2017-07

Goldblatt, B. v. Young, J. ( 2017 )

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J-A33025-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
BRUCE J. GOLDBLATT IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
v.
JANE D. YOUNG
Appellant No. 692 WDA 2016
Appeal from the Decree Entered April 19, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County
Civil Division at No(s): 2010-3177
BRUCE J. GOLDBLATT IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
JANE D. YOUNG
Appellee No. 741 WDA 2016
Appeal from the Decree Entered April 19, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County
Civil Division at No(s): 2010-3177
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., SOLANO, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY SOLANO, J.: FILED JULY 31, 2017
Bruce J. Goldblatt (“Husband”) and Jane D. Young (“Wife”), each
appeal from a decree of divorce. The parties raise numerous issues
regarding the court’s disposition of their economic claims. We affirm the
____________________________________________
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A33025-16
decree granting the parties’ divorce; affirm in part, reverse in part, and
vacate in part the trial court’s April 14, 2016 order determining equitable
distribution as set forth below; and remand for further proceedings.
The parties were together in marriage for 3½ years, but their divorce
proceedings have lasted more than twice that long. Their legal saga began
when the parties married in 2006 and executed a prenuptial agreement that
is at the heart of much of their dispute. The trial court provided the
following description of the proceedings below:
The parties, Bruce Goldblatt (“[H]usband,” age 62 at the time
of trial), and Jane Young (“[W]ife,” age 58 at the time of trial),
married on October 24, 2006. For each, this was their second
marriage and no children were born therefrom. They separated
on April 2, 2010 when [H]usband left the marital residence.
Husband filed a divorce complaint on April 28, 2010 in the
Washington County Court of Common Pleas. The complaint
contained just one count, which was for a divorce from [W]ife.
On May 14, 2010, [W]ife filed an answer and counterclaim,
which included requests for alimony pendente lite (“A.P.L.”),[1]
alimony, equitable distribution of marital property, enforcement
of a prenuptial agreement,[2] and injunctive relief. The Court
held a four-day trial on the issues starting on February 23, 2016.
There has been protracted litigation regarding these divorce
claims as well as claims ancillary to the divorce. Throughout the
proceedings, there have been voluminous petitions for contempt
of court orders and for the enforcement of discovery requests.
Most of these contempt and enforcement proceedings were the
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1
Alimony pendente lite is “temporary support granted to a spouse during
the pendency of a divorce or annulment proceeding.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 3103.
2
The parties signed an “Amended Prenuptial Agreement” on December 15,
2006, almost two months after their marriage, and it is that amended
agreement that is at issue in this case.
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result of [H]usband’s behavior or failure to comply with the
payment of support or discovery requests. Accordingly, [W]ife
incurred attorney fees to enforce the Court’s orders and her
claims were stalled as a result of [H]usband’s contemptuous
behavior. Specifically, ten court orders were issued against
[H]usband for failing to comply with discovery matters. As a
result, [W]ife had been awarded $30,981.89 in counsel fees
through February 23, 2016 due to [H]usband’s failure to comply
with discovery requests or to pay support as ordered.[3]
Trial Ct. Op., 4/14/16, at 1-2 (some footnotes and citations omitted).
On May 19, 2010,4 Wife filed a petition to enforce a portion of
Paragraph 3(c) of the prenuptial agreement, which reads:
Following the marriage, both parties shall contribute their
entire net income to a joint account or accounts, to be utilized
for household and living expenses of the parties during the term
of the marriage, and as the source of payment for mortgage
payments, property taxes and all other expenses of the marital
residence. The parties acknowledge that their contributions to
this account or accounts shall not be equal.
R.R. at 1059a.5 This paragraph — and, in particular, its two facially
inconsistent clauses, “Following the marriage” and “during the term of the
marriage” — has been a major source of the protracted controversy between
the parties. Another provision of the agreement, Paragraph 4, deals with
Wife’s right to support and maintenance after the parties’ divorce or
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3
As discussed below, the orders sanctioning Husband were based on an
interpretation of his obligations under the Prenuptial Agreement that was
overturned later in the litigation. The latter decision reversed the order
forming the basis for those sanctions.
4
The dates referenced in this decision are the docketing dates.
5
We cite to the reproduced record for the parties’ convenience.
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separation, and the relation of Paragraph 4 to Paragraph 3(c) has been a
component of the dispute. Much of the disagreement below resulted from
an early interpretation of paragraph 3(c) by Judge DiSalle that placed
substantial financial burdens on Husband and that was later rescinded when
another judge, Judge Gilman, took over the case.
The court, in an interim order by Judge DiSalle, granted Wife’s petition
to enforce Paragraph 3(c) on the same day that Wife filed it, May 19, 2010.
Interpreting the agreement, Judge DiSalle ordered that, even though the
parties had separated, Husband had to deposit his entire paycheck — 100%
of his income — into the parties’ joint checking account for use by Wife to
