument on appeal is as follows:
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there is no specific indicia of a common element or theme,
and no evidence presented that demonstrates that the
activities presented at trial from 2003 were a “fingerprint”
which would have overcome the test as to if the testimony as
to those activities were unduly prejudicial. There can be no
question that the evidence of the activities was prejudicial to
[Appellant], that they were alleged to occur 14 years apart,
and they were incredibly dissimilar, any similarities being
those inherent in the commission of any crime of this nature.
Appellant’s Brief at 24-25 (some capitalization omitted).
As with Appellant’s second argument on appeal, this is simply a
generalized argument. Appellant cites to no facts that are specific to his case
and Appellant does not support his claim with any explanation as to why “there
is no specific indicia of a common element or theme” between the crimes or
as to why the crimes are “incredibly dissimilar.” See id. Indeed, any analysis
of this claim would require that this Court act as Appellant’s advocate – which
we are not permitted to do. Bombar v. W. Am. Ins. Co., 932 A.2d 78, 93
(Pa. Super. 2007) (“[t]his Court will not act as counsel and will not develop
arguments on behalf of an appellant”). As such, Appellant’s claim on appeal
is waived. Commonwealth v. Spotz, 716 A.2d 580, 585 n.5 (Pa. 1999)
(“[the Pennsylvania Supreme Court] has held that an issue will be deemed to
be waived when an appellant fails to properly explain or develop it in his
brief”).
Fourth, Appellant claims that the trial court erred when it denied his
post-sentence motion for judgment of acquittal on his burglary conviction.
According to Appellant, there existed a mistake in the Commonwealth’s
information. Specifically, the information declares:
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COUNT 3: Burglary – Overnight Accommodations . . .
On or about: 10/25/2017 18 § 3502 §§ A1I
Between October 25, 2017 and October 26, 2017 in the
County of Monroe, Pocono Township, Pennsylvania,
[Appellant] entered a building or occupied structure, or
separately secured or occupied portion thereof, with intent to
commit a [crime] therein, to wit: [Appellant] entered
premises lawfully owned or possessed by another with the
intent to commit the crime of burglary.
Commonwealth’s Information, 6/5/18, at 1.
Of note, the above burglary charge declares that Appellant intended to
commit the predicate crime of “burglary.” See id. Appellant acknowledges
that the specific “intended” crime of “burglary” was a typographical error.
Appellant’s Brief at 27. Nevertheless, Appellant claims that, given this error,
“the default [reading of the information] should be a plain reading of the
statute for the offense charged, which would then make the second thing to
prove that [Appellant] entered the location and commits, attempts or
threatens to commit a bodily injury crime therein.” Id. According to
Appellant, since he was acquitted of the “bodily injury crimes” for which he
was charged, he should likewise be discharged from his burglary conviction.
Id. This claim fails.
In relevant part, burglary under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a)(1) is defined as
follows:
(a) Offense defined.--A person commits the offense of
burglary if, with the intent to commit a crime therein, the
person:
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(1)(i) enters a building or occupied structure, or
separately secured or occupied portion thereof, that is
adapted for overnight accommodations in which at the
time of the offense any person is present and the person
commits, attempts or threatens to commit a bodily injury
crime therein;
(ii) enters a building or occupied structure, or separately
secured or occupied portion thereof that is adapted for
overnight accommodations in which at the time of the
offense any person is present.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a)(1).
We have explained:
the Commonwealth is not required to specify what crime a
defendant, who is charged with burglary (or attempted
burglary), was intending to commit. Further, the
Commonwealth need not prove the underlying crime to
sustain a burglary conviction. Commonwealth v. Lease,
703 A.2d 506 (Pa. Super. 1997) (burglary conviction affirmed
where defendant was acquitted of the underlying crimes of
theft and receiving stolen property because the factfinder
could have determined that the defendant entered the
residence with the intent to steal but did not consummate the
theft after entry)[;] see also Commonwealth v. Alston,
651 A.2d 1092, 1095 (Pa. 1994) (Commonwealth is not
required to allege or prove what particular crime the
defendant intended to commit after entry into a residence.)
