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Com. v. Snook, J. ( 2020 )


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  • J-S02026-20
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA            :     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :          PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee               :
    :
    v.                           :
    :
    JOSHUA MICHAEL SNOOK                    :
    :
    Appellant              :        No. 1198 MDA 2019
    Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 12, 2019
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Snyder County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-55-CR-0000094-2013
    BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., KING, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                         FILED: FEBRUARY 5, 2020
    Appellant, Joshua Michael Snook, appeals pro se from the order entered
    in the Snyder County Court of Common Pleas, which denied his petition filed
    under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We affirm in part, vacate in
    part, and remand for further proceedings.
    The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. On
    February 17, 2013, Appellant’s wife, Jennifer Snook, drove Appellant to his
    grandparents’ home to retrieve a gun to shoot an individual with whom
    Appellant had argued that evening.          While in his grandparents’ home,
    Appellant fatally wounded his grandmother with a knife and cut the arm and/or
    wrist of his grandfather. On March 20, 2014, Appellant entered a negotiated
    guilty plea to third-degree murder and a nolo contendere plea to aggravated
    1   42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9541-9546.
    J-S02026-20
    assault and conspiracy to commit murder. In exchange, the Commonwealth
    agreed to, inter alia: (i) the entry of nolle prossequi on all remaining charges;
    (ii) permit Appellant to communicate with his wife, who had been charged as
    a co-defendant in the case, after sentencing; and (iii) recommend an
    aggregate term of twenty (20) to sixty (60) years’ incarceration. The court
    accepted the plea as knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and imposed the
    negotiated sentence on April 23, 2014.       The sentencing order included a
    provision permitting Appellant to correspond with his wife. Appellant did not
    file post-sentence motions or a direct appeal. Subsequently, co-defendant
    Mrs. Snook also entered a guilty plea and received a sentence of incarceration
    for her role in the events of February 17, 2013.
    Appellant timely filed pro se his first PCRA petition on April 24, 2015.
    On April 28, 2015, the PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed an amended
    PCRA petition on July 23, 2015. In the amended petition, Appellant asserted
    plea counsel had rendered ineffective assistance for, inter alia, inducing
    Appellant to enter into an unenforceable plea agreement.            Specifically,
    Appellant averred it was impossible for him to communicate with his wife after
    sentencing due to a Department of Corrections (“DOC”) policy prohibiting
    communication between co-defendants.          The PCRA court conducted an
    evidentiary hearing on October 13, 2015.
    On March 29, 2016, by agreement of the parties, the PCRA court: (i)
    deemed plea counsel ineffective for advising Appellant to enter a plea
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    agreement which included a term that was impossible to fulfill; (ii) vacated
    the April 2014 judgment of sentence; (iii) and ordered resentencing. That
    same day, Appellant entered a new negotiated guilty plea to third-degree
    murder and nolo contendere plea to aggravated assault and conspiracy to
    commit murder. The terms of the parties’ new plea agreement omitted the
    provision allowing for communication with co-defendant Mrs. Snook, and
    included the Commonwealth’s agreement to a reduced sentence of sixteen
    (16) to sixty (60) years’ incarceration.   After conducting a new oral plea
    colloquy on the record, the court accepted the plea as knowing, intelligent,
    and voluntary, and imposed the new negotiated aggregate sentence of sixteen
    (16) to sixty (60) years’ incarceration.    Following sentencing, the court
    informed Appellant of his post-sentence and appellate rights.     Appellant,
    however, filed no post-sentence motions or direct appeal.
    On March 30, 2017, Appellant timely filed pro se his first PCRA petition
    from the March 29, 2016 judgment of sentence. The PCRA court appointed
    new counsel on April 3, 2017. On July 12, 2017, Appellant filed an amended
    PCRA petition, asserting original PCRA counsel was ineffective during the
    March 29, 2016 plea proceedings because counsel failed to, inter alia, object
    to the plea colloquy as insufficient where neither the court nor counsel had
    explained the mens rea for malice.
