Com. v. Russell, A. ( 2020 )

J. S17037/20
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
ASHLEY LYNN RUSSELL, : No. 812 MDA 2019
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 15, 2019,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County
Criminal Division at No. CP-49-CR-0001161-2016
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
ASHLEY LYNN RUSSELL, : No. 813 MDA 2019
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 15, 2019,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County
Criminal Division at No. CP-49-CR-0001162-2016
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
ASHLEY LYNN RUSSELL, : No. 814 MDA 2019
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 15, 2019,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County
Criminal Division at No. CP-49-CR-0001208-2016
J. S17037/20
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
ASHLEY LYNN RUSSELL, : No. 815 MDA 2019
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 15, 2019,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County
Criminal Division at No. CP-49-CR-0001219-2016
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., STABILE, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED SEPTEMBER 08, 2020
Ashley Lynn Russell appeals from the judgments of sentence entered
April 15, 20191 by the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County as
a result of appellant’s entering guilty pleas to the following charges: burglary2
at No. CP-49-CR-1161-2016 (“Docket No. 1161”); DUI-controlled substance
1 Preliminarily, we note that appellant’s notices of appeal purport to appeal
from not only the April 15, 2019 judgments of sentence, but also from the
trial court’s order dated April 6, 2018 denying appellant’s pretrial motion to
dismiss and the trial court’s order dated July 6, 2018, denying appellant’s
motion for reconsideration of appellant’s pretrial motion to dismiss. Because
appellant’s appeals properly lie from the April 15, 2019 judgments of
sentence, we have corrected the captions accordingly. See Commonwealth
v. Shamberger, 788 A.2d 408, 410 n.2 (Pa.Super. 2001) (en banc) (citation
omitted), appeal denied, 800 A.2d 932 (Pa. 2002).
2 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a)(2).
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(first offense) and opening door unsafely3 at No. CP-49-CR-1162-2016
(“Docket No. 1162”); criminal attempt (escape) and criminal mischief
(tampering with property)4 at No. CP-49-CR-1208-2016 (“Docket No. 1208”);
and simple assault and recklessly endangering another person (“REAP”)5 at
No. CP-49-CR-1219-2016 (“Docket No. 1219”). The trial court imposed an
aggregate sentence of two to five years’ imprisonment. After careful review,
we affirm.6
The trial court set forth the following factual and procedural history:
The facts are as summarized as follows as to [Docket
No. 1161]:[Footnote 1]
[Footnote 1] [Appellant] is charged in four
separate informations involving four
separate incidents. On or around
December 9, 2016, [the trial c]ourt and
the attorneys attached to the case began
to list [Docket Nos. 1161, 1162, 1208,
and 1219] in the same caption. However,
there is no record that a motion to
consolidate was requested or imposed.
Beginning in or around January 2017, only
one submission was given to [the trial
c]ourt for the four cases.
On August 12, 2016, officers of the peace investigated
a burglary that occurred at a residence in the City of
Shamokin. The homeowner told the officers that while
he was out of town, someone had broken into the
3 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3802(d)(2) and 3705, respectively.
4 18 Pa C.S.A. §§ 901(a) and 3304(a)(2), respectively.
5 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2701(a)(1) and 2705, respectively.
6 The Commonwealth did not file a brief in this matter.
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home, trashed the residence, cut the connection of
the security cameras, and stole items, including a
firearm. However, left behind was a hard drive
connected to the video system that captured footage
of the burglary. Upon watching the tape, an officer
and the homeowner allegedly identified one of the
suspects who entered the residence as [appellant].
A police criminal complaint was filed on August 12,
2016. On August 29, 2016, a preliminary hearing that
was scheduled for August 23, 2016 was rescheduled
for September 20, 2016. On September 20, 2016,
[appellant] waived her right to counsel and her right
to a preliminary hearing. A guilty plea conference was
scheduled for November 7, 2016. On October 5,
2016, the [Commonwealth] filed an information that
charged [appellant] with five counts. On December 9,
2016, [appellant’s] bail was modified to $25,000
unsecured, and [appellant] was placed on the bail
supervision program. On December 9, 2106,
Michael O’Donnell[, Esq.,] was appointed to represent
[appellant].