[However, w]hen the Commonwealth does specify, in the
information or indictment, the crime defendant intended to
commit, the Commonwealth must prove the requisite intent
for that particular crime in order to prove a burglary or
attempted burglary.
Commonwealth v. Brown, 886 A.2d 256, 260 (Pa. Super. 2005) (some
citations omitted).
Here, as Appellant acknowledges, the Commonwealth’s information
contained a typographical error – it is nonsensical to charge a person with
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burglary and declare that predicate crime for the burglary was burglary.
Appellant claims that this error requires that we “default” to read the
information as specifying that the intended crime be “to commit a bodily injury
crime,” as that is a required element of burglary under 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 3502(a)(1)(i) and the information specifically charged Appellant with
committing burglary under Section 3502(a)(1)(i). Appellant’s Brief at 27.
However, “a bodily injury crime” is not a specific, predicate crime.
Therefore, even if we defaulted to read the information as specifying “a bodily
injury crime,” the Commonwealth would still not have been required to prove
a specific bodily injury crime to sustain the burglary conviction – and
Appellant’s acquittals on the sexual offenses would not demand an acquittal
on the burglary charge. See Brown, 886 A.2d at 260 (“the Commonwealth
is not required to specify what crime a defendant, who is charged with burglary
(or attempted burglary), was intending to commit. Further, the
Commonwealth need not prove the underlying crime to sustain a burglary
conviction”).
Moreover, given the clear typographical error in the information, we
must conclude that the information plainly does not specify what crime
Appellant was intending to commit during the burglary. To be sure, the trial
court instructed the jury on the elements of Appellant’s burglary charge in the
following manner:
[Appellant] is also charged with burglary. To find [Appellant]
guilty of burglary you must find that the following three
elements have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
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First, [Appellant] entered the premises in which the Healing
Touch Massage was located.
Second, [Appellant] entered the premises with the intent to
commit a crime inside.
Third, the premises in which Healing Touch Massage was
located was a building or occupied structure or a separately
secured or occupied portion of a building or structure that is
adapted for overnight accommodations in which at the time
of the offense any person was present.
N.T. Trial, 9/14/18, at 220-221.
The trial court’s jury charge tracks the language contained in 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a)(1)(ii) – not 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a)(1)(i). Nevertheless,
Appellant did not object to this charge. See id. Thus, Appellant was, in fact,
convicted of burglary under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a)(1)(ii) – and not burglary
under § 3502(a)(1)(i). See Commonwealth v. Clair, 326 A.2d 272, 274
(Pa. 1974); Commonwealth v. Matty, 619 A.2d 1383, 1386-87 (Pa. Super.
1993); Pa.R.Crim.P. 647(b) (“[n]o portions of the [jury] charge nor omissions
from the charge may be assigned as error, unless specific objections are made
thereto before the jury retires to deliberate”); Commonwealth v. Graham,
576 A.2d 371, 375 (Pa. Super. 1990) (discussing harmless variances from the
information). As such, consistent with the trial court’s jury charge, the
Commonwealth was merely required to prove that Appellant “entered the
premises with the intent to commit a crime inside.” See N.T. Trial, 9/14/18,
at 220 (emphasis added); see also 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a)(1)(ii). The
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Commonwealth did so. Indeed, Appellant was convicted of the predicate
crime of theft in this case. Hence, Appellant’s fourth claim on appeal fails.
Finally, Appellant claims that the trial court abused its discretion at
sentencing when it “clearly considered[] and utilized . . . the offenses for which
[Appellant] was acquitted” to sentence him in the aggravated range for his
burglary conviction. Appellant’s Brief at 29-30.
“[S]entencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
sentencing judge, whose judgment will not be disturbed absent an abuse of
discretion.” Commonwealth v. Ritchey, 779 A.2d 1183, 1185 (Pa. Super.
2001). Moreover, pursuant to statute, Appellant does not have an automatic
right to appeal the discretionary aspects of his sentence. See 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9781(b). Instead, Appellant must petition this Court for permission to
appeal the discretionary aspects of his sentence. Id.
