Com. v. Sarvey, M. ( 2020 )

J-A09026-20
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
MELISSA SARVEY F/K/A MELISSA :
CIELESKI :
: No. 1358 WDA 2019
Appellant :
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 7, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-33-CR-0000014-2012
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
MELISSA SARVEY F/K/A MELISSA :
CIELESKI :
: No. 1359 WDA 2019
Appellant :
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 7, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-33-CR-0000605-2007
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., MURRAY, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED MAY 27, 2020
Melissa Sarvey (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered following remand by this Court for resentencing. Because we
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in resentencing Appellant,
we vacate the judgment of sentence and remand for resentencing.
A prior panel of this Court summarized the facts and procedural history:
On July 26, 2011, while Appellant was incarcerated at the
Jefferson County Correctional Facility, she attempted to deliver
one-half of a tablet of Oxycodone and one tablet of Zolpidem
(Ambien) to another inmate. The incident was recorded on video.
Appellant hid the pills under a commissary form and slid them
under her cell door toward another inmate’s cell. A corrections
officer noticed the papers being pushed underneath Appellant’s
cell door and attempted to pick them up. Appellant refused to
release the papers, and after a struggle, the officer was able to
take the papers away from Appellant. The officer handed the
commissary form back to Appellant, and as the officer walked
away, she noticed a baggie containing two pills in the place where
the paper had been. The officer confiscated the baggie[.] . . .
Appellant was ultimately charged with two counts of [possession
with the intent to deliver (PWID)], two counts of possession by an
inmate, two counts of controlled substance to prison, and two
counts of criminal attempt.
On April 16, 2012, a jury found Appellant guilty on all
charges. On May 17, 2012, the trial court sentenced Appellant to
consecutive terms of incarceration of one to three years for one
PWID count and one and one-half years to three years for the
second PWID count. The court further imposed consecutive terms
of incarceration of one and one-half years to three years for each
count of possession by an inmate, and a term of incarceration of
two to five years for each count of controlled substance to prison.
Finding that the criminal attempt convictions merged with the
controlled substance to prison convictions, the sentencing court
did not impose a sentence for the criminal attempt convictions.
The trial court also revoked Appellant’s probation on a single count
of hindering apprehension at Docket CP-33-CR-605-2007 and
sentenced her to an additional term of confinement of one to two
years. Finally, the trial court revoked Appellant’s probation at
Dockets CP-33-CR-662-2008, CP-33-CR-387-2008, and CP-33-
CR-388-2008, and resentenced Appellant to five years of
probation at each docket, running concurrent to each other.
Appellant’s total period of incarceration was ten and one-half to
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twenty-four years of incarceration followed by five years of
probation.
Appellant filed a timely direct appeal, arguing that the trial
court erred when it allowed the Commonwealth to amend the
charges immediately before trial. On direct appeal, she argued
that the amendment did not allow her sufficient time to adjust her
defense strategy and subjected her to mandatory minimum
sentences that increased the severity of her penalty. This Court
found that Appellant’s appeal was without merit because the new
charges did not arise from different facts nor would they have
required her to alter her trial or defense strategy; thus, she was
not prejudiced by the amendment. See Commonwealth v.
Sarvey, 68 A.3d 368, 968 WDA 2012 (Pa. Super. Filed February
21, 2013 (unpublished memorandum)[]. Appellant sought
Supreme Court review, which was denied on September 14, 2013.
Commonwealth v. Sarvey, 621 Pa. 672, 74 A.3d 1031 (Pa.
2013).
Appellant sought timely collateral review, and the PCRA
court appointed counsel. Counsel filed a no merit letter/petition
to withdraw as counsel pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner,
518 Pa. 491, 544 A.2d 927 (1988), and Commonwealth v.
Finley, 379 Pa. Super. 390, 550 A.2d 213 (1988) (en banc), on
February 14, 2014. After receiving notice of the PCRA court’s
intent to dismiss the PCRA petition without a hearing, Appellant
sent the court a letter in which she stated she wanted to continue
the appeal. Ultimately, and after a convoluted path and a change
of counsel, this Court directed the PCRA court to order Appellant
to file an amended PCRA petition within thirty days from the date
of our memorandum. Appellant filed her timely amended petition,
and following an extensive hearing, the PCRA court denied her
petition.
