Com. v. Vo, K. ( 2017 )

J-S23021-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
KYLE VO :
:
Appellant : No. 2327 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Dated July 18, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-15-CR-0001077-2015
BEFORE: OLSON, J., SOLANO, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY SOLANO, J.: FILED OCTOBER 16, 2017
Appellant Kyle Vo appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed
after a jury convicted him of the rape of Marguerite (“Maggie”) Kane while
she was unconscious and of aggravated indecent assault without consent,
sexual assault, indecent assault of an unconscious person, and indecent
assault without consent.1 We affirm.
Ms. Kane testified at trial that, on the night of January 21, 2015, into
the morning of January 22, 2015, in a dormitory at West Chester University,
she and her roommate, Maria Urban, had been drinking alcoholic beverages
and went to see their friends, Tyler Claycomb and Steven Massaro, in the
men’s dormitory room. N.T., 4/18/16, at 97. Ms. Kane and Ms. Urban did
not stay long in Mr. Claycomb and Mr. Massaro’s room because the women
1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3121(a)(3), 3125(a)(1), 3124.1, 3126(a)(4), and
3126(a)(1), respectively.
J-S23021-17
were “both very drunk and nobody else was.” Id. at 96. Ms. Kane
described herself as “very drunk at that point” but still walking and talking.
Id. at 97. She testified that at the time, she “wasn’t very aware of how
alcohol is measured, and . . . how much was enough to get you drunk. And
[she] wasn’t very familiar with alcohol itself.” Id. at 89. She added that
she had never been as drunk before as she was on the night of January 21
into January 22, 2015 — she was the “drunkest [she] had ever been.” Id.
at 89, 104.
Ms. Kane testified that after she and Ms. Urban returned to their
dormitory room, they, Appellant, and Mark Dukes “who lived across the hall”
from Ms. Kane and Ms. Urban, had a conversation about sexual experiences,
and she told them that she was a virgin. N.T., 4/18/16, at 80, 85, 114-15.
The others asked her “why [she] was a virgin” and her “decision-making in
planning to be a virgin. And [she] told them that [she] wanted [her] first
time to be very special. . . . [She] stuck to the fact that [she] wanted to stay
a virgin.” Id. at 114-15. She continued:
My family and I are all Catholic, and I really value that. And my
religion is very important to me. And if I didn’t save it for
marriage, I wanted it to at least be something of value. And I
really valued saving it for something that mattered.
Id. at 116. Ms. Kane testified that she “talked about that with them for a bit
of time.” Id. Ms. Kane stated that she was “already pretty intoxicated at
that point in time.” Id. at 125.
-2-
J-S23021-17
Ms. Kane also testified that Mr. Dukes then offered to have sex with
her, but, “despite the fact that [she was] intoxicated, [she was] still not
interested in having sex with Mark.” N.T., 4/18/16, at 125. He had
returned to his dormitory room and “sent [her] text messages asking to
have sex.” Id. at 117. She testified that she showed the texts to Ms.
Urban, and then:
[They] talked about it and . . . laughed at him, like, he thought I
would go and have sex with him after I just said that I didn’t
want to. . . . I thought it was really funny that after that big spiel
about not giving it up, that he would then ask me to go have
sex.
Id. She testified that she turned him down in a text message reply. Id. at
122-23. She asserted that she rejected his offer because she was not ready
to have sex with anyone at that point.
Ms. Kane then explained that Appellant asked her if she “wanted more
to drink,” and she “said, yes, because [she] didn’t think [she] was as drunk
as [she] was, in retrospect. So he left to go and get alcohol from his room.”
N.T., 4/18/16, at 126. Ms. Kane testified that before Appellant returned, her
friend, Catherine Senior, entered Ms. Kane’s dormitory room but did not
drink any alcohol. N.T., 4/19/16, at 59. Ms. Kane stated that Appellant
returned with “shots of vodka from a water bottle that he brought,” then “he
offer[ed] to go get more alcohol.” N.T., 4/18/16, at 126-27. Ms. Kane
asserted that, when Appellant returned again:
He gave me one shot and then said that we were going to go
shot for shot, meaning that we were going to drink at the same
-3-
J-S23021-17
time. And he gave — he gave me at least more than three
shots, but I’m not exactly sure how many he gave me.
Id. at 127. She testified that those shots made her “so out of it” and “very,
very drunk.” Id. at 129. Ms. Kane testified that, “[a]fter those shots,” she
“felt the drunkest.” N.T., 4/19/16, at 50; see also id. at 59, 63.
