Com. v. Meshyock, E. ( 2020 )

J-A25028-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
EDWARD LEROY MESHYOCK :
:
Appellant : No. 808 MDA 2019
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 18, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Mifflin County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-44-CR-0000605-2017
BEFORE: STABILE, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 18, 2020
Edward Leroy Meshyock appeals from the judgment of sentence entered
on April 18, 2019. He challenges the constitutionality of the sobriety
checkpoint he drove through that resulted in his convictions for three counts
of driving under the influence of alcohol or controlled substance (“DUI”), and
one count each for driving while operating privilege is suspended or revoked,
registration and certificate of title required, obedience to authorized persons
directing traffic, careless driving, and habitual offenders.1 We affirm.
The procedural history and facts of this case are as follows. Sergeant
Jerid Hartsock testified that he was working as a checkpoint supervisor for a
DUI checkpoint conducted from 10 p.m., June 30, 2018, until 3 a.m., July 1,
2018. N.T., Trial, 2/21/19, at 6, 7, 8. He stated, “The checkpoint we set up
____________________________________________
1 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3802(a)(1), (d)(1)(i), (d)(3), 1543(b)(1.1)(i), 1301(a),
3102(a), 3714(a), and 6503.1, respectively.
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where we posted signs. So everybody knew that there was a checkpoint
starting at 600 feet from the center of the checkpoint. In both directions. We
used large, large signs, cones and flares so that everybody was aware there
was a sobriety checkpoint ahead.” Id. at 8.
According to Sergeant Hartsock’s testimony, in the early morning hours
of July 1, Sergeant Hartsock saw Meshyock riding his motorcycle through the
checkpoint. Id. at 8, 9. Meshyock “[p]assed all of our signs and also the
motorcycle passed several troopers who were trying to get the motorcycle to
stop at the checkpoint.” Id. at 8. “That motorcycle passed the troopers that
had their hands raised out, trying to get him to stop.” Id. Meshyock finally
came to an abrupt stop after Sergeant Hartsock “kind of yelled an order to try
to get him to pay attention to stop.” Id. at 8, 9. Sergeant Hartsock asked
Meshyock why he did not stop and Meshyock “said he thought it was some
sort of a fire or something[.]” Id. at 9. Sergeant Hartsock testified he observed
that Meshyock’s “eyes were glassy and bloodshot,” and he “detected the odor
of an alcoholic beverage.” Id. Meshyock admitted to Sergeant Hartsock that
“he had been drinking.” Id. After conducting field sobriety tests, Sergeant
Hartsock “believed with the signs that I saw that [Meshyock] was intoxicated
to the point that he wasn’t safe to drive” and placed Meshyock under arrest.
Id. at 13, 14.
The Commonwealth charged Meshyock with the above-referenced
offenses and he filed a motion to suppress, arguing “[t]he State Police
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conducted an unlawful roadblock[.]” Memorandum of Law in Support of
Defendant’s Omnibus Pretrial Motion, filed 9/27/18, at 3.
The Commonwealth presented the following evidence in support of the
constitutionality of the checkpoint. Sergeant Hartsock testified that the
particular location of the checkpoint was chosen based on statistical
information, including a “heat map” that showed where there had been DUI
arrests and DUI-related crashes. N.T., Suppression Hearing, 8/28/18, at 23-
25; see Commonwealth’s Exhibit 1 - Sobriety Checkpoint Plan. Based on this
information, the state police “pick[ed] a road which obviously people would
have to use to get back and forth from where we’re having the issues and
that’s why we did our DUI checkpoint.” Id. at 24.
Prior to implementing the checkpoint, Sergeant Hartsock gave the
Sobriety Checkpoint Plan to Lieutenant Storm for approval. Id. at 8. Sergeant
Hartsock testified that Lieutenant Storm was “somebody higher than me.” Id.
at 21. The Sobriety Checkpoint Plan included a listing of each DUI arrest and
DUI crash, identified the county where each arrest and crash occurred, and
included the heat map showing the affected areas. Id.
After approval, troopers gave prior notice of the checkpoint to the
community on June 17, 2017, via the local newspaper. Id. at 6. On the night
of the checkpoint, there was a sign giving notice about the checkpoint “from
the center of the checkpoint in both directions 600 feet.” Id. at 9. Troopers
also set up flares and cones. Id. Sergeant Hartsock also testified that,
pursuant to established State Police policy, they stopped every vehicle that
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passed through the checkpoint unless traffic backed-up, at which point the
policy would require them to wave vehicles through. Id. at 10, 22.
