Com. v. Sweitzer, B. ( 2020 )


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  • J-S73044-19
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :         PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    BRANDON VAUGHN SWEITZER,                   :
    :
    Appellant               :       No. 865 MDA 2019
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 25, 2019
    in the Court of Common Pleas of York County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0007445-2017
    BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., LAZARUS, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.:                    FILED: FEBRUARY 7, 2020
    Brandon Vaughn Sweitzer (“Sweitzer”) appeals from the judgment of
    sentence imposed following his convictions of rape and sexual assault. 1 We
    affirm.
    On the evening of September 16, 2016, Sweitzer, C.F., Jennifer
    Rohrbaugh (“Rohrbaugh”), and two of Sweitzer’s friends gathered at
    Rohrbaugh’s home in Manchester, Pennsylvania, for a bonfire and some
    alcoholic drinks. Around midnight, C.F. and Rohrbaugh went inside the home
    to sleep. C.F. slept in Rohrbaugh’s guest bedroom. Sweitzer and his two
    friends went to a local bar for a couple hours, then returned to Rohrbaugh’s
    ____________________________________________
    1   18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3121(a)(3), 3124.1.
    J-S73044-19
    home. At some point in the night, Sweitzer entered the room in which C.F.
    was sleeping, and engaged in sexual relations with C.F.2
    The next morning, C.F. left Rohrbaugh’s home, drove to a nearby
    Rutter’s convenience store, called 911, and told police that she had been
    sexually   assaulted     by   Sweitzer3        the   previous   night.   Sweitzer   was
    subsequently charged with rape and sexual assault.
    At trial, following C.F.’s testimony during the prosecution’s case-in-
    chief, the prosecutor advised the court that C.F. intended to observe the rest
    of the trial. Sweitzer objected, and argued that if C.F. was not sequestered,
    she should not be permitted to give rebuttal testimony. The trial court denied
    Sweitzer’s request to sequester C.F., and permitted C.F. to give rebuttal
    testimony after she had observed the totality of the trial, including Sweitzer’s
    testimony.4
    Following trial, the jury found Sweitzer guilty of the above-mentioned
    offenses. The trial court sentenced Sweitzer to five to ten years in prison.
    ____________________________________________
    2 C.F. testified at trial that she had been asleep         when Sweitzer entered the
    room, and that she awoke to find him having                sex with her, without her
    consent. Sweitzer testified at trial that C.F. was         awake and talked with him
    when he entered the room, and consented to the             sexual relations.
    3C.F. only knew Sweitzer by his first name. The investigating police officers
    obtained Sweitzer’s last name and phone number from Rohrbaugh.
    4 The trial court initially ruled that C.F. would not be permitted to give rebuttal
    testimony if she observed the trial. However, the trial court changed its ruling
    before the trial resumed.
    -2-
    J-S73044-19
    Sweitzer filed a timely Notice of Appeal and a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise
    Statement of matters complained of on appeal.
    On appeal, Sweitzer raises the following question for our review:
    “Whether, after initially finding [C.F.] had to be sequestered for [Sweitzer’s]
    testimony[,] because [C.F.] would be testifying in rebuttal, the trial court
    erroneously reversed itself and allowed her to be present for Sweitzer’s
    testimony before taking the stand and rebutting that very testimony?” Brief
    for Appellant at 4.
    This Court’s standard of review for a trial court’s decision on
    sequestration of witnesses is abuse of discretion. We will not
    reverse a trial judge’s decision to grant or deny sequestration
    absent a clear abuse of discretion. Moreover, an appellant must
    demonstrate that he or she was actually prejudiced by a trial
    judge’s sequestration order before any relief[ ]may be warranted.
    Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 
    894 A.2d 759
    , 767 (Pa. Super. 2006)
    (citations and quotation marks omitted), overruled on other grounds by
    Commonwealth v. Hicks, 
    208 A.3d 916
    (Pa. 2019).
    Sweitzer alleges that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his
    Motion to sequester C.F. from Sweitzer’s testimony. See Brief for Appellant
    at 26-35. Sweitzer argues that by allowing C.F. to hear his testimony, C.F.
    was able to rehabilitate her own testimony from the prosecution’s case-in-
    chief by molding it to fit Sweitzer’s testimony. 
    Id. at 28-31.
    Sweitzer claims
    that he was prejudiced as a result, because the jury’s determination of the
    sole issue at trial, i.e., whether C.F. consented to the sexual activity, was
    based on the credibility of C.F.’s and Sweitzer’s testimony. 
    Id. at 31-35.
    -3-
    J-S73044-19
    “At a party’s request[,] the court may order witnesses sequestered so
    that they cannot learn of other witnesses’ testimony.” Pa.R.E. 615. “A request
    for sequestration must be specific and supported by a showing that the
    interests of justice require it. The purpose of sequestration is to prevent a
    witness from molding his testimony with that presented by other witnesses.”
    
    Stevenson, 894 A.2d at 767
    (citation and brackets omitted).
    Here, C.F. testified on two occasions; during the prosecution’s case-in-
    chief, and on rebuttal.       C.F. could not have molded her testimony in the
    prosecution’s case-in-chief to fit Sweitzer’s testimony, because C.F. testified
    before Sweitzer. See N.T., 1/14-18/19, at 137-231. Although C.F.’s rebuttal
    testimony followed Sweitzer’s testimony, a party is permitted to present
    rebuttal witness testimony, subject to the trial court’s discretion,5 for the
    purpose of contradicting the testimony of an opposing witness.            See
    Commonwealth v. Hickman, 
    309 A.2d 564
    , 567 (Pa. 1973) (setting forth
    the standard for admission of rebuttal testimony). Assuming that C.F. had
    “molded” her rebuttal testimony to fit Sweitzer’s testimony, Sweitzer suffered
    no prejudice, because he was free to cross-examine C.F. on rebuttal, and point
    out any contradictions or inconsistencies with C.F.’s prior testimony, and the
    jury would have been free to consider the inconsistencies in its credibility
    assessment. See 
    Stevenson, supra
    . Moreover, subject to the trial court’s
    ____________________________________________
    5As Sweitzer has not claimed that the substance of C.F.’s rebuttal testimony
    was inadmissible, we need not address this issue.
    -4-
    J-S73044-19
    discretion, Sweitzer could have presented additional testimony in support of
    his case following C.F.’s rebuttal testimony. See Commonwealth v. Beck,
    
    560 A.2d 1370
    , 1374 (Pa. 1989) (stating, “[t]hat a trial judge properly may
    permit a [party] who has rested to reopen his case for the purpose of offering
    additional testimony is well-settled in our law.”). Accordingly, we find that
    the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to sequester C.F. from
    Sweitzer’s testimony.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 02/07/2020
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 865 MDA 2019

Filed Date: 2/7/2020

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024