As this Court explained:
[t]o reach the merits of a discretionary sentencing issue, we
conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether
appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, Pa.R.A.P. 902,
903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at
sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence,
Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal
defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a
substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not
appropriate under the Sentencing Code, [42 Pa.C.S.A.]
§ 9781(b).
Commonwealth v. Cook, 941 A.2d 7, 11 (Pa. Super. 2007).
In the case at bar, Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion where
he preserved his specific discretionary aspect of sentencing claim. Appellant
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also filed a timely notice of appeal. Moreover, while Appellant’s brief does not
include the requisite Rule 2119(f) statement, the Commonwealth has not
objected to this failure. As such, we will “ignore the omission and determine
if there is a substantial question that the sentence imposed was not
appropriate” under the Sentencing Code. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Kiesel, 854 A.2d 530, 533 (Pa. Super. 2004) (“when the appellant has not
included a Rule 2119(f) statement and the appellee has not objected, this
Court may ignore the omission and determine if there is a substantial question
that the sentence imposed was not appropriate, or enforce the requirements
of Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) sua sponte, i.e., deny allowance of appeal”).
Generally, to raise a substantial question, an appellant must “advance
a colorable argument that the trial judge’s actions were: (1) inconsistent with
a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental
norms which underlie the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. McKiel,
629 A.2d 1012, 1013 (Pa. Super. 1993); Commonwealth v. Goggins, 748
A.2d 721, 726 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc), appeal denied, 759 A.2d 920 (Pa.
2000). Appellant claims that the trial court improperly enhanced his sentence
based upon conduct for which he had been charged, but then acquitted –
specifically, the conduct relating to the sexual offense charges. This presents
a substantial question and allows us to review Appellant’s claim. See
Commonwealth v. Downing, 990 A.2d 788, 792 (Pa. Super. 2010)
(“[a]ppellant’s claim [that] the trial court relied on an improper factor raises
a substantial question permitting review”).
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We have explained:
sentencing is vested in the discretion of the trial court, and
will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of that
discretion. An abuse of discretion involves a sentence which
was manifestly unreasonable, or which resulted from
partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will. It is more than just an
error in judgment.
Commonwealth v. Crork, 966 A.2d 585, 590 (Pa. Super. 2009) (quotations
and citations omitted).
Further,
A sentence is invalid if the record discloses that the
sentencing court may have relied in whole or in part upon an
impermissible consideration. This is so because the court
violates the defendant's right to due process if, in deciding
upon the sentence, it considers unreliable information, or
information affecting the court's impartiality, or information
that it is otherwise unfair to hold against the defendant.
Simply put, the evidence upon which a sentencing court relies
must be accurate, and there must be evidentiary proof of the
factor[] upon which the court relied.
Downing, 990 A.2d at 793 (quotations and citations omitted).
Nevertheless, as we have held: “[a] judge may consider unadjudicated
arrests in sentencing a defendant, so long as the arrests are not regarded as
establishing criminal conduct, and even arrests that result in acquittals, if the
judge is aware of the acquittal.” Commonwealth v. Bowers, 25 A.3d
349, 356 (Pa. Super. 2011) (emphasis added); see also Commonwealth v.
Craft, 450 A.2d 1021, 1024 (Pa. Super. 1982) (“a court, in imposing
sentence[,] may consider prior arrests and concurrent charges as long as the
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court realizes that the defendant had not been convicted on those prior
charges”).
Here, the trial court clearly realized that Appellant was acquitted of the
sexual offense charges. To be sure, the trial court not only presided over
Appellant’s jury trial but, at sentencing, the trial court expressly stated that it
was aware the jury acquitted Appellant of the sexual offense charges. See
N.T. Sentencing, 12/10/18, at 8 (the trial court stated: “[t]he fact that you
were acquitted of the sex crimes in this case certainly does not mean that I
can't [take your past] history into consideration”). Therefore, in accordance
with our precedent, since the trial court fashioned Appellant’s sentence in full
awareness of the fact that Appellant was acquitted of the sexual offense
charges, we must conclude that the trial court did not consider an
impermissible factor or abuse its discretion in sentencing Appellant. See
Bowers, 25 A.3d at 356. Appellant’s claim on appeal thus fails.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/30/2020
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