In Re: S.A.F.P., Jr., Appeal of: K.M.F. ( 2020 )


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  • J-S69016-19
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    IN RE: S.A.F.P.JR, A MINOR                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    APPEAL OF: K.M.F., MOTHER                  :
    :
    :
    :
    :
    :   No. 2191 EDA 2019
    Appeal from the Order Entered July 18, 2019
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County,
    Orphans' Court at No(s): No. 2019-A9013.
    BEFORE:      SHOGAN, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:                         FILED FEBRUARY 06, 2020
    K.M.F. (Mother) appeals the order terminating her rights to her seven-
    year-old son, S.A.F.P. Jr. (Child), pursuant to the Adoption Act. See 23
    Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b).1 After review, we affirm.
    In an opinion filed on September 26, 2019, the orphans’ court provided
    a thorough recitation of the facts and procedural history of this case. 2
    Therefore, we will only briefly summarize them. Child, born in April 2011, was
    removed from Mother’s custody in April 2017 due to concerns about Mother’s
    substance abuse, lack of treatment, lack of supervision and protective
    ____________________________________________
    *   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    1   S.P. (Father) voluntarily relinquished his parental rights.
    2   See Orphans’ Court Opinion, 9/26/19, at 1-12.
    J-S69016-19
    capacity, and because of the existence of domestic violence in the home.
    Bucks County Children and Youth Services Agency (CYS) had received six
    referrals for abuse against Child committed by Mother’s paramour (D.R.).3
    Child was formally adjudicated dependent in May 2017. Child was placed in
    the home of his maternal aunt and uncle.
    At the time of Child’s adjudication, CYS developed a placement
    permanency plan, which consisted of objectives Mother needed to fulfill in
    order to be reunited with Child. Specifically, the plan obligated Mother to: 1)
    obtain and maintain suitable housing; 2) obtain and maintain a source of
    income; 3) obtain a mental health evaluation and follow any and all treatment
    recommendations; 4) maintain regular visitation with Child; 5) submit to
    random urine testing; and 6) address domestic violence concerns. Over the
    course of the dependency case, Mother did not make significant progress
    toward accomplishing any of these objectives.        Of note, Mother chose to
    remain in a violent relationship with her paramour instead of alleviating the
    principal concerns that led to Child’s removal.
    On February 5, 2019, CYS filed a petition to involuntarily terminate
    Mother’s parental rights.4 The orphans’ court conducted evidentiary hearings
    ____________________________________________
    3 In light of this Court’s redaction of all information that might identify Child,
    we note that D.R. is most commonly identified as “Mr. R.” in the attached
    orphans’ court opinion. See Orphans’ Court Opinion, 9/26/19, passim
    (redacted).
    4 In the parties’ briefs and in the orphans’ court opinion, there is reference to
    a January 2019 goal change hearing. Those specifics are not in the record.
    -2-
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    in March 27, 2019. At the hearings, Child was represented by his guardian ad
    litem, who indicated that Child’s legal interests merged with his best interests.
    On July 8, 2019, the orphans’ court entered the order granting the petition
    under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8) and (b). Mother timely filed this
    appeal.
    Mother raises the following issues for our review:
    1. Did the [orphans’] court erroneously grant [CYS’s]
    petition to involuntarily terminate the parental rights
    of [Mother] pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2)
    when [CYS] failed to prove the grounds thereunder by
    clear and convincing evidence?
    2. Did the [orphans’] court erroneously grant [CYS’s]
    petition to involuntarily terminate the parental rights
    of [Mother] pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(5)
    when [CYS] failed to prove the grounds thereunder by
    clear and convincing evidence?
    3. Did the [orphans’] court erroneously grant [CYS’s]
    petition to involuntarily terminate the parental rights
    of [Mother] pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8)
    when [CYS] failed to prove the grounds thereunder by
    clear and convincing evidence?
    4. Did the [orphans’] court erroneously move its inquiry
    to the needs and welfare of [C]hild pursuant to 23
    Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b) and erroneously find that
    termination would best meet said needs and welfare
    when [CYS] failed to prove grounds for involuntary
    termination of parental rights pursuant to the grounds
    alleged under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), and (8)
    by clear and convincing evidence?
    5. Did the trial court erroneously find that the needs and
    welfare of [C]hild as contemplated under 23 Pa.C.S.A.
    2511(b) were best met by terminating the parental
    rights of [Mother]?