pay all household and joint living expenses pending a hearing scheduled for
September 24, 2010. Order, 5/19/10.
On August 17, 2010, Wife filed a petition to enforce compliance with
the court’s May 19, 2010 order. The court again granted Wife’s petition that
same day and ordered Husband to, among other things, comply with the
May 19, 2010 order, retroactive to May 19th. On September 24, 2010,
Judge DiSalle held a hearing on Wife’s original May 19, 2010 enforcement
petition, but did not immediately issue an order. At the hearing, both
Husband and Wife testified; Husband’s counsel opined that Paragraph 3 of
the prenuptial agreement was ambiguous, and Wife’s counsel disagreed.
On October 8, 2010, Wife filed a third petition to enforce, which
claimed Husband failed to comply with the court’s May 19 and August 17,
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2010 orders. The court again granted the petition that same day, and
ordered Husband to make all payments owed to Wife within three business
days.
On October 21, 2010, Judge DiSalle issued an order granting Wife’s
original May 19, 2010 petition to enforce. He held that Husband was
obligated under Paragraph 3(c) to, among other things, deposit his entire
paycheck into the parties’ joint account and “not make any withdrawals or
transaction[s] from the account absent an agreement by the parties.”
Order, 10/21/10.
We state the subsequent procedural history as set forth by the trial
court:
Two weeks later on November 1, 2010, [H]usband filed a
Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition, which [W]ife did not join.
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court dismissed [H]usband’s petition
because it had no merit. Husband, thereafter, filed a second
Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition on December 15, 2010 that
[W]ife did not join. The proceeding was converted to a Chapter
11 proceeding. Again, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court dismissed the
petition because it had no merit. All divorce proceedings were
halted for four months due to the automatic stays in place
pending dismissal of husband’s bankruptcy cases. Husband
explained that filing the bankruptcies was at “the advice of
counsel,” but did not elaborate. This [c]ourt believes the
bankruptcy petitions were filed, in part, to relieve [H]usband’s
financial obligation that Judge DiSalle had imposed upon him.
Another reason for the delay in the divorce proceedings
concerned a residence located on Dyers Stone Drive in
Nottingham Township, Washington County. When the parties
married, [H]usband sold his home and moved into [W]ife’s
premarital residence located on Arrowhead Lane, Eighty Four,
Pennsylvania. According to the prenuptial agreement, however,
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[W]ife was to sell her Arrowhead Lane residence and use those
proceeds to purchase a marital residence for the parties. The
new home was to be titled in her name only, and any
appreciation in value was to remain [W]ife’s separate property.[6]
Wife contracted with Custom Homes following the marriage to
construct the new home on Dyers Stone Drive. During the
construction process, the parties noticed that the walls were
cracking and that drywall nails were popping from the drywall.[7]
These problems led to . . . two lawsuits. [The first of these
resulted from a decision by Husband and Wife to fire Custom
Homes, resulting in an action by the builder for breach of
contract. Custom Homes won an arbitration judgment of
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6
The property was purchased with a $623,200 mortgage. Joint Ex. 1 at ¶
19 (parties’ joint stipulations). One of the disputed issues in this appeal is
whether the parties should share responsibility for that mortgage debt even
though the home is Wife’s property.
7
The court further explained:
As [W]ife testified, the home was about two-thirds complete
when the builder was fired. The parties stipulated that the cost
to stabilize the subsidence and to make the necessary repairs to
the home would be between $425,000 and $475,000. Further,
the cost to then complete the house would be between $300,000
and $350,000. Based upon same, the total estimated cost of
complete remediation is between $725,000 and $825,000.
Therefore, this “leaves Dyers Stone with a fair market value ‘as
is’ of between [negative] $100,000 and [negative] $200,000, [”]
without considering the expenditure of $104,904.55 in counsel
fees thus far.[]
Trial Ct. Op., 4/14/16, at 3 n.6. The parties stipulated that if the home “was
a completed structure ready for habitation, [it would have] a fair market
value of $625,000.” Joint Ex. 1 at ¶ 21. But because the cost to repair and
complete the home would cost between $725,000 and $825,000, the marital
home has, at best, a negative value of $100,000. The parties also stipulated
that the value of the unimproved lot was $45,000, the estimated cost to
demolish the half-constructed home would be $75,000, and thus a post-
demolish lot would have a fair market value of negative $30,000. Id. at
¶ 23.
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$64,032.21 against Husband and Wife, jointly and severally.8]
Believing that [the other lawsuit], the Codesys lawsuit, should be
litigated before the divorce trial, [W]ife filed requests to continue
the scheduling of the trial four separate times. Eventually, this
[c]ourt would not grant any further continuances. In addition,
[W]ife caused some delay in the divorce proceedings for failing
to comply with [H]usband’s discovery request. The [c]ourt
sanctioned [W]ife three times.
On May 1, 2010, [W]ife filed a complaint against Codesys in
Allegheny County with respect to the Dyers Stone Drive
property. Codesys was the company hired to perform
“inspections on the Property during the course of the project.”
Wife alleged that Codesys “failed to review the Property and
permitted construction to move forward despite a defective
foundation.” See Jane Young v. Codesys, GD-12-5436