Commonwealth v. Sarvey, 199 A.3d 436, 443-44 (Pa. Super. 2018)
(citations to notes of testimony omitted).
On appeal from the PCRA court’s denial of her petition, Appellant raised
multiple issues, including an ineffective assistance of counsel claim averring
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that her trial counsel “fail[ed] to raise on appeal the discretionary aspects of
the lower court’s sentence.” Sarvey, 199 A.3d at 445.
Agreeing with Appellant that her underlying discretionary sentencing
claim had merit, a panel of this Court held that “Appellant’s sentence of over
ten years of incarceration for attempt[ing] to pass one and one-half pills . . .
was unduly harsh and clearly unreasonable given the nature and
circumstances of the offenses.” Sarvey, 199 A.3d at 456-57. We reversed
the order of the PCRA court, vacated Appellant’s judgment of sentence, and
remanded her case for resentencing “consistent with [our] opinion.” Id. at
457.
Upon remand, the trial court resentenced Appellant to an aggregate
term of 8 to 17 years of incarceration, followed by two years of probation.
Appellant did not file post-sentence motions. On September 6, 2019,
Appellant filed two separate notices of appeal.1
Appellant presents two issues for our review:
1. Does sentencing [Appellant] to a maximum sentence in excess
of ten years, in direct contravention of the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania’s order in [Commonwealth] v. Sarvey, 199 A.3d
436 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018), constitute legal error where in Sarvey,
this Court expressly stated that sentencing [Appellant] to “over
ten years of incarceration for attempting to pass one and one-half
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1 Appellant has complied with our Supreme Court’s directive in
Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969 (Pa. 2018) by filing separate
notices of appeal at each docket, “where a single order resolves issues arising
on more than one docket.” Id. at 971.
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pills was clearly unreasonable” and “remanded for resentencing
consistent with that opinion”? Id. at 457.
2. Does sentencing [Appellant] to a maximum sentence in excess
of ten years constitute an abuse of discretion because a term
exceeding ten years of incarceration “for attempting to pass one
and one-half pills” is “clearly unreasonable”?
Appellant’s Brief at 5-6.
Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of her sentence. “The
right to appellate review of the discretionary aspects of a sentence is not
absolute, and must be considered a petition for permission to appeal.”
Commonwealth v. Buterbaugh, 91 A.3d 1247, 1265 (Pa. Super. 2014).
“An appellant must satisfy a four-part test to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction
when challenging the discretionary aspects of a sentence.” Id. We conduct
this four-part test to determine whether:
(1) the appellant preserved the issue either by raising it at the
time of sentencing or in a post-sentence motion; (2) the appellant
filed a timely notice of appeal; (3) the appellant set forth a concise
statement of reasons relied upon for the allowance of appeal
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) the appellant raises a
substantial question for our review.
Commonwealth v. Baker, 72 A.3d 652, 662 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation
omitted). “A defendant presents a substantial question when he sets forth a
plausible argument that the sentence violates a provision of the sentencing
code or is contrary to the fundamental norms of the sentencing process.”
Commonwealth v. Dodge, 77 A.3d 1263, 1268 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations
omitted).
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Appellant has complied with the first three prongs of the test by raising
her discretionary sentencing claims at the time of sentencing, filing a timely
notice of appeal, and including in her brief a Rule 2119(f) concise statement.
See Appellant’s Brief at 8-10. Therefore, we examine whether Appellant
presents a substantial question for review.
Appellant alleges that in the aggregate, the consecutive sentences she
received were excessive. See Appellant’s Brief at 9. She further argues that
“a sentence exceeding ten years for attempting to pass one and a half pills is
‘clearly unreasonable.’” Id. at 9-10. While we note that the trial court
decreased Appellant’s maximum sentence from 24 years to 17 years, upon
review, we again “opine that the sentence was unquestionably harsh.”
Sarvey, 199 A.3d at 455-56 (“Although we are cognizant of the danger of any
amount of drugs in a prison setting and realize the sentencing court was
familiar with Appellant’s history . . . . [w]e also note that Appellant’s crime did
not involve violence. Further, we reiterate that Appellant’s crime involved one
episode of attempting to pass a very small quantity of prescription pills.”).
Thus, Appellant has raised a substantial question. See Commonwealth v.
Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 171-72 (Pa. Super. 2010) (“[T]he imposition of
consecutive, rather than concurrent, sentences may raise a substantial
question . . . where the aggregate sentence is unduly harsh, considering the
nature of the crimes and length of imprisonment.”).
In reviewing Appellant’s sentencing claim, we recognize:
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Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
sentencing judge. The standard employed when reviewing the
discretionary aspects of sentencing is very narrow. We may
reverse only if the sentencing court abused its discretion or
committed an error of law. A sentence will not be disturbed on
appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an
abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment.
Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference to the record,
that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised
its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision. We must accord
the sentencing court’s decision great weight because it was in the
best position to review the defendant’s character, defiance or
indifference, and the overall effect and nature of the crime.
Commonwealth v. Cook, 941 A.2d 7, 11-12 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations
omitted).
Initially, Appellant attempts to invoke a challenge to the legality of
sentence by suggesting that the trial court “ignored this Court’s mandate to
resentence [Appellant].” Appellant’s Brief at 11. We reject this contention.
In holding that the trial court imposed a sentence that was “unduly harsh and
clearly unreasonable given the nature and circumstances of the offense,” we
concluded that Appellant’s underlying discretionary sentencing claim had
merit and her trial counsel was therefore “ineffective for failing to preserve
and appeal” the issue. Sarvey, 199 A.3d at 456-57. For that reason, we
vacated Appellant’s sentence and remanded her case “for resentencing
consistent with [our] opinion.” Id. at 457.
While a trial court on remand must strictly comply with the mandate of
an appellate court, “[a]n appellate [c]ourt has no power to impose a sentence;
that power is to be exercised exclusively by the trial court and can only be
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usurped by the legislature.” Commonwealth v Holiday, 954 A.2d 6, 10 (Pa.
Super. 2008) (citation omitted). “Therefore, where an appellate [c]ourt
determines a sentence is illegal or otherwise improper, the Court may not
superimpose its judgment on the trial court by directing the sentence
imposed[.]” Id.
In deciding Appellant’s prior appeal, we directed the trial court to
resentence Appellant. However, as the fashioning of a sentence is left to the
discretion of the trial court, we do not read our prior decision as implying a
particular sentence on remand. See Holiday, 954 A.2d at 10. Rather, we
examine Appellant’s new sentence, and whether it is excessive and harsh
given the nature and circumstances of the offenses.
Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in resentencing
her to an aggregate term of 8 to 17 years of incarceration because her
sentence is “still considerably over ten years, and therefore still clearly
unreasonable.” Appellant’s Brief at 11. Appellant, the trial court, and the
Commonwealth all debate whether the term “sentence,” as used in our
previous opinion, refers to the minimum or maximum sentence Appellant
originally received. See Appellant’s Brief at 11-12; Trial Court Opinion,
10/4/19, at *1; Commonwealth Brief at 2-3. Appellant argues that the term
“sentence” refers to her maximum sentence. Appellant’s Brief at 11 (“As this
Court well knows, an inmate’s minimum sentence is merely the date upon
which an inmate becomes eligible for parole consideration . . . Minimum
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sentences are therefore not ‘sentences’ that trial courts impose.”). In
response, both the trial court and the Commonwealth define “sentence” as the
minimum sentence Appellant was given. Trial Court Opinion, 10/4/19, at *1
(“Both of [Appellant’s] issues rely on her interpretation of the Superior Court
opinion. The [c]ourt did not and does not agree with her interpretation,
though.”); Commonwealth’s Brief at 2-3 (“The [trial] court and, indeed, any
reasonable person with knowledge of the matter, would infer . . . that it was
the minimum sentence being discussed by this Court rather than the
maximum.”) (emphasis omitted). We agree with Appellant.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated that “the maximum
sentence is the real sentence . . . the only portion of the sentence which has
legal validity.” Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410, 430 (Pa. 2017)
(citing Commonwealth v. Daniel, 243 A.2d 400, 403 (Pa. 1968)). “Under
Pennsylvania law, the minimum term imposed on a prison sentence merely
sets the date prior to which a prisoner may not be paroled.” Rogers v.
Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 724 A.2d 319, 326 n.2 (Pa.