Ms. Kane testified that eventually Appellant sat on her bed and began
rubbing her thigh. N.T., 4/18/16, at 135-36, 139, 141. She said that her
thoughts were disconnected and she had difficulty processing what was
happening. See id. at 142, 145. She remembers that Appellant moved her
shorts and stuck his finger in her vagina, after which her hand “flopped
backward,” she felt pain, and then “blacked out,” so that she does not
remember clearly. Id. at 145-46. She testified that she felt limp and could
not move. Id. at 147. When she awoke, she found Appellant on top of her,
naked, with his penis in her vagina. Id. at 147-50. She testified that she
went in and out of consciousness but remembers waking again to find
Appellant behind her, where he was naked and “grinding her,” and waking
another time to find him with his penis inside her vagina. Id. 151-53. She
testified:
And I realized, oh, he is having sex with me. And the pain that I
felt, I then knew what was going on. And I don’t remember
anything after that.
Id.
When asked if she consented to sexual intercourse with Appellant, Ms.
Kane answered negatively. N.T., 4/18/16, at 142-44, 150. She testified
-4-
J-S23021-17
that Appellant never said anything to her about wanting to have sex with
her, nor even made any flirtatious comments to her; it never occurred to her
that Appellant wanted to have sex with her. She added that she never said
anything to him to suggest that she was interested in having sex with him,
and it never crossed her mind that sex was a possibility with Appellant or
anyone else that night. Id. at 143-44.
Ms. Kane asserted that as soon as Appellant left her room, she told
Ms. Urban that she was raped — “And Maria was telling me, you know, oh,
my first time wasn’t good either. And I’m, like, no, I was raped.” N.T.,
4/18/16, at 157-58.
Catherine Senior testified that Ms. Kane was “pretty drunk” on the
night of the incident. N.T., 4/19/16, at 122. Ms. Senior also testified that
the next morning Ms. Kane called her and asked her to come to her
dormitory room; when Ms. Senior arrived, Ms. Kane told her that “she
doesn’t want to have sex and that he did it anyway.” Id. at 132.
Steven Massaro testified that, when Ms. Kane entered his dormitory
room, “she was intoxicated and she had [a] mason jar which had liquid in it
that I presumed was alcohol[.]” N.T., 4/19/16, at 244. Tyler Claycomb
corroborated this testimony, stating that Ms. Kane had “a mason jar with a
straw in it, so it had alcohol in it,” from which she continued to drink after
she entered his room. Id. at 261-62. He described Ms. Kane as already
drunk when she entered his dormitory room. Id. at 261-62, 264.
-5-
J-S23021-17
Mr. Claycomb further testified that he went to see Ms. Kane in her dormitory
room later that night, by which time she was “very drunk.” Id. at 266.
Chase Adams, a roommate of Mr. Massaro and Mr. Claycomb, testified
that when he saw Ms. Kane that night —
She was very drunk. And Cate [Senior] was there trying to, like,
help her get in her pajamas to go to bed. And she was, like,
fighting with Cate and, like, giggling and being really loud. So
she was very intoxicated at that point. . . . She was falling
around, didn’t really have a sense of anything going on. Like,
she had fallen off her chair and was, like, laying on the floor
laughing for a good five minutes. So it was easy to tell that she
was very intoxicated. . . . [She was s]lurring words[.]
N.T., 4/19/16, at 305-06, 320. Mr. Adams also testified that prior to the
night in question, Ms. Kane had told him, Mr. Claycomb, and Ms. Senior that
she had no sexual experience, that she was waiting for sex, and that she
was not a believer in casual sex. Id. at 297.
Mark Dukes testified that he saw alcohol in Ms. Kane’s dormitory
room. N.T., 4/20/16, at 42. He also confirmed that, during the night of the
incident, Ms. Kane told Appellant, Ms. Urban, and him that she was a virgin,
was waiting for the right person, and was not “rushing into it.” Id. at 45-46.
Christopher Burke, Appellant’s roommate, testified that on the
morning of January 22, 2015, Appellant told Mr. Burke that he had sexual
relations with an unnamed girl the night before and had taken her virginity.
N.T., 4/20/16, at 63-64.
Maria Urban testified that Ms. Kane was “really drunk.” N.T., 4/20/16,
at 78. She also testified that Ms. Kane told Appellant that she did not want
-6-
J-S23021-17
to have sex. Id. at 83-84, 91. Ms. Urban further testified that she, herself,
eventually passed out from alcohol consumption, but that when she awoke
during the night, she saw Appellant having sex with Ms. Kane. She
described Ms. Kane as looking “limp” and “dead.” Id. at 92. She added that
she did not hear Appellant nor Ms. Kane speak while he was having sex with
her. Id. Ms. Urban stated that she did not see Ms. Kane kiss Appellant,
stroke him, or move at all. Id. at 92-93. Ms. Urban admitted that, due to
her inebriation, she “didn’t put two and two together that [Ms. Kane] wasn’t
moving. [She] just didn’t add it up.” Id. at 94. She described the
experience as “really weird and confusing.” Id. Ms. Urban continued that,
when Ms. Kane awoke, she was “really upset, really confused” and said she
did not know what happened. Id. at 95. Ms. Urban added that, when Ms.