    On June 15, 2018, again by the parties’ agreement, the PCRA court
    vacated the March 2016 judgment of sentence based on the deficient plea
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    colloquy. Appellant then entered a new negotiated guilty plea to third-degree
    murder and nolo contendere plea to aggravated assault and conspiracy to
    commit murder.      As part of the new plea agreement, the Commonwealth
    agreed, inter alia, to a reduced aggregate sentence of twelve (12) to forty
    (40) years’ incarceration, and to return Appellant’s personal property.     In
    exchange, Appellant expressly waived: (i) his right to appeal from the new
    judgment of sentence; and (ii) any future PCRA claims. Following a new oral
    plea colloquy, the court accepted the plea as knowing, intelligent, and
    voluntary, and resentenced Appellant to an aggregate twelve (12) to forty
    (40) years’ incarceration, per the plea agreement.       The sentencing order
    memorialized the terms of the parties’ plea agreement, in relevant part, as
    follows:
    9. It is hereby additionally ordered that as part of this
    sentence the following:
    9.1. [Appellant] has waived his right to appeal this
    sentence and has additionally waived all of claims with
    respect to the filing of petitions for Post-Conviction
    Relief in regard to his entire criminal case.
    9.2. The Commonwealth shall return to [Appellant]
    the following items of personal property after the
    expiration of the 30-day appeal period from this
    sentence:
    His wallet, his Social Security card, his keys
    seized from his home filing cabinet, his birth
    certificate, and two iPhones.
    (Sentencing Order, filed June 15, 2018).      Appellant filed no post-sentence
    motions or direct appeal.
    -4-
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    On June 11, 2019, Appellant timely filed pro se the current PCRA
    petition, which was his first petition from the June 15, 2018 judgment of
    sentence.   In his petition, Appellant asserted several claims of ineffective
    assistance of counsel. Appellant also complained the Commonwealth failed to
    comply with the June 15, 2018 plea agreement, because it had not returned
    Appellant’s personal property. On June 28, 2019, the court issued notice of
    its intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing per Pa.R.Crim.P. 907;
    Appellant responded pro se on July 9, 2019. On July 12, 2019, the PCRA court
    denied Appellant’s petition as an untimely serial PCRA petition filed from the
    original April 2014 judgment of sentence. Appellant filed pro se a timely notice
    of appeal and a voluntary concise statement of errors complained of on appeal
    per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) on July 22, 2019.
    Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
    DID THE PCRA COURT ERR IN REJECTING [APPELLANT’S]
    CLAIM THAT THE COMMONWEALTH IS IN BREACH OF
    APPELLANT’S PLEA AGREEMENT AND SENTENCING ORDER
    OF JUNE 15, 2018?
    DID THE PCRA COURT ERR IN DISMISSING APPELLANT’S
    PCRA [PETITION] AS “UNTIMELY” AS IT WAS FILED WITHIN
    ONE YEAR OF THE FINAL JUDGMENT OF SENTENCE OF JUNE
    15, 2018?
    DID THE PCRA COURT ERR/ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
    FAILING TO HOLD AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING WHERE
    APPELLANT RAISED ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT THAT
    WOULD ENTITLE HIM TO RELIEF?
    DID THE PCRA COURT ERR IN FAILING TO APPOINT PCRA
    COUNSEL AND ORDERING AMENDMENT OF APPELLANT’S
    CLAIMS?
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    DID THE PCRA COURT ERR WHEN FAILING TO
    ADDRESS/CORRECT THE MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE
    RESULTING FROM COMMONWEALTH’S BREACH OF
    APPELLANT’S PLEA AGREEMENT AND SENTENCING ORDER?
    DID THE PCRA COURT ERR, AS A MATTER OF LAW, WHEN
    FAILING TO REACH THE MERITS OF APPELLANT’S
    REMAINING CLAIMS THAT ARE NOW RESURRECTED, AS A
    MATTER OF LAW, DUE TO THE COMMONWEALTH’S BREACH
    OF APPELLANT’S PLEA AGREEMENT AND SENTENCING
    ORDER?
    (Appellant’s Brief at 4).
    For purposes of disposition, we combine Appellant’s issues. Appellant
    argues his current PCRA petition is a first, timely petition filed from the June
    15, 2018 judgment of sentence. Appellant contends the PCRA court erred
    when it failed to appoint PCRA counsel and hold an evidentiary hearing.
    Appellant avers plea counsel was ineffective for, inter alia, inducing Appellant
    into entering unknowing and unintelligent pleas where counsel should have
    investigated Appellant’s intoxication on the night at issue as a possible
    defense. Appellant also maintains the Commonwealth breached the June 15,
    2018 plea agreement when it failed to return Appellant’s personal property,
    which was an express term of the parties’ agreement. Appellant concludes
    this Court should reverse the denial of PCRA relief and remand for further
    proceedings. We agree some limited relief is due.
    Preliminarily, a PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent petition,
    shall be filed within one year of the date the underlying judgment of sentence
    becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment of sentence is final
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    “at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the
    Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
    or at the expiration of time for seeking the review.”            42 Pa.C.S.A. §
    9545(b)(3).