1999) (citation omitted, emphasis in original). Accordingly, “[w]here the
sentence is one of total confinement as specified in [S]ection 9721(a)(4), the
[sentencing] court is compelled to state a maximum sentence, which is, in
effect, the full sentence to be served, and a minimum sentence, which
specifies the date on which the defendant, once jailed, is eligible for parole.”
Commonwealth v. Basinger, 982 A.2d 121, 127 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citation
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omitted); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9756 (“In imposing a sentence of total
confinement the court shall at the time of sentencing specify any maximum
period up to the limit authorized by law . . . The court shall impose a minimum
sentence of confinement which shall not exceed one-half of the maximum
sentence imposed.”). Consistent with the foregoing, we examine Appellant’s
17-year maximum in reviewing her discretionary sentencing claim.
We reiterate that sentencing is within the sound discretion of the trial
court. Cook, 941 A.2d at 11. However, a trial court’s discretion is not
unrestricted. See Commonwealth v. Robertson, 874 A.2d 1200, 1212 (Pa.
Super. 2005) (“The deference paid to the trial court does not necessitate a
rubber stamped approval of the sentences imposed by the sentencing court.”)
(citation omitted). Otherwise, “[a]ppellate review of sentencing matters
would become a mockery and a sham if all sentences were routinely affirmed
under the guise of the discretion of the trial court.” Id. (citation omitted).
Section 9781(c)(2) of the Sentencing Code provides that on appeal, this
Court “shall vacate the sentence and remand the case to the sentencing court
with instructions if it finds: . . . the sentencing court sentenced within the
sentencing guidelines but the case involves circumstances where the
application of the guidelines would be clearly unreasonable[.]” 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9781(c)(2). In determining whether a particular sentence is clearly
unreasonable,
the appellate court must consider the defendant’s background and
characteristics as well as the particular circumstances of the
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offense involved, the trial court’s opportunity to observe the
defendant, the presentence investigation report, if any, the
Sentencing Guidelines as promulgated by the Sentencing
Commission, and the ‘findings’ upon which the trial court based
its sentence.
Commonwealth v. Coulverson, 34 A.3d 135, 147 (Pa. Super. 2011)
(citation omitted).
Here, the trial court resentenced Appellant to an aggregate 17 years of
incarceration. Upon review, we again conclude that given the circumstances,
the sentence was unreasonable.
In our prior decision, we recognized the danger of any amount of a
controlled substance in a prison setting, and the trial court’s familiarity with
Appellant’s history. See Sarvey, 199 A.3d at 455-56. However, the fact
remains that Appellant’s 17-year sentence is the result of Appellant’s single
act of attempting to pass a half tablet of oxycodone and one tablet of Ambien
to another inmate, and the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences.2
While this decision is well-within the trial court’s normal discretion, see
Commonwealth v. Zirkle, 107 A.3d 127, 133 (Pa. Super. 2014), under these
circumstances, the 17-year aggregate sentence is unreasonable.
This Court has explained that defendants are not entitled to “volume
discounts” when they are sentenced for multiple convictions. See
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2If the trial court had ordered Appellant’s sentences to run concurrently, the
aggregate sentence would have been 2 to 4 years of incarceration.
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Commonwealth v. Gonzalez-Dejusus, 994 A.2d 595, 598 (Pa. Super.
2010). However, in this case, Appellant’s six convictions arise from a single
incident. While the crimes do not merge for sentencing purposes, in our prior
decision, we observed the “substantial overlap among [possession with the
intent to deliver, possession by an inmate, and controlled substance to
prison.” Sarvey, 199 A.3d at 456.
Appellant was convicted of one attempt to deliver one and a half tablets
of controlled substances to another inmate. She was not convicted of
attempting to deliver controlled substances to multiple inmates, or another
inmate on more than one occasion, and she was not found in possession of a
moderate or large amount of controlled substances while imprisoned. Also,
none of Appellant’s convictions involved violence. Compare with
Commonwealth v. Jones, 942 A.2d 903 (Pa. Super. 2008) (discretionary
sentencing claim meritless where defendant was sentenced on 10 convictions
to 80 to 160 years of imprisonment for crime spree during which he robbed
and sexually assaulted three elderly women on three separate occasions).
On this record, we find Appellant’s 17-year sentence to be
unreasonable, and once again remand for resentencing.
Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded for resentencing.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/27/2020
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