Com. v. Veneri, A. ( 2020 )


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  • J-S32043-20
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    ANTHONY JOHN VENERI, JR.                   :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 912 EDA 2020
    Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 4, 2020,
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County,
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0003526-1978,
    CP-23-CR-0003713-1978.
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    ANTHONY JOHN VENERI, JR.                   :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 1387 EDA 2020
    Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 4, 2020,
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County,
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0003526-1978,
    CP-23-CR-0003713-1978.
    BEFORE:      KUNSELMAN, J., KING, J., and COLINS, J.*
    MEMORANDUM PER CURIAM:                             FILED SEPTEMBER 11, 2020
    ____________________________________________
    *   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S32043-20
    In these consolidated appeals, Anthony John Veneri, Jr., presents a pro
    se challenge to the order denying his latest petitions filed pursuant to the Post
    Conviction Relief Act. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. We affirm.
    The pertinent facts and procedural history are as follows: On January
    31, 1979, a jury convicted Veneri of two bank robberies and related charges.
    The trial court sentenced him to twenty-five to fifty years of imprisonment to
    be served consecutive to a previously imposed sentence for armed robbery
    imposed by another state. Veneri filed a timely appeal to this Court, and we
    affirmed his judgment of sentence on November 19, 1982. Commonwealth
    v. Veneri, 
    452 A.2d 784
     (Pa. Super. 1982) (en banc). Our Supreme Court
    denied Veneri’s allocatur petition on September 13, 1983.
    Over the ensuing decades Veneri unsuccessfully has sought post-
    conviction relief.   Veneri filed the instant “Petition for this Court Depriving
    [Veneri’s] Rights Under Color of State Law” on January 14, 2020, and a
    “Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Nunc Pro Tunc” the next day. In both
    filings, Veneri asserted several claims, including a claim that the bills of
    information filed against him were void and claims of ineffective assistance of
    counsel.
    On January 27, 2020, following review of Veneri’s petitions and the
    record as a whole, the PCRA court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intent
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    J-S32043-20
    to dismiss without a hearing.1 Veneri did not file a response. By order entered
    March 4, 2020, the PCRA court entered an order dismissing Veneri’s petitions.
    These timely appeals followed. The PCRA court did not require Pa.R.A.P. 1925
    compliance.
    This Court’s standard of review regarding an order dismissing a petition
    under the PCRA is to ascertain whether “the determination of the PCRA court
    is supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal error. The PCRA
    court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings
    in the certified record.” Commonwealth v. Barndt, 
    74 A.3d 185
    , 191-92
    (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations omitted).
    Veneri has filed a handwritten/printed brief and supplement thereto
    which marginally complies with our briefing requirements. Before reaching
    any of his “issues” however, we must first determine whether the PCRA court
    correctly determined that Veneri’s most recent petitions were untimely filed.
    Initially, as noted by the PCRA court, the PCRA is intended to be the sole
    means of achieving post-conviction relief and that the statute has subsumed
    the writ of habeas corpus. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542; Commonwealth v.
    Taylor, 
    65 A.3d 462
     (Pa. Super. 2013). Thus, Veneri’s most recent filings are
    subject to the PCRA’s time restrictions.
    ____________________________________________
    1 Although the PCRA court referenced the Rule 907 notice order in its
    subsequent order denying Veneri’s petitions, this order does not appear in the
    electronic record. In addition, we note that Veneri has filed multiple petitions
    after he took the instant appeal.
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    J-S32043-20
    Generally, a petition for relief under the PCRA, including a second or
    subsequent petition, must be filed within one year of the date the judgment
    is final unless the petition alleges, and the petitioner proves, that an exception
    to the time limitation for filing the petition, set forth at 42 Pa.C.S.A. sections
    9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and (iii), is met.2 A PCRA petition invoking one of these
    statutory exceptions must be filed within one year of the date the claims could
    have been presented. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). Asserted exceptions to the
    time restrictions for a PCRA petition must be included in the petition, and may
    not be raised for the first time on appeal. Commonwealth v. Furgess, 
    149 A.3d 90
     (Pa. Super. 2016).
    Here, this Court has previously held that, “pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. §
    9545(b)(3), [Veneri’s] judgment of sentence became final ninety days after
    ____________________________________________
    2   The exceptions to the timeliness requirement are:
    (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
    interference of government officials with the presentation of the
    claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth
    or the Constitution or laws of the United States.
    (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to
    the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise
    of due diligence; or
    (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized
    by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court
    of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and
    has been held by that court to apply retroactively.
    42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and (iii).
    -4-
    J-S32043-20
    September 13, 1983, when he did not seek review of our Supreme Court’s
    denial of relief.” Veneri, unpublished memorandum at 3. Because Veneri
    filed the petitions at issue three decades later, they are patently untimely,
    unless Veneri satisfied his burden of pleading and proving that one of the
    enumerated exceptions applies.
    In his latest petitions, Veneri has failed to acknowledge, let alone plead
    and prove the applicability of any of the PCRA’s time-bar exceptions. In his
    original and supplemental “briefs,” Veneri avers that he is “submitting to this
    Honorable Court, newly discovered issues,” and, once again, claims that his
    trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue the bills of information were
    “void-in-limine.” Veneri’s Brief at 3. The PCRA court correctly addressed this
    issue:
    [T]he issue of the validity of the Informations filed
    against [Veneri] in 1978, which [Veneri] raises in [his]
    present petition, was already decided in his 1982 [direct
    appeal] in Commonwealth v. Veneri, 
    452 A.2d 784
     (Pa.
    Super. 1982) [(en banc)] and therefore may not be raised
    in his PCRA.      42 Pa.C.S.A. §9543(a)(3).    Moreover,
    [Veneri’s] contention that the Informations charging him
    were “void in limine” is meritless.
    PCRA Court Opinion, 4/15/20, at 3-4.
    In Veneri, an en banc panel of this Court concluded that then
    Pa.R.Crim.P. 225(b) (now Rule 560(B))’s requirement of that actual signature
    of the attorney for the Commonwealth, was “directory only and that its
    absence renders an information merely voidable and curable by amendment
    if properly raised in a pre-trial motion to quash.” Veneri, 
    452 A.2d at 788
    .
    -5-
    J-S32043-20
    In Veneri’s case, we found he waived this challenge because he raised it for
    the first time on appeal. 
    Id.
     Although Veneri now claims, as he did in multiple
    prior filings, that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to timely raise this
    defect, claims of ineffectiveness do not establish a timeliness exception under
    the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 95459(b)(4) (providing, “For purposes of this
    subchapter, “government officials” shall not include defense counsel, whether
    appointed or retained”); Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 
    65 A.3d 339
    , 349
    (Pa. 2013) (explaining allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel will not
    overcome the jurisdictional timeliness requirements of the PCRA).
    In sum, because Veneri’s latest petitions are patently untimely and
    Veneri cannot avail himself of any of the PCRA’s time-bar exceptions, the PCRA
    court did not error in denying them.
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 9/11/20
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 912 EDA 2020

Filed Date: 9/11/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/11/2020