(Complaint, ¶¶ 20, 21). After many continuances, the Court of
Common Pleas has set the trial for the first week of September
2016. Wife has also sued her counsel who represented her in
the case that she defended against Custom Homes. See Jane
Young v. John Lippl, GD-12-19194.
Trial Ct. Op., 4/14/16, at 1-4 (some footnotes and citations omitted).
Meanwhile, Wife continued to file a flurry of motions seeking relief for
Husband’s failure to comply with the court’s prior orders instructing him to
deposit his entire paycheck into the parties’ joint account:
• On April 28, 2011, Wife filed a petition to prevent Husband from
withdrawing money from his retirement account.9 The court granted Wife’s
petition and, on May 25, 2011, entered an order that Husband could
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8
Husband and Wife disputed whose decision it was to fire Custom Homes.
Husband claims Wife controlled the litigation strategy in the case.
9
The retirement account was Husband’s only asset subject to marital
distribution.
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withdraw up to $50,000 from his retirement account over three months,
which would then be transferred to Wife; the order stated that the account
would be frozen after Husband withdrew $50,000. Order, 5/25/11.
• On May 26, 2011, the court held Husband in contempt for failing
to pay amounts required under the court’s prior orders. Among other
things, the court ordered Husband to pay 50% of his paycheck or
unemployment compensation10 directly to Wife. Order, 5/26/11.
• On June 22, 2011, the court granted Wife’s petition for counsel
fees. The court’s order (which included the court’s handwritten
interlineations) stated: “Plaintiff, Bruce J. Goldblatt[’s] obligation to pay the
sum of $50,000.00 and other sums as counsel fees for the vexatious
behavior and otherwise shall be considered by the Divorce Master.” Order,
6/22/11.
• On July 14, 2011, on Wife’s motion for reconsideration of the
May 26, 2011 order instructing Husband to pay 50% (rather than 100%) of
his wages or unemployment income to Wife,11 the court ordered Husband to
provide an accounting of his income and expenses since May 1, 2010. The
order also stated that Wife’s claim for legal fees associated with enforcing
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10
Husband was notified in April of 2011, that he would be laid off from his
job on June 30, 2011.
11
Husband did not challenge the timeliness of Wife’s motion for
reconsideration.
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Husband’s obligation under the prenuptial agreement “shall be preserved for
equitable distribution.” Order, 7/14/11.
• On July 21, 2011, on another of Wife’s petitions for contempt,
the court again ordered Husband to, among other things, pay Wife 50% of
his net pay.
Eventually, on August 3, 2012, Judge DiSalle granted Wife’s petition
for special relief and ordered Husband to, among other items, reimburse
Wife for the household and living expenses she incurred following the
parties’ separation. The order also stated that all future “issues regarding
compliance with this and prior Orders of Court and compliance with
discovery matters shall be heard by” Judge Gilman, who was the presiding
family court judge at that time. Order, 8/3/12.
On October 25, 2012, in response to a petition filed by Wife on August
16, 2012, the court found Husband in contempt and instructed that Husband
could purge the contempt by, among other items, paying 50% of his net
paycheck and any unemployment compensation to Wife. Order, 10/25/12.
Later (the record is unclear regarding the date), the parties’ counsel
appeared in court and advised Judge Gilman that Husband failed to comply
with that October 25, 2012 order. On December 10, 2012, the court found
Husband in contempt of its August 3 and October 25, 2012 orders, but
declined to imprison him. On December 28, 2012, Wife filed a petition for
reconsideration of the court’s decision to not incarcerate Husband, which the
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court granted that same day. The court ordered Husband to report to
county jail on January 7, 2013, and stated that Husband would be
incarcerated until such time as he complied with the court’s orders and
purged his contempt, but in no event would he be held in jail for more than
one month.
On January 4, 2013, Husband filed an omnibus motion for
reconsideration that raised multiple issues. In pertinent part, Husband
asked the court to reconsider its December 28, 2012 order instructing him to
report to jail. The motion raised a litany of arguments, including that the
court’s underlying orders (which, as discussed, formed the bases for the
court’s December 28, 2012 order instructing Husband to report to jail)
lacked any basis in the Rules of Civil Procedure governing an award of
support. Husband also requested the court to (1) certify for appeal the
court’s August 3, 2012 reimbursement order, which was interlocutory; (2)
stay the proceedings; and (3) impose house arrest or work release in lieu of
incarceration. In a supporting brief, Husband explained his contention that
all of the orders compelling him to pay either 100% or 50% of his paycheck
pursuant to Paragraph 3(c) of the parties’ prenuptial agreement flowed from
Judge DiSalle’s flawed interpretation of that provision, and he asked Judge
Gilman to depart from that interpretation:
Judge DiSalle apparently decided that [Husband] had to
continue to deposit his income into a joint account pursuant to
paragraph 3 of the prenuptial agreement, but there is no such
determination of record. This can only be inferred because
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Judge DiSalle repeatedly ordered [Husband] to deposit 100% of
income into a joint account. It is not clear why since the
Agreement qualified the deposit with the phrase “during the
term of the marriage.” It is not clear whether Judge DiSalle
