Traver, I. v. Reliant Senior Care ( 2020 )


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  • J-A25042-19
    
    2020 PA Super 23
    IRENE TRAVER, ADMINISTRATRIX OF :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    THE ESTATE OF CLAYTON L. TRAVER, :         PENNSYLVANIA
    DECEASED                         :
    :
    :
    v.                   :
    :
    :
    RELIANT SENIOR CARE HOLDINGS,    :
    INC.; RELIANT LAKESIDE HOLDINGS, :
    LLC, D/B/A/, LAKESIDE HEALTH AND :
    REHABILITATION CENTER; RELIANT   :
    SENIOR CARE MANAGEMENT, LLC;     :
    RELIANT SENIOR CARE              :
    PENNSYLVANIA, LLC; RSC MASTER    :
    TENANT I, LLC; RSC CONSOLIDATED :
    HOLDINGS, LLC; HCR MANORCARE,    :
    LLC; MANORCARE OF KINGSTON PA, :
    LLC D/B/A MANORCARE HEALTH       :
    SERVICES - KINGSTON;             :
    MANORCARE HEALTH SERVICES,       :
    INC., A/K/A MANORCARE HEALTH     :
    SERVICES, LLC; HCR MANORCARE     :
    HEARTLAND, LLC; MANOR CARE,      :
    INC.; HCR MANORCARE, INC.; HCR   :
    IV HEALTHCARE, LLC.; HCR III     :
    HEALTHCARE, LLC; HCR II          :
    HEALTHCARE, LLC; HCR             :
    HEALTHCARE, LLC; HCRMC           :
    OPERATIONS, LLC; HCR MANORCARE :
    OPERATIONS II, LLC. HCR MANOR    :
    CARE SERVICES, LLC; HEARTLAND    :
    EMPLOYMENT SERVICES, LLC;        :
    GOLDEN GATE NATIONAL SENIOR      :
    CARE, LLC; GGNSC WILKES-BARRE    :
    II LP D/B/A GOLDEN LIVING CENTER :
    - SUMMIT; GGNSC EQUITY           :
    HOLDINGS, LLC; GGNSC HOLDINGS    :
    LLC; GGNSC ADMINISTRATIVE        :
    SERVICES LLC; GGNSC CLINICAL     :
    SERVICES, LLC; GOLDEN GATE       :
    ANCILLARY, LLC; WYNETTE          :
    WOLFORD, NHA; RIVER RUN, LLC     :
    D/B/A RIVER RUN REHABILITATION   :
    J-A25042-19
    AND NURSING CENTER; MOSHE       :
    SCEINER; NATHAN STERN           :
    :
    :
    APPEAL OF: HCR MANORCARE, LLC;  :
    MANORCARE OF KINGSTON PA, LLC   :
    D/B/A/ MANORCARE HEALTH         :
    SERVICES - KINGSTON;            :
    MANORCARE HEALTH SERVICES,      :
    INC. A/K/A MANORCARE HEALTH     :
    SERVICES, LLC; HCR MANORCARE,   :
    INC.; HCR IV HEALTHCARE, LLC;   :
    HCR III HEALTHCARE, LLC; HCR II :
    HEALTHCARE, LLC; HCR            :
    HEALTHCARE, LLC; HCRMC          :
    OPERATIONS, LLC; HCR MANORCARE :
    OPERATIONS II, LLC; HEARTLAND   :
    EMPLOYMENT SERVICES, LLC; HCR   :                   No. 432 MDA 2019
    MANOR CARE SERVICES, LLC
    Appeal from the Order Entered February 7, 2019
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County
    Civil Division at No(s): 2016-3983
    BEFORE: STABILE, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
    OPINION BY MUSMANNO, J.:                 FILED: FEBRUARY 6, 2020
    HCR ManorCare, LLC; ManorCare of Kingston PA, D/B/A ManorCare
    Health Services – Kingston (“the ManorCare Facility”); ManorCare Health
    Services, Inc., A/K/A ManorCare Health Services, LLC; HCR ManorCare, Inc.;
    HCR IV Healthcare, LLC; HCR II Healthcare, LLC; HCR Healthcare, LLC;
    HCRMC Operations, LLC; HCR ManorCare Operations II, LLC; Heartland
    Employment Services, LLC; and HCR ManorCare Services, LLC (collectively,
    “the   ManorCare   Defendants”), appeal       from the     Order   denying   their
    Preliminary Objection, in the nature of a Motion to Enforce the Arbitration
    Agreement,    to   the   Complaint   filed   by   Irene   Traver   (“Traver”),   as
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    J-A25042-19
    Administratrix of the Estate of Clayton L. Traver, deceased (“the Estate”).1
    We affirm.
