Com. v. Kolaski, C. ( 2017 )

J-S13040-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
CHRISTOPHER KOLASKI
No. 3723 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Order November 19, 2015
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division
at No(s): CP-51-CR-0008572-2014
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, and FITZGERALD,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED OCTOBER 06, 2017
The Commonwealth appeals from the order entered in the Philadelphia
County Court of Common Pleas (“CCP”), which granted Appellee Christopher
Kolaski’s motion to dismiss his misdemeanor driving under the influence
(“DUI”) charges pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 110. The Commonwealth argues it
is not required to bring all summary, misdemeanor, and felony charges in a
single court proceeding. In light of this Court’s recent decision in
Commonwealth v. Perfetto, ___ A.3d ___, 2017 Pa. Super. 281, 2017 WL
_____ (Aug. 30, 2017) (en banc), we reverse the CCP’s order and remand
for further proceedings.
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S13040-17
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.
On January 10, 2009, Philadelphia police stopped Appellee’s vehicle after
noticing reckless and erratic driving. Appellee’s eyes were watery and
glassy, and he was unable to keep his balance upon exiting the vehicle. The
officers issued him a traffic citation for careless driving and arrested him for
DUI. On March 16, 2009, the Philadelphia Traffic Court found Appellee guilty
in absentia of careless driving. Thereafter, on June 9, 2014, the Philadelphia
Municipal Court convicted Appellee of two counts of DUI. Following
sentencing, Appellee timely appealed to the CCP for a trial de novo. Prior to
his new trial, however, Appellee filed a motion to dismiss the DUI charges
pursuant to Section 110. After a hearing on the motion, the CCP dismissed
the DUI charges on November 19, 2015, and held that Appellee’s prior traffic
court conviction barred the subsequent prosecution of his DUI offenses. The
Commonwealth timely appealed and filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise
statement.
On appeal, the Commonwealth raises the following issue: “Did the
[CCP] err when, in contravention of Supreme Court precedent, it dismissed
misdemeanor charges pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 110 based on the prior
adjudication of summary traffic offenses?” Commonwealth’s Brief at 4.
Pennsylvania’s compulsory joinder statute states, in relevant part:
§ 110. When prosecution barred by former
prosecution for different offense
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Although a prosecution is for a violation of a different
provision of the statutes than a former prosecution or is
based on different facts, it is barred by such former
prosecution under the following circumstances:
(1) The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in
a conviction as defined in section 109 of this title (relating
to when prosecution barred by former prosecution for the
same offense) and the subsequent prosecution is for:
* * *
(ii) any offense based on the same conduct or
arising from the same criminal episode, if such
offense was known to the appropriate prosecuting
officer at the time of the commencement of the first
trial and occurred within the same judicial
district as the former prosecution unless the
court ordered a separate trial of the charge of such
offense[.]
18 Pa.C.S. § 110(1)(ii) (emphasis added).
In Perfetto, this Court determined that 42 Pa.C.S. § 1302, which
governs the jurisdiction of traffic courts, creates an exception to the
compulsory joinder rule. Perfetto at *13. The Perfetto Court reasoned
that under Section 1302 traffic courts have exclusive jurisdiction over
summary traffic violations. Id.; see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 1302(b) (“[t]he
jurisdiction of a traffic court under this section shall be exclusive of the
courts of common pleas . . . .”) We concluded, “[W]here a defendant is
charged with a summary traffic violation, a misdemeanor, and a felony, in
judicial districts with a traffic court, the Title 75 summary offense may be
disposed of in a prior proceeding in the traffic court, which has exclusive
jurisdiction to hear it, without violating the compulsory joinder rule.”
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Perfetto at *14.
Here, an earlier prosecution in the former Philadelphia Traffic Court1
resulted in a conviction of Appellee’s summary traffic violation, the DUI
offenses arose from the same criminal episode as the summary offense, and
the prosecutor during the traffic court proceeding would have known of the
DUI offenses, as they were charged at the same time as the summary
offense. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 110(1)(ii). Furthermore, all of Appellee’s
offenses occurred within the single judicial district of Philadelphia. See id.
Nevertheless, Philadelphia had a designated traffic court that had exclusive
jurisdiction to hear Appellee’s summary traffic violation. See Perfetto at
*13-14; see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 1302(b). Accordingly, the principles set forth
in Perfetto apply in this case, and a subsequent prosecution for DUI in the
Philadelphia Municipal Court General Division is permissible under the
compulsory joinder rule.2 See Perfetto at *13-14. Therefore, we conclude
that the CCP erred in granting Appellee’s petition to dismiss the DUI charges
1 At the time of Appellee’s offenses, Philadelphia had a separate traffic court
that adjudicated his summary traffic violation. However, as of June 19,
2013, Philadelphia restructured the Municipal Court into two sections, the
General Division and the Traffic Division, which absorbed the former Traffic
Court.
2 We recognize that in Perfetto the defendant’s violation and conviction for
the summary traffic violation occurred after the restructuring of the
Philadelphia Municipal Court and, therefore, involved the Municipal Court
Traffic Division. Although the instant case involves the former Traffic Court,
the Perfetto Court’s general discussion of the Section 1302 exception
remains instructive.
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under Section 110, and we reverse the order and remand for further
proceedings.
Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
P.J.E. joins the Memorandum.
Judge Lazarus Concurs in the Result.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/6/2017
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