Com. v. Aina, A. ( 2020 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
ANDRE YANICK AINA :
:
Appellant : No. 1469 MDA 2018
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 24, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-14-CR-0000688-2015
BEFORE: STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.: FILED MARCH 31, 2020
Andre Yanick Aina (Aina) appeals pro se from the order of the Court of
Common Pleas of Centre County (PCRA court) denying his first petition for
relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-
9546. The Commonwealth concedes that Aina’s trial counsel was ineffective
for not seeking dismissal of firearms not to be carried without a license. We
agree and remand for Aina’s conviction to be vacated. On the remaining
claims, we remand for the appointment of counsel or a hearing pursuant to
Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998).
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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I.
On April 8, 2015, Aina was pulled over for a traffic violation while driving
on Interstate 80. A search of the car produced a SKS-model rifle, stun gun
and rolling papers, while a search incident to arrest produced a bag of
marijuana. Aina was charged with persons not to possess firearms, firearms
not to be carried without a license, prohibited offensive weapons, possession
of a small amount of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, restrictions
on use of limited access highways and speeding.1
Before trial, Aina moved to suppress the evidence found in the car and
on his person. Following a suppression hearing, that motion was denied. Aina
also moved to dismiss the persons not to possess firearms charge because he
had never been convicted of an enumerated offense. That motion was
granted, leaving firearms not to be carried without a license as the only
firearms offense. For that offense, a “firearm” is limited in relevant part to
rifles “with a barrel length less than 16 inches” or “an overall length of less
than 26 inches.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 6102 (definition of “firearm”).2
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1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6105(a)(1), 6106(a)(1), 908(a), 35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(31),
(a)(32) and 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3313(d)(1), 3362(a)(1.1), respectively.
2 In contrast, a “firearm” for persons not to possess firearms is not limited by
the weapon’s length or its barrel. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(i) (“As used in this
section only, the term ‘firearm’ shall include any weapons which are designed
to or may readily be converted to expel any projectile by the action of an
explosive or the frame or received of any such weapon.”).
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At the November 2, 2015 bench trial, the Commonwealth did not
present any evidence about the length of the rifle or its barrel. Instead of
producing the actual rifle at trial, the Commonwealth relied on a photograph
but did not provide any of the rifle’s measurements. Despite this apparent
failure to establish an essential element, Aina’s trial counsel did not seek to
dismiss the firearms not to be carried without a license charge. The trial court
found Aina guilty of all offenses (except speeding) and, on December 17,
2015, sentenced him to 3 to 6 years’ imprisonment for firearms not to be
carried without license.3
Aina retained new counsel who filed a direct appeal of the denial of his
suppression motion but not his firearms conviction. On December 9, 2016,
this Court affirmed the judgment of sentence. See Commonwealth v. Aina,
417 MDA 2016 (Pa. Super. 2016) (unpublished memorandum). Aina did not
petition for permission to appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
On March 16, 2017, Aina filed a pro se PCRA petition averring, among
other things, that trial counsel ineffectively waived his right to a jury trial and
was ineffective at trial. Using the standardized PCRA form provided by the
Department of Corrections, Aina checked the box requesting the appointment
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3 The trial court also imposed concurrent sentences of 6 to 12 months’
imprisonment for prohibited offensive weapons, 15 to 30 days for possession
of a small amount of marijuana and 1 to 6 months for possession of drug
paraphernalia. As part of its sentencing, the trial court ordered that all
contraband confiscated, including the rifle, be destroyed.
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of counsel. On April 19, 2017, PCRA counsel was appointed. Aina, however,
continued to file several pro se motions amending his initial petition. Though
these filings had no legal effect because he was represented by counsel, the
Commonwealth still filed answers to all of Aina’s pro se filings on August 1,
2017. Each answer included a motion to dismiss without hearing based on
Aina’s failure to plead his ineffectiveness claims under the established three-
prong framework and state facts supporting each claim as required by
Pa.R.Crim.P. 902. On August 24, 2017, PCRA counsel was ordered to inform
the court within 60 days if he intended to file an amended petition or a
Turner/Finley no-merit letter.4
Before anything was filed, Aina filed a motion to dismiss counsel on
September 19, 2017.5 After permitting counsel to withdraw, the PCRA court
asked Aina if he wished to represent himself or have new counsel appointed.
Aina replied by asking if stand-by counsel could be appointed to file motions.
The PCRA court explained that he would still represent himself if stand-by
counsel were appointed. When asked how long Aina would have to wait for a
hearing if new counsel was appointed, the PCRA court replied that it could not
say exactly but stated, “these things don’t happen quickly.” Aina then stated
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4 Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and
Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. 1988).
5 Aina also filed a disciplinary complaint against PCRA counsel, prompting him
in turn to file a motion to withdraw as counsel.
