Com. v. Brock, R. ( 2020 )


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  • J-S02017-20
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee                :
    v.                             :
    :
    RYAN EDWARD BROCK                          :
    :
    Appellant               :       No. 1368 MDA 2019
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 30, 2019
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Huntingdon County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-31-CR-0000097-2018
    BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., KING, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                             FILED FEBRUARY 20, 2020
    Appellant, Ryan Edward Brock, appeals from the judgment of sentence
    entered in the Huntingdon County Court of Common Pleas, following his jury
    trial conviction for aggravated assault.1 We affirm.
    In its opinion, the trial court sets forth the relevant facts of this case as
    follows:
    On November 22, 2017, [Appellant] was an inmate at the
    State      Correctional    Institution   at    Huntingdon,
    Pennsylvania….      Mr. Kenneth Boal was the sergeant
    assigned to Bravo block where [Appellant] was housed. At
    or around 3:00 p.m.[,] Sergeant Boal noticed [Appellant] at
    a desk located at the end of the block. He overheard
    [Appellant] conversing with a Corrections Officer…about
    seeing someone from the psychology department.
    [Appellant]…was insistent that he wanted a psychologist to
    come to the block and see him immediately. Sergeant Boal
    testified that [Appellant] was agitated. He related that he
    told [Appellant] that a call to psychology would be made,
    ____________________________________________
    1   18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(3).
    J-S02017-20
    and that he should return to his cell. [Appellant] complied
    with the order and started down the tier towards his cell.
    Sergeant Boal followed him. At a point midway down the
    tier, [Sergeant] Boal testified [Appellant] planted a foot,
    spun around, and hit him on the left side of his face. His
    glasses flew off, and he and [Appellant] (who is substantially
    younger) engaged in a struggle.           [Appellant] struck
    him…with multiple blows to both sides of his head. Sergeant
    Boal was able to take [Appellant] to the floor, but…he
    continued to kick and swing. Another officer—CO Roberta
    Miller—was on the tier when the fight began and she called
    for help, and then she gained control of [Appellant’s] legs.
    Other officers responded, and [Appellant] was sprayed with
    pepper spray which rather quickly brought the fight to a
    conclusion.
    (Trial Court Opinion, filed October 2, 2019, at 1-2).
    Following trial, a jury convicted Appellant of aggravated assault. On
    July 30, 2019, the court imposed a sentence of twenty-seven (27) to fifty-four
    (54) months’ imprisonment consecutive to any sentence Appellant was
    already serving. Appellant did not file post-sentence motions. On August 15,
    2019, Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal and voluntary Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
    concise statement of errors complained of on appeal.
    Appellant raises the following issue for our review:
    SHOULD [APPELLANT] HAVE BEEN GRANTED A VERDICT OF
    ACQUITTAL, GIVEN THAT THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT
    TRIAL FAILED TO PROVE THE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME
    CHARGED?
    (Appellant’s Brief at 2).
    On appeal, Appellant asserts the Commonwealth failed to provide any
    evidence to prove that he intended to injure Sergeant Boal. Appellant claims
    he was seeking psychology services, and Sergeant Boal denied the request
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    and ordered him to return to his cell. Appellant acknowledges he reacted to
    the order with anger, but Appellant insists he did not have the purpose of
    causing an injury to Sergeant Boal. Appellant concludes the Commonwealth
    presented insufficient evidence to support the aggravated assault conviction.
    We disagree.
    When examining a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence, our standard
    of review is as follows:
    The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the
    evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at
    trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there
    is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every
    element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In
    applying [the above] test, we may not weigh the evidence
    and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition,
    we note that the facts and circumstances established by the
    Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
    innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may
    be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak
    and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of
    fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The
    Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every
    element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means
    of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the
    above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all
    evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the
    [trier] of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses
    and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe
    all, part or none of the evidence.
    Commonwealth v. Jackson, 
    215 A.3d 972
    , 980 (Pa.Super. 2019) (quoting
    Commonwealth v. Hansley, 
    24 A.3d 410
    , 416 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal
    denied, 
    613 Pa. 642
    , 
    32 A.3d 1275
    (2011)).
    The Pennsylvania Crimes Code defines the offense of aggravated
    -3-
    J-S02017-20
    assault, in relevant part, as follows:
    § 2702. Aggravated assault
    (a) Offense defined.—A                  person   is   guilty   of
    aggravated assault if he:
    *      *    *
    (3) attempts to cause or intentionally or
    knowingly causes bodily injury to any of the
    officers, agents, employees or other persons
    enumerated in subsection (c), in the performance
    of duty;
    *      *    *
    (c) Officers, employees, etc., enumerated.—The
    officers, agents, employees and other persons referred to in
    subsection (a) shall be as follows:
    *      *    *
    (9) Officer or employee of a correctional
    institution, county jail or prison, juvenile detention
    center or any other facility to which the person has
    been ordered by the court pursuant to a petition
    alleging delinquency under 42 Pa.C.S. Ch. 63
    (relating to juvenile matters).
    18 Pa.C.S.A § 2702(a)(3), (c)(9).         Sections (a)(3) and (c) list protected
    classes of persons and evince the legislative concern with protecting these
    classes, as well as a decision to attach more serious consequences to behavior
    that threatens law enforcement officers while in the performance of their
    duties. Commonwealth v. Jones, 
    629 A.2d 133
    (Pa.Super. 1993).
    A person is guilty of aggravated assault on a corrections officer if the
    person attempts to cause or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to
    -4-
    J-S02017-20
    the officer during performance of duty. Commonwealth v. Brown, 
    23 A.3d 544
    , 560 (Pa.Super. 2011) (en banc). Therefore, in the context of aggravated
    assault on a corrections officer, the Commonwealth does not need to establish
    that the corrections officer actually suffered a bodily injury. 
    Id. Rather, the
    Commonwealth need only establish an attempt to inflict bodily injury. 
    Id. To show
    an attempt to cause bodily injury, the Commonwealth must
    establish the defendant acted with specific intent to cause bodily injury.
    Commonwealth v. Matthew, 
    589 Pa. 487
    , 491-92, 
    909 A.2d 1254
    , 1257
    (2006). A person acts with intent with respect to a material element of the
    crime, if “it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to
    cause such a result[.]”     18 Pa.C.S.A. § 302(b)(1)(i).       Therefore, the
    Commonwealth can prove the requisite intent to inflict bodily injury by
    showing factual circumstances that reasonably suggest the defendant
    intended to cause injury. 
    Brown, supra
    at 560.
    Instantly, Sergeant Boal testified that Appellant requested psychological
    services. Sergeant Boal attempted to follow institutional protocol, informing
    Appellant that he would make a call to request the services. In the meantime,
    Sergeant Boal needed to return Appellant to his cell. While returning to the
    cell, Appellant planted his foot, spun around, and punched Sergeant Boal with
    a closed fist to the head. Appellant repeatedly punched Sergeant Boal until
    other officers subdued Appellant. Further, Sergeant Boal sought immediate
    medical attention for the injuries caused by Appellant’s flurry of punches.
    -5-
    J-S02017-20
    Contrary to Appellant’s contentions, the Commonwealth produced sufficient
    evidence to establish Appellant’s intent to cause Sergeant Boal bodily injury.
    See 
    Matthew, supra
    ; 
    Brown, supra
    .          Therefore, Appellant’s issue lacks
    merit. Accordingly, we affirm.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 2/20/2020
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1368 MDA 2019

Filed Date: 2/20/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/20/2020