On January 13, 2017, the guilty plea that was
scheduled for December 9, 2016 was continued to
March 6, 2017. On February 10, 2017,
Attorney O’Donnell filed a motion for leave to
withdraw from representation, because he
represented a co-defendant in one of [appellant’s]
criminal cases; on February 17, 2017, a hearing was
scheduled for March 3, 2017 to review this matter.
Attorney O’Donnell filed a motion to appoint counsel
and for leave to withdraw from representation on
March 3, 2017, which was granted on March 6, 2017.
Also on March 6, 2017, Marc Lieberman[, Esq.,] was
appointed to represent [appellant.]
The caption for the hearing on March 6, 2017 list[ed]
only [Docket Nos. 1161 and 1162], and the
Commonwealth called only for these two cases.
However, Attorney Lieberman told [the trial c]ourt
that he would be entering his appearance for
[appellant] in all four cases. The [trial c]ourt allowed
Attorney Lieberman to file a continuance to prepare
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and review the matter “with time assessed against
[appellant].”
On December 18, 2017, the Commonwealth’s motion
for status conference was granted, and the conference
was scheduled for January 29, 2019. The order
granting the conference was filed on December 19,
2016.
The facts are as summarized as follows as to [Docket
No. 1162]:
On July 4, 2016, [appellant] had pulled her vehicle to
the side of a road. As a car was passing by,
[appellant] opened her door, which struck the passing
car. An officer arrived on the scene and approached
her vehicle, which was still running. [Appellant]
exited the vehicle and the officer observed that she
was swaying, slurring her speech, and had bloodshot
eyes. A pedestrian, Jessica Day, tried to take
[appellant’s] purse from the car but the officer
stopped Day. Upon searching the purse, officers
found a marijuana cigarette and drug paraphernalia.
After a field sobriety test, [appellant] was handcuffed
and placed into the cruiser. She was taken to
Shamokin Hospital, where she had a blood test done.
Afterwards, [appellant] was transported home. A
toxicology report came back on July 19, 2016, which
showed controlled substances in [appellant’s] blood.
A police criminal complaint was filed on July 19, 2016.
On September 12, 2016, [the trial court] signed a
commitment order against [appellant.] [The trial
court] signed a recommitment order on
September 20, 2016. On or around September 20,
2016, [appellant] signed a waiver of counsel form and
a waiver of preliminary hearing. Also on
September 20, a guilty plea conference was
scheduled for November 7, 2016. The complaint was
docketed on September 27, 2016. On October 5,
2016, the [Commonwealth] filed an information that
charged [appellant] with four counts.
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The facts are as summarized as follows as to [Docket
No. 1208]:
[Appellant] had been imprisoned on August 12, 2016
and was incarcerated at Snyder County Prison. On
August 14, 2016, [appellant] allegedly attempted
suicide by using her own shoe straps. [Appellant] was
escorted from the prison to Sunbury Community
Hospital. At the hospital, [appellant] attempted to
escape while wearing handcuffs and leg restraints;
she was taken down by a correctional officer.
[Appellant] was moved to a Northumberland County-
owned transport vehicle outside the hospital’s
entrance. Once in the vehicle, she repeatedly kicked
the right-rear passenger window, which caused it to
break. Her actions prompted correctional officers to
call for assistance from Sunbury Police. A Sunbury
police officer noticed that [appellant] was holding
shards of glass from the broken window and was
attempting to cut herself. [Appellant] was removed
from the transport vehicle and placed in the police
cruiser. Once in the cruiser, [appellant] attempted to
kick the divider, which prompted the Sunbury officer
to fasten a hobble device around her leg shackles.
[Appellant] said she wanted to make a phone call to
check on the welfare of a relative, and that she would
risk being shot. [Appellant] also told the officers that
she was claustrophobic. When [appellant] was
returned to Snyder County Prison, she refused to
walk, and kicked and spat on two correctional officers.
On August 15, 2016, [appellant] was transported to
York County Prison. A written complaint was filed on
August 24, 2016.
