Com. v. Patterson, J. ( 2020 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
JOSEPH PATTERSON, : No. 1979 EDA 2019
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 27, 2019,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No. CP-51-CR-0006519-2012
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., NICHOLS, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: Filed: December 30, 2020
Joseph Patterson appeals from the June 27, 2019 order entered by the
Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County dismissing his petition for relief
filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§§ 9541-9546. After careful review, we quash.
On September 18, 2012, appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea,
wherein he pled guilty to one count each of attempted murder and possession
of an instrument of crime.1 Pursuant to the terms of the negotiated guilty
plea agreement, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of 12-24 years’
imprisonment, with mental health treatment as needed. Appellant did not
seek direct appellate review.
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901(a) and 907(a), respectively.
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On August 22, 2013, appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition. On
February 10, 2017, the PCRA court appointed Peter A. Levin, Esq., to
represent appellant. Attorney Levin filed an amended PCRA petition on
appellant’s behalf on October 18, 2017. The PCRA court subsequently held an
evidentiary hearing on January 31, 2019. On March 15, 2019, the PCRA court
entered an order dismissing appellant’s PCRA petition and granting
Attorney Levin leave to withdraw. The PCRA court then vacated its March 15,
2019 order on June 27, 2019. That same day, the PCRA court entered an
order dismissing appellant’s PCRA petition.
Appellant filed a notice of appeal on July 12, 2019. The PCRA court
ordered appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and appellant timely complied. The PCRA court
subsequently filed an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
Before we can address the merits of appellant’s appeal, we must first
determine whether we have jurisdiction to do so. Indeed, we may raise a
jurisdictional issue sua sponte. Commonwealth v. Parker, 173 A.3d 294,
296 (Pa.Super. 2017), citing Commonwealth v. Grove, 170 A.3d 1127,
1136-1137 (Pa.Super. 2017); Commonwealth v. Ivy, 146 A.3d 241, 255
(Pa.Super. 2016).
As our supreme court has observed:
Once a PCRA petition has been decided and the ruling
on it has become final, there is nothing for a
subsequent petition or pleading to “extend.” Far from
continuing in perpetuity, the trial court’s jurisdiction
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over a matter generally ends once an appeal is taken
from a final order or, if no appeal is taken, thirty days
elapse after the final order. See 42 Pa.C.S.[A.]
§ 5505 (“Modification of orders: Except as otherwise
provided or prescribed by law, a court upon notice to
the parties may modify or rescind any order within
30 days after its entry, notwithstanding the prior
termination of any term of court, if no appeal from
such order has been taken or allowed.”).
Commonwealth v. Robinson, 837 A.2d 1157, 1162 (Pa. 2003) (emphasis
added).
This court, however, has recognized that there are some instances in
which a final order may be altered beyond 30 days of entry.
The power to modify a sentence in order to amend
records, to correct mistakes of court officers or
counsel’s inadvertencies, or to supply defects or
omissions in the record is inherent in our court
system. Commonwealth v. Fiore, [] 491 A.2d 276
([Pa.Super.] 1985). A sentencing court can,
sua sponte, correct an illegal sentence originally
imposed, even after the defendant has begun serving
the original sentence. Commonwealth v. Jones, []
554 A.2d 50 ([Pa.] 1989). Where an initial
punishment was procured by fraud, the trial court may
decrease or increase the initial sentence. Id.
Commonwealth v. Myer, [] 82 A.2d 298
([Pa.Super.] 1951). This inherent power of the court
to correct obvious and patent mistakes is not
eliminated by the expiration of the thirty-day appeal
period. Commonwealth v. Cole, [] 263 A.2d 339
([Pa.] 1970). In Cole, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court explained that an order granting both a new trial
and an arrest of judgment was clearly contradictory;
thus, the original order was patently erroneous and
could be corrected even after the thirty days had
passed. Id.
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Commonwealth v. Harper, 890 A.2d 1078, 1082 (Pa.Super. 2006), quoting
Commonwealth v. Quinlan, 639 A.2d 1235, 1239 (Pa.Super. 1994), appeal
dismissed as improvidently granted, 675 A.2d 711 (Pa. 1996).
In the instant case, there is no evidence of record that the PCRA court’s
March 15, 2019 order was the product of fraud, nor is there any evidence of
record indicating that the March 15, 2019 order was contradictory or was
vacated to correct any obvious or patent mistakes. On October 22, 2020, this
court directed the PCRA court to file a supplemental Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion
explaining why it vacated its March 15, 2019 order on June 27, 2019, and
then immediately entered the same dismissal order with the later date. The
PCRA court has not complied with our directive. Since the appeal presently
before this court is clearly untimely, we quash the appeal.
Appeal quashed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Shogan, J. joins this Memorandum.
Nichols, J. notes dissent.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/30/20
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