Com. v. Muhammad, Y. ( 2020 )


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  • J-S74024-19
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    YAHYA ASAAD MUHAMMAD                       :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 2438 EDA 2019
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 23, 2019
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division
    at No(s): CP-46-CR-0007151-2018
    BEFORE:      BENDER, P.J.E., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
    MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                               Filed: February 7, 2020
    Yahya Asaad Muhammad (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of
    sentence imposed after the trial court convicted him of driving under the
    influence of alcohol (DUI).1 We affirm.
    The trial court accurately summarized the factual background as follows:
    On September 9, 2018, Officer Evan Flora was working as a
    patrol officer in Bridgeport Borough, Montgomery County. Notes
    of Testimony, “N.T.” Apr. 15, 2019 at 4. During his shift that
    night, he received a dispatch from adjacent Upper Merion
    Township that there was a hit and run in the area of 202 and
    DeKalb Street and that officers observed a dark colored sedan with
    heavy damage driving away from that area on two rims. 
    Id. at 5-6.
    Officer Flora observed a maroon Ford 500 driving on two
    rims that were sparking underneath the car; Flora could hear the
    metal screeching on the ground. 
    Id. at 6.
    The car was traveling
    ____________________________________________
    *   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    1   75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1).
    J-S74024-19
    well under the posted speed limit of 25 mph. 
    Id. Officer Flora
          believed this to be the car from the dispatch. 
    Id. at 6-7.
    He
    executed a U-turn and got behind the vehicle.             
    Id. at 7.
          [Appellant] made a U-turn, at which point Officer Flora activated
    his emergency lights and executed a traffic stop. 
    Id. [Appellant] pulled
    over and immediately exited his vehicle, before Officer Flora
    approached him. 
    Id. [Appellant] began
    to inspect the damage to
    his vehicle. 
    Id. at 8.
    Officer Flora approached [Appellant] and
    asked him for his license, registration and proof of insurance. 
    Id. at 9.
    [Appellant] retrieved a stack of papers from the vehicle and
    began sorting through it and dropping papers. 
    Id. When he
          attempted to retrieve the dropped documents, Officer Flora
    observed him lose his balance and steady himself on the door of
    the car. 
    Id. at 10.
    Officer Flora questioned [Appellant] about the damage to his
    car and [Appellant] indicated that he ran over a median in Upper
    Merion.[FN1] 
    Id. During their
    conversation, Officer Flora observed
    that [Appellant’s] pupils were dilated, his eyes were glassy and
    bloodshot and there was an odor of alcohol on his breath. 
    Id. at 11.
    Officer Flora asked [Appellant] if he had been drinking, [and
    Appellant] initially responded, “No.” 
    Id. The second
    time, he said
    “not within the hour.” 
    Id. Finally, [Appellant]
    stated, “It’s my
    birthday man, come on.” 
    Id. at 12.
    At this point Officer Flora
    attempted to administer field sobriety tests.          
    Id. at 13.
          Throughout the testing, [Appellant] attempted to talk his way out
    of it. 
    Id. at 15-16.
    Officer Flora administered a portable breath
    test. 
    Id. His first
    attempt at the breath test was unsuccessful
    and on his second attempt he sucked air in instead of blowing air
    out. 
    Id. at 15.
    Officer Flora attempted to administer additional
    tests, but [Appellant] complained about each location until,
    eventually, he refused to move to a location to conduct further
    field sobriety testing.     
    Id. at 17.
       While Officer Flora was
    attempting to explain a third test, [Appellant] put his hands
    behind his back and stated, “arrest me.” 
    Id. [Appellant] also
          refused to submit to chemical testing. 
    Id. at 55.
    FN1 Police ultimately determined that [Appellant] was
    not involved in the hit and run. 
    Id. at 19.
    Trial Court Opinion, 9/16/19, at 1-3.
    -2-
    J-S74024-19
    Appellant appeared for a bench trial on April 15, 2019, after which the
    trial court found him guilty of DUI, general impairment. On July 23, 2019, the
    trial court sentenced Appellant to three to six months of incarceration.
    Appellant filed this timely appeal.   Both the trial court and Appellant have
    complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925.
    Appellant presents one issue for our review:
    Was the evidence insufficient as a matter of law for the court
    to convict [Appellant] of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1) DUI/Unsafe
    Driving when there was insufficient evidence [Appellant] operated
    a vehicle “after imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such that
    the individual is rendered incapable of safely driving, operating or
    being in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle.”
    Appellant’s Brief at 2.
    Our standard of review of Appellant’s sufficiency claim is well-settled:
    The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of
    the evidence is whether viewing all the evidence
    admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the
    verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable
    the fact-finder to find every element of the crime
    beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above
    test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute
    our judgment for [that of] the fact-finder. In addition,
    we note that the facts and circumstances established
    by the Commonwealth need not preclude every
    possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a
    defendant's guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder
    unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that
    as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn
    from      the    combined       circumstances.      The
    Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving
    every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt
    by means of wholly circumstantial evidence.
    Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record
    must be evaluated and all evidence actually received
    must be considered. Finally, the trier of fact while
    -3-
    J-S74024-19
    passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the
    weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all,
    part or none of the evidence.
    To reiterate, the jury, as the trier of fact—while passing on the
    credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence—is free
    to believe all, part, or none of the evidence. In conducting review,
    the appellate court may not weigh the evidence and substitute its
    judgment for the fact-finder.
    Commonwealth v. Baumgartner, 
    206 A.3d 11
    , 14–15 (Pa. Super. 2019)
    (citations omitted).
    Instantly, Appellant was convicted of DUI, general impairment, pursuant
    to 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1), which states that an individual “may not drive,
    operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle after
    imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such that the individual is rendered
    incapable of safely driving, operating or being in actual physical control of the
    movement of the vehicle.”
    Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding
    that he was incapable of safe driving because he “was able to walk unaided,
    talk coherently and he followed all of the officer’s directions.” Appellant’s Brief
    at 5. Appellant further asserts that Officer Flora did not “witness any driving
    behavior . . . which would suggest that he was incapable of safe driving.” 
    Id. at 7.
    He continues:
    It turned out that [Appellant] was not involved in the hit and run
    in Upper Merion, so that could not provide evidence of incapacity
    to drive. When Officer Flora turned on his lights, [Appellant]
    immediately pulled over and was able to hand over his driving
    documents. There is no blood or breath test to show he was
    intoxicated. Moreover, there are no roadside tests to show he was
    intoxicated.
    -4-
    J-S74024-19
    