    -3-
    J-S69016-19
    Mother’s Brief at 6.
    In reviewing an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, we
    adhere to the following principles:
    [A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion
    standard when considering a trial court's determination of a
    petition for termination of parental rights. As in dependency
    cases, our standard of review requires an appellate court to
    accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of
    the trial court if they are supported by the record. In re:
    R.J.T., 
    9 A.3d 1179
    , 1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings
    are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the
    trial court made an error of law or abused its
    discretion. Id.; In re R.I.S., 
    36 A.3d 567
    , 572 (Pa.
    2011) (plurality). As has been often stated, an abuse of
    discretion does not result merely because the reviewing
    court might have reached a different conclusion. Id.; see
    also Samuel–Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc., 
    34 A.3d 1
    , 51 (Pa. 2011); Christianson v. Ely, 
    838 A.2d 630
    ,
    634 (Pa. 2003). Instead, a decision may be reversed for an
    abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
    unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. 
    Id.
    As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for
    applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in these
    cases. We observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts
    are not equipped to make the fact-specific determinations
    on a cold record, where the trial judges are observing the
    parties during the relevant hearing and often presiding over
    numerous other hearings regarding the child and
    parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190. Therefore, even where the
    facts could support an opposite result, as is often the case
    in dependency and termination cases, an appellate court
    must resist the urge to second guess the trial court and
    impose its own credibility determinations and judgment;
    instead we must defer to the trial judges so long as the
    factual findings are supported by the record and the court's
    legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an
    abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of Atencio, 
    650 A.2d 1064
    , 1066 (Pa. 1994).
    -4-
    J-S69016-19
    In re I.E.P., 
    87 A.3d 340
    , 343–344 (Pa. Super. 2014) (quoting In re
    Adoption of S.P., 
    47 A.3d 817
    , 826–827 (Pa. 2012)).
    The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing
    evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental
    rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 
    985 A.2d 273
    , 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). We have
    explained that the “standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as
    testimony that is so ‘clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the
    trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of
    the precise facts in issue.’ ” 
    Id.
     (quoting In re J.L.C., 
    837 A.2d 1247
    , 1251
    (Pa. Super. 2003)). Moreover, this Court may affirm the trial court's decision
    regarding the termination of parental rights with regard to any one subsection
    of section 2511(a). In re B.L.W., 
    843 A.2d 380
    , 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en
    banc).
    Here, the orphans' court terminated Mother's parental rights pursuant
    to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8) and (b).      We focus our review on
    subsections (a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows:
    § 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
    (a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a
    child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the
    following grounds:
    (2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
    or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
    essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for
    his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and
    causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or
    will not be remedied by the parent.
    -5-
    J-S69016-19
    ***
    (b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the
    rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
    developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
    of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated
    solely on the basis of environmental factors such as
    inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and
    medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.
    With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection
    (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by
    the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which
    are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
    filing of the petition.
    23 Pa.C.S. § 2511. This Court has explained that the focus in terminating
    parental rights under section 2511(a) is on the parent, but under section
    2511(b), the focus is on the child. In re Adoption of C.L.G., 
    956 A.2d 999
    ,
    1008 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc).
    Mother argues that the conditions which led to Child’s removal are in
    the process of being remedied. Mother’s Brief at 18. Mother notes that she
    has cooperated in her treatment plans and improved in her communication
    with the foster parents. Id. at 19. Although Mother admits to the domestic
    violence concerns involving her paramour, she argues that Child was never
    exposed to those issues. Id. at 20. Finally, Mother argues that she has a
    worthwhile bond with Child; and that although his preference is to reside with
    the foster parents, Child maintained that he wanted contact with Mother. Id.
    at 29.
    In response, the orphans' court has provided a thorough evaluation
    supporting termination of Mother's parental rights to Child pursuant to each
    -6-
    J-S69016-19
    challenged provision, including 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) and (b). Having
    reviewed the notes of testimony and the certified record, we conclude that the
    Honorable Gary B. Gilman’s findings and conclusions are supported by clear
    and convincing evidence of record, and we adopt Judge Gilman’s opinion as
    our own.5
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 2/6/20
    ____________________________________________
    5The parties are directed to attach a copy of the orphans’ court opinion of
    September 25, 2019 to any future filings in this matter.
    -7-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2191 EDA 2019

Filed Date: 2/6/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021