Valley Truck Cntr, Inc. v. Margarita Express, LLC ( 2020 )


Menu:
  • J. S34041/20
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    VALLEY TRUCK CENTER, INC.       :            IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :                  PENNSYLVANIA
    v.              :
    :
    MARGARITA EXPRESS, LLC AND      :
    ANGEL E. PEREZ-REYNOSO, AND     :
    AUSTIN ENVIRONMENTAL,           :
    C/O MAINE TRAILER REGISTRATION  :                No. 2013 MDA 2019
    :
    APPEAL OF: AUSTIN ENVIRONMENTAL :
    Appeal from the Order Entered November 14, 2019,
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County
    Civil Division at No. 2018-CV-4494
    BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E. AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
    MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.:            FILED DECEMBER 15, 2020
    Austin Environmental appeals from the November 14, 2019 order
    granting appellee, Valley Truck Center, Inc.’s (“Valley Truck”), motion to
    amend the amount of the December 11, 2018 default judgment entered
    against appellant for unpaid towing and storage fees.1     For the following
    reasons, we affirm.
    The trial court summarized the relevant facts and procedural history of
    this case as follows:
    On August 20, 2018, [Valley Truck] commenced this
    action against defendants, Margarita Express, LLC
    1We note that appellant’s notice of appeal also references the trial court’s
    October 25, 2019 order denying appellant’s “Petition to Strike and/or Open
    Default Judgment.”
    J. S34041/20
    (“Margarita”),       Angel      E.     Perez-Reynoso
    (“Perez-Reynoso”), and [appellant] asserting claims
    for breach of implied contract and unjust enrichment.
    Valley Truck avers that Perez-Reynoso was the
    operator of a tractor owned by Margarita and a trailer
    owned by [appellant] that were involved in a single
    vehicle accident on Interstate Route 81 on June 15,
    2018. It has alleged that the trailer overturned,
    causing its cargo to be strewn on the Interstate, and
    requiring the Pennsylvania State Police to contact
    Valley Truck to assist with the cleanup of the area of
    the Interstate by removing the rubbish from the
    Interstate, transporting the same in dumpsters to
    Keystone Sanitary Landfill, remov[ing] the vehicles
    (tractor and trailer) from the Interstate, and storing
    the same at its storage facility, awaiting further
    instruction from Margarita and [appellant].
    Valley Truck claims that it contacted Margarita and
    [appellant] on numerous occasions to inquire as to
    what action should be taken with respect to their
    tractor, trailer, and property that remain[ed] stored
    at the facility of [Valley Truck] for an extended period
    of time, and that it also provided invoices to Margarita
    and [appellant] for the costs of cleanup, disposal, and
    storage of the vehicles and rubbish in the amount of
    $44,411.51. It submits that although demand has
    been made, no payment in full was received.
    Additionally, Valley Truck contends that storage costs
    continue to accrue at the rate of $200.00 per day
    ($100 tractor/$100 trailer) from June 17, 2018, until
    the property has been removed and/or this matter has
    been resolved. In its prayers for relief, it demands
    judgment in the amount of $56,411.51, as well as an
    additional $200.00 per day for storage fees together
    with reasonable attorney fees and any other relief that
    the Court deems reasonable.
    [Appellant] was served with the Complaint by Deputy
    Sheriff Natalie George on August 24, 2018. Based
    upon [appellant’s] failure to file a timely responsive
    pleading, Valley Truck forwarded a 10[-]day notice of
    its intent to enter a default judgment to [appellant]
    on November 21, 2018. In the absence of any reply,
    -2-
    J. S34041/20
    Valley Truck filed a default judgment against
    [appellant] in the amount of $82,013.56 on
    December 11, 2018.
    Although Margarita and Perez-Reynoso mounted a
    defense by filing pleadings and participating in this
    litigation, [appellant] declined to do so, and Valley
    Truck ultimately filed an amended Writ of Execution
    against [appellant] in the amount of $86,697.69 on
    July 18, 2019. Almost two months later, and more
    than nine months after the entry of the default
    judgment against it, [appellant] filed a petition on
    September 16, 2019, seeking to strike or open the
    default judgment. Valley Truck opposed that petition,
    and following the completion of oral argument on
    October 22, 2019, Judge Thomas J. Munley entered
    an Order on October 25, 2019, denying [appellant’s]
    petition to strike or open the default judgment.