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that he wished to proceed pro se with stand-by counsel. The PCRA court
agreed that they would “treat it that way” and appointed stand-by counsel.
Because he was no longer represented by counsel, the PCRA court
granted Aina’s request that all of his pro se filings be deemed filed. In the
ensuing months, Aina filed additional motions and supplements to his PCRA
petition. Among these, on December 19, 2017, he filed a “motion to compel
discovery and evidence” requesting production of the rifle for measurement.
In his “motion to supplement PCRA petition” filed on January 29, 2018, Aina
asserted that trial counsel was ineffective for not challenging the
Commonwealth’s failure to establish the length of the rifle or its barrel. Aina
reiterated this at an April 6, 2018 hearing on his “motion to compel discovery
and evidence,” contending the Commonwealth failed to present any evidence
at trial about the length of the rifle or its barrel.
On May 15, 2018, the PCRA court issued an opinion and order dismissing
without hearing all of Aina’s claims except his claim that trial counsel was
ineffective in waiving his right to a jury trial. Though stating it was reviewing
all of Aina’s claims, the PCRA court did not address trial counsel’s failure to
challenge firearms not to be carried without a license. Instead, the PCRA court
confined its analysis to the claims raised in the initial PCRA petition and
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concluded that, except for the jury waiver claim, there were no genuine issues
of material fact requiring an evidentiary hearing.6
After holding an evidentiary hearing on the remaining ineffectiveness
claim concerning the jury waiver claim, the PCRA court denied the petition in
an opinion and order dated July 24, 2018. Aina filed a notice of appeal from
the PCRA court’s denial that was received in the PCRA court on August 29,
2018.7 This Court quashed Aina’s appeal after he filed a non-conforming brief.
Aina, however, applied for and was granted reconsideration and ordered to
file a new merits brief.
II.
A.
Aina first argues that trial counsel was ineffective for not raising the
Commonwealth’s failure to establish an essential element of his conviction to
18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a)(1): the length of the rifle or its barrel. After opposing
Aina’s pursuit of collateral relief for over two-and-a-half years, the
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6 It does not appear that the PCRA court provided Aina with 20-day notice of
its intent to dismiss his claims without hearing as required by Pa.R.Crim.P.
907(1).
7 Though filed outside the 30-day appeal period, we find that it was timely
under the “prisoner mailbox rule,” which provides “a pro se prisoner’s
document is deemed filed on the date he delivers it to prison authorities for
mailing.” Commonwealth v. Chambers, 35 A.3d 34, 38 (Pa. Super. 2011).
The notice of appeal is time-stamped as being received by the Superior Court
Prothonotary on August 21, 2018, and was then forwarded to the PCRA court.
Aina, thus, timely sent the notice of appeal.
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Commonwealth now concedes that it failed to present sufficient evidence to
convict him of firearms not to be carried without a license. Besides this
concession in its merits brief, the Commonwealth has filed an application for
relief requesting a remand so that the PCRA court can vacate the firearms
conviction and Aina can be released since he is currently incarcerated solely
on that offense. The Commonwealth admits that it has determined through
investigation that the rifle did not meet the definition of a “firearm” under
Section 6102. Consequently, not only was there insufficient evidence to
convict Aina of firearms not to be carried without a license, but the
Commonwealth believes that he is innocent of the offense as well.
After reviewing the record and in light of the Commonwealth’s admission
that Aina is innocent of firearms not to be carried without a license, we agree
that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to have the firearms not to be
carried without a license offense dismissed for insufficient evidence.
Accordingly, we will grant the Commonwealth’s application to remand so the
firearms conviction can be vacated and, if currently incarcerated solely on the
firearms conviction, Aina is to be immediately released.
B.
Before we can address the merits of his other claims implicating his
other convictions, we must address sua sponte whether Aina properly waived
his right to representation. As this Court has explained, “where an indigent,
first-time PCRA petitioner was denied his right to counsel—or failed to properly
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waive that right—this Court is required to raise this error sua sponte and
remand for the PCRA court to correct that mistake.” Commonwealth v.
Johnson, 158 A.3d 117, 121 (Pa. Super. 2017) (emphasis in original)
(quotation omitted).
A PCRA petitioner has a rule-based “right to representation of counsel
for purposes of litigating a first PCRA petition through the entire appellate
process.” Commonwealth v. Robinson, 970 A.2d 455, 457 (Pa. Super.
2009) (en banc); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(C). To protect this right, we
have held that “in any case where a defendant seeks self-representation in a
PCRA proceeding and where counsel has not properly withdrawn,” the PCRA
court must hold a Grazier hearing to determine whether “the defendant’s
waiver of the right to counsel is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.”