considered Paragraph 4 of the Prenuptial Agreement which
states what is to happen upon separation. It states [Wife] is
entitled to support. There are procedures and guidelines for
obtaining support, yet [Wife] wholly ignored them and
proceeded to seek enforcement in motions court. [Wife] was
successful, so successful to the extent that she obtained orders
first freezing [Husband’s] separate non-marital asset 401k, then
directing domestic support obligation reimbursement
disbursements to [Wife] from the 401k for expenses related to
her own separate non-marital assets. . . . [Wife] continues to
press for enforcement in motions court to the extent that she
now has [Husband] on the brink of incarceration. The prior
holding(s) would thus serve to create manifest injustice on
[Husband], not only in loss of his non-marital asset but he will
be jailed. This is exactly the type of case where the exception to
the coordinate jurisdiction rule applies. . . .
[Wife] makes much of the fact that [Husband] had previously
withdrawn money from his 401k. He was Ordered to pay 100%
of his income into a joint account. [Husband] is left with
nothing. Where was he supposed to get money? [Wife] would
not agree to withdrawals. The support guidelines would not
leave him in such a position.
Husband’s Brief in Support of Omnibus Mot., 1/14/13, at 8-9 (unpaginated).
After considering Wife’s responsive brief, Judge Gilman granted
Husband’s omnibus motion on February 1, 2013. The court vacated all prior
orders commanding Husband to pay 50% or 100% of his income to Wife as
support. Order, 2/1/13. The parties stipulated that per those orders,
Husband had paid $84,056.38 to Wife. Joint Ex. 1 at ¶ 14. 12 The court
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12
As discussed below, Wife did not reimburse Husband for these amounts.
Rather, that sum was credited as Wife’s alimony pendente lite.
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reasoned that Judge DiSalle’s prior interpretation that Paragraph 3(c)
applied after the parties separated was incorrect. Trial Ct. Op., 2/1/13, at
4.13
Over the next three years, each party changed counsel several
times.14 The parties filed numerous motions on countless issues. One such
motion was Wife’s October 3, 2014 motion for sanctions, claiming Husband
failed to respond to her request for documents. In an order issued that day,
the court, among many other things, noted Husband’s “blatant disregard” of
two of the court’s prior orders instructing Husband to respond to Wife’s
discovery requests. The trial court ordered that Husband “shall pay counsel
fees to [Wife’s] attorney. Said amount to be determined at the master
hearing regarding equitable distribution.” Order, 10/3/14.
In addition to deferring the issue of counsel fees, the court also
similarly deferred the issue of alimony pendente lite. In a September 28,
2013 order, the court canceled a hearing regarding alimony pendente lite
and stated, “Said issue shall be consolidated with those claims heard by the
divorce master if the parties are unable to settle.” Order, 9/28/13.
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13
On February 20, 2013, Wife filed a petition to clarify the court’s
February 1, 2013 order and to certify the order for interlocutory appeal. The
court denied Wife’s petition that day.
14
Wife’s present counsel entered an appearance just a month before trial.
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Eventually, in October 2015, the court ordered Husband to pay $50 per
month as provisional alimony pendente lite. Joint Ex. 1 at ¶ 16.
Finally, almost six years after Husband filed for divorce, the court held
a four-day trial in February 2016. On April 14, 2016, the court issued an
order resolving the issues raised at trial, including the deferred issues of
counsel fees and alimony pendente lite. Trial Ct. Op., 4/14/16, at 18. We
discuss each of the trial court’s disputed holdings from that decision in detail
below. For now, we note that the court ordered Husband to pay alimony
pendente lite of $110,187, which represents Husband’s obligation from
May 14, 2010 (the date the parties separated) through the end of March
2016. Id. at 11. The court also ordered Husband to pay his proportionate
share of Wife’s medical insurance premiums and Wife’s unreimbursed
medical expenses, which totaled $23,300. Husband thus owed Wife support
in a total amount of $133,487. Id. at 12. As noted above, however,
Husband had previously paid $84,056.38 to Wife per Judge DiSalle’s prior
orders. Husband also paid an additional $12,676.12 in provisional alimony
pendente lite in 2013 to 2016. Joint Ex. 1 at ¶ 17.15 Thus, after deducting
Husband’s prior payments, the court concluded Husband owed a net amount
of $36,754.50 to Wife for support. Trial Ct. Op., 4/14/16, at 12.
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15
Husband paid this sum to the Domestic Relations Office, instead of paying
Wife directly, and that Office, in turn, transferred the funds to Wife.
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In addition, the court held that Husband owed Wife an additional
$32,201.59. The court calculated that figure from (1) the division of the
marital portion of Husband’s 401(k) retirement account,16 which was the
only marital asset subject to distribution, Trial Ct. Op., 4/14/16, at 7, (2) the
amount Husband should reimburse Wife for paying the premiums on
Husband’s life insurance policy, and (3) counsel fees awarded to Wife,
though in an amount less than Wife requested. The court therefore
concluded that Husband owed Wife a grand total of $68,956.09 ($36,754.50
of support, plus $32,201.59 of the marital estate and counsel fees).
On April 19, 2016, the court entered its final decree of divorce. On
May 12, 2016, Wife appealed from the April 1314, 2016 order; on May 20,
2016, Husband timely cross-appealed from the April 14, 2016 order.17 We
treat the parties’ appeals as being from the April 19, 2016 final decree of
divorce. Cf. Rich v. Acrivos,

