Com. v. Mohacsi, T. ( 2020 )

J. S44040/19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
TERRA N. MOHACSI, : No. 509 WDA 2019
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 19, 2019,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County
Criminal Division at No. CP-65-CR-0001842-2017
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED FEBRUARY 18, 2020
Terra N. Mohacsi appeals from the March 19, 2019 judgment of sentence
entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County following her
conviction of driving under the influence (“DUI”) – highest rate of alcohol
(BAC 0.16+) (second offense) and DUI – general impairment (second
offense).1 After careful review, we vacate appellant’s judgment of sentence.
The trial court provided the following procedural history:
[Appellant] was charged with the [aforementioned]
offenses due to an incident that occurred on
February 13, 2017[.]
....
[Appellant] filed an omnibus pre-trial motion on
August 7, 2017. In the motion, she argued that her
consent to the blood draw was involuntary and no
1 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3802 (c) and (a)(1), respectively.
J. S44040/19
other exception to the warrant requirement
recognized in Birchfield[2] applies; therefore, the
blood test results should be suppressed and [the
count of DUI highest rate of alcohol] should be
dismissed. An omnibus pre-trial motion hearing
occurred before [the trial c]ourt on May 15, 2018.
After reviewing briefs that were submitted by
[appellant] and the Commonwealth, [the trial court]
denied [appellant’s] omnibus pre-trial motion.
A non-jury trial occurred before [the trial c]ourt on
December 13, 2018. The parties did not present any
additional testimony at the non-jury trial. They
stipulated that the stop of [appellant’s] vehicle was
proper, that she was driving while impaired due to
alcohol, a blood test was requested, and the result of
the blood test was .238. Additionally, defense counsel
noted that the stipulation regarding the blood test
would include the facts set forth in the omnibus
pre-trial motion hearing transcript. [Appellant] was
found guilty [of the aforementioned charges] based
upon the stipulation by the parties, the transcript, and
the lab report that was admitted as Commonwealth’s
Exhibit 1.
Subsequently, [appellant] was sentenced on
March 19, 2019, to the mandatory minimum on a
Tier III second offense DUI. At Count 1 [(DUI highest
rate of alcohol), appellant] was sentenced to five (5)
years of intermediate punishment with six (6) months
[of] home electronic monitoring. She was granted
work release and ordered to pay a fine and restitution.
She was also sentenced to an eighteen (18) month
license suspension and was ordered to follow all
treatment recommendations from her CRN
evaluation.[ ] Her sentence was to be terminated
3
2 Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S.Ct. 2160 (2016).
3 “A CRN evaluation is ‘[a] uniform prescreening evaluation procedure for all
[DUI] offenders to aid and support clinical treatment recommendations
offered to the judiciary, prior to sentencing. 67 Pa.Code § 94.2.”
Commonwealth v. Parsons, 166 A.3d 1242, 1244 n.1 (Pa.Super. 2017)
(emphasis and citation omitted).
-2-
J. S44040/19
after three (3) years, assuming she has completed the
treatment and got into no other trouble. Count 2
[(DUI – general impairment)] merged for purposes of
sentencing.
Trial court opinion, 4/23/19 at 1-2 (extraneous capitalization and citations to
the record omitted; footnote omitted).
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. The trial court ordered
appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) and appellant timely complied. The trial court
subsequently filed an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
I. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in failing to suppress
the test results obtained by a warrantless
search and seizure of [a]ppellant’s blood?
II. Did the [trial c]ourt impose an illegal sentence
in the [sic] failing to dismiss Count 1 of the
Information and failing to sentence only at
Count 2, an ungraded misdemeanor, with a
maximum penalty of 6 months in prison, and a
maximum twelve month driver’s license
suspension?
Appellant’s brief at 4.
In her first issue, appellant contends that the trial court erred when it
determined that appellant’s consent to a warrantless blood draw was a
knowing and voluntary relinquishment of her right to refuse. (Id. at 16.)
Specifically, appellant argues that she subjectively believed that she would
have faced enhanced criminal penalties if she refused to consent to a blood
draw. (Id.) Appellant further contends that the police failed to provide her
-3-
J. S44040/19
with any warning pertaining to an effect of a potential refusal, nor did the
police affirmatively tell appellant that she had a right to refuse the blood draw.
(Id.)
