Com. v. Johnson, K. ( 2020 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
KAREEM B. JOHNSON :
:
Appellant : No. 545 EDA 2020
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 13, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0005390-2015
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.: FILED: DECEMBER 31, 2020
Kareem B. Johnson (Johnson) appeals from the order of the Court of
Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (PCRA Court) denying his petition filed
pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
After review, we affirm.
On June 21, 2016, Johnson entered an open guilty plea to robbery and
related firearms offenses.1 The trial court accepted the plea and deferred
sentencing pending a presentence investigation (PSI). The PSI revealed that
Johnson was diagnosed as mildly mentally retarded at an early age and,
according to his family, still needed help in basic decision-making. Johnson
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*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3701(a)(1)(ii), 6105(a)(1), 6106(a)(1) and 6108, respectively.
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was also diagnosed with personality disorder and paranoid type schizophrenia
and was prescribed Zyprexa and Prozac. Despite this information, no issues
about Johnson’s competency to stand trial were raised before or at sentencing.
On December 19, 2017, the trial court sentenced him to 8 to 20 years’
imprisonment for robbery and concurrent sentences for the firearms
convictions. Johnson did not file a direct appeal.
On December 7, 2018, Johnson filed a pro se PCRA petition. Counsel
was appointed and filed an amended petition raising two claims for relief. In
his first claim, Johnson alleged that this plea was unlawfully induced and that
he was innocent, arguing that the information in the PSI about his intellectual
and mental health issues should have raised concerns, and that the trial court
should have determined whether he was competent to stand trial. Johnson
asserted the same thing in his second claim, but argued that plea counsel was
ineffective for having him plead guilty instead of seeking to withdraw his plea
and request a competency hearing. The PCRA court issued notice of its intent
to dismiss without a hearing under Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 and, after receiving no
response, denied the petition. Johnson timely appealed.2
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2
Our standard of review for claims denying PCRA relief without a hearing is
well-settled:
[T]he right to an evidentiary hearing on a post-conviction petition
is not absolute. It is within the PCRA court’s discretion to decline
to hold a hearing if the petitioner’s claim is patently frivolous and
has no support either in the record or [in] other evidence. It is
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I.
In his first issue, Johnson contends that the PCRA court erred in denying
his unlawful inducement claim without an evidentiary hearing. He disputes
that his plea was voluntary, knowing and intelligent, and argues that the trial
court should have examined the totality of the circumstances of his plea to
ensure that he understood its consequences. In support, he highlights the
information in his PSI that he was diagnosed as being mildly mentally retarded
and asserts that this information should have, at the very least, prompted the
trial court to inquire into his competency. Id. Additionally, Johnson argues
that the trial court should have also inquired into his psychiatric competency
to accept the plea because, according to the PSI, he was diagnosed with
personality disorder and paranoid type schizophrenia and was prescribed
medication to treat these mental illnesses. Id. at 13. Because of the
medication, Johnson further asserts that his mental competency was
compromised at his guilty plea hearing. Id.
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the responsibility of the reviewing court on appeal to examine
each issue raised in the PCRA petition in light of the record
certified before it in order to determine if the PCRA court erred in
its determination that there were no genuine issues of material
fact in controversy and in denying relief without conducting an
evidentiary hearing.
Commonwealth v. Grayson, 212 A.3d 1047, 1054 (Pa. Super. 2019)
(citation omitted).
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Under the PCRA, the petitioner must plead and prove by a
preponderance of evidence that his conviction or sentence resulted from a
guilty plea “unlawfully induced where the circumstances make it likely that the
inducement caused the petitioner to plead guilty and the petitioner is
innocent.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(iii). “A valid guilty plea must be
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered.” Commonwealth v.
Kelley, 136 A.3d 1007, 1013 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted).
The Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure mandate that pleas
be taken in open court, and require the court to conduct an on-
the-record colloquy to ascertain whether a defendant is aware of
his rights and the consequences of his plea. Specifically, the court
must affirmatively demonstrate the defendant understands: (1)
the nature of the charges to which he is pleading guilty; (2) the
factual basis for the plea; (3) his right to trial by jury; (4) the
presumption of innocence; (5) the permissible ranges of
sentences and fines possible; and (6) that the court is not bound
by the terms of the agreement unless the court accepts the
agreement. This Court will evaluate the adequacy of the plea
colloquy and the voluntariness of the resulting plea by examining
the totality of the circumstances surrounding the entry of that
plea.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 590. “Once the defendant has
entered a guilty plea, it is presumed that he was aware of what he was doing,
and the burden of proving involuntariness is upon him.” Commonwealth v.
Willis, 68 A.3d 997, 1002 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). “The law does not require that the defendant be pleased with
the outcome of his decision to enter a plea of guilty: All that is required is
that his decision to plead guilty be knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently
made.” Id. (citation and brackets omitted). “A person who elects to plead
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guilty is bound by the statements he makes in open court while under oath
and he may not later assert grounds for withdrawing the plea which contradict
the statements he made at his plea colloquy.” Commonwealth v. Pier, 182
A.3d 476, 480 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted).
In finding that Johnson’s first issue warranted no relief, the PCRA court
stated the following:
[Johnson] has failed to present any specific evidence which would
suggest he was incompetent at the time of the plea. Instead, he
relies on the [PSI] and Mental Health reports prepared prior to his
sentencing, which indicate that [Johnson] has been diagnosed
with a personality disorder, paranoid schizophrenia, and mental
retardation. These reports also state that [Johnson] was taking
medication for his mental health issues, and that, although he
struggled with his education, he ultimately earned a high school
diploma. At the time of sentencing, [Johnson] stated that he was
not suffering from any mental illness, and that he was satisfied
with his attorney. He also signed a written guilty colloquy in which
he confirmed that he understood the proceedings, that counsel
had explained the case to him, and that he was satisfied with
counsel. Moreover, trial counsel signed the same colloquy,
indicating that they had no concerns about [Johnson’s]
competency despite the information contained in the presentence
reports. Because the mere existence of mental illness is not
sufficient to show incompetency, and [Johnson] has offered no
further evidence to support his claim, he has failed to meet his
burden.
PCRA Court Opinion, 7/2/20, at 5.
We agree with this analysis and conclude that the PCRA court did not
abuse its discretion in finding that Johnson’s claim did not raise a genuine
issue of material fact requiring an evidentiary hearing. First, at the June 21,
2016 guilty plea hearing, Johnson did not raise any issues about being
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incompetent or unable to comprehend the consequences of pleading guilty.
Indeed, Johnson confirmed as much on the record.
THE COURT: How far did you go in school?
MR. JOHNSON: Twelfth.
THE COURT: Read, write, understand English?
MR. JOHNSON: Yes.
THE COURT: Are you under the influence of drug[s] or alcohol
today?
MR. JOHNSON: No.
THE COURT: Suffering from any mental illness today?
MR. JOHNSON: No.
N.T., 6/21/16, at 6-7. Johnson also completed a written guilty plea colloquy
confirming that he understood the plea that it was knowing, intelligent and
voluntary.
As a result, Johnson’s claim that his intellectual limitations prevented
him from entering a valid plea is belied by his statements in the guilty plea
colloquies—both written and oral—that he understood the consequences of his
guilty plea. The PSI related that he was diagnosed as mildly mentally retarded
in the first grade and that he was placed in special education classes. Johnson
did, however, go on to eventually earn his high school diploma. Beyond the
information in the PSI, Johnson provided no further evidence in his amended
petition tending to show that he was mentally incompetent or incapable of
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understanding the nature of his plea, which, as noted above, he told the trial
court he understood.
The same holds true for his mental health diagnoses. Johnson avowed
on the record that he did not have a mental illness that would impede his
ability to comprehend his plea, nor that he was under the influence of any
medication. Johnson is bound by these statements and cannot now assert
grounds for attacking his plea that contradict his statement. See
Commonwealth v. Willis, 68 A.3d 997, 1009 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation
omitted).
