Com. v. Wallace, R. ( 2020 )


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  • J-S68016-19
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    RONALD WALLACE                             :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 480 WDA 2019
    Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 28, 2019
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-02-CR-0006333-2014
    BEFORE:      GANTMAN, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:                          FILED FEBRUARY 10, 2020
    Ronald Wallace appeals from the order, entered in the Court of Common
    Pleas of Allegheny County, dismissing his petition filed pursuant to the Post
    Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.          After careful
    review, we affirm.
    On April 26, 2014, Wallace was charged with six counts each of
    stalking,1 terroristic threats,2 harassment,3 and intimidation of witnesses or
    victims,4 in connection with conduct involving his 21-year-old niece, Krystal
    ____________________________________________
    *   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    1   18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2709.1(a)(1).
    2   18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2706(a)(1).
    3   18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2709(a).
    4   18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4952(a)-(b).
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    Scott. After a three-day trial that concluded on May 29, 2015, a jury convicted
    him of all charges. The trial court set forth the facts of this case as follows:
    During the summer of 2013, [Wallace] and his sister, Tammy
    Ruggieri, re-established contact with one another. [Wallace] had
    been in and out of [Ruggieri’s] life throughout the years, and he
    had not been around her, or her family, for quite some time.
    [Ruggieri] was assisting [Wallace] in obtaining an apartment as
    he was getting his life back in order. [Ruggieri] asked her
    daughter, [Scott], to give [Wallace] a chance to be a part of her
    life. [Scott] was 21 years old at the time of her mother’s request,
    and she had not seen [Wallace] since she was approximately ten
    (10) years old.
    At first, [Scott] was excited to build a relationship with [Wallace],
    and the relationship between them was “fine” and “cordial.” At
    the time, [Scott] was attending school full[-]time at Robert Morris
    University and was also employed and working as a bartender at
    McFadden’s. As time went on, the nature of their relationship
    changed dramatically, and for the worse. [Wallace] began to
    excessively call and text [Scott] over the next few months.
    [Scott] became afraid of [Wallace’s] behavior, and she informed
    her mother that the excessive contact was “weirding her out.” In
    addition to the sheer number of calls being problematic, [Scott]
    was concerned and stressed over the fact that [Wallace] would
    become angry when she would not respond to his calls and
    messages. [Ruggieri] became involved in the situation, telling
    [Wallace] that he needed to limit his calls and texts to [Scott]
    because the frequency of his calls and text messages was
    inappropriate.
    Despite this warning, [Wallace’s] behavior continued and
    escalated, becoming more threatening over the next several
    months. [Wallace] was angry at [Scott] after her mother spoke
    with him about the frequency of his contact with [Scott], and he
    responded by calling and texting [Scott] “numerous times a day”
    “all day every day.” In November of 2013, [Scott] grew so
    desperate for the contact to stop that she obtained a Protection
    from Abuse Order (PFA) against [Wallace]. Notwithstanding the
    court order, [Wallace] did not cease contact. In fact, the situation
    appeared to grow worse after [Scott] secured the PFA. In January
    of 2014, [Wallace] left two (2) disturbing voicemails on
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    [Ruggieri’s] work phone. The voicemails were about [Scott] and
    her bartending job at McFadden’s, and they were extremely
    hostile and threatening in nature. Among other things, [Wallace]
