Com. v. Moore, A. ( 2020 )


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  • J-A24015-19
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    ADAM JAMES MOORE                           :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 472 EDA 2019
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 8, 2019
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-15-SA-0000431-2018
    BEFORE:      BENDER, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and COLINS, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                       FILED FEBRUARY 05, 2020
    Appellant, Adam James Moore, appeals from the judgment of sentence
    of a $200 fine and $452.48 in restitution, which was imposed after he was
    found guilty, following a summary appeal, of a violation of the Dog Law, 3 P.S.
    §§ 459-101 - 459-1205. After review, we conclude that this appeal is within
    the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Court and, thus, we order that the
    appeal be transferred.
    The facts underlying this case are not pertinent to our disposition. We
    only note that, according to Appellant, on March 25, 2018, he was issued a
    citation by the Chester County Animal Control authorities for violating 3 P.S.
    § 459-502(a) (Dog bites; detention and isolation of dogs). See Appellant’s
    Brief at 6. Following a summary trial before the magisterial district court,
    ____________________________________________
    *   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-A24015-19
    Appellant was acquitted of that offense. However, the district court convicted
    him of violating 3 P.S. § 459-305(a)(1) (Confinement and housing of dogs not
    part of a kennel), which the court deemed to be a ‘lesser-included offense’ of
    the charged section 459-502(a) violation.
    Appellant filed a timely summary appeal to the Court of Common Pleas
    of Chester County.    Prior to his trial de novo, he filed a “Motion to Quash
    Conviction of 3 P.S. § 459-305(a)(1) as Void Ab Initio,” which the court
    denied. Following Appellant’s trial de novo, the court upheld his conviction
    under section 459-305(a)(1).      Appellant was thereafter sentenced to the
    above-stated fine and restitution.
    Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and complied with the trial
    court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors
    complained of on appeal. The trial court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion on April
    18, 2019. Herein, Appellant states three issues for our review:
    I. Did the magisterial district court err by finding Appellant guilty
    of 3 P.S. § 459-305(a)(1), incorrectly classifying it as a “lesser[-]
    included offense” of that which was originally charged?
    II. Did the [trial] court … err by denying Appellant’s Motion to
    Quash Conviction of 3 P.S. § 459-305(a)(1) as Void Ab Initio?
    III. Did the [trial] court … lack the authority to conduct a trial de
    novo on the offense of 3 P.S. § 459-305(a)(1) since that offense
    was neither originally charged nor a lesser[-]included offense of
    the originally charged offense?
    Appellant’s Brief at 5.
    -2-
    J-A24015-19
    Before we consider any of Appellant’s issues, we must determine
    whether this case should be transferred to the Commonwealth Court under 42
    Pa.C.S. § 762. That statute provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
    § 762. Appeals from courts of common pleas
    (a) General rule.--Except as provided in subsection (b),
    the Commonwealth Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of
    appeals from final orders of the courts of common pleas in
    the following cases:
    ***
    (2)    Governmental         and      Commonwealth
    regulatory criminal cases.--All criminal actions or
    proceedings for the violation of any:
    (i) Rule, regulation        or   order   of   any
    Commonwealth agency.
    (ii) Regulatory statute administered by any
    Commonwealth agency subject to Subchapter A
    of Chapter 5 of Title 2 (relating to practice and
    procedure of Commonwealth agencies). The
    term “regulatory statute” as used in this
    subparagraph does not include any provision of
    Title 18 (relating to crimes and offenses).
    42 Pa.C.S. § 762(a)(2).
    In Commonwealth v. Hake, 
    738 A.2d 46
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999), the
    Commonwealth Court declared that it has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals
    under the Dog Law, because that statute “is not a penal statute under the
    Crimes Code (Title 18), but is a regulatory statute, administered and enforced
    by the Department of Agriculture (Title 7, Chapter 27 of the Pa.Code).” 
    Id. -3- J-A24015-19
    at 47 n.3. Nevertheless, we recognize that, because the Commonwealth has
    not raised any issue with this Court’s jurisdiction over the present appeal, “it
    is within our discretion to transfer the matter to the Commonwealth Court or
    retain jurisdiction.”   Lara, Inc., v. Dorney Park Coaster Co., Inc., 
    534 A.2d 1062
    , 1066 (Pa. Super. 1987); see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 704 (providing for
    an exception to exclusive jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Court if the
    appellee does not object to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Superior Court).
    In Lara, Inc., we explained that,
    [i]n exercising this discretion, we must examine the question on
    a case by case basis. This [C]ourt may retain jurisdiction over
    cases that should have been appealed to the Commonwealth
    Court in the interest of judicial economy. However, … the interest
    of judicial economy must be weighed against other interests, one
    of which is the possibility of establishing conflicting lines of
    authority.
    Lara, 
    Inc., 534 A.2d at 1066
    . Notably, we cautioned in Lara, Inc., that “we
    should be most cautious in assuming jurisdiction over matters that properly
    belong before the Commonwealth Court.” 
    Id. (footnote omitted).
    Here, we conclude that the preferable course is to transfer this appeal
    to the Commonwealth Court.       Jurisdiction of issues under the Dog Law is
    properly vested in the Commonwealth Court, see 
    Hake, 738 A.2d at 47
    n.3,
    and the Court’s experience in this area is evident from the appeals it has
    entertained involving claims under that statute. We also seek to avoid the
    risk of establishing conflicting lines of authority. Therefore, we transfer this
    case to Commonwealth Court.
    Case transferred to Commonwealth Court. Jurisdiction relinquished.
    -4-
    J-A24015-19
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 2/5/20
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 472 EDA 2019

Filed Date: 2/5/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/5/2020