Com. v. Johnson, A. ( 2020 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
AQUIL JOHNSON, : No. 2478 EDA 2018
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 17, 2012,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No. MC-51-MD-0003664-2012
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., NICHOLS, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED DECEMBER 28, 2020
Aquil Johnson, pro se, appeals nunc pro tunc from the December 17,
2012 aggregate judgment of sentence of 6 to 12 months’ imprisonment
imposed after the trial court found him guilty of two counts of contempt of
court1 during his Grazier2 hearing. This sentence was ordered to run
consecutive to the 12½ to 25-year sentence appellant is currently serving in
an unrelated matter, at CP-51-CR-0005617-2009. After careful review, we
remand this matter for the limited purpose of allowing the sentencing court to
1 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 4132(3). As discussed, infra, the sentencing order
incorrectly states that appellant was sentenced pursuant to
Section 4137(a)(1).
2 Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998).
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correct a clerical error in the sentencing order, and affirm appellant’s
judgment of sentence in all other respects.
The trial court summarized the relevant facts and procedural history of
this case as follows:
[O]n September 25, 2008, [a]ppellant and his
conspirator, Matthew Smith, visited their
acquaintance and marijuana dealer, Michael Wilson.
Mr. Wilson let the two in through the backdoor of his
residence at 6111 Jefferson Street, Philadelphia and
welcomed them into his living room. While [a]ppellant
distracted Mr. Wilson, Mr. Smith positioned himself on
the other side of Mr. Wilson and shot him in the back
of the head. Appellant and [Smith] then grabbed a
bag of marijuana off of the living room table, laughed
at Mr. Wilson, and left him for dead. Responding
officers took Mr. Wilson to the University of
Pennsylvania Hospital. He then identified [a]ppellant
and Mr. Smith out of a photo array, and consistently
identified both of them as his assailants. As a result
of their vicious attack, Mr. Wilson suffered dangerous
swelling to his brain and had a portion of his skull
surgically removed. Appellant was arrested later that
same day.
On January 11, 2013, a jury sitting before the
Honorable Chris R. Wogan convicted [a]ppellant of
attempted murder, aggravated assault, and criminal
conspiracy.[3] On March 15, 2013, [a]ppellant was
sentenced to an aggregate term of 30 [to] 60 years’
incarceration. [The record reflects that on May 29,
2019, a panel of this court affirmed appellant’s
convictions but vacated appellant’s judgment of
sentence and remanded for resentencing because his
sentences for conspiracy and attempted murder
should have merged. See Commonwealth v.
Johnson, A.3d , 2019 WL 2317695, at *7
(Pa.Super. 2019) (unpublished memorandum).]
3 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901(a), 2702(a), and 903(a)(1), respectively.
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In the lead up to trial, [a]ppellant moved to proceed
pro se. At the Grazier hearing on December 17,
2012, [a]ppellant was twice found to be in contempt
of court. [The trial court] sentenced [appellant] to
3 [to] 6 months’ incarceration for each finding of
contempt, to be served consecutively. On
December 24, 2012, [a]ppellant filed a defective
pro se notice of appeal with the wrong docket number
and did not later perfect his appeal. Over one and a
half years late, [a]ppellant filed a pro se PCRA[4]
[p]etition on June 30, 2014. Appointed counsel filed
an [a]mended PCRA [p]etition on July 20, 2017 and
the Commonwealth responded with a [m]otion to
[d]ismiss the PCRA [p]etition on October 30, 2017
(docketed November 3, 2017). Appellant filed a
second [a]mended PCRA [p]etition on his own behalf
on November 13, 2017. On August 16, 2018, the
Honorable Sean F. Kennedy ordered [a]ppellant’s
direct appeal rights to be reinstated nunc pro tunc.
Trial court opinion, 1/9/20 at 1-3 (citations to notes of testimony and original
footnote omitted).
On August 17, 2018, appellant’s then-counsel, Zak T. Goldstein, Esq.,
filed a timely notice of appeal on appellant’s behalf. Thereafter, on April 18,
2019, appellant filed a motion indicating his desire to proceed pro se, and the
trial court scheduled a Grazier hearing. Following the Grazier hearing,
appellant was granted leave to proceed pro se on September 23, 2019.
Appellant filed a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, in
accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), on October 9, 2019. On January 9, 2020,
the trial court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
4 Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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I. Was [sic] appellant’s Pennsylvania and United
States constitutional rights to due process
violated when Judge Wogan charged, convicted
and sentenced the appellant for two counts of
contempt of court without any prior notice, an
opportunity to be heard or an opportunity to
conform his conduct which was required
pursuant to In Re Mandell, 414 A.2d 1013 n.7
(Pa.1980)?