Kane realized what had happened, she immediately said that she had not
wanted to have sex. Id. at 95-96.
Twelve hours after these events, Ms. Kane, under police supervision,
made a recorded call to Appellant in an attempt to gain admissions from
Appellant relating to his criminal conduct. During this recorded call, the
following conversation occurred:
[Ms. Kane:] But, but like what, what did, what did, did you,
did you use a condom yesterday?
[Appellant:] We, I didn’t even come, so it, I don’t even, it
was like, it wasn’t even that long.
[Ms. Kane:] What happened, I don’t remember?
-7-
J-S23021-17
[Appellant:] Wait, can you, like, um, I’m like actually
making blankets for like kids at a hospital right now, I’m not
even lying, it’s at Sykes [Student Union] right now.
[Ms. Kane:] Dude, I, I need to know what happened, I’m
not sure[. W]hat if I’m pregnant?
[Appellant:] We had . . . You’re not pregnant, I didn’t. . . I
swear to god, you’re not pregnant.
* * *
[Ms. Kane:] Did you use a condom?
[Appellant:] What?
[Ms. Kane:] Did you use a condom?
[Appellant:] Yes, the second time.
* * *
[Ms. Kane:] So you didn’t use a condom the first time?
[Appellant:] No.
[Ms. Kane:] What if I got a disease or something?
[Appellant:] I don’t, I just got tested . . . at Sykes, at that
thing like two weeks ago . . . not two weeks ago, two months
ago.
[Ms. Kane:] How dare you? You knew that I didn’t want to
have sex, I literally said that, yesterday, in front of you.
[Appellant:] You said you did . . . I was passed out and
then you like . . . yeah, I was actually passed out and you woke
up, woke me up . . .
[Ms. Kane:] Kyle, I was drunk yesterday . . . you got me
drunk.
[Appellant:] I was . . . I was passed out.
-8-
J-S23021-17
[Ms. Kane:] You got me drunk and had sex with me when
you knew that I didn’t want to have sex . . . while I was sober, I
said that to you.
* * *
[Appellant:] Like, literally, like the first time, it was for two
minutes and I was, like I was so drunk I literally passed out on
you, and I woke up, you woke me up . . . wait, I actually have to
leave right now . . . like I can’t have this . . .
* * *
[Ms. Kane:] Without a condom?
[Appellant:] What? No, the second time I actually had a
condom.
[Ms. Kane:] OK, I don’t remember anything that happened.
[Appellant:] You weren’t even blacked out, you told me you
weren’t even that drunk . . .
[Ms. Kane:] But, I did say I was drunk?
[Appellant:] Wait, I, like can I actually, like because I’m in
the middle of something right now, I’m actually making blankets
for like kids in the hospital. . .
* * *
[Appellant:] [T]he second like I had a condom the second
time and I still didn’t come.
* * *
[Appellant:] Can you wait, for like an hour and a half,
because this is pretty important, and I didn’t, like you’re not
pregnant . . . I, there’s (unintelligible)
* * *
[Ms. Kane:] [W]hat if I’m pregnant, dude? What if you
actually did, what if you did come and you, and I’m pregnant?
-9-
J-S23021-17
[Appellant:] You’re not pregnant, because I didn’t come . . .
[Ms. Kane:] ‘Cause you didn’t use a condom . . .
* * *
[Appellant:] I’ll get a Plan B pill if you’re really, like if you’re
concerned . . . I don’t want you to freak out . . .
[Ms. Kane:] Do I need to go to the hospital?
[Appellant:] You don’t need to go to the hospital . . . oh my
god. Like, you want me to go to Wawa, like after I’m done and
get you Plan B?
[Ms. Kane:] What do you mean, go and get me Plan . . .
are you saying that I have to go and take a freakin’ birth control
pill?
[Appellant:] If you’re worried about it, I’ll go out and like
walk to Rite-Aid and get you, like a Plan B pill if you’re worried
about it.
* * *
[Ms. Kane:] You did it to me, though . . . while I was drunk
. . . I wouldn’t have had to be worried about it.
* * *
[Ms. Kane:] Were you drunk?
[Appellant:] Yeah . . . (Unintelligible) . . . like are you sure
...
* * *
[Ms. Kane:] Yeah, I wanna know, like, why? When I had
already told you that I didn’t wanna have sex, I had multiple
times said that I’m a virgin . . .