[An appellate court’s] standard of review in
addressing a challenge to the denial of a suppression
motion is limited to determining whether the
suppression court’s factual findings are supported by
the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn
from those facts are correct. Because the
Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression
court, we may consider only the evidence of the
Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the
defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the
context of the record as a whole. Where the
suppression court’s factual findings are supported by
the record, [the appellate court is] bound by [those]
findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal
conclusions are erroneous. Where . . . the appeal of
the determination of the suppression court turns on
allegations of legal error, the suppression court’s legal
conclusions are not binding on an appellate court,
whose duty it is to determine if the suppression court
properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the
conclusions of law of the courts below are subject to
[] plenary review.
Commonwealth v. Jones, 121 A.3d 524, 526-527 (Pa.Super. 2015), appeal
denied, 135 A.3d 584 (Pa. 2016) (citation omitted).
Initially, we are guided by Commonwealth v. McCoy, 895 A.2d 18, 28
(Pa.Super. 2006), in which we concluded that Section 1547 is an implied
consent statute applicable to all drivers and requires that a motorist consent
to chemical tests under appropriate circumstances. Id., citing
Commonwealth v. Mordan, 615 A.2d 102 (Pa.Super. 1992).
-4-
J. S44040/19
Following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Birchfield, this
court decided Commonwealth v. Miller, 186 A.3d 448 (Pa.Super. 2018),
appeal denied, 199 A.3d 858 (Pa. 2018). In Miller, the defendant argued
that because of a prior DUI arrest, he was under the subjective belief that he
was subject to enhanced criminal punishment if he refused to consent to a
blood draw. Id. at 449-450. The Miller court, citing a contemporaneous
decision in Commonwealth v. Robertson, 186 A.3d 440 (Pa.Super. 2018),
appeal denied, 195 A.3d 852 (Pa. 2018), rejected the suppression court’s
rationale for granting the defendant’s motion to suppress because “defendants
are presumed to know case law in addition to statutory law,” and the police
do not have an affirmative duty to “inform defendants that they do not face
enhanced criminal penalties if they refuse a blood test.” Miller, 186 A.3d at
450, citing Robertson, 186 A.3d at 446; see also Commonwealth v.
Krenzel, 209 A.3d 1024, 1029 (Pa.Super. 2019) (finding that a defendant’s
reliance on her subjective, albeit erroneous, misunderstanding of
constitutional law does not render her consent involuntary), appeal denied,
2019 WL 6873117 (Pa. 2019).
Our inquiry, however, does not end there. The Krenzel court further
held that a police officer has an affirmative duty to inform an individual of his
or her rights to refuse to consent to a blood draw under form DL 26B or
Section 1547. Id. at 1032. Failure to do so on the part of the officer renders
an individual’s consent involuntary because without being informed of the
-5-
J. S44040/19
consequences of refusing to submit to a blood draw, an individual’s consent is
neither a knowing nor conscious choice. Id.
Here, at the time the police requested appellant to consent to a blood
draw, appellant had been orally notified that she was under arrest for DUI,
but she had not been placed into physical custody. (Notes of testimony,
5/15/18 at 7-8.) The record reflects that appellant consented to the request
for a blood draw without asking any further questions. (Id. at 8.) Appellant
testified that she consented to the blood draw because she “understood that
if [she] did not consent to the blood draw that [she] would receive[,] at
minimum[,] a year license suspension or a possibility [of] facing time in jail.”
(Id. at 15.) Appellant attributed this to “knowing other people that have gone
through similar circumstances.” (Id. at 15-16.) There is no evidence of
record that the police used duress or any coercive tactics in order to obtain
appellant’s consent for a blood draw.
The record, however, further reflects that the police did not advise
appellant of her right to refuse to consent to the blood draw or of the
consequences that could result from such a refusal. (Id. at 4, 7-8.)
Accordingly, because appellant’s consent to the blood draw was neither
knowing nor conscious, we find that the trial court erred as a matter of law in
denying her suppression motion. Krenzel, 209 A.3d at 1032. We, therefore,
vacate appellant’s judgment of sentence.
-6-
J. S44040/19
Because we have vacated appellant’s judgment of sentence and
remanded for a new trial, further discussion of appellant’s second issue is not
necessary, as the issue is now moot.
Judgment of sentence vacated. Order denying suppression reversed.
Case remanded for a new trial. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/18/2020
-7-