II. Was appellant’s Pennsylvania and United States
constitutional rights to due process violated
where the evidence was insufficient to establish
beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) appellant
acted with intent to obstruct the proceedings
and or (2) that the administration of justice was
“actually and significantly disrupted” by either
count of contempt?
III. Was appellant’s Pennsylvania and United States
constitutional rights to due process violated
when the court failed to reinstate the appellant’s
post-sentence motion rights as requested
where, Commonwealth v. Liston, 977 A.2d
1089 (Pa. 2009)[,] was inapplicable to the
appellant where his appeal rights were
reinstated due to government interference
instead of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Even if Liston was applicable, [] appellant plead
and proved he was entitled to his motion rights
back for the same reason he was entitled to his
appeal rights back?
IV. Should leave be granted to allow [] appellant to
raise his judicial bias claim against [J]udge
Wogan in this direct appeal instead of
remanding back to the lower court to allow the
appellant to file post-sentence motions to
preserve the claim where, further delay in
resolution of this case would cause a manifest
injustice. If leave is granted to raise this claim
without having to go back and present it in a
post-sentence motion, the appellant’s is [sic]
raising the claim that his rights to due process
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was violated where Judge Wogan showed bias
or the potential for bias to [sic] high too [sic] be
constitutionally tolerable?
Appellant’s brief at 4-5 (extraneous capitalization omitted).
Preliminarily, we note that the sentencing order indicates that appellant
was sentenced pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 4137(a)(1), which pertains to the
contempt powers of magisterial district judges. However, the court has
indicated on the record that it intended for appellant to be convicted and
sentenced for contempt of court under Section 4132(3), and the wrong statute
noted on the sentencing order was a clerical error. (See notes of testimony
(CP-51-CR0001587-2009), 3/15/13 at 16; trial court opinion, 1/9/20 at 4-5.)
Accordingly, we remand this matter for the limited purpose of allowing the
sentencing court to correct this error. See, e.g., United States v. James,
642 F.3d 1333, 1343 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that, “[b]ecause the written
judgment incorrectly states that James was convicted under [21 U.S.C.]
§ 841(b)(1)(B)(iii), rather than § 841(b)(1)(C), we remand for the limited
purpose of correcting the clerical error”), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 958 (2011).
We now turn to the merits of appellant’s claims.
I. Due Process Challenge
Appellant first argues that his due process rights were violated when the
trial court charged, convicted, and sentenced him for two counts of contempt
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of court without any prior notice, an opportunity to be heard, or an opportunity
to conform his conduct to court norms. (Appellant’s brief at 12-15.)
Our review of the record reveals that appellant failed to properly raise
this due process challenge before the trial court or otherwise object on this
basis during the December 17, 2012 hearing. Accordingly, appellant’s claim
could be found waived on this basis alone. See Commonwealth v. Allen,
2015 WL 6957090, *13 (Pa.Super. 2015) (unpublished memo); see also
Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (stating, “[i]ssues not raised in the lower court are waived
and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal”). In any event, we find that
appellant’s due process claim lacks arguable merit.
As discussed, appellant was convicted of two counts of direct criminal
contempt of court for misconduct that (1) occurred during the course of his
Grazier hearing; and (2) was personally observed by Judge Wogan. Our
supreme court has long recognized the inherent power of a court to impose
summary punishment for misconduct that occurs in its presence, and that this
power does not offend our notions of due process:
In Pennsylvania, [t]his Court has long upheld a court’s
power to maintain courtroom authority by the
imposition of summary punishment for contempt in
appropriate cases. [A] summary proceeding to
protect the orderly administration is perfectly
proper[.] . . . The court must be able to control those
appearing before it, and must be able to use its power
summarily to avoid interference with the principal
matter before the court. Summary proceedings for
contempt of court are those in which the adjudication
omits the usual steps of the issuance of process,
service of complaint and answer, holding hearings,
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taking evidence, listening to arguments, awaiting
briefs, submission of findings, and all that goes with a
conventional court trial. Thus, the summary
contempt power has been upheld against due
process attacks[.] . . .
....
. . . . Where the contempt is committed directly under
the eye or within the view of the court, it may proceed
upon its own knowledge of the facts, and punish the
offender, without further proof, and without issue or
trial in any form[.]
Commonwealth v. Moody, 125 A.3d 1, 8, 11-12 (Pa. 2015) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted; brackets in original; emphasis added).