* * *
[Appellant:] [Y]ou told me, you’re like, I wanna have sex
...
- 10 -
J-S23021-17
[Ms. Kane:] When I was drunk?
[Appellant:] Like, I asked you, like, I asked you, like are
you sure? And then you told me like the second time you
weren’t even drunk . . .
[Ms. Kane:] While I was . . . but I already . . . while I had
been drinking, and after I had been drinking you asked me if I
wanted to have sex and I said yes?
[Appellant:] Yeah, because we were making out and, then
like, it happened.
[Ms. Kane:] It happened?
[Appellant:] Maggie, do you want me to, like honest to god,
this is like if you’re worried, like if you’re pregnant, like . . .
[Ms. Kane:] What if I am pregnant? What happens if I am
pregnant?
[Appellant:] That’s what I’m saying . . . do you want me to
go to Wawa and get you Plan B?
[Ms. Kane:] Are you saying that if I am pregnant, you, you
would want me to just go and get a birth control pill?
[Appellant:] That’s what happens, that’s, do you know what
Plan B is?
[Ms. Kane:] It’s a contraceptive.
[Appellant:] Exactly . . . do you want, like if you’re worried
about it, that much . . . I didn’t come in you . . .
[Ms. Kane:] I’m saying, if I’m already preg . . .
[Appellant:] You’re not pregnant . . . you can’t get pregnant
in . . .
[Ms. Kane:] How do you know I’m not pregnant?
- 11 -
J-S23021-17
[Appellant:] Oh, my god, you it just . . . you’re not already
pregnant. . . . Do you want me to get you Plan B? Do you want
me to?
[Ms. Kane:] Why do you keep saying that? That, that’s . . .
why is that the only option if I was pregnant?
[Appellant:] What . . . I don’t know (Unintelligible)
[Ms. Kane:] What if the condom didn’t work . . . condoms
break, you know?
[Appellant:] It didn’t break . . . well, it didn’t . . .
[Ms. Kane:] How do you know the condom didn’t break?
[Appellant:] Alright, do, like, alright . . .
* * *
[Ms. Kane:] Well, I wanna know what happens if I am
pregnant.
[Appellant:] I will get you Plan B and then you won’t be
pregnant. You can’t be pregnant after you take Plan B.
[Ms. Kane:] So I should go to the hospital?
[Appellant:] You don’t get . . . I can get Plan B at CVS . . .
people get Plan B all the time.
[Ms. Kane:] So, you’re gonna buy me Plan B?
[Appellant:] Yeah . . . I will spend forty bucks on Plan B for
you if you’re worried . . . I don’t want you to worry about it.
* * *
[Ms. Kane:] What did you do with, what did you do with the
condom?
[Appellant:] I threw it out.
* * *
- 12 -
J-S23021-17
[Ms. Kane:] Yeah . . . ‘cause I wanna know if it worked.
‘Cause you took, like you took my virginity, dude, and if I’m
pregnant from that? You take my virginity . . .
[Appellant:] Then I will get you, if you’re worried about
being pregnant, then I will get you Plan B. I have to go right
now, though.
Tr. of Jan. 22, 2015 Consensual Call to Appellant by Ms. Kane at 1-10,
attached to Trial Ct. Op., 10/19/16, as Ex. 1 (some formatting altered).2
Appellant was eventually arrested, charged, and tried before a jury
from April 18 to 20, 2016. On the second day of Appellant’s trial, the
Commonwealth made an oral motion in limine for “evidentiary guidance” as
to the use of the transcript of the telephone call:
[Commonwealth]: During the course of the conversation, it’s our
position [Appellant] made a number of out-of-court self-serving
statements that are inadmissible unless the Commonwealth
chooses to bring them into evidence. The Commonwealth can
bring them in under the Hearsay Rule of a statement by party
opponent. But the defense cannot offer an out-of-court
statement of their own client at trial. So I wanted to — my
understanding is that . . . before we finish this witness and
before we start cross, that we’re in agreement that the defense
cannot cross-examine [Ms. Kane] about that phone call, or those
out-of-court statements by [Appellant].
N.T., 4/19/16, at 3. In response, Appellant argued that there were “grounds
for appropriate cross-examination” of Ms. Kane, because there were:
things Miss Kane said during that conversation as showing action
inconsistent with someone who had just been raped by
[Appellant] less than 24 hours prior. [W]hat Miss Kane said
during that conversation she can be subject to cross-
examination on.
2 We understand that the ellipses within the lines of the transcript signal
pauses, not the removal or editing out of words.
