Com. v. Vurimindi, V. ( 2020 )

J-S74029-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
VAMSIDHAR VURIMINDI :
:
Appellant : No. 2234 EDA 2018
Appeal from the Order Entered June 22, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0008022-2012
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM PER CURIAM: Filed: February 7, 2020
Vamsidhar Vurimindi (Appellant) appeals pro se from the “stay away”
order which “does not change the original condition of probation that was
issued on April 25, 2014,” and “restates the same condition: namely that
Appellant must stay away from both victims in this matter.” Trial Court
Opinion, 5/28/19, at 2.1
Appellant is familiar with this Court and vice versa. He previously
appealed from the judgment of sentence entered on April 25, 2014, which the
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 The trial court noted that the order was issued in response to the victims’
request, because of safety concerns, to have “a piece of paper to give to their
local police departments.” Trial Court Opinion, 5/28/19, at 2 n.1.
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trial court imposed after it convicted Appellant of two counts of stalking and
one count of disorderly conduct. We stated:
[Appellant’s] egregious and bizarre behavior forced his first victim
to install a panic-button alarm system that connected directly to
the local police and to consider hiring a body guard. That victim
[ultimately] relocated. [Appellant’s] actions forced the other
victim to sell her condominium and move twice to get away from
[Appellant]. Both women were terrified of [him].
Commonwealth v. Vurimindi, 200 A.3d 1031, 1034 (Pa. Super. 2018)
(citations omitted), appeal denied, 217 A.3d 793 (Pa. 2019). Based on
Appellant’s “continuous and deliberate failure to comply with the Pennsylvania
Rules of Appellate Procedure,” this Court dismissed the appeal. Id.
Instantly, Appellant appeals from the trial court’s June 22, 2018 “stay
away” order, and raises three issues which we reproduce verbatim:
1. Whether on 06-22-2018, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505 deprived Trial
Court jurisdiction to amend 04-25-2014 original sentence after
expiration of 30 days?
2. Whether on 06-22-2018, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9771(d) preclude Trial
Court from increasing the 04-25-2014 original conditions of
probation without hearing?
3. Whether 06-22-2018 Trial Court Order increasing conditions of
stay–away order is void for its vagueness and overbreadth?
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
We begin by repeating the “observation that [Appellant’s] pro se status
does not relieve him of his duty to follow the Rules of Appellate Procedure.”
Vurimindi, 200 A.3d at 1037. We recognize that “[a]lthough this Court is
willing to liberally construe materials filed by a pro se litigant, pro se status
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confers no special benefit upon the appellant. To the contrary, any person
choosing to represent himself in a legal proceeding must, to a reasonable
extent, assume that his lack of expertise and legal training will be his
undoing.” Id. at 1037-38, citing In re Ullman, 995 A.2d 1207, 1211–12 (Pa.
Super. 2010).
We previously described Appellant’s “rambling pro se brief,” stated that
where “there are considerable defects, we will be unable to perform appellate
review,” and dismissed Appellant’s appeal. See id. at 1037–38, citing
Commonwealth v. Tchirkow, 160 A.3d 798, 804-05 (Pa. Super. 2017).
Likewise, in this appeal, Appellant has presented this Court with a
rambling brief, which, although it cites statutes and case law, is largely
nonsensical and devoid of meaningful legal argument. See generally,
Appellant’s Brief at 10-24. For example, Appellant claims the trial court’s
“newly increased conditions are designed to terrorize Appellant with the threat
of arrest and incarceration, and to preclude him from serving subpoenas
and/or civil complaints on [his victims] or upon their legal representatives and
to persecute Appellant by prosecuting him for prosecuting civil rights violation
complaints.” Id. at 18. Accordingly, we again find that Appellant has
“thwarted appellate review, and [a]s such, we conclude that the only
appropriate remedy is waiver of all issues.” Vurimindi, 200 A.3d at 1043.
We further note that the Commonwealth, stating that Appellant’s claims
“contribute to his ongoing attempts to harass his victims through frivolous
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litigation,” argues that this appeal should be dismissed because the trial court
“already imposed a stay away order as a condition of probation” in its April
25, 2014 judgment of sentence. Commonwealth Brief at 4. The
Commonwealth echoes the trial court’s statement that the June 22, 2018
order from which Appellant appeals is a “reissuance of a paper copy of the
stay away order at the request of the victims, so they could have a physical
copy of upon [Appellant’s] release on probation,” and notes that the June 22,
2018 order “explicitly states that it was issued ‘pursuant to the Judgment of
Sentence and conditions of probation imposed by this Court on the 25th day
of April, 2014.’” Id. at 5.
It is well-settled that a court may require as a condition of probation
that a defendant refrain from contact or communication with his victim(s).
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. McBride, 433 A.2d 509 (Pa. Super. 1981).
The Sentencing Code provides that as a condition of probation, a trial court
may impose “reasonable conditions . . . as it deems necessary to ensure or
assist the defendant in leading a law abiding life.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9754(b)
(referencing Section 9763, conditions of probation). We recognize — and
remind Appellant:
Th[e trial court’s] broad power to impose conditions as part of an
order of probation is intended to individualize the sentencing
process so that an effort can be made to rehabilitate a criminal
defendant while, at the same time, preserving the right of law
abiding citizens to be secure in their persons and property.
McBride, 433 A.2d at 510.
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Appeal dismissed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date:2/7/20
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