    A petition for collateral relief will generally be considered a PCRA petition
    if it raises issues cognizable under the PCRA.         See Commonwealth v.
    Peterkin, 
    554 Pa. 547
    , 553, 
    722 A.2d 638
    , 640 (1998); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542
    (stating PCRA shall be sole means of obtaining collateral relief and
    encompasses all other common law and statutory remedies for same
    purpose). The plain language of the PCRA mandates that claims which could
    be   brought   under   the   PCRA,    must    be   brought    under   the   PCRA.
    Commonwealth v. Hall, 
    565 Pa. 92
    , 96-97, 
    771 A.2d 1232
    , 1235 (2001).
    Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are generally cognizable under the
    PCRA.    See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii) (stating claim of ineffective
    assistance of counsel is cognizable under PCRA).
    “On the other hand, a collateral petition to enforce a plea agreement is
    regularly treated as outside the ambit of the PCRA and under the contractual
    enforcement theory of specific performance. The designation of the petition
    does not preclude a court from deducing the proper nature of a pleading.”
    Commonwealth v. Kerns, 
    220 A.3d 607
    , 611-12 (Pa.Super. 2019) (internal
    citations and quotation marks omitted).
    Plea bargains play a critical role in the criminal justice system of this
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    Commonwealth:
    With respect to plea bargains, [t]he reality of the criminal
    justice system is that nearly all criminal cases are disposed
    of by plea bargains: [n]inety-seven percent of federal
    convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are
    the result of guilty pleas. Plea bargaining is not some
    adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal
    justice system.      Accordingly, it is critical that plea
    agreements are enforced, to avoid any possible perversion
    of the plea bargaining system. The disposition of criminal
    charges by agreement between the prosecutor and the
    accused, …is an essential component of the administration
    of justice. Properly administered, it is to be encouraged. In
    this Commonwealth, the practice of plea bargaining is
    generally regarded favorably, and is legitimized and
    governed by court rule…. A “mutuality of advantage” to
    defendants and prosecutors flows from the ratification of the
    bargain.
    Assuming the plea agreement is legally possible to fulfill,
    when the parties enter the plea agreement and the court
    accepts and approves the plea, then the parties and the
    court must abide by the terms of the agreement. Specific
    enforcement of valid plea bargains is a matter of
    fundamental fairness. The terms of plea agreements are
    not limited to the withdrawal of charges, or the length of a
    sentence. Parties may agree to—and seek enforcement of—
    terms that fall outside these areas.
    Although a plea agreement occurs in a criminal context, it
    remains contractual in nature and is to be analyzed under
    contract-law standards. Furthermore, disputes over any
    particular term of a plea agreement must be resolved by
    objective standards.      A determination of exactly what
    promises constitute the plea bargain must be based upon
    the totality of the surrounding circumstances and involves a
    case-by-case adjudication.
    Any ambiguities in the terms of the plea agreement will be
    construed against the Government.        Nevertheless, the
    agreement itself controls where its language sets out the
    terms of the bargain with specificity.      Regarding the
    Commonwealth’s duty to honor plea agreements, well-
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    settled Pennsylvania law states:
    Our courts have demanded strict compliance with that
    duty in order to avoid any possible perversion of the
    plea bargaining system, evidencing the concern that
    a defendant might be coerced into a bargain or
    fraudulently induced to give up the very valued
    constitutional guarantees attendant the right to trial
    by jury.
    Whether a particular plea agreement has been breached
    depends on what the parties to the agreement reasonably
    understood to be the terms of the agreement.
    Commonwealth v. Farabaugh, 
    136 A.3d 99
    , 1001-02 (Pa.Super. 2016),
    appeal denied, 
    643 Pa. 140
    , 
    172 A.3d 1115
    (2017) (internal citations and
    quotation marks omitted). Further: “[T]he convicted criminal is entitled to
    the benefit of his bargain through specific performance of the terms of the
    plea agreement. Thus, a court must determine whether an alleged term is
    part of the parties’ plea agreement. If the answer to that inquiry is affirmative,
    then the convicted criminal is entitled to specific performance of the term.”
    Commonwealth v. Martinez, 
    637 Pa. 208
    , 233, 
    147 A.3d 517
    , 532-33
    (2016) (some internal citations omitted).
    Significantly, defendants can waive valuable rights as part of a plea
    bargain, including the right to appeal, in exchange for important concessions
    by the Commonwealth, so long as the defendant’s waiver is knowing,
    intelligent, and voluntary. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Barnes, 
    687 A.2d 1163
    (Pa.Super. 1996), appeal denied, 
    548 Pa. 613
    , 
    693 A.2d 585
    (1997)
    (holding defendant’s waiver of right to file motion for post-trial relief in
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    exchange for Commonwealth’s agreement not to seek death penalty was
    valid). See also Commonwealth v. Byrne, 
    833 A.2d 729
    , 736 (Pa.Super.