- 13 -
J-S23021-17
N.T., 4/19/16, at 5.3 The trial court reserved its ruling pending a review of
the transcript. Id. at 8.
After reviewing the transcript, the court prohibited its use. Appellant
then preserved his argument for the record:
I think it’s certainly not a question of admissibility, it should be
admissible in as much as what Miss Kane said during that
conversation, it’s a question of weight, what weight that the jury
should give it, if any, which is subject of them as the fact finders
to make that determination. They can certainly choose to accept
it and find it to be exculpatory. In that respect I think that the
evidence must be admitted for purposes of cross-examination to
show conduct that is inconsistent, quite frankly, with the actions
of a person who was just raped not more than 12 hours earlier
when given the opportunity to speak directly with the defendant.
That’s why I provided the [trial c]ourt with a copy.
Certainly the copy of the transcript of what was said in the tape
it’s clear she never once uses the word rape during that
conversation. On many occasions she inquires about pregnancy.
On many other occasions she inquires about the use of a
condom. On several occasions she inquires about birth control
or Plan B. This is clearly a conversation where she’s showing
that her concern is with an unwanted pregnancy or perhaps a
sexually transmitted disease but not rape. I think that that is
exculpable evidence that should be put before the jury and allow
them to make the decision on what weight to give it.
N.T., 4/19/16, at 88-89. Thus, Appellant argued that Ms. Kane’s conduct
and her statements after the rape were inconsistent with her trial testimony,
3 Appellant also posited that his recorded statements could be presented to
the jury with a cautionary instruction. N.T., 4/19/16, at 5. The
Commonwealth countered that Appellant could not introduce his side of the
out-of-court conversation and no cautionary instruction would “fix that.” Id.
at 8. “It[’]s his opportunity to try to get his version of events in front of the
jury without actually having to testify.” Id. Appellant responded that the
court could exclude his statements. Id.
- 14 -
J-S23021-17
and he therefore should have been permitted to use the transcript to
impeach her.
After Appellant’s conviction, he was sentenced on July 18, 2016, to six
to twenty years’ confinement followed by five years’ probation. Appellant
did not file any post-trial or post-sentence motions. On July 21, 2016,
Appellant filed a notice of appeal and retained different counsel for the
appeal.
Appellant now raises one issue for our review:
Whether the trial court erred by not permitting counsel the
opportunity to cross-examine the alleged victim Marguerite Kane
about inconsistent statements she made during a wire intercept
with the Appellant the afternoon after the incident where such
exclusion of evidence violated the Appellant’s constitutional due
process right to present a full and complete defense under the
Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution?
Appellant’s Brief at 3.
“The admissibility of evidence is a matter for the discretion of the trial
court and a ruling thereon will be reversed on appeal only upon a showing
that the trial court committed an abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v.
Towles, 106 A.3d 591, 603 (Pa. 2014) (citations omitted).
Appellant argues that the trial court should have permitted him to use
the transcript of the telephone call as a prior inconsistent statement during
his cross-examination of Ms. Kane. Appellant’s Brief at 11. Appellant
asserts:
- 15 -
J-S23021-17
By not permitting cross-examination about prior inconsistent
statements the [trial c]ourt violated the Appellant’s constitutional
due process right to present a full and complete defense. The
admissibility of the contents of these statements by Ms. Kane
are critical in this appeal. The Appellant maintains that he,
through counsel, should have been permitted to cross-examine
Ms. Kane on the inconsistencies in the wire intercept with the
trial testimony.
The defense theory was that the sexual contact between Ms.
Kane and the Appellant was consensual. Defense counsel
attempted to demonstrate that Ms. Kane, throughout the night
in question, was able to articulate, act and carry herself in a
manner inconsistent with being drunk, thus demonstrating that
she was aware and consented to the sexual acts with the
Appellant. In order to do this, defense counsel attempted to test
the credibility of Ms. Kane’s testimony. . . . At no point during
her testimony did Ms. Kane ever state that she was sober when
she was with the Appellant. However during the wire intercept
she stated: “You got me drunk and had sex with me, when you
know that I didn’t want to have sex . . . while I was sober, I said
that to you.” Her statement from the wire intercept indicates
that she was sober at some point with the Appellant prior to any
sexual contact. This is an inconsistent statement and one that
trial counsel should have been permitted to use for cross-
examination. . . .
Also, during the wire intercept Ms. Kane was confronted with
the fact that the Appellant had asked her if she wanted to have
sex and she had verbally responded by saying “yes.” Again,
counsel should have been permitted the opportunity to cross-
examine Ms. Kane with respect to this specific fact. . . .
Not allowing counsel the opportunity to cross-examine Ms. Kane
about inconsistent statements, and ultimately test her credibility,
violated the Appellant’s due process rights.
