Com. v. Vurimindi, V. ( 2020 )


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  • J-S74029-19
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    VAMSIDHAR VURIMINDI                        :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 2234 EDA 2018
    Appeal from the Order Entered June 22, 2018
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-51-CR-0008022-2012
    BEFORE:      BENDER, P.J.E., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
    MEMORANDUM PER CURIAM:                                 Filed: February 7, 2020
    Vamsidhar Vurimindi (Appellant) appeals pro se from the “stay away”
    order which “does not change the original condition of probation that was
    issued on April 25, 2014,” and “restates the same condition: namely that
    Appellant must stay away from both victims in this matter.”            Trial Court
    Opinion, 5/28/19, at 2.1
    Appellant is familiar with this Court and vice versa.     He previously
    appealed from the judgment of sentence entered on April 25, 2014, which the
    ____________________________________________
    *   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    1 The trial court noted that the order was issued in response to the victims’
    request, because of safety concerns, to have “a piece of paper to give to their
    local police departments.” Trial Court Opinion, 5/28/19, at 2 n.1.
    J-S74029-19
    trial court imposed after it convicted Appellant of two counts of stalking and
    one count of disorderly conduct. We stated:
    [Appellant’s] egregious and bizarre behavior forced his first victim
    to install a panic-button alarm system that connected directly to
    the local police and to consider hiring a body guard. That victim
    [ultimately] relocated. [Appellant’s] actions forced the other
    victim to sell her condominium and move twice to get away from
    [Appellant]. Both women were terrified of [him].
    Commonwealth v. Vurimindi, 
    200 A.3d 1031
    , 1034 (Pa. Super. 2018)
    (citations omitted), appeal denied, 
    217 A.3d 793
    (Pa. 2019).           Based on
    Appellant’s “continuous and deliberate failure to comply with the Pennsylvania
    Rules of Appellate Procedure,” this Court dismissed the appeal. 
    Id. Instantly, Appellant
    appeals from the trial court’s June 22, 2018 “stay
    away” order, and raises three issues which we reproduce verbatim:
    1. Whether on 06-22-2018, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505 deprived Trial
    Court jurisdiction to amend 04-25-2014 original sentence after
    expiration of 30 days?
    2. Whether on 06-22-2018, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9771(d) preclude Trial
    Court from increasing the 04-25-2014 original conditions of
    probation without hearing?
    3. Whether 06-22-2018 Trial Court Order increasing conditions of
    stay–away order is void for its vagueness and overbreadth?
    Appellant’s Brief at 4.
    We begin by repeating the “observation that [Appellant’s] pro se status
    does not relieve him of his duty to follow the Rules of Appellate Procedure.”
    
    Vurimindi, 200 A.3d at 1037
    . We recognize that “[a]lthough this Court is
    willing to liberally construe materials filed by a pro se litigant, pro se status
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    J-S74029-19
    confers no special benefit upon the appellant. To the contrary, any person
    choosing to represent himself in a legal proceeding must, to a reasonable
    extent, assume that his lack of expertise and legal training will be his
    undoing.” 
    Id. at 1037-38,
    citing In re Ullman, 
    995 A.2d 1207
    , 1211–12 (Pa.
    Super. 2010).
    We previously described Appellant’s “rambling pro se brief,” stated that
    where “there are considerable defects, we will be unable to perform appellate
    review,” and dismissed Appellant’s appeal.       See 
    id. at 1037–38,
    citing
    Commonwealth v. Tchirkow, 
    160 A.3d 798
    , 804-05 (Pa. Super. 2017).
    Likewise, in this appeal, Appellant has presented this Court with a
    rambling brief, which, although it cites statutes and case law, is largely
    nonsensical and devoid of meaningful legal argument.          See generally,
    Appellant’s Brief at 10-24.   For example, Appellant claims the trial court’s
    “newly increased conditions are designed to terrorize Appellant with the threat
    of arrest and incarceration, and to preclude him from serving subpoenas
    and/or civil complaints on [his victims] or upon their legal representatives and
    to persecute Appellant by prosecuting him for prosecuting civil rights violation
    complaints.”    
    Id. at 18.
       Accordingly, we again find that Appellant has
    “thwarted appellate review, and [a]s such, we conclude that the only
    appropriate remedy is waiver of all issues.” 
    Vurimindi, 200 A.3d at 1043
    .
    We further note that the Commonwealth, stating that Appellant’s claims
    “contribute to his ongoing attempts to harass his victims through frivolous
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    J-S74029-19
    litigation,” argues that this appeal should be dismissed because the trial court
    “already imposed a stay away order as a condition of probation” in its April
    25, 2014 judgment of sentence.           Commonwealth Brief at 4.           The
    Commonwealth echoes the trial court’s statement that the June 22, 2018
    order from which Appellant appeals is a “reissuance of a paper copy of the
    stay away order at the request of the victims, so they could have a physical
    copy of upon [Appellant’s] release on probation,” and notes that the June 22,
    2018 order “explicitly states that it was issued ‘pursuant to the Judgment of
    Sentence and conditions of probation imposed by this Court on the 25th day
    of April, 2014.’” 
    Id. at 5.
    It is well-settled that a court may require as a condition of probation
    that a defendant refrain from contact or communication with his victim(s).
    See, e.g., Commonwealth v. McBride, 
    433 A.2d 509
    (Pa. Super. 1981).
    The Sentencing Code provides that as a condition of probation, a trial court
    may impose “reasonable conditions . . . as it deems necessary to ensure or
    assist the defendant in leading a law abiding life.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9754(b)
    (referencing Section 9763, conditions of probation).     We recognize — and
    remind Appellant:
    Th[e trial court’s] broad power to impose conditions as part of an
    order of probation is intended to individualize the sentencing
    process so that an effort can be made to rehabilitate a criminal
    defendant while, at the same time, preserving the right of law
    abiding citizens to be secure in their persons and property.
    
    McBride, 433 A.2d at 510
    .
    -4-
    J-S74029-19
    Appeal dismissed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date:2/7/20
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2234 EDA 2018

Filed Date: 2/7/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/7/2020