[Appellant’s] bail was set at $100,000. She was
committed for not being able to post bail. On
September 20, 2016, [appellant] signed a waiver of
counsel and a waiver of preliminary hearing. The
[Commonwealth] filed an information on October 5,
2016. On November 4, 2016, a guilty plea conference
that was scheduled for November 7 was continued to
December 9, 2016 because the Sheriff would not
transport [appellant] due to safety concerns. On
December 9, 2016; bail was modified to $25,000 and
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she was released on unsecured bail. On December 9,
2016, [appellant] signed a confession of judgment
waiver. Also on that date, [Attorney] O’Donnell was
appointed to represent [appellant.]
The facts are as summarized as follows as to [Docket
No. 1219]:
On August 2, 2016, two law enforcement officers of
the Shamokin Police Department were looking for an
individual on whom [appellant] allegedly placed a
[protection from abuse order]. The officers met with
[appellant], who said the individual had thrown a rock
at her vehicle. The officers told [appellant] not to
search for the individual, and that they would look for
him. The officers were unable to locate the individual
at first, but they were dispatched to a Shamokin
address because [appellant] had pepper-sprayed the
individual, tried to stab a man and tried to gain entry
to a home. When the officers confronted [appellant],
they told her to drop the knife, which she did after
some hesitation. [Appellant] was placed in police
custody while police took control of the knife and
interviewed the individual and the man. A police
complaint was filed on August 2, 2016. A preliminary
hearing was scheduled for August 9, 2016, but was
continued for [appellant] to obtain legal
representation. [Appellant’s] bail was set at $15,000
and [appellant] was released on bond. On August 23,
2016, the [magisterial district judge] continued
[appellant’s] preliminary hearing for an unlisted
reason. On September 20, 2016, [appellant] waived
her right to counsel and her right to a preliminary
hearing. [Appellant] was formally arraigned on
October 3, 2016. On October 27, 2016, the
[Commonwealth] filed an information on five counts.
On December 9, 2016, bail was modified to $25,000
and she was released on unsecured bail. On
December 9, 2016, [appellant] signed a confession of
judgment waiver. Also on that date,
[Attorney] O’Donnell was appointed to represent
[appellant].
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On January 29, 2018, [appellant] filed a motion to
dismiss under Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 as to all four cases.
In this motion, [appellant] claims that the only period
of time that has been assessed against [appellant]
was between January 13, 2017 and March 6, 2017 for
the different [docket] numbers. Aside from this
period of time, more than 365 days had passed and
[appellant] argues the Commonwealth failed to bring
her to trial on time, thus violating her rights under the
[C]onstitutions of Pennsylvania and the United States.
The Commonwealth [did] not file[] a response to
[appellant’s] motion.
Trial court order denying appellant’s Rule 600 motion, 4/6/18 at 2-6
(footnote 2 omitted).
The trial court held a hearing on appellant’s Rule 600 motion on March 5,
2018. On April 6, 2018, the trial court entered an order denying appellant’s
Rule 600 motion. Appellant entered a guilty plea at all four docket numbers
on April 15, 2019, wherein appellant reserved her right to bring an appeal
addressing the trial court’s denial of her Rule 600 motion. The trial court
imposed sentence on April 15, 2019.
Appellant filed timely notices of appeal on May 15, 2019.7 The trial court
ordered appellant to file concise statements of errors complained of on appeal
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and appellant timely complied. In lieu of an
opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), the trial court filed a statement in
7 The trial court entered its judgments of sentence in separate orders.
Accordingly, Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969 (Pa. 2018), and its
progeny do not apply to the instant case.
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which the trial court noted that its Rule 600 calculations were set forth in its
April 6, 2018 order denying appellant’s Rule 600 motion.
On August 13, 2019, this court, in a per curiam order, consolidated
appellant’s appeals sua sponte, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 513. On October 17,
2019, appellant filed with this court a petition to remand to the trial court for
an “enlargement of the record to include local criminal practices and
procedures for consideration of [] appellant’s arguments to dismiss pursuant
to [Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure] 600[,]” which this court granted
in a per curiam order entered on October 18, 2019. The trial court held a
hearing to supplement the record on October 31, 2019. Following the hearing,
appellant filed an amended concise statement of errors complained of on
appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The trial court subsequently filed a
supplemental statement in lieu of an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a),
wherein it relies upon its previous Rule 600 calculations.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
[I.] Whether the [trial] court erred in
determing [sic] that a continuance that the
[trial] court has granted may be of unlimited
duration despite contrary local practices and
procedures?