Based on the foregoing, even if appellant had properly preserved his
due process challenge, we would find no merit to his claim that the trial court
violated his due process rights by finding him in contempt of court at the
Grazier hearing.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Appellant next argues that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his
convictions for criminal contempt of court because “evidence was insufficient
to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) [he] acted with intent to
obstruct the proceedings[, or] (2) that the administration of justice was
actually and significantly disrupted[.]” (Appellant’s brief at 16.) We disagree.
Our standard of review in assessing whether there was sufficient
evidence to sustain a conviction is well settled:
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[W]e must determine whether the evidence admitted
at trial, and all reasonable inferences drawn from that
evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to
the Commonwealth as verdict winner, was sufficient
to enable the fact finder to conclude that the
Commonwealth established all of the elements of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The
Commonwealth may sustain its burden by means of
wholly circumstantial evidence. Further, the trier of
fact is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Reese, 156 A.3d 1250, 1257-1258 (Pa.Super. 2017)
(citation omitted), appeal denied, 173 A.3d 1109 (Pa. 2017).
“In reviewing an appeal from a contempt order, we place great reliance
on the discretion of the trial judge. We review the record to determine if the
facts support the trial court’s decision and will reverse the trial court only if
there is a plain abuse of discretion.” In re Arrington, 214 A.3d 703, 707
(Pa.Super. 2019) (citation omitted).
Criminal contempt is codified in Section 4132, which provides, in
relevant part, that the courts of the Commonwealth have the power to “impose
summary punishments for contempts of court” in cases where there is “[t]he
misbehavior of any person in the presence of the court, thereby obstructing
the administration of justice.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 4132(3). Thus, “[t]o sustain a
conviction for direct criminal contempt under [Section 4132(3)], there must
be proof beyond reasonable doubt (1) of misconduct, (2) in the presence of
the court, (3) committed with the intent to obstruct the proceedings, (4) that
obstructs the administration of justice.” Moody, 125 A.3d at 5 n.4 (citation
omitted).
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Upon review, we find that there was ample evidence from which the trial
judge could conclude that appellant was guilty of contempt of court. The
evidence established that during the December 17, 2012 Grazier hearing,
appellant repeatedly interrupted Judge Wogan as he was attempting to
conduct the colloquy and failed to listen to instructions from the court. At one
point during the hearing, Judge Wogan instructed appellant that he “ha[s] to
answer these questions so [the trial court] can determine whether [he can]
represent [him]self.” (Notes of testimony, 12/17/12 at 3.) However,
appellant disregarded Judge Wogan’s warning and continued to voice his
disapproval with both his court-appointed attorney and the prospect of
representing himself. (Id.) Judge Wogan cautioned appellant that he could
elect to represent himself in this matter or proceed with his current
court-appointed counsel, but that there was no option to have a new attorney
appointed in this matter. (Id. at 3-4.) This led to the following exchange
whereby appellant again interrupted Judge Wogan’s colloquy and resulted in
his being held in contempt of court:
A. But regardless of what you say, even in the
courtroom with me, [Attorney Joseph D.
Lento’s] not going to represent me whether I
keep him or not.
Q. Why isn’t he?
A. Because he’s not going to do what I asked him
to do. Like the thing is I want to do my defense
and he’s not going to present it.
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Q. Okay. You need to start answering my
questions and not go off on a speech.
A. I understand that, Your Honor, but --
Q. You will not talk about anything else. You’re
completely misreading about the law.
You do understand that you have a right to be
represented by counsel, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. [Attorney] Lento at this point was appointed to
represent you, since you cannot afford an
attorney, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, let’s look for a list. This is number one on
our list. Here’s what can happen if you --
A. I’m getting railroaded, that’s what’s
happening.
Q. I’m holding you in contempt for disrupting the
operations of my courtroom.
Id. at 4-5 (emphasis added).
The record further reflects that Judge Wogan held appellant in contempt
of court a second time after he repeatedly feigned misunderstanding
Judge Wogan’s explanation of the sentencing guidelines in an attempt to delay
and obstruct the operations of the courtroom:
Q. All right. Do you understand that if you’re found
guilty of attempted murder here, you could be
sentenced to 20 to 40 with a pretty substantial
fine, do you understand that?
A. No, I don’t understand that.
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Q. How come? You don’t understand that the
maximum period of incarceration is 40 year [sic]
for this and a maximum fine of --
A. No, I don’t. Can you explain?
Q. Well, it’s pretty simple --
A. Just because I make it to trial, doesn’t mean I’m
guilty of those.