    At least three business days prior to November 14,
    2019, Valley Truck served [appellant] with its “Motion
    to Amend Judgment Amount.” Valley Truck’s motion
    memorializes the earlier filings in this litigation,
    including the entry of the default judgment in the
    amount of $82,013.56 and Judge Munley’s ruling
    denying [appellant’s] petition to strike or open that
    judgment. It asserts that additional storage charges
    accrued subsequent to the date of that default
    judgment and until the time that the tractor and trailer
    were eventually removed from Valley Truck’s storage
    facility. Based upon the daily storage charges set
    forth in Valley Truck’s complaint and attached exhibit,
    Valley Truck attested that the total amount due and
    owing was $109,911.51, and sought to modify the
    previously entered judgment against [appellant] to
    reflect the final amount of $109,911.51 plus costs and
    statutory interest.
    Trial court opinion, 4/29/20 at 2-4 (citations, internal quotation marks, and
    some brackets omitted).
    -3-
    J. S34041/20
    On November 14, 2019, the trial court entered an order granting
    Valley Truck’s motion to amend the default judgment from $82,013.56 to
    $109,911.51 to reflect the additional storage fees that had accrued as of that
    date.    On November 18, 2019, Valley Truck filed a praecipe for writ of
    execution in the judgment amount of $109,911.51, plus statutory interest,
    poundage, and fees, for the total sum of $116,938.84. Appellant filed a notice
    of appeal on December 10, 2019. Thereafter, the trial court ordered appellant
    to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, in accordance
    with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b).          Appellant filed its
    timely Rule 1925(b) statement on January 7, 2020, and the trial court filed its
    Rule 1925(a) opinion on April 29, 2020.
    On February 13, 2020, this court directed appellant to show cause,
    within ten days, as to why its appeal from the November 14, 2019 order
    amending the default judgment should be quashed as interlocutory, given that
    claims against the other defendants remained pending. (See per curiam
    order, 2/13/20.) On February 27, 2020, appellant filed an untimely response
    to the rule to show cause order, arguing that the November 14, 2019 order
    was immediately appealable as an order affecting a judgment. On March 18,
    2020, the rule to show cause order was discharged, and the issue was referred
    to this panel.
    Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
    1.    Whether the trial court erred in denying
    [appellant’s] petition to strike and/or open
    -4-
    J. S34041/20
    default judgment when proper service was not
    shown of the complaint upon [appellant] when
    [Valley Truck’s] own complaint avers a different
    address than the address at which [appellant]
    was allegedly served; and when [appellant]
    provided undisputed evidence that the address
    at which service was allegedly completed was
    not the registered corporate office or principal
    place of business of [appellant?]
    2.     Whether the trial court erred in granting [Valley
    Truck’s] motion to reassess damages without a
    hearing when the original amount of damages
    was determined to be for a sum certain, based
    upon     [Valley     Truck’s]     pleadings   and
    calculations, at the time of entry of the default
    judgment by the Prothonotary and when:
    (a) [Valley Truck] submitted no documentation
    or evidence to support its claim for an additional
    damages award and for additional storage and
    cleanup costs; and (b) at the time of entry of
    judgment there was no request by [Valley
    Truck] for trial or hearing to determine damages
    as would be required under Pa.R.C.P. 1037, and
    when the damages are not apparent on the face
    of the complaint[?]
    Appellant’s brief at 4 (extraneous capitalization omitted).
    Prior to consideration of the merits of appellant’s claims, we must first
    determine whether the appeal is properly before us. It is well established that
    “[t]he appealability of an order directly implicates the jurisdiction of the court.”