[II.] Whether the [trial] court erred by not properly
considering in this case, how the [trial] court’s
established local practices and procedures as to
the duration of it’s [sic] continuances, controls
mechanical run time, pursuant to [Pa.]R.Crim.P.
Rule 600?
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Appellant’s amended brief at 12 (full capitalization omitted).8
Preliminarily, we note the unusual procedural posture of this case.
Generally, in cases where a defendant has entered a guilty plea, she waives
her right to raise a direct appeal, except for appeals pertaining to jurisdiction,
the legality of sentence, and the validity of the plea itself. Commonwealth
v. Lincoln, 72 A.3d 606, 609 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal denied, 87 A.3d 319
(Pa. 2014). As noted by previous panels of this court, because “our courts
have not specifically addressed the validity of conditional plea agreements,
our courts have proceeded to review the merits of issues specifically reserved
in plea agreements.” Commonwealth v. Singleton, 169 A.3d 79, 81-82
(Pa.Super. 2017), appeal denied, 181 A.3d 1080 (Pa. 2018), citing
Commonwealth v. Terreforte, 587 A.2d 309 (Pa. 1991) (per curiam order)
(“remanding for the Superior Court to review the appellant’s Rule [600] claim
8 We note that appellant failed to divide the argument section of her brief into
as many parts as there are questions to be answered pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). We have the authority to dismiss appeals for failing to
comply with the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure and will do so in
cases where such a failure hinders our ability to conduct meaningful appellate
review. In re R.D., 44 A.3d 657, 674 (Pa.Super. 2012), appeal denied, 56
A.3d 398 (Pa. 2012), citing Commonwealth v. Hardy, 918 A.2d 766, 771
(Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied, 940 A.2d 362 (Pa. 2008); see also
Pa.R.A.P. 2101 (requiring that briefs conform with all material aspects of the
relevant Rules of Appellate Procedure and granting appellate courts the power
to quash or dismiss appeals in cases where defects in the brief are
substantial). Here, because our ability to conduct meaningful appellate review
has not been hindered, despite appellant’s violation of Rule 2119(a), we will
not dismiss her appeal.
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after the appellant claimed that counsel was ineffective for informing him that
he could reserve this issue for appeal in his plea agreement”).
Here, the record reflects that appellant, when entering her guilty pleas,
reserved her right to file an appeal pertaining to Rule 600 issues. (See written
guilty plea addendum, 4/11/19 at unnumbered page 4.) Accordingly, we shall
proceed to review appellant’s issue on the merits.
This Court reviews a ruling under Rule 600
pursuant to an abuse-of-discretion
standard. An abuse of discretion is not a
mere error in judgment but, rather,
involves bias, ill will, partiality, prejudice,
manifest unreasonableness, or
misapplication of law. Additionally, when
considering a Rule 600 claim, this Court
must view the record facts in the light
most favorable to the winner of the
Rule 600 motion. It is, of course, an
appellant’s burden to persuade us the trial
court erred and relief is due.
Commonwealth v. Claffey, 80 A.3d 780, 787
(Pa.Super. 2013) (citations omitted).
Additionally, when considering the trial
court’s ruling, this Court is not permitted
to ignore the dual purpose behind
Rule 600. Rule 600 serves two equally
important functions: (1) the protection of
the accused’s speedy trial rights, and
(2) the protection of society. In
determining whether an accused’s right to
a speedy trial has been violated,
consideration must be given to society’s
right to effective prosecution of criminal
cases, both to restrain those guilty of
crime and to deter those contemplating it.
However, the administrative mandate of
Rule 600 was not designed to insulate the
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criminally accused from good faith
prosecution delayed through no fault of
the Commonwealth.
So long as there has been no misconduct
on the part of the Commonwealth in an
effort to evade the fundamental speedy
trial rights of an accused, Rule 600 must
be construed in a manner consistent with
society’s right to punish and deter crime.
In considering these matters . . . , courts
must carefully factor into the ultimate
equation not only the prerogatives of the
individual accused, but the collective right
of the community to vigorous law
enforcement as well.