815 A.2d 1106

, 1107 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2003)
(holding that premature appeal from order declaring marriage irretrievably
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16
The parties stipulated that $355,337.74 was the value of Husband’s
retirement account one day prior to the parties’ separation. Joint Ex. 1 at ¶
28. The court used that value to ascertain the portion subject to marital
distribution. The value of that retirement account as of June 30, 2015 was
$232,585.79. Joint Ex. 1 at ¶ 29. Husband’s only other significant financial
asset was the approximately $50,000 he received from selling his pre-
marital residence shortly after the date of the parties’ marriage. Trial Ct.
Op., 4/14/16 at 8 n.13.
17
This Court later consolidated both appeals. Order, 6/13/16.
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broken was perfected when court entered divorce decree).18 The court did
not order the parties to comply with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).19
Wife’s Appeal
Wife raises the following issues:
[1] The trial court, presided over by Judge Gilman sitting in
coordinate jurisdiction, erred in finding that an exception to the
coordinate jurisdiction rule was warranted, and thus its reversal
of Judge DiSalle’s preceding Orders and findings was improper.
[2] Assuming, arguendo, that the trial court under Judge
Gilman was not already bound by Judge DiSalle’s prior
determinations as to the mortgage and Custom Homes
judgment, it nevertheless erred in interpreting the Prenup to
characterize these joint debts as Wife’s separate, non-marital
obligations.
[3] The trial court abused its discretion in denying Wife’s
request for an award of equitable reimbursement.
[4] The trial court abused its discretion in limiting wife’s
award of additional attorney’s fees to $3,000, and in finding that
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18
Wife later filed a motion for special relief to amend the certified record.
We grant that motion.
19
Subsequently, Wife filed an emergency application for an injunction with
this Court, requesting that this Court freeze Husband’s financial accounts to
prevent any dissipation. Wife’s Emergency Appl. for Inj., 12/23/16. This
Court ordered a temporary freeze that day, pending receipt of Husband’s
response. Husband filed a response on December 28, 2016, claiming,
among other things, that he has paid all court-ordered counsel fees and
complied with the court’s equitable distribution order. Husband’s Answer to
Wife’s Emergency Appl. for Inj., 12/28/16, at ¶¶ 18-19. On December 28,
2016, this Court vacated its December 23, 2016 order, denied Wife’s
emergency application for relief, lifted any freeze, and granted the trial court
permission to resolve any “matters that [did] not involve the pending issues”
in these appeals. Order, 12/28/16.
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Wife’s counsel fees are “grossly out of proportion to the relative
value and complexity of the case.”
Wife’s Brief at 33, 41, 48, 55.
As we stated in Laudig v. Laudig,

624 A.2d 651

, 653 (Pa. Super.
1993), with respect to appeals regarding the financial terms of divorce
decrees:
Our standard of review on appeal is a narrow one. We need
determine only whether the trial court committed an error of law
or an abuse of discretion. We do not usurp the trial court’s fact-
finding function.
We must decide, “Was there an error in the law’s application, or is this
appeal mere financial frustration?”    Colonna v. Colonna,