Id. at 11-12. Appellant argues that his right to a fair trial was denied
because the court improperly limited his ability to cross-examine Ms. Kane
- 16 -
J-S23021-17
under Pa.R.E. 611 and 613. Id. at 16-19.4
The trial court stated that it “thoroughly reviewed the transcript of the
consensual call to determine if there are any inconsistent statements within
the phone call or statements that are inconsistent with her trial testimony.”
Trial Ct. Op. at 8. The court said that it found no inconsistencies:
It is determined that there are no inconsistent statements and
that [Appellant]’s argument is without merit. Throughout this
conversation, it was clear that the victim was consistent in
stating that she did not know what happened. She confronted
[Appellant] with the fact that he knew she was a virgin and she
did not want to have sex. She was trying to get [Appellant] to
tell her why he did it and questioned whether he used a condom
and whether she could be pregnant. There were no inconsistent
statements within the recorded call nor were her statements
inconsistent with her trial testimony.
Id. at 12.
We agree with the trial court that the portions of the phone call that
Appellant identified as inconsistent statements were not, in fact, inconsistent
with Ms. Kane’s trial testimony. We do not agree that a woman’s statement
that she is concerned about pregnancy or contracting a sexually transmitted
4 Rule 611(b) states: “Cross-examination of a witness . . . should be limited
to the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting
credibility, however, the court may, in the exercise of discretion, permit
inquiry into additional matters as if on direct examination.” Rule 613(a)
states:
A witness may be examined concerning a prior inconsistent
statement made by the witness to impeach the witness’s
credibility. The statement need not be shown or its contents
disclosed to the witness at that time, but on request, the
statement or contents must be shown or disclosed to an adverse
party’s attorney.
- 17 -
J-S23021-17
disease is any way inconsistent with her contention that she was raped. Nor
do we agree that Ms. Kane’s failure to say the word “rape” on the recorded
call is inconsistent with her testimony that she was raped. In fact, when a
friend made comments to Ms. Kane that were inconsistent with Ms. Kane’s
contention that she was raped, Ms. Kane corrected her friend immediately.
N.T., 4/18/16, at 158.
We also conclude that Appellant is not entitled to relief with respect to
additional portions of the phone conversation that he identifies in his brief to
this Court.5 Appellant focuses on two additional portions of the
conversation, and we shall address each separately.
The first of the additional phone call excerpts identified by Appellant
does not relate to any statement by Ms. Kane, but rather to a statement by
Appellant himself. Appellant argues: “Appellant had asked her if she
wanted to have sex and she had verbally responded by saying ‘yes.’ . . .
Counsel could have questioned her about being confronted with this fact by
5 We question whether Appellant properly preserved his issue with respect to
these additional statements, as he did not identify them in his argument to
the trial court. “It is beyond cavil that if the ground upon which an objection
is based is specifically stated, all other reasons for its exclusion are waived.”
Commonwealth v. Hitcho, 123 A.3d 731, 769 (Pa. 2015) (brackets and
citation omitted). “Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). The trial
court never had the opportunity to rule on whether the specific statements
currently challenged on appeal were prior inconsistent statements, since
Appellant did not ask it to consider those statements. We find it
unnecessary to decide this case on the basis of waiver, however.
- 18 -
J-S23021-17
Appellant and her response, or lack thereof.” Appellant’s Brief at 15.
Appellant’s argument refers to the following excerpt from the recorded call:
[Appellant:] You told me, you’re like, I wanna have sex[.]
[Ms. Kane:] When I was drunk?
[Appellant:] Like, I asked you, like, I asked you, like are
you sure? And then you told me like the second time you
weren’t even drunk[.]
[Ms. Kane:] While I was . . . but I already . . . while I had
been drinking, and after I had been drinking you asked me if I
wanted to have sex and I said yes?
Tr. of Jan. 22, 2015 Consensual Call at 9. It is clear from this excerpt that it
was Appellant who said that Ms. Kane consented to sexual intercourse, not
Ms. Kane. Because this statement was not by Ms. Kane, it cannot be
considered a prior inconsistent statement and Ms. Kane could not have been
cross-examined about it. See Pa.R.E. 613(a) (“A witness may be examined
concerning a prior inconsistent statement made by the witness”).
Appellant appears to contend that Ms. Kane’s “response, or lack
thereof” to his assertion that she consented should be treated as a
statement by Ms. Kane. See Appellant’s Brief at 15. Appellant cites no
authority in support of such a contention, and we know of none. In
Commonwealth v. Ragan, 645 A.2d 811 (Pa. 1994), the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania stated:
[i]f a witness had been under a duty to speak on a prior
occasion, or if it would have been natural for the witness to have
spoken on such an occasion, but the witness remained silent, the
witness may be impeached by showing that the present
- 19 -
J-S23021-17
testimony included a fact as to which he had been silent on a
prior occasion.