Q. That’s considered a trial issue. I don’t know
whether you will be found guilty or not
that [sic]. That’s for a jury to decide. If you
don’t understand what I’m telling you, it’s very
simple. I can send you to prison for 20 to 40
years if you are found guilty of attempted
murder. Do you understand that if you’re found
guilty of attempted murder you can serve 20 to
40 years on that. Do you understand that?
A. I don’t understand what’s going on right now.
Q. Okay. What is it that you don’t understand. I’ve
explained --
A. None of this. I don’t understand any of this.
Q. So I take it you withdraw your pro se motion
and you’d like to continue with
[Attorney] Lento?
A. I never said that. I don’t understand what
you’re telling me.
Q. You don’t understand the very, very simple
statement that if, only if, you’re found guilty,
you could be facing up to 40 years for attempted
murder[?]
A. I don’t know what’s going on in this courtroom.
I don’t. This is my first time in this court room,
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first time meeting you, I don’t understand
what’s go [sic] on.
Q. All right. I’m holding you in contempt for
obstructing the operations of my
courtroom. I sentence you to serve
another 3 to 6 months. That’s consecutive
to the earlier 3 to 6 months.
Do not lie to me when I’m asking you a
very simple question. You most certainly
understand that you can get 40 years for
attempted murder. Do not lie to me again
and delay the operations of this courtroom.
Id. at 5-7 (emphasis added).
Based on the foregoing, we find that there is ample evidence that
appellant acted with the intent to obstruct the trial court’s resolution of his
own Grazier hearing, and the administration of justice was actually
obstructed multiple times. See Moody, 125 A.3d at 5 n.4. Accordingly,
appellant’s claim that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his convictions
for two counts of contempt of court must fail.
III. Reinstatement of Post-Sentence Motion Rights Nunc Pro Tunc
Appellant next argues that his due process rights were violated when
the PCRA court failed to automatically reinstate his post-sentence motion
rights nunc pro tunc, following the reinstatement of his direct appeal rights
nunc pro tunc, due to alleged “governmental interference.” (Appellant’s brief
at 24.) We disagree.
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This court has recognized that the reinstatement of the right to file a
direct appeal does not carry with it the automatic right to file a nunc pro tunc
post-sentence motion. Liston, 977 A.2d at 1093-1094. On the contrary, the
PCRA court must expressly grant the right to file a nunc pro tunc
post-sentence motion. Commonwealth v. Capaldi, 112 A.3d 1242, 1245
(Pa.Super. 2015). To the extent appellant challenges the PCRA court’s failure
to do so, we find that this issue is of no matter since we did find any of
appellant’s claims waived based upon his failure to file timely post-sentence
motions. On the contrary, appellant waived his due process challenges by
failing to properly raise them before the trial court during the December 17,
2012 hearing.5 See In re Martorano, 346 A.2d 22 (Pa. 1975) (due process
challenge to contempt proceeding waived because not raised at contempt
hearing).
IV. Judicial Bias
In his final claim, appellant contends that “Judge Wogan showed bias or
the potential for bias to [sic] high to be constitutionally tolerable” by “injecting
himself in the accusatory process and expressing a prejudgment of guilt”
during the course of the December 17, 2012 Grazier hearing. (Appellant’s
5The Commonwealth has indicated that it is not opposed to a remand to allow
appellant the opportunity to file post-sentence motions nunc pro tunc. (See
Commonwealth’s brief at 16.) In light of our resolution of this issue, however,
we decline to do so.
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brief 33-35.) Our review of the record, however, reveals that appellant failed
to properly preserve this claim before the trial court.
It is well settled that “[j]udicial bias may not be raised for the first time
during post-trial proceedings.” Crawford v. Crawford, 633 A.2d 155, 160
(Pa.Super. 1993) (citation omitted). On the contrary, a party seeking recusal
or disqualification on the basis of judicial bias or impartiality “must raise the
objection at the earliest possible moment, or that party will suffer the
consequence of being time barred.” Commonwealth v. Stafford, 749 A.2d
489, 501 (Pa.Super. 2000) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted),
appeal denied, 795 A.2d 975 (Pa. 2000). The failure to timely move for a
judge’s recusal after the facts allegedly establishing bias come to a
defendant’s attention renders the judicial bias claim waived. See
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 790 (Pa.Super. 1998), appeal
denied, 739 A.2d 1056 (Pa. 1999).
Instantly, the record reflects that appellant did not move for recusal of
Judge Wogan. Because appellant failed to raise his claim of judicial bias at
the earliest possible opportunity, it is waived. Id.; see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Case remanded for the correction of a
clerical error in the sentencing order. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Shogan, J. joins this Memorandum.
Nichols, J. concurs in the result.
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Judgment Entered.
JosephD.Seletyn,Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/28/2020
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