791 A.2d 353

,
355 (Pa. Super. 2001) (citation omitted), appeal denied,

803 A.2d 732

 (Pa.
2002).
The Coordinate Jurisdiction Rule and
Interpretation of Paragraph 3(c) of the Prenuptial Agreement
As set forth above, one of the primary sources of dispute in this
litigation is the proper interpretation of Paragraph 3(c) of the Prenuptial
Agreement. Paragraph 3 dealt with a broad range of topics. Much of it dealt
with gifts and rights of inheritance. Paragraph 3(c) dealt with the parties’
creation of marital assets during an ambiguous period following their
wedding:
c. It is hereby acknowledged that as of the date of this
Agreement, [Wife] is the owner of her personal residence located
at . . . Arrowhead Lane, Eight[y] Four, PA. . . . The parties
acknowledge that following the contemplated marriage,
[Wife] will sell her personal residence and utilize a portion of the
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proceeds therefrom to acquire a new marital residence for the
parties. . . .
Following the marriage, both parties shall contribute their
entire net income to a joint account or accounts, to be utilized
for household and living expenses of the parties during the
term of the marriage, and as the source of payment for
mortgage payments, property taxes and all other expenses of
the marital residence.     The parties acknowledge that their
contributions to this account or accounts shall not be equal.
In the event that the marriage ends as a result of divorce,
[Husband] agrees to vacate the property, waiving any and all
right, title and interest in and to all equity, and all appreciation
in the value of the marital residence during the course of the
marriage. . . .
R.R. at 1058a-59a (emphases added).
The prenuptial agreement did not define the term “marriage” as it was
used in the Agreement, but Paragraph 11 stated, “In the construction of this
Agreement, the parties hereto intend and agree that the separate provisions
of this Agreement shall be construed as a whole and, where possible,
consistent with each other.” R.R. at 1069a.         In this connection, the
construction of Paragraph 3(c) also implicated Paragraph 4, which provided:
Each of the parties hereby agrees that in the event the marital
relationship contemplated hereunder, once contracted, shall
thereafter no longer be maintained, whether under the
provisions of a separation agreement, by reason of separation,
divorce, or otherwise, no claim for spousal support,
maintenance, alimony, . . . or alimony pendente lite and/or
counsel fees may be made by [Husband], but such claims shall
be available to [Wife] as if this Agreement did not exist, and no
claims for costs and expenses shall be made by either against
the other or against the estate of the other . . . .
R.R. at 1061a-62a.
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Judge DiSalle interpreted Paragraph 3(c) as obligating Husband to
continue depositing his paycheck (and later, a portion of his unemployment
compensation) into the parties’ joint bank account for so long as the parties
remained formally married — even after the parties had separated. Judge
Gilman, on the other hand, concluded that Paragraph 3(c) obligated
payments by Husband only until the marriage was no longer maintained,
and he viewed the provisions in Paragraph 4 for support and alimony
pendente lite as governing payments to Wife after the parties’ separation.
Judge Gilman therefore determined that Judge DiSalle’s interpretation of
Paragraph 3(c) was erroneous and reversed all prior orders compelling
Husband to deposit his paycheck or unemployment compensation proceeds
after the parties separated.
Typically, under the doctrine of coordinate jurisdiction, one trial judge
cannot overturn an order issued by another trial judge.           We recently
discussed the “coordinate jurisdiction” rule as follows:
Within [the law of the case] doctrine lies the directive that
judges sitting on the same court in the same case should not
overrule each other’s decisions, otherwise known as the
“coordinate jurisdiction rule.”
The purposes behind the law of the case doctrine and the
coordinate jurisdiction rule are (1) to protect the settled
expectations of the parties; (2) to insure uniformity of decisions;
(3) to maintain consistency during the course of a single case;
(4) to effectuate the proper and streamlined administration of
justice; and (5) to bring litigation to an end. Only in exceptional
circumstances, such as an intervening change in the controlling
law, a substantial change in the facts or evidence giving rise to
the dispute in the matter, or where the prior holding was clearly
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erroneous and would create a manifest injustice if followed, may
the doctrine be disregarded.
Mariner Chestnut Partners, L.P. v. Lenfest,

152 A.3d 265

, 282 (Pa.
Super. 2016) (citations and some quotation marks omitted).            The last
exception, relating to a clearly erroneous prior holding that would create
manifest injustice if followed, is at issue here.    Our Supreme Court has
discussed the limited purpose of that exception:
To accede to a coordinate judge’s order that is clearly erroneous
would be not only to permit an inequity to work on the party
subject to the order, but would allow an action to proceed in the
face of almost certain reversal on appellate review. Moreover,
the requirement that the prior holding also create a manifest
injustice serves as a significant curb on the exception so that it
would apply to only those situations in which adhering to the
prior holding would be, in essence, plainly intolerable.
Zane v. Friends Hosp.,

836 A.2d 25

, 29-30 (Pa. 2003).
Husband contends that Judge DiSalle’s interpretation of Paragraph 3(c)
was clearly erroneous and that it subjected him to a manifest injustice,
thereby making it proper for Judge Gilman to depart from the erroneous
interpretation.   Wife, on the other hand, contends that Judge Gilman
violated the coordinate jurisdiction rule by improperly reversing Judge
DiSalle’s prior rulings. She asserts that Judge Gilman failed to establish that
Judge DiSalle’s original order was both “clearly erroneous” and “would create
a manifest injustice if followed.”
Our standard of review of an order implicating the coordinate
jurisdiction rule is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. Zane, 836
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A.2d at 30 n.8.   In considering this question, we recognize that, although
presented in the context of conflicting rulings by different trial judges and
the limits of the coordinate jurisdiction doctrine, the ultimate question that
must be resolved here is the proper interpretation of Paragraph 3(c). Even if
Judge Gilman had adhered to Judge DiSalle’s interpretation of that
paragraph, that interpretation could not stand on appeal if we ultimately
were to conclude that the two judges’ agreed-upon interpretation was
wrong. Therefore, although we remain mindful of the coordinate jurisdiction
implications here, we focus initially on discerning the correct meaning of the
parties’ agreement.
In this connection, we observe:
The determination of marital property rights through prenuptial,
post-nuptial and settlement agreements has long been
permitted, and even encouraged. [T]he Supreme Court
recognized that prenuptial agreements are contracts, and as
such, are governed by contract law.          Similarly, contract
principles apply to antenuptial and post-nuptial agreements. It
has been held that absent fraud, misrepresentation, or duress,
spouses should be bound by the terms of their agreements.
Laudig,