Commonwealth v. Peterson, 19 A.3d 1131, 1134-
35 (Pa.Super. 2011), quoting Commonwealth v.
Ramos, 936 A.2d 1097, 1100 (Pa.Super. 2007).
Rule 600 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
Rule 600. Prompt Trial
(A) Commencement of Trial; Time for
Trial
. . . [.]
(2) Trial shall commence within
the following time periods.
(a) Trial in a court case in
which a written
complaint is filed
against the defendant
shall commence
within 365 days from
the date on which the
complaint is filed.
. . . [.]
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(C) Computation of Time
(1) For purposes of
paragraph (A), periods of
delay at any stage of the
proceedings caused by the
Commonwealth when the
Commonwealth has failed to
exercise due diligence shall
be included in the
computation of the time
within which trial must
commence. Any other
periods of delay shall be
excluded from the
computation.
. . . [.]
Pa.R.Crim.P. 600.
Generally, Rule 600 requires that a
defendant be brought to trial within
365 days of the filing of the criminal
complaint. Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(2)(a).
However, a defendant is not automatically
entitled to discharge under Rule 600
where trial starts more than 365 days
after the filing of the complaint.
Commonwealth v. Goldman, 70 A.3d
874, 879 (Pa.Super. 2013). Rather,
Rule 600 “provides for dismissal of
charges only in cases in which the
defendant has not been brought to trial
within the term of the adjusted run date,
after subtracting all excludable and
excusable time.” Id. The adjusted run
date is calculated by adding to the
mechanical run date, i.e., the date
365 days from the complaint, both
excludable time and excusable delay. Id.
“Excludable time” is classified as periods
of delay caused by the defendant.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(2). “Excusable
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delay” occurs where the delay is caused
by circumstances beyond the
Commonwealth’s control and despite its
due diligence. Commonwealth v.
Roles, 116 A.3d 122, 125 (Pa.Super.
2015). “Due diligence is a fact-specific
concept that must be determined on a
case-by-case basis. Due diligence does
not require perfect vigilance and
punctilious care, but rather a showing by
the Commonwealth that a reasonable
effort has been put forth.”
Commonwealth v. Armstrong, 74 A.3d
228, 236 (Pa.Super. 2013) (citation
omitted). Due diligence includes,
inter alia, listing a case for trial prior to
the run date, preparedness for trial within
the run date, and keeping adequate
records to ensure compliance with
Rule 600. Commonwealth v. Ramos,
936 A.2d 1097, 1102 (Pa.Super. 2007).
Periods of delay caused by the
Commonwealth’s failure to exercise due
diligence must be included in the
computation of time within which trial
must commence. Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1).
Commonwealth v. Moore, 214 A.3d 244, 248-49
(Pa.Super. 2019), appeal denied, 224 A.3d 360 (Pa.
2020).
Commonwealth v. Martz, A.3d. , 2020 WL 2029287 at *4-6
(Pa.Super. April 28, 2020).
As noted above, appellant bears the burden of proving that relief is due
pursuant to Rule 600. See Claffey, 80 A.3d at 787. On appeal, appellant
presents the following argument:
[Appellant] respectfully advocates that a specific
period of time, a period of time which began with the
commencement date of the next criminal term of
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court of 2017, which followed the continuance granted
on and dated March 16, 2017, and, that same period
of time would then conclude on the date of the Status
Conference held on December 19, 2017, should be
assessed as time for purposes of Rule 600, against
the Commonwealth as regards all of the four
Informations filed by the Commonwealth against
[a]ppellant.
Appellant’s brief at 16 (emphasis in original). Specifically, the basis for
appellant’s appeal appears to be based in the local practice of Northumberland
County, which appellant avers mandates that the Commonwealth is
responsible for calling cases to trial. (Id. at 20.) Appellant further contends
that the continuance granted by the trial court on March 16, 2017, with time
applied to appellant, should have “logically ended pursuant to local practice
on April 27, 201[7], with the date of commencement of the new Pre-Trial
hearings or, arguably on April 10, 2017, with the next Criminal Jury Selection.”
(Id. at 22.)
The trial court, however, reached the following conclusion:
[Appellant] has already conceded that January 13,
2017 — March 6, 2017 shall be assessed against her.