    Between 2013 and 2015, Clayton L. Traver (“Decedent”), Traver’s
    husband, resided in several different nursing home facilities on multiple
    occasions, including three separate residencies2 at the ManorCare Facility,
    which is owned and operated by the ManorCare Defendants. Relevantly, each
    time Decedent was admitted to the ManorCare Facility, Traver signed an
    Admission Agreement and an Arbitration Agreement. Decedent died on March
    20, 2015.
    As Administratrix for the Estate, Traver initiated the instant action on
    April 14, 2016, by filing a Praecipe for Writ of Summons. Traver filed Praecipes
    ____________________________________________
    1 The ManorCare Defendants’ Preliminary Objections contained various other
    Motions, which the trial court denied in part and granted in part. However,
    the Motion to Enforce the Arbitration Agreement is the sole issue relevant to
    this appeal. Although interlocutory, an appeal may be taken as of right from
    an order denying a petition to compel arbitration. Bair v. Manor Care of
    Elizabethtown, PA, LLC, 
    108 A.3d 94
    , 96 (Pa. Super. 2015); see also 42
    Pa.C.S.A. § 7320(a)(1); Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(8).
    2Decedent resided in the ManorCare Facility during the periods of November
    22, 2013, to December 20, 2013; April 25, 2014, to June 26, 2014; and
    February 25, 2015, to March 3, 2015.
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    to Reissue the Writ of Summons on May 12, 2016, and June 6, 2016.3
    Traver filed a Complaint4 on September 21, 2016, asserting claims of
    ordinary and corporate negligence, custodial neglect, survival and wrongful
    death.    Traver sought punitive damages in four counts of the Complaint.
    Regarding the ManorCare Defendants, Traver alleged that, in an effort to
    maximize profits, the ManorCare Defendants intentionally reduced staffing
    levels and increased the number of sick, elderly, and frail patients requiring
    complex medical care.          Traver claimed that this practice resulted in a
    recklessly high resident-to-staff ratio, and the failure of staff to properly
    manage and treat illnesses and injuries among the residents. Traver alleged
    that, as a result of inadequate care, Decedent suffered from a fall, pneumonia,
    multiple urinary tract infections, dehydration, skin tears, pressure ulcers, and
    scrotal dermatitis during his residencies.
    ____________________________________________
    3 Traver later filed a Motion to Consolidate the instant action with a separate
    action (which is not included in the certified record) that she had filed against
    the owners and operators of the Lakeside Health and Rehabilitation Center.
    The trial court granted Traver’s Motion to Consolidate on September 14, 2016.
    4 The Complaint named 31 total defendants. Golden Gate National Senior
    Care, LLC; GGNSC Wilkes-Barre II LP D/B/A Golden Living Center – Summit;
    GGNSC Holdings, LLC; GGNSC Equity Holdings, LLC; GGNSC Administrative
    Services, LLC; GGNSC Clinical Services LLC; Golden Gate Ancillary, LLC; and
    Wynette Wolford, NHA, filed a separate, related appeal, which is docketed at
    No. 452 MDA 2019. The remaining listed defendants are not parties to the
    instant appeal.
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    J-A25042-19
    On October 11, 2016, the ManorCare Defendants filed Preliminary
    Objections, including a Motion to Enforce the Arbitration Agreement.
    Specifically, the ManorCare Defendants asserted that, upon Decedent’s
    admission to the ManorCare facility, Traver executed a voluntary Arbitration
    Agreement on Decedent’s behalf. The ManorCare Defendants pointed to the
    following relevant provisions of the Arbitration Agreement:
    VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
    (“AGREEMENT”)
    THE PARTIES ARE WAIVING THEIR RIGHT TO A TRIAL
    BEFORE A JUDGE OR JURY OF ANY DISPUTE BETWEEN
    THEM, PLEASE READ CAREFULLY BEFORE SIGNING. THE
    PATIENT WILL RECEIVE SERVICES IN THIS CENTER
    WHETHER OR NOT THIS AGREEMENT IS SIGNED.