624 A.2d at 653

 (citations omitted); accord Sabad v. Fessenden,

825 A.2d 682

, 686 (Pa. Super.), appeal denied,

836 A.2d 122

 (Pa. 2003).
Husband contends that Paragraph 3(c) is ambiguous.
Whether a contract contains ambiguous terms is a question of
law. To determine whether there is an ambiguity, it is proper for
a court to hear evidence from both parties and then decide
whether there are objective indications that the terms of the
contract are subject to differing meanings.      A contract is
ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible of different
constructions and capable of being understood in more than one
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sense. The fact that the parties do not agree upon a proper
interpretation does not necessarily render a contract ambiguous.
Nicholas v. Hofmann,

158 A.3d 675

, 693 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citations
omitted).   “[I]t is axiomatic that contractual clauses must be construed,
whenever possible, in a manner that effectuates all of the clauses being
considered.”   Lenau v. Co-eXprise, Inc.,

102 A.3d 423

, 430 (Pa. Super.
2014) (citation omitted), appeal denied,

113 A.3d 280

 (Pa. 2015).
In support of her interpretation of the contested agreement language,
Wife points out that the second paragraph in Paragraph 3(c) uses the phrase
“during the term of the marriage.” She maintains that this phrase means
that Husband’s payment obligation was to “persist as long as the marriage
does.” Wife’s Brief at 36.   Wife reasons that the parties addressed any
potential separation in Paragraph 4 of the prenuptial agreement. Therefore,
in Wife’s view, Paragraph 3(c) did not contemplate the parties’ separation.
Had the parties intended Paragraph 3(c) to address separation, the disputed
clause would have obligated Husband “to contribute his net income to the
joint account, ‘during the term of the marriage or until such time as the
parties separate.’”   Id. at 36-37.    Because Paragraph 3(c) obligated
Husband to continue to pay after separation and until the parties’ divorce,
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Wife argues that Judge Gilman’s reasoning rendered the phrase “during the
term of the marriage” “out of existence.” Id. at 37.20
In arriving at a contrary interpretation of the Agreement, the trial
court reasoned as follows:
On a macro-level review of the agreement, there is a flow
about it which is defined by the status progression of the parties’
relationship from before, during, and after marriage. The first
paragraphs describe separate property brought to the marriage
and the issue of disclosure. Moving to the language in question
of paragraph 3(c), it is directly in the middle of the before
marriage and after marriage segments. This delineation is self-
evident because the language of the paragraph immediately
thereafter states, “In the event that the marriage ends as a
result of divorce....”
This macro-perspective is only given greater credence when
viewing the agreement on a micro-level. The phrase “following
the marriage” does not mean after the marriage ends. In
paragraph 3(c), the same paragraph with the contested
language, there is a second use of “following the marriage.”
Specifically, the agreement reads, “Following the contemplated
marriage [Wife] will sell [her then-current residence] and utilize
a portion of the proceeds to acquire a new marital residence for
the parties.” This language could never be interpreted to affect
the period after the marriage. If it were read in the same context
as alleged by [Wife], then it would require [Wife] to sell her
current residence and invest the proceeds in a new joint
residence after separation. This interpretation defies logic.
____________________________________________
20
Wife also contends Judge Gilman made his ruling without the transcripts
of hearings resolving Wife’s petitions to enforce the court’s May 19, 2010
order, and should have deferred to Judge DiSalle’s interpretation because it
was based on the hearings. We find this contention without merit. Judge
Gilman properly relied primarily on the agreement’s language. And, in any
event, our review of the record shows that no party testified with any
precision about the term at issue. Wife points to no extrinsic evidence from
the hearings that carries controlling weight on this question.
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The language in later paragraphs, specifically paragraph 4 of
the agreement, also use clear, precise terms like divorce and/or
separation to designate the termination of the marriage. For
example, the agreement states, “[I]n the event the marital
relationship contemplated hereunder, once contracted, shall
thereafter no longer be maintain[ed], whether under the
provisions of a separate agreement, by reason of separation,
divorce....” More importantly, this language and paragraph
describes the parties’ rights to support once they separate. . . .
If the intent was for [Husband] to continue to deposit 100% of
his wages into the joint account after the two parties separated,
the contract drafters would have used these terms.
Furthermore, the language “following the marriage” means
following the act of becoming married as shown by legal
definitions of marriage.
Trial Ct. Op., 2/1/13, at 4-5 (footnote omitted).
We agree with Judge Gilman’s reasoning that the disputed language
required Husband to deposit his net income after the parties’ marriage
ceremony but not after the parties separated or divorced. Paragraph 3(c)
discusses income contributions “following the parties’ marriage”21 to pay “for
household and living expenses of the parties during the term of the