Of the utmost significance to the resolution of this
issue, [the trial court] granted a continuance on behalf
of [appellant] on March 6, 2017, “with time assessed
against [appellant].” The declaration of the [trial]
court governed the matter until further action was
taken. As the [trial court] noted at the proceeding on
March 6, 2017, this was for the purpose of allowing
new counsel to prepare for future proceedings in the
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matter, for [appellant’s] benefit.[9] Accordingly,
[appellant’s] Rule 600 motion is without
merit.[Footnote 4] . . . .
[Footnote 4] The Commonwealth had filed
a motion for status conference on
December 19, 2017, which was continued
by [the trial court] by Order of
January 29, 2018 in light of [appellant’s]
pending motions under Rule 600; this will
be rescheduled and the “clock” now
resumes against the Commonwealth from
the date of this ruling.
Trial court order denying appellant’s Rule 600 motion, 4/6/18 at 7.
The record supports the trial court’s conclusion. Indeed,
Northumberland County Deputy Court Administrator Amy Siko testified during
direct examination by appellant’s counsel as follows pertaining to the practice
in Northumberland County:
Q[:] So in this matter, there was a period of time
from March 2017 I believe, when a continuance
was granted, until December of that year, when
the matters--the four essential cases were
scheduled for a status conference. So during
that period of time, from March to December,
whose responsibility would it have been to in
effect schedule [appellant’s] case for pre-trial
conferences?
A[:] If it was scheduled in March and continued at
[appellant’s] request, it would have been [up to]
her defense counsel to file a continuance to get
to our office to have it rescheduled, which
9 Specifically, the record reflects that the trial court instructed appellant’s
counsel to file a continuance form and that the trial court would grant the
continuance with time assessed against appellant. (Notes of testimony,
3/6/17 at 2.)
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typically is within 60 days, to have it put back
on.
Q[:] Right. And if--
A[:] And it was not put back on because we never
got no paperwork [sic] to put it back on.
....
THE COURT: Well the transcript reflects [appellant’s]
request for a continuance, which I granted on the
record, and indicated at that time that the time would
be assessed against [appellant]. And what the Court
Administrator is indicating is at that time, defense
counsel at the end of the hearing typically hands up a
written continuance form for the Judge to sign. And
that would be transmitted to the Court Administrator’s
Office, who would then complete the form by
scheduling the next event in the case.
So I think the lapse here occurred because, as
[Ms. Siko] indicated, for whatever reason that
continuance form was not handed up at the conclusion
of the status conference in March.
[Appellant’s counsel]: That may very well be, Your
Honor. It’s too long ago for me to remember
accurately what happened. But I guess the point that
I was making is that, without going into argument as
far as Rule 600 and diligence, nothing occurred in the
case from March of 2017 until there was a new order
rescheduling it for a status conference some seven
months later in December. And my questions to the
Deputy Court Administrator are to reflect that it would
have been the responsibility of the [Commonwealth]
to push the case along. Apparently, Your Honor, again
I am--
THE COURT: Hold on, let [Ms. Siko] answer the
question. Do you agree with that statement?
[Ms. Siko]: No, I do not. If it was a status conference
that was continued on the record, it would have been
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the [defense a]ttorney’s responsibility to get us a
continuance to reschedule it as the time was against
[appellant]. It’s not the [Commonwealth’s] job to list
it for trial if it’s not ready for trial.
Notes of testimony, 10/31/19 at 6-9.
In the instant case, the record reflects, and appellant concedes,10 that
appellant did not file a continuance with the Northumberland County Court
Administrator after her case was continued at the record at appellant’s
counsel’s request. Therefore, we find that the trial court’s conclusions are
based in the record and that the trial court did not misapply or override the
law when reaching its conclusion. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion when it denied appellant’s Rule 600 motion.
Judgments of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 09/08/2020
10 Apparently, no written continuance was filed nor was
an Order of continuance ever issued. [Appellant’s]
counsel does not clearly remember what happened in
this event from nearly three years ago. Perhaps
[appellant’s] counsel never filed a continuance form.
Perhaps he did. Either is possible. [Appellant’s]
counsel cannot recall anything more.
Appellant’s brief at 26.
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