    ARBITRATION IS DESCRIBED IN THE VOLUNTARY
    ARBITRATION PROGRAM BROCHURE COPY, ATTACHED
    AND MADE PART OF THIS AGREEMENT.
    ***
    1. Agreement to Arbitrate “Disputes”: All claims arising out
    of or related to this agreement, the Admission Agreement or any
    and all past or future admissions of the Patient [Decedent] at this
    Center [the ManorCare Facility], or any sister Center operated by
    any subsidiary of HCR ManorCare, Inc. (“Sister Center”), including
    claims for malpractice, shall be submitted to arbitration. …
    ***
    8. Right to Change Your Mind: This Agreement may be
    cancelled by written notice sent by certified mail to the Center’s
    Administrator within 30 calendar days of the Patient’s date of
    admission.
    9. Binding on Parties & Others: The Parties intend that this
    Agreement shall benefit and bind the Center, its parents, affiliates,
    and subsidiary companies, and shall benefit and bind the Patient
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    (as defined herein), his/her successors, spouses, children, next of
    kin, guardians, administrators, and legal representatives.
    Preliminary Objections, 10/11/16, at ¶ 16 (bold in original); see also id.,
    Exhibit B (Arbitration Agreement).
    Traver filed a Response, and a Memorandum in support thereof, on
    October 31, 2016. Traver alleged, inter alia, that the Arbitration Agreement
    was unenforceable because Traver lacked legal authority to execute a binding
    agreement on Decedent’s behalf, as Decedent had never executed a power of
    attorney or otherwise designated her as his agent.
    The ManorCare Defendants thereafter filed a Sur-Reply to Traver’s
    Response, arguing that Traver had authority to execute the Arbitration
    Agreement under the doctrines of apparent authority and authority by
    estoppel. Traver filed a Response thereto.
    Following    discovery     and    briefing   concerning   the   circumstances
    surrounding the execution of the Arbitration Agreement, the trial court entered
    an Order on February 7, 2019, denying the ManorCare Defendants’ Motion to
    Enforce the Arbitration Agreement. The ManorCare Defendants filed a timely
    Notice of Appeal.5, 6
    The ManorCare Defendants now raise the following issue for our review:
    ____________________________________________
    5 The end of the 30-day appeal period was March 9, 2019, a Saturday. See
    1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908.
    6 The trial court did not order the ManorCare Defendants to file a concise
    statement of matters complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
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    Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred in finding that [] Traver lacked
    authority to execute the Arbitration Agreement[] on behalf of her
    husband, [Decedent], when the record evidence demonstrated
    that there was a clear understanding between them that [] Traver
    was authorized to execute [the Arbitration Agreement] on
    [Decedent’s] behalf, and that understanding was communicated
    to the ManorCare Defendants?
    Brief for Appellants at 6.
    The ManorCare Defendants claim that the trial court erred in concluding
    that Traver lacked the legal authority to execute the Arbitration Agreement on
    behalf of Decedent.      See id. at 20-31.      According to the ManorCare
    Defendants, the trial court ignored recent case law recognizing federal and
    state policies favoring arbitration. Id. at 20-23. The ManorCare Defendants
    allege that Traver had authority to act as Decedent’s agent, and offer three
    separate arguments in this regard.
    First, the ManorCare Defendants argue that Traver had express
    authority to execute the Arbitration Agreement on Decedent’s behalf, because
    the couple had agreed to make decisions for one another as early as 2012,
    and had never formally executed a power of attorney simply due to the costs.
    Id. at 24. The ManorCare Defendants assert that Traver signed an Admission
    Agreement upon Decedent’s arrival at the ManorCare Facility in 2013, and
    Decedent separately signed the Admission Agreement two days later.          Id.
    According to the ManorCare Defendants, Decedent’s independent signature
    signified his consent to be bound by the contract, as well as Traver’s authority
    to sign on his behalf. Id. at 24-25.
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    The ManorCare Defendants next claim that Traver had apparent
    authority to act on behalf of Decedent because Traver indicated, in Decedent’s
    presence, that she could sign the admissions documents on Decedent’s behalf,
    and Decedent did not object. Id. at 25-26.