marriage,” but it does not explain what “term of the marriage” means in the
context of a marital breakup that begins with a separation. While it certainly
is true that a marriage ends upon entry of a formal decree under the Divorce
Code, 23 Pa.C.S. § 3323, Paragraph 4 addresses what happens when “the
marital    relationship    contemplated        hereunder,   once   contracted,   shall
____________________________________________
21
As Judge Gilman held, the word “marriage” in this phrase refers to the act
by which the parties entered into their civil contract of marriage. See
generally Marriage Law, 23 Pa.C.S. § 1102.
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thereafter no longer be maintained, whether under the provisions of a
separation agreement, by reason of separation, divorce, or otherwise.” The
Agreement thus did not view a divorce decree as the only way in which the
marriage contract would cease to be effective.
Importantly, Paragraph 4 specifically provided that Wife could pursue a
support claim if the parties separated.          R.R. at 1061a-62a.    Wife’s
interpretation would entitle her to Paragraph 3(c) income at the same time
as she could receive post-separation support under Paragraph 4, giving her
a right to double-recovery that is not implied by any reading of the parties’
agreement. We therefore conclude that Judge Gilman’s construction of the
Agreement is the more reasonable one that both effectuates and is in
harmony with the entire prenuptial agreement. See Nicholas, 158 A.3d at
693; Lenau, 102 A.3d at 430.       Accordingly, Judge Gilman did not err in
holding that Judge DiSalle’s interpretation was clearly erroneous.
Judge Gilman also did not err in concluding that he could depart from
Judge DiSalle’s interpretation because it caused a substantial injustice. See
Zane, 836 A.2d at 29-30. Judge DiSalle’s order obligated Husband to
deposit 100% (and later, 50%) of his net income into the parties’ joint bank
account to pay for expenses at the same time as he was to pay Wife spousal
support or alimony pendente lite. Such a requirement imposed an obvious
hardship and was unjust. Wife argues that there was no manifest injustice
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to Husband, particularly in light of Husband’s “prolonged non-compliance.”
Wife’s Brief at 38. We disagree, and we defer to Judge Gilman on this issue.
We therefore conclude that Wife’s first issue merits no relief.
The Dyers Stone Mortgage
Wife’s second issue concerns the $623,200 mortgage debt on the
Dyers Stone property. The trial court held that she is responsible for that
debt. Wife contends that Husband shares that responsibility.
This issue implicates a different section of the prenuptial agreement,
Paragraph 6, which states:
Except as otherwise expressly provided herein, neither party,
nor his or her property, shall be held liable for or subject to the
debts of or the claims against the other party, whether such
debts or claims be acquired prior to or during the marriage of
the parties.
R.R. at 1066a.     However, a full understanding of Paragraph 6 requires
consideration of the first portion of Paragraph 3(c), which provides:
c. It is hereby acknowledged that as of the date of this
Agreement, [Wife] is the owner of her personal residence located
at . . . , Eight[y] Four, PA. . . . Both [Husband] and [Wife]
acknowledge that this residence is the non-marital property of
[Wife], and in this regard, [Husband] specifically acknowledges
that he waives any and all right, title and interest he may have
by virtue of his marriage to [Wife] in her personal residence, or
the proceeds therefrom, however invested or titled. The parties
acknowledge that following the contemplated marriage, [Wife]
will sell her personal residence and utilize a portion of the
proceeds therefrom to acquire a new marital residence for the
parties. The amount of the proceeds that [Wife] will invest in
the new marital residence along with all equity and appreciation
in the new marital residence shall remain [Wife’s] non-marital
property. The new marital residence shall be titled in [Wife’s]
name, but shall be subject to the terms and conditions set forth
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in this Agreement.     The parties shall cooperate to obtain
mortgage financing for the new marital residence, and
[Husband] will co-sign mortgage documents, if required. If
required by the lending institution, the property shall be titled in
joint names, as tenants by the entireties, but shall remain
subject to the terms and conditions set forth in this Agreement.
R.R. at 1058a-59a. Pursuant to this provision, Husband co-signed the Dyers
Stone mortgage documents and the property was titled in the parties’ joint
names.
In April of 2008, two years before the parties separated, Husband
signed a Waiver of Spousal Interest releasing any right, title, or interest
Husband had in the Dyers Stone property. It reads:
[Husband], now and forever, release[s] any right, title or
interest I may have in the [Dyers Stone property (“Real
Estate”)] that is to be jointly titled in my name and my Wife’s
name. The titling of the Real Estate, in joint names, is so that
[Wife] is able to obtain financing; and is not meant to convert or
transmute the Real Estate into marital property. This Waiver on
my part is made consistent with Paragraph 3, sub-section C of
the Prenuptial Agreement that my Wife and I executed on
December 19, 2006. I respectfully request that any Court of
competent jurisdiction enforce this Waiver against me consistent
with the cited terms and provisions of said Prenuptial
Agreement.
Absent a written Agreement to the contrary, the Real
Estate shall be my Wife’s sole and separate property