    falsely accused [Scott] of being a “stripper” and giving “lap
    dances” at McFadden’s. The messages further warned that “the
    crazy man” was coming for her.         After listening to these
    voicemails, [Scott] became “absolutely terrified” of [Wallace] and
    called the police.
    Although [Wallace] was arrested and taken into custody after the
    January 2014 voicemails, his contact with [Scott] did not cease.
    [Wallace] wrote [Scott] numerous letters from the Allegheny
    County Jail (ACJ), receiving so many that she “lost count.”
    However, there were six (6) letters that [Wallace] sent between
    April 8, 2014, and May 2, 2014 that were particularly threatening.
    The majority of these letters were eight (8) pages long and
    contained writing from the top to bottom of a legal-sized page. In
    these letters, [Wallace] used highly vulgar, disturbing and
    threatening language, acknowledging that he knew he was not
    supposed to be contacting [Scott], and attempting to manipulate
    and guilt her into dropping the charges against him. These letters
    terrified [Scott], and she was afraid for her life. Although she was
    previously a straight “A” student, [Scott] started missing school
    because of the stress generated by the letters. She lost sleep and
    focus. [Wallace’s] behavior resulted in [Scott] suffering a great
    amount of fear, and his threats continue to go through her mind
    “every single day.”
    Trial Court Opinion, 2/12/16, at 5-7 (citations omitted).
    On July 15, 2015, Wallace was sentenced to an aggregate term of
    seven-to-fourteen years’ imprisonment followed by an eleven-year term of
    probation. Id. at 2. Wallace filed a motion to reconsider sentence, which the
    court denied on August 26, 2015. Wallace then filed a direct appeal, and our
    Court    affirmed   his   judgment   of    sentence   on   December   23,      2016.
    Commonwealth v. Wallace, 1486 WDA 2015 (Pa. Super. filed Dec. 23,
    2016) (unpublished memorandum). Wallace filed a petition for allowance of
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    appeal, which our Supreme Court denied on June 20, 2017. Commonwealth
    v. Wallace, 
    169 A.3d 581
     (Pa. 2017) (Table).
    On January 16, 2018, Wallace filed a pro se PCRA petition; the court
    appointed PCRA counsel, who filed an amended petition on August 27, 2018,
    raising claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Following an evidentiary
    hearing, the court dismissed Wallace’s petition on February 28, 2019. Wallace
    timely filed a notice of appeal and court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise
    statement of errors complained of on appeal.
    On appeal, Wallace presents the following issues for our consideration:
    (1)   Was appellate counsel ineffective for not arguing that the
    evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to prove,
    beyond a reasonable doubt, that [Wallace] committed the
    offense of terroristic threats at counts 11, 15, and 23,
    insofar as the respective letters of April 18, April 21, and
    May 2, 2014, did not threaten to commit any crime of
    violence against [Scott], nor did they contain language
    establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that [Wallace]
    intended to terrorize [Scott]?
    (2)   Was appellate counsel ineffective for not arguing that the
    evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to prove,
    beyond a reasonable doubt, that [Wallace] committed the
    offense of intimidation of a witness at count 9[,] insofar as
    the content of the letter of April 18, 2014, fails to establish
    beyond a reasonable doubt that [Wallace] was intimidating,
    or attempting to intimidate [Scott] from informing or
    reporting information relating to the commission of a crime?
    Brief of Appellant, at 4 (capitalization removed).
    Our standard and scope of review for the denial of a PCRA petition are
    well-settled. We review the PCRA court’s findings of fact to determine whether
    they are supported by the record, and review its conclusions of law to
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    determine whether they are free from legal error. Commonwealth v. Spotz,
    