    Bailey v. RAS Auto Body, Inc., 
    85 A.3d 1064
    , 1067 (Pa.Super. 2014)
    (citation and quotation marks omitted). Under Pennsylvania law,
    an appeal may be taken from: (1) a final order or an
    order certified as a final order (Pa.R.A.P. 341); (2) an
    interlocutory order as of right (Pa.R.A.P. 311); (3) an
    interlocutory order by permission (Pa.R.A.P. 312,
    -5-
    J. S34041/20
    1311, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 702(b)); or (4) a collateral order
    (Pa.R.A.P. 313).
    Commonwealth v. Tchirkow, 
    160 A.3d 798
    , 803 (Pa.Super. 2017) (internal
    quotation marks and case citations and omitted). “A final order is one that
    disposes of all the parties and all the claims . . . or is entered as a final order
    pursuant to the trial court’s determination.” Veloric v. Doe, 
    123 A.3d 781
    ,
    784 (Pa.Super. 2015) (internal case citations and quotation marks omitted);
    see also Pa.R.A.P. 341(b). Rule 341(c) governs the determination of a final
    order and provides, in relevant part, as follows:
    When more than one claim for relief is presented in an
    action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim,
    or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are
    involved, the trial court or other government unit may
    enter a final order as to one or more but fewer than
    all of the claims and parties only upon an express
    determination that an immediate appeal would
    facilitate resolution of the entire case. Such an order
    becomes appealable when entered. In the absence of
    such a determination and entry of a final order, any
    order or other form of decision that adjudicates fewer
    than all the claims and parties shall not constitute a
    final order . . . .
    Pa.R.A.P. 341(c).
    Instantly, appellant has appealed from the trial court’s November 14,
    2019    order   amending    the   default   judgment    entered   against   it   on
    December 11, 2018.      As noted, however, appellant’s notice of appeal also
    references the trial court’s October 25, 2019 order denying its petition to strike
    and/or open the default judgment.
    -6-
    J. S34041/20
    Preliminarily, we note that to the extent appellant purports to appeal
    from the October 25, 2019 order denying appellant’s “Petition to Strike and/or
    Open Default Judgment,” the appeal is untimely on its face. It is well settled
    that a notice of appeal must “be filed within 30 days after the entry of the
    order from which the appeal is taken,” Pa.R.A.P. 903, and this court “may not
    enlarge the time for filing a notice of appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 105(b). Here, the
    trial court’s order denying the petition to strike or open was entered on
    October 25, 2019, and thus, the period from which to timely appeal that order
    expired on November 25, 2019. See Pa.R.A.P. 903. Appellant did not file its
    notice of appeal in this matter until December 10, 2019, more than two weeks
    past the deadline.
    Appellant contends that its appeal should be deemed timely because the
    trial court’s November 14, 2019 order amending the default judgment amount
    was immediately appealable of right as an order affecting a judgment,
    pursuant to Rule 311(a)(1). See Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(1) (providing for appeal as
    of right from an order refusing to open, vacate, or strike off a judgment);
    see also response to rule to show cause, 2/27/20 at ¶ 3.
    Appellant is correct that an order denying a petition to strike and/or
    open a default judgment may constitute a final, appealable order. See, e.g.,
    Keller v. Mey, 
    67 A.3d 1
    , 4 n.5 (Pa.Super 2013). Nonetheless, the record
    reflects that appellant has failed to file an answer to Valley Truck’s motion to
    amend the default judgment, nor did it raise any of the claims it now raises
    -7-
    J. S34041/20
    on appeal during oral argument on the motion. Accordingly, to the extent
    appellant appeals from the November 14, 2019 order granting Valley Truck’s
    motion to amend the amount of the December 11, 2018 default judgment, we
    agree with the trial court that the claims appellant raises for the first time in
    its Rule 1925(b) statement are waived.         See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (stating,
    “[i]ssues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the
    first time on appeal”); see also trial court opinion, 4/29/20 at 6.
    Based on the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s November 14, 2019
    order granting Valley Truck’s motion to amend the amount of the
    December 11, 2018 default judgment entered against appellant.
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 12/15/2020
    -8-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2013 MDA 2019

Filed Date: 12/15/2020

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024