In the case at bar, defense witnesses Tyrone Simmons, Daniel
Hunter, and Tameka Brown all testified that at the time they
learned of appellant’s arrest they had been aware that someone
other than appellant had murdered Darren Brown. It would only
seem natural that one in possession of such information would
have immediately contacted the authorities in order to exculpate
an individual who they supposedly knew was wrongly accused.
Thus, the prosecution was entitled to impeach their credibility by
bringing out the fact that they failed to take any such action.
Id. at 826 (emphasis in original; citations omitted). The facts of this case
are not comparable to those in Ragan. Appellant did not ask Ms. Kane a
question that would naturally elicit a statement like that at issue in Ragan.
Rather, he told Ms. Kane that she had stated that she wanted to have sex
with him, causing Ms. Kane to repeat that assertion back to him in the form
of a question that sought clarification of what he claims to have happened
and what he claims was her state of inebriation. Ms. Kane never expressed
agreement with Appellant’s assertion. Cf. Commonwealth v. Parker, 104
A.3d 17, 29 (Pa. Super. 2014) (holding a question is a statement if it
includes an implied assertion), appeal denied, 117 A.3d 296 (Pa. 2015).
Appellant also challenges Ms. Kane’s statements about her alcohol
consumption and her level of intoxication. He explains:
At trial, Ms. Kane testified that leading up to and including the
entire sexual episode she was very drunk, in fact, as drunk as
she has ever been in her lifetime. At no point during her trial
testimony did Ms. Kane ever state that she was sober when she
was with the Appellant. . . . That statement both impeaches her
credibility as a witness, because it is inconsistent with her trial
testimony, and the statement lends some support to the defense
theory at trial that she, in fact, consented to the sexual acts.
- 20 -
J-S23021-17
Ms. Kane’s statement during the wire intercept was that “You got
me drunk and had sex with me, when you know that I didn’t
want to have sex...while I was sober, I said that to you” is an
inconsistent statement and the trial court erred by not
permitting counsel to cross-examine Ms. Kane about that specific
statement.
. . . Not only does this specific statement contradict her
testimony, but it would also lend some support to the defense
theory that she wasn’t very drunk and consented to the sexual
acts with the Appellant. Throughout the trial, counsel attempted
to demonstrate this fact by highlighting Ms. Kane’s ability to
effectively communicate with friends and other students in her
dorm, physically move around her dorm and room, change
clothes, meet Mr. Dukes and converse with him (including
providing him with her telephone number), share text messages
from Mr. Dukes with Ms. Urban and the Appellant, reply to the
text messages from Mr. Dukes about his sexual advances
towards her, have additional conversation with Ms. Senior and
the Appellant and finally converse one-on-one with the
Appellant.
. . . Ms. Kane testified at length about what she drank and how
much she drank. For a significant portion of the night she was
drinking without the Appellant even being around. . . . Again,
her statement from the wire intercept is inconsistent with her
trial testimony.
Appellant’s Brief at 14-16.
The Commonwealth replies that Appellant’s “argument is illogical.
Defense counsel can point to no place in the transcripts of the wire intercept
or the trial in which [Ms. Kane] stated she was sober at the time of the rape
or that she consented to the sexual acts. . . . At best this is a collateral
matter.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 19.
The first part of Ms. Kane’s telephone statement that Appellant
references — that Appellant “got [her] drunk,” Tr. of Jan. 22, 2015
Consensual Call at 3 — is not inconsistent with her trial testimony. At trial,
- 21 -
J-S23021-17
Ms. Kane related how Appellant brought vodka to her room and gave her
several shots of it, making her “very, very drunk.” N.T., 4/18/16, at 129.
The second part of Ms. Kane’s telephone statement that is highlighted
by Appellant — her statement that she told Appellant she did not want to
have sex “while [she] was sober,” Tr. of Jan. 22, 2015 Consensual Call at 3
— requires closer examination. As Appellant points out, Ms. Kane testified
during trial that she was intoxicated throughout the evening of January 21,
2015 and the following morning. N.T., 4/18/16, at 114-15, 125. On careful
review, however, we do not find the stark inconsistency that Appellant
posits.
First, as the Commonwealth points out, there is no inconsistency in
Ms. Kane’s statements that she was intoxicated at the time Appellant
sexually penetrated her. At trial, she testified that by that time she was so
intoxicated that her body went limp, her thoughts were disconnected, and
she went in and out of consciousness. N.T., 4/18/16, at 142, 145, 147,
151-53. In the phone call, Ms. Kane told Appellant, “You did it to me . . .
while I was drunk.” Tr. of Jan. 22, 2015 Consensual Call at 6.