The trial court denied the motion and Meshyock proceeded with a bench
trial. The court found him guilty as above and sentenced him to a total of six
to 18 months in jail followed by 18 months of reporting probation, plus fines.
This timely appeal followed.
Meshyock asks us to review one claim:
Did the trial court err inholding that a State Police roadblock
conducted in Mifflin County on the night of June 30, 2017,
into July 1, 2017, complied with all five requirements for
police roadblocks as articulated by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Tarbert[,] 517 Pa.
277, 535[] A.2d 1035 (1987) and Commonwealth v.
Blouse, 531 Pa. 167, 611 A.2d 1177 (1992)?
Meshyock’s Br. at 4 (suggested answer omitted).
Our standard of review of the denial of a motion to suppress “is limited
to determining whether the suppression court’s factual findings are supported
by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are
correct.” Commonwealth v. Garibay, 106 A.3d 136, 138 (Pa.Super. 2014)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Jones, 988 A.2d 649, 654 (Pa. 2010)). Where
the Commonwealth prevails at the suppression motion, “we may consider only
the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the
defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as
a whole.” Id. (quoting Jones, 988 A.2d at 654). Our scope of review is
plenary. Id.
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A DUI checkpoint passes constitutional muster where there is
substantial, “not complete,” compliance with the following guidelines:
1. Vehicle stops must be brief and must not entail a physical
search;
2. There must be sufficient warning of the existence of the
checkpoint;
3. The decision to conduct a checkpoint, as well as the
decisions as to time and place for the checkpoint, must
be subject to prior administrative approval;
4. The choice of time and place for the checkpoint must be
based on local experience as to where and when
intoxicated drivers are likely to be traveling; and
5. The decision as to which vehicles to stop at the
checkpoint must be established by administratively pre-
fixed, objective standards, and must not be left to the
unfettered discretion of the officers at the scene.
Commonwealth v. Worthy, 957 A.2d 720, 725 (Pa. 2008) (citing Blouse,
611 A.2d at 1180 (quoting Tarbert, 535 A.2d at 1043)). “Thus, where the
trial court’s factual findings support the conclusion that the roadblock
substantially complied with the guidelines, and where the trial court’s findings
are premised on sufficient evidence of record, this Court will not disturb the
trial court’s conclusion of substantial compliance.” Commonwealth v.
Yastrop, 768 A.2d 318, 323 (Pa. 2001).
Meshyock maintains that the Commonwealth failed to present evidence
that the troopers complied with the first and third guidelines. He argues there
was no evidence that the police conducted “‘momentary stops’ to allow the
police to make a brief observation of motorists, without physical searches of
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vehicles and passengers.” Meshyock’s Br. at 13. He also argues there was no
evidence “that an officer in an administrative capacity decide to hold the
roadblock and create and [sic] the roadblock plan, rather than an officer who
actively participates in the roadblock.” Id. at 13. Meshyock argues that
“[b]oth the decision to hold a roadblock and the roadblock’s plan must be
initiated and created by officers in an administrative capacity.” Id. at 16
(emphasis in original). In support, he cites Commonwealth v. Paes, 862
A.2d 625, 630 (Pa.Super. 2004).
Here, the trial court concluded that the DUI checkpoint substantially
complied with the requirements of Tarbert/Blouse, and the record supports
that conclusion. Sergeant Hartsock testified that they placed an article in the
local newspaper giving prior notice of the checkpoint. He also testified about
the statistics, including the “heat map,” used to determine where to conduct
the checkpoint. Additionally, Lieutenant Storm, whom Sergeant Hartsock
described as “somebody higher than me,” reviewed and approved the
checkpoint before the troopers put the checkpoint into effect. Sergeant
Hartsock also testified that, based on Pennsylvania State Police procedure,
they stopped every vehicle during the checkpoint unless there was a backup
in traffic. Sergeant Hartsock could not recall if there was a backup in traffic on
the night in question, but confirmed that if one had developed, they would
have followed the established procedure and “let everybody clear through.”
N.T., Suppression, at 5. All of the above supports the trial court’s conclusion
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that the checkpoint substantially complied with the Tarbert/Blouse
guidelines.
Meshyock’s additional argument that an administrative officer must both
“initiate” and “create” the roadblock is unavailing. Meshyock’s Br. at 6. His
citation to Paes is inapposite. In Paes, we invalidated a DUI checkpoint
because a single officer “made the decision to set up the roadblock and then
participated in conducting its operation.” Paes, 862 A.2d at 630. Paes does
not stand for the proposition that the same officer cannot both first propose
the checkpoint and develop the checkpoint plan. Meshyock’s claims are
meritless and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion
to suppress.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 02/18/2020
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