    Id. Appellant’s argument
    is unsupported by both the record and prevailing
    authority. Our Supreme Court has explained:
    The types of evidence that the Commonwealth may proffer in a
    subsection 3802(a)(1) prosecution include but are not limited to,
    the following: the offender’s actions and behavior, including
    manner of driving and ability to pass field sobriety tests;
    demeanor, including toward the investigating officer; physical
    appearance, particularly bloodshot eyes and other physical signs
    of intoxication; odor of alcohol, and slurred speech. Blood alcohol
    level may be added to this list, although it is not necessary and
    the two hour time limit for measuring blood alcohol level does not
    apply. Blood alcohol level is admissible in a subsection 3801(a)(1)
    case only insofar as it is relevant to and probative of the accused’s
    ability to drive safely at the time he or she was driving. The
    weight to be assigned these various types of evidence
    presents a question for the fact-finder, who may rely on his
    or her experience, common sense, and/or expert
    testimony.
    Commonwealth v. Segida, 
    985 A.2d 871
    , 879 (Pa. 2009) (emphasis
    added).
    The trial court, sitting as the fact finder in this case, reasoned:
    Instantly, [Appellant] was driving a severely damaged
    vehicle and when initially questioned about the damage, he stated
    that he ran over a median in Upper Merion and presumably
    continued to drive the vehicle into a neighboring jurisdiction on
    two rims. When Officer Flora got behind him, he made a U-turn.
    When Officer Flora made contact with [Appellant,] he displayed
    signs of impairment, including glassy, bloodshot eyes, dilated
    pupils and an odor of alcohol on his breath. He was uncooperative
    during field sobriety tests. Furthermore, he admitted that he had
    consumed alcohol and told Officer Flora to arrest him following the
    Officer’s attempt to administer field sobriety tests. The foregoing
    is sufficient to prove that [Appellant] imbibed a sufficient amount
    of alcohol as to render him incapable of safe driving.
    Trial Court Opinion, 9/16/19, at 4.
    -5-
    J-S74024-19
    The trial court’s reasoning is irrefutable. The Commonwealth presented
    one witness, Officer Evan Flora; Appellant did not present any witnesses. See
    N.T., 4/15/19, at 58. Officer Flora’s testimony comports with the trial court’s
    recitation of the evidence reproduced above.       For instance, Officer Flora
    testified that he first observed Appellant’s vehicle “on two rims that was
    sparking from underneath the car” and heard it screeching. 
    Id. at 7.
    When
    he pulled Appellant over, he observed Appellant, who was alone in the vehicle,
    to have glassy and bloodshot eyes, “a strong odor of alcoholic beverage
    emitting from his breath,” and, upon standing, an “unsteady gait.” 
    Id. at 11.
    Officer Flora testified that Appellant “was attempting to talk his way out of”
    the portable breath test, and then “began sucking on the device.” 
    Id. at 15.
    Although there is more, this testimony without more was sufficient for the trial
    court to conclude that Appellant drove his vehicle “after imbibing a sufficient
    amount of alcohol such that [Appellant was] rendered incapable of safely
    driving, operating or being in actual physical control of the movement of the
    vehicle.” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1).
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    -6-
    J-S74024-19
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 2/7/20
    -7-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2438 EDA 2019

Filed Date: 2/7/2020

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024