    Finally, the ManorCare Defendants contend that Traver is estopped from
    denying her authority to sign on behalf of Decedent, because Decedent was
    aware that Traver had signed the admissions documents, and did not object
    or retract the documents. Id. at 26. The ManorCare Defendants again argue
    that by signing the Admission Agreement himself two days later, Decedent
    essentially acknowledged Traver’s authority.         Id. at 28, 30.    Further, the
    ManorCare Defendants point out that Traver had signed the Arbitration
    Agreement for each of Decedent’s three residencies at the ManorCare Facility,
    and claim that “Traver should not be permitted to take a position at this
    junction that is wholly inconsistent with her prior pattern and practice.” Id.
    at 28.
    We are mindful of the following standard of review:
    In reviewing a claim that the trial court improperly denied
    preliminary objections in the nature of a petition to compel
    arbitration, we are limited to determining whether the trial court’s
    findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether the
    trial court abused its discretion in denying the petition. Since
    contract interpretation is a question of law, our review of the trial
    court’s decision is de novo and our scope is plenary.
    Bair, 108 A.3d at 96 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
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    Even if a party did not sign an arbitration agreement, he may be
    compelled to arbitrate under such agreement, based on common law
    principles of agency and contract. Wisler v. Manor Care of Lancaster, LLC,
    
    124 A.3d 317
    , 323 (Pa. Super. 2015). Here, the ManorCare Defendants, as
    the parties asserting agency, bear the burden of establishing an agency
    relationship between Decedent and Traver. See 
    id.
    “Agency is a relationship whereby the principal manifests assent that
    another person (the agent) will act on the principal’s behalf subject to the
    principal’s control, and the agent agrees to do so.” 
    Id.
    The basic elements of agency are the manifestation by the
    principal that the agent shall act for him, the agent’s acceptance
    of the undertaking[,] and the understanding of the parties that
    the principal is to be in control of the undertaking. An agency
    relationship may be created by any of the following: (1) express
    authority, (2) implied authority, (3) apparent authority, and/or (4)
    authority by estoppel.
    Washburn v. N. Health Facilities, Inc., 
    121 A.3d 1008
    , 1012 (Pa. Super.
    2015) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
    In her deposition, Traver testified that Decedent was first admitted to
    the ManorCare Facility in November 2013, following a hospitalization. N.T.
    (Traver Deposition), 11/1/18, at 59.7            Traver stated that Decedent was
    transported from the hospital by an ambulance, and she arrived at the
    ManorCare Facility later that day with her daughter and son. 
    Id. at 64-65
    .
    ____________________________________________
    7 The transcript of Traver’s deposition is attached as Exhibit D to the
    ManorCare Defendants’ Supplemental Brief in support of their Motion to
    Enforce the Arbitration Agreement.
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    Traver testified that she remembered meeting “the girl in the office”
    (i.e., Paulette Delevan (“Delevan”), the admissions director at the ManorCare
    Facility) and being given papers to admit Decedent into the ManorCare Facility.
    
    Id. at 65-66
    ; see also 
    id. at 68-69
     (wherein Traver stated that Delevan came
    to Decedent’s room not long after Traver had arrived, and asked Traver to
    accompany her to her office to sign the paperwork). According to Traver,
    Delevan asked her if she was the person who could sign the papers for
    Decedent, and Traver indicated that she was responsible for Decedent. 
    Id. at 67-68
    ; see also 
    id. at 68
     (wherein Traver explained that she managed the
    household; she sometimes signed documents on Decedent’s behalf; and
    Decedent was aware that she sometimes signed documents for him); 
    id. at 74
     (wherein Traver testified that she and Decedent had an understanding that
    they could act on each other’s behalf). Traver also explained that she and
    Decedent had talked about executing a power of attorney before he had gotten
    sick, but that they did not have the money to do so. 
    Id. at 73-74
    .
    Traver testified that she could not remember any of the documents
    being explained to her before she signed them. 
    Id. at 70-71
    . When presented
    with a copy of the Admission Agreement, Traver testified that the document
    did not look familiar, and she did not remember signing it. 
    Id. at 78-79, 81
    .
    Traver was also unable to confirm whether she had read the Arbitration
    Agreement before she had signed it. 