Robinson, supra at 456 and 459. This demands that the PCRA court hold
an on-the-record colloquy with the petitioner and, “at a minimum … elicit the
following information from” the petitioner:
(a) that the [petitioner] understands that he or she has the right
to be represented by counsel, and the right to have free counsel
appointed if the [petitioner] is indigent;
[ (b) ] that the [petitioner] understands that if he or she waives
the right to counsel, the [petitioner] will still be bound by all the
normal rules of procedure and that counsel would be familiar with
these rules;
[ (c) ] that the [petitioner] understands that there are possible
defenses to these charges that counsel might be aware of, and if
these defenses are not raised at trial, they may be lost
permanently; and
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[ (d) ] that the [petitioner] understands that, in addition to
defenses, the [petitioner] has many rights that, if not timely
asserted, may be lost permanently; and that if errors occur and
are not timely objected to, or otherwise timely raised by the
[petitioner], these errors may be lost permanently.
Id. at 459-460; Pa.R.Crim.P. 121(A)(2).
Additionally, a PCRA petitioner’s statement of intention to proceed
without counsel does not constitute a knowing waiver of his right to legal
representation. Even when such an intention is evinced, the PCRA court must
conduct a Grazier hearing and elicit information in accordance with
Pa.R.Crim.P. 121 before the petitioner will be permitted to proceed pro se.
See Commonwealth v. Stossel, 17 A.3d 1286, 1290 (Pa. Super. 2011). We
have explained the necessity of an on-the-record colloquy in the context of a
waiver of counsel for purposes of PCRA proceedings:
Regardless of how unambiguous a defendant’s expression may be,
without a colloquy the court cannot ascertain that the defendant
fully understands the ramifications of a decision to proceed pro se
and the pitfalls associated with his lack of legal training. Thus, a
defendant cannot knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive
counsel until informed of the full ramifications associated with self-
representation.
Robinson, supra at 460 (quotations and citation omitted).
Based on our review of the record, the PCRA court never conducted an
on-the-record colloquy as required by Grazier and Pa.R.Crim.P. 121 to ensure
that Aina, as a first-time indigent PCRA petitioner, made a knowing, voluntary
and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. Significantly, at the hearing on
Aina’s motion to dismiss counsel, the PCRA court did not elicit from him the
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information required by Pa.R.Crim.P. 121 to allow waiver. Instead, as
summarized above, the PCRA court merely explained that if stand-by counsel
were appointed, that attorney would be available to assist but would not file
pleadings. See N.T., 10/23/17, at 6-7. At no point during the hearing did the
PCRA court ensure that Aina understood that he was entitled to counsel and
the potential pitfalls that would result if he waived his right to counsel. The
PCRA court was required to do this regardless of Aina’s stated intent to
represent himself with stand-by counsel. See Stossel, supra (remand
required for Grazier hearing when PCRA court fails to conduct on-the-record
colloquy to ensure petitioner understands consequences of decision to waive
counsel).
In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, the PCRA court admitted that it never
conducted a typical on-the-record colloquy, but nonetheless believed that the
entire record showed that Aina made a voluntary, knowing and intelligent
waiver. See PCRA Court Opinion, 11/30/18, at 1-2. In support of this
proposition, the PCRA court cited Commonwealth v. Meehan, 628 A.2d
1151 (Pa. Super. 1993). In Meehan, this Court held that a PCRA petitioner
waived his right to counsel even though the PCRA court did not hold a detailed
on-the-record colloquy covering all of the information contained in the
predecessor to Pa.R.Crim.P. 121. In so holding, however, this Court stated
that a PCRA court must still ensure that a petitioner understands: “(1) his
right to be represented by counsel; (2) that if he waives this right, he will still
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be bound by all normal procedural rules; and (3) that many right and potential
claims may be permanently lost if not timely asserted.” Meehan, supra at
1157. Because the PCRA court did not inquire into any of this information
with Aina, Meehan does not support the PCRA court’s position that he
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel.
Accordingly, we vacate the PCRA court’s July 24, 2018 final order
dismissing his PCRA petition, as well as its May 15, 2018 order dismissing
Aina’s claims without hearing. We remand for the PCRA court to conduct a
Grazier hearing to determine if Aina still wishes to proceed pro se. If he does
not, then the PCRA court must appoint new counsel and permit the filing of an
amended PCRA petition. Alternatively, if Aina wishes to proceed pro se after
the Grazier hearing, the PCRA court may then reinstate its orders dismissing
Aina’s claims without hearing provided it gives proper Rule 907 notice, which
it did not do for its May 15, 2018 order dismissing all of Aina’s claims (except
the jury trial waiver claim and 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a)(1) firearms charge)
without hearing.
The Commonwealth’s application to remand so the 18 Pa.C.S.
§ 6106(a)(1) firearms conviction can be vacated is granted. The remainder
of the sentencing order is vacated for a Grazier hearing. Case remanded.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 03/31/2020
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