Appellant’s contention is that Ms. Kane’s telephone statement that she
told Appellant “while [she] was sober” about her preference to remain a
virgin raises questions about whether she also was sober (or, at least,
sufficiently sober to consent) at the time he penetrated her. But nothing in
Ms. Kane’s telephone statement contradicts her trial testimony that her
inebriation increased as the night progressed. Although Ms. Kane stated at
- 22 -
J-S23021-17
trial that she was drunk from the time when she visited Mr. Claycomb and
Mr. Massaro in their dorm room, she also testified that at that time she was
“still walking and talking” and “[k]new what [she was] doing.” N.T.,
4/18/16, at 97. When she later returned to her own room and Appellant
asked her if she wanted more to drink, she “said, yes, because [she] didn’t
think [she] was as drunk as [she] was, in retrospect.” Id. at 126. It was
around this time, before imbibing Appellant’s vodka, that Ms. Kane discussed
her desire to preserve her virginity. See id. at 80, 85, 114-16; N.T.,
4/20/16, at 45-46. The sexual intercourse happened later, after Appellant
gave Ms. Kane “at least more than three shots” of vodka and she passed
out. N.T., 4/18/16, at 126-27, 129; N.T., 4/19/16, at 50, 59, 63.
Appellant’s telephone statements were consistent with this course of events.
That her telephone call characterized her state at the time she expressed her
virginity preference as “sober” while at trial she said she was intoxicated but
“still walking and talking” and with knowledge of “what [she was] doing”
does not present such an inconsistency as to make the trial court’s exclusion
of the evidence an abuse of discretion, and we see no violation of Appellant’s
due process rights in the trial court’s ruling. We note that Appellant did not
even make this argument about an inconsistency in Ms. Kane’s statements
regarding her degree of inebriation when he sought to use the phone call
transcript in the trial court. See N.T., 4/19/16, at 5, 8, 88-89.
Moreover, insofar as the evidentiary ruling affected Appellant’s ability
to test Ms. Kane’s credibility in testifying that she was intoxicated when the
- 23 -
J-S23021-17
sexual penetration took place, we believe any error was harmless. All the
witnesses corroborated Ms. Kane’s testimony that she became increasingly
intoxicated as that evening progressed. Ms. Senior, Mr. Claycomb,
Mr. Adams, and Ms. Urban testified that Ms. Kane was extremely intoxicated
on the night in question, with her outward signs of intoxication including a
lack of coordination, falling down, and slurring her words. N.T., 4/19/16, at
122, 261-66, 305-06, 320; N.T., 4/20/16, at 78. They said she nevertheless
was lucid when discussing her sexual preferences, telling Appellant that she
did not want to have sexual relations. N.T., 4/20/16, at 45-46, 84. But
Ms. Urban testified that she then witnessed Appellant having intercourse
with Ms. Kane while Ms. Kane was immobile and unresponsive. Id. at 83,
91-93. Ms. Urban also asserted that Ms. Kane, upon regaining
consciousness, was upset and confused, said she did not know what had
happened, and, as soon as she realized that Appellant had had sexual
relations with her, told Ms. Urban that she had not wanted to have
intercourse. Id. at 95-96.
“The accused is entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect trial.”
Commonwealth v. Rasheed, 640 A.2d 896, 898 (Pa. 1994). As the
Supreme Court explained in Commonwealth v. Story, 383 A.2d 155 (Pa.
1978):
[A]n error may be harmless where the properly admitted
evidence of guilt is so overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of
the error is so insignificant by comparison that it is clear beyond
a reasonable doubt that the error could not have contributed to
the verdict. . . . Once the court determines that the evidence of
- 24 -
J-S23021-17
guilt is overwhelming, it then decides if the error was so
insignificant by comparison that it could not have contributed to
the verdict.
Id. at 166; see also Commonwealth v. Jacoby, __A.3d__, 2017 WL
4287343, *13-*14 (Pa., Sept. 28, 2017); Rasheed, 640 A.2d at 898.
Based on our review of the record, we conclude that any error that may
have occurred based upon the trial court’s exclusion of the phone
conversation and resulting restriction of Appellant’s ability to cross-examine
Ms. Kane about her degree of intoxication throughout the evening preceding
the crime was harmless. The properly admitted evidence of guilt was so
overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the error was so insignificant by
comparison that it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the error could
not have contributed to the verdict. See id. Appellant is therefore not
entitled to relief.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judge Olson joins the memorandum.
Judge Musmanno files a dissenting memorandum.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/16/2017
- 25 -