    Id. at 88-89
    . Further, Traver testified
    that, prior to initiating the instant action, she did not know what arbitration
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    was, and was unaware that there are ways to resolve disputes outside of a
    courtroom. 
    Id. at 62-63
    .8
    Delevan testified in her deposition that she had no memory of Traver or
    Decedent, and did not remember reviewing paperwork with either one of
    them. N.T. (Delevan Deposition), 11/1/18, at 8, 14.9 Delevan stated that in
    instances where a new resident did not have a power of attorney document,
    her ordinary procedure was to “ask [her] counterpart at the hospital who
    would be the responsible party for the individual coming into the nursing
    home, who did they work with … and who signed the documents for them in
    the hospital.” Id. at 15-16. According to Delevan, her routine practice was
    to ask the resident who they would like to sign admissions paperwork on their
    behalf before presenting the paperwork to a family member. Id. at 28. But
    see id. at 34 (wherein Delevan testified that “it was a different scenario with
    everyone coming into the nursing home.”). Delevan stated that she would tell
    the resident that she was taking their family member to her office to complete
    paperwork, and would tell the resident who had signed on their behalf. Id. at
    29. Delevan also testified that she typically presented the signed documents
    to the resident. Id. at 29-30. Despite having no recollection of Traver or
    ____________________________________________
    8 Traver was not specifically questioned about any agreements she would have
    signed at the start of Decedent’s other residencies at the ManorCare Facility.
    9 The transcript of Delevan’s deposition is attached as Exhibit E to the
    ManorCare Defendants’ Supplemental Brief in support of their Motion to
    Enforce the Arbitration Agreement.
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    Decedent, Delevan testified that the signatures and dates on the Admission
    Agreement indicate that, in accordance with her routine procedure, Traver had
    signed the document on behalf of Decedent, and Delevan had then presented
    a copy of the signed document to Decedent. Id. at 32.
    We first examine whether Traver had express authority to bind Decedent
    to the terms of the Arbitration Agreement. “Express authority exists where
    the principal deliberately and specifically grants authority to the agent as to
    certain matters.” Wisler, 124 A.3d at 323. Additionally, “[t]he creation of
    an agency relationship requires no specific formalities.” Walton v. Johnson,
    
    66 A.3d 782
    , 787 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted). “It is well settled that
    neither a husband nor wife has the power to act as agent for the other merely
    due to the marriage relationship.” Washburn, 121 A.3d at 1014; see also
    Wisler, 124 A.3d at 323 (explaining that a familial relationship does not, by
    itself, create an agency relationship).   Instead, we conduct a fact-specific
    inquiry to determine whether the principal intended to establish an agency
    relationship. See Wisler, 124 A.3d at 323. “[W]e do not assume agency by
    a mere showing that one person does an act for another.” Walton, 
    66 A.3d at 787
     (citation omitted).
    As the trial court aptly noted in its Opinion, “it is undisputed that []
    Traver did not have a power of attorney for [Decedent] at the time she
    executed the Agreements, nor was she his legal guardian.”          Trial Court
    Opinion, 5/1/19, at 2. Traver’s status as Decedent’s wife does not, by itself,
    - 12 -
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    establish an agency relationship. Washburn, 121 A.3d at 1014. Further,
    nothing in the record suggests that Decedent expressly indicated to Delevan
    that Traver could sign the documents on his behalf.       See id. at 1014-15
    (concluding that wife was not husband’s agent, despite her having previously
    signed and filed joint tax returns and healthcare forms on her husband’s
    behalf, because there was no evidence that husband had authorized her to do
    so); see generally Wisler, 124 A.3d at 324 (because the nursing home had
    the duty to ascertain the nature and extent of the written power of attorney,
    the patient’s son, who had a power of attorney but was unable to produce it,
    did not have express authority to bind the patient to arbitration).
    We next consider whether Traver had apparent authority to act on
    Decedent’s behalf in signing the Arbitration Agreement.
    Apparent agency exists where the principal, by word or conduct,
    causes people with whom the alleged agent deals to believe that
    the principal has granted the agent authority to act. An agent
    cannot simply[,] by his own words, invest himself with apparent
    authority. Such authority emanates from the action of the
    principal and not the agent.
    Wisler, 124 A.3d at 324 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
    The ManorCare Defendants’ argument concerning apparent authority
    relies primarily on Traver’s alleged representation to Delevan that she was
    permitted to sign the necessary admissions documents on his behalf.