Moreover, “[t]he fact that a defendant has experienced mental illness in
the past does not per se render him incompetent to stand trial.”
Commonwealth v. Santiago, 855 A.2d 682, 697 (Pa. 2004). The same is
true of prescribed medication: without evidence that the medication affected
the defendant’s ability to comprehend, mere use of the medication will not
render a plea involuntary or unknowing. See Willis, supra (finding “the mere
fact Appellant was taking prescribed psychotropic medication at the time of
his plea does not, of itself, result in the conclusion he was unable to enter a
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent guilty plea.”). Here, Johnson relies solely
on the PSI to contend that he was incompetent to plead guilty because he was
diagnosed with personality disorder and paranoid type schizophrenia and
prescribed medication. However, this contention, without more, is insufficient
to raise a genuine issue of material fact requiring an evidentiary hearing, and
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Johnson provided no evidence in his amended petition tending to contradict
his representation at the plea hearing that he understood the plea. Thus, his
first claim lacks merit.
II.
Next, Johnson’s claims that the PCRA court erred in finding that plea
counsel was not ineffective for having Johnson plead guilty rather than
requesting a competency hearing similarly lacks merit.
“Allegations that counsel misadvised a criminal defendant in the plea
process are properly determined under the ineffectiveness of counsel
subsection of the PCRA [ (42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(ii)), ] not the subsection
specifically governing guilty pleas [ (42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(iii)) ].”
Commonwealth v. Lynch, 820 A.2d 728, 730 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2003). We
observe the following with respect to ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims.
The law presumes counsel has rendered effective assistance. In
general, to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
a petitioner must show, by a preponderance of the evidence,
ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of
the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining process
that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken
place.
The petitioner must demonstrate: (1) the underlying claim has
arguable merit; (2) counsel lacked a reasonable strategic basis for
his action or inaction; and (3) but for the errors and omissions of
counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the
proceedings would have been different. The petitioner bears the
burden of proving all three prongs of the test.
Commonwealth v. Postie, 200 A.3d 1015, 1022-23 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en
banc) (citations, footnote and quotation marks omitted). Since Johnson
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entered into a guilty plea, we keep in mind that “[i]n the context of a plea, a
claim of ineffectiveness may provide relief only if the alleged ineffectiveness
caused an involuntary or unknowing plea.” Commonwealth v. Orlando, 156
A.3d 1274, 1281 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).
As we discussed above, Johnson’s underlying claim—that the PSI raised
concerns about his competency that should have prevented the entry of his
plea—lacks arguable merit. That Johnson was diagnosed with a mental illness
did not, as he suggests, require plea counsel to request a competency hearing,
and that plea counsel was ineffective for failing to do so. See Santiago,
supra (rejecting claim that trial counsel should be deemed ineffective for not
requesting competency hearing because defendant had been diagnosed with
a mental illness). The record indicates that Johnson’s plea was entered
knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently, and he is bound by the statements
that he made in open court attesting that he understood the plea and was not
under the influence of any medication. See Commonwealth v. Pollard, 832
A.2d 517, 523 (Pa. Super. 2003) (“The longstanding rule of Pennsylvania law
is that a defendant may not challenge his guilty plea by asserting that he lied
while under oath, even if he avers that counsel induced the lies.”) (citation
omitted).
As we noted in the first issue, Johnson relied solely on the information
in the PSI; he provided no further information about his intellectual capacity
or mental health to support his contention that he was incompetent to stand
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trial and, therefore, enter a knowing, voluntary and intelligent guilty plea. The
information in the PSI, without more, was not enough to render any plea he
entered involuntary, and Johnson has not pointed us to any case law on the
contrary. Accordingly, we hold that the PCRA court correctly rejected his
ineffective assistance of trial claim without hearing.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/31/20
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