    2003) (stating: “We are aware of no authority that provides an impediment
    to a defendant’s express, knowing, and voluntary waiver of a statutory right
    if that waiver is key in obtaining a bargained-for exchange from the
    Commonwealth”).
    Instantly, Appellant’s June 15, 2018 judgment of sentence became final
    on July 15, 2018, after expiration of the time for Appellant to file a direct
    appeal in this Court. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). See also Pa.R.A.P.
    903(a) (stating appellant has 30 days to file notice of appeal in this Court).
    The PCRA court deemed Appellant’s current filing a serial PCRA petition from
    the original April 2014 judgment of sentence, and denied Appellant’s petition
    as untimely. The April 2014 judgment of sentence, however, no longer stood
    at the time Appellant filed the current PCRA petition.    Rather, the record
    confirms the March 29, 2016 proceedings resulted in the vacation of the April
    2014 judgment of sentence, entry of a new plea agreement with different
    terms, and entry of a new judgment of sentence. Likewise, during the June
    15, 2018 proceedings, the court vacated the March 29, 2016 judgment of
    sentence, Appellant entered a new plea agreement with different terms, and
    the court imposed a wholly new judgment of sentence against Appellant.
    Therefore, Appellant’s current June 11, 2019 PCRA petition represented
    Appellant’s first PCRA petition from the June 15, 2018 judgment of sentence,
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    which was timely filed. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).
    Nevertheless, Appellant expressly waived his right to PCRA review as
    part   of   the   June   15,   2018   plea   agreement,   in   exchange    for   the
    Commonwealth’s sentencing reduction. See 
    Byrne, supra
    ; 
    Barnes, supra
    .
    Appellant does not challenge on appeal the validity of his waiver of appellate
    rights.     Consequently, Appellant is precluded from raising his current
    ineffective assistance of counsel claims, which are otherwise cognizable under
    the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii). Thus, we affirm the court’s
    denial of PCRA relief, albeit on different grounds.2 See Commonwealth v.
    Reese, 
    31 A.3d 708
    , 727 (Pa.Super. 2011) (en banc) (stating appellate court
    may affirm order of trial court on any basis if ultimate decision is correct).
    Appellant’s claim regarding the return of his personal property,
    however, constitutes a claim to enforce the bargained-for exchange he made
    in the June 15, 2018 plea agreement and falls outside of the PCRA. See
    2 Ordinarily, a PCRA petitioner is entitled to the assistance of counsel to litigate
    a first PCRA petition. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(c) (stating indigent defendant is
    entitled to appointment of counsel for litigation of first PCRA petition). Under
    these circumstances, however, remanding for appointment of counsel
    concerning Appellant’s PCRA claims would be a futile act.             See, e.g.,
    Commonwealth v. Hart, 
    911 A.2d 939
    , 942 (Pa.Super. 2006) (explaining
    failure to appoint counsel for first-time PCRA petitioner who has served his
    sentence is harmless error; remand would be futile act under such
    circumstances because defendant who has already served sentence is
    ineligible for PCRA relief). Additionally, the court was not required to hold an
    evidentiary hearing on Appellant’s PCRA claims. See Commonwealth v.
    Hardcastle, 
    549 Pa. 450
    , 
    701 A.2d 541
    (1997) (explaining PCRA court is not
    required to hold evidentiary hearing where there is no genuine issue
    concerning any material fact, petitioner is not entitled to PCRA relief, and no
    purpose would be served by any further proceedings).
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    Kerns, supra
    . See also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2) (enumerating cognizable
    issues under PCRA). The court failed to address Appellant’s claim alleging a
    breach of the plea agreement when it denied Appellant’s June 11, 2019 filing.
    Therefore, we vacate the court’s July 12, 2019 order only with respect to
    Appellant’s claim to enforce the plea bargain and remand for consideration of
    whether Appellant was denied his bargained-for exchange regarding return of
    his property. Accordingly, we affirm the July 12, 2019 order denying PCRA
    relief, vacate the order regarding Appellant’s claim to enforce the plea
    agreement, and remand for further proceedings.
    Order affirmed in part; vacated and remanded in part. Jurisdiction is
    relinquished.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 02/05/2020
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Document Info

Docket Number: 1198 MDA 2019

Filed Date: 2/5/2020

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024