    However, apparent agency “emanates from the action of the principal and
    not the agent.” Id. (emphasis added). The trial court concluded, and we
    agree, that “the record is devoid of the type of evidence on which the [c]ourt
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    could conclude that [Decedent’s] conduct, as the purported principal, could
    establish an agency relationship with [Traver] based upon apparent
    authority….”   Trial Court Opinion, 5/1/19, at 3.    There had been no prior
    dealings between Decedent and the ManorCare Defendants at the time of his
    2013 admission, and it is unclear from the record whether Decedent was
    aware that Traver was signing the admissions documents, including the
    Arbitration Agreement, on his behalf.        See Wisler, 124 A.3d at 324-25
    (declining to enforce an arbitration agreement signed by patient’s son at the
    time of admission, even where son had a power of attorney, because the
    defendants had failed to obtain a copy of the power of attorney or confirm
    with the patient whether his son’s authority extended to signing such
    agreement); Washburn, 121 A.3d at 1015 (concluding that, despite wife’s
    practice of signing joint tax returns and healthcare forms on her husband’s
    behalf, the nursing home was unaware of such arrangement at the time of
    signing, and had no basis to infer that wife was authorized to act as her
    husband’s agent). Additionally, Delevan had no specific recollection of her
    interactions with Decedent and Traver, and could therefore offer no additional
    insight into the alleged agency relationship. See Wisler, 124 A.3d at 325
    (noting that the admissions coordinator of father’s nursing home could not
    remember his admission to the facility).
    Finally, we consider the ManorCare Defendants’ assertion that Traver is
    estopped from denying her authority to sign the Arbitration Agreement.
    “Authority by estoppel occurs when the principal fails to take reasonable steps
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    to disavow the third party of his or her belief that the purported agent was
    authorized to act on behalf of the principal.”      Wisler, 124 A.3d at 325
    (citation, quotation marks and brackets omitted). Additionally, the third party
    must justifiably rely on its belief that an agency relationship existed. Walton,
    
    66 A.3d at 788
    .
    The ManorCare Defendants offered no evidence that Decedent was
    aware of the Arbitration Agreement or had authorized Traver to sign the
    Agreement on his behalf.      See Wisler, 124 A.3d at 32.         Although the
    ManorCare Defendants argue that Decedent had an opportunity to review the
    documents two days after Traver had signed them, our review of the record
    confirms that Decedent did not, in fact, separately sign the Arbitration
    Agreement, as he had the Admissions Agreement.                See Preliminary
    Objections, 10/11/16, Exhibit B (Arbitration Agreement). As the ManorCare
    Defendants concede in their brief, the Arbitration Agreement is a stand-alone
    agreement. Brief for Appellants at 9. Indeed, the Arbitration Agreement itself
    states that “the patient will receive services … whether or not this agreement
    is signed.”    Objections, 10/11/16, Exhibit B (Arbitration Agreement)
    (capitalization omitted). Thus, we cannot agree that Decedent ratified the
    Arbitration Agreement after Traver had signed it. See Wisler, 124 A.3d at
    325 (declining to enforce an arbitration agreement, which had been signed by
    the patient’s son, because the nursing home failed to establish that patient
    knew about the agreement or had authorized his son to sign it; there was no
    evidence of patient’s conduct when the agreements were executed; and the
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    agreement was not presented to patient later for ratification); Washburn,
    121 A.3d at 1015-16 (explaining that arbitration agreement was “not part of
    the contractual quid pro quo for admission to the [nursing home] facility and
    its attendant benefits,” where the arbitration agreement was separate from
    the admissions agreement, and admission was not conditioned on agreeing to
    arbitration).
    Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that the ManorCare Defendants
    failed to establish that Traver had legal authority to execute the Arbitration
    Agreement on Decedent’s behalf. Accordingly, as the trial court’s findings are
    supported by substantial evidence, and we otherwise discern no abuse of the
    court’s discretion, we affirm the Order denying the ManorCare Defendants’
    Preliminary Objection in the nature of a Motion to Enforce the Arbitration
    Agreement.
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 02/06/2020
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Document Info

Docket Number: 432 MDA 2019

Filed Date: 2/6/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/6/2020