    84 A.3d 294
    , 311 (Pa. 2014). The scope of our review is limited to the findings
    of the PCRA court and the evidence of record, viewed in the light most
    favorable to the prevailing party at the trial level. 
    Id.
    In both of his claims, Wallace argues appellate counsel was ineffective
    for failing to raise challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence on direct
    appeal. The law presumes that counsel was effective, and the burden rests
    on the appellant to prove otherwise. Commonwealth v. Ousley, 
    21 A.3d 1238
    , 1244 (Pa. Super. 2011). To prevail on an ineffectiveness claim, Wallace
    must establish: (1) his underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) appellate
    counsel had no reasonable basis for his or her action or inaction; and (3)
    appellate counsel’s error prejudiced Wallace such that there is a reasonable
    probability the outcome at trial would have been different absent such error.
    Commonwealth v. Fears, 
    86 A.3d 795
    , 804 (Pa. 2014). “Failure to prove
    any prong of this test will defeat an ineffectiveness claim.” 
    Id.
    With regard to the second element, an appellant must show that:
    [I]n light of all the alternatives available to counsel, the strategy
    actually employed was so unreasonable that no competent lawyer
    would have chosen it. We inquire whether counsel made an
    informed choice, which at the time the decision was made
    reasonably could have been considered to advance and protect
    [the] defendant’s interests.
    Commonwealth v. Buska, 
    655 A.2d 576
    , 582-83 (Pa. Super. 1995). “If
    counsel’s chosen course had some reasonable basis, the inquiry ends and
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    counsel’s assistance is deemed effective.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 
    899 A.2d 1060
    , 1064 (Pa. 2006).
    Here, Wallace has failed to establish that appellate counsel lacked a
    reasonable basis for choosing not to raise the sufficiency of the evidence
    challenges specified above.    For both ineffectiveness claims, the extent of
    Wallace’s argument regarding appellate counsel’s decision is a bald assertion
    that “counsel could not have had a reasonable basis” for failing to raise the
    sufficiency challenge.    See Brief of Appellant, at 14, 19.         Boilerplate
    allegations, such as these, are insufficient to rebut the presumption that
    counsel was effective. Commonwealth v. Jones, 
    815 A.2d 598
    , 612 (Pa.
    2002).   Moreover, the record belies Wallace’s assertion.      See N.T. PCRA
    Hearing, 2/27/19, at 6.
    At the PCRA hearing, appellate counsel testified that she chose to forego
    the sufficiency claims on direct appeal in order to focus on Wallace’s strongest
    and most viable claim, which related to the alleged deprivation of his right to
    testify. 
    Id.
     Although she found the sufficiency challenges to be non-frivolous,
    appellate counsel believed that it would be more beneficial for Wallace if she
    zealously argued what she perceived to be his strongest claim. 
    Id.
     Appellate
    counsel had concerns that the detailed, fact-heavy analysis necessary to argue
    insufficiency of the evidence would have overshadowed and detracted from
    the stronger issue on appeal. 
    Id.
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    The Supreme Court of the United States has explicitly held that counsel
    need not, and indeed should not, raise every non-frivolous claim on appeal.
    Smith v. Robbins, 
    528 U.S. 259
    , 288 (2000). Our Supreme Court has also
    recognized that counsel “may forego even arguably meritorious issues in favor
    of claims which, in the exercise of counsel’s objectively reasonable
    professional judgment, offered a greater prospect of securing relief.” Jones,
    supra at 613. “This process of ‘winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal
    and focusing on’ those more likely to prevail, far from being evidence of
    incompetence, is the hallmark of effective appellate advocacy.” Id. at 614
    (quoting Jones v. Barnes, 
    463 U.S. 745
    , 751-52 (1983)).
    Wallace has failed to establish that appellate counsel had no reasonable
    basis for her decision not to raise the sufficiency of the evidence challenges.
    Accordingly, appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective, and Wallace is
    entitled to no relief.5 Williams, supra at 1064.
    Order affirmed.
    ____________________________________________
    5 Furthermore, after a thorough review of the record, the parties’ brief, the
    applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of Judge Lazzara, we conclude
    that Wallace’s underlying sufficiency of the evidence challenges do not have
    arguable merit. There was sufficient evidence to prove Wallace guilty of both
    terroristic threats and intimidation of a witness or victim where Wallace
    directly and indirectly threatened to commit crimes of violence against the
    victim and attempted to guilt, manipulate, and intimidate her into dropping
    the charges against him and absenting himself from court proceedings. See
    Trial Court Opinion, 2/12/16, at 12-32.
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    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 2/10/2020
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Document Info

Docket Number: 480 WDA 2019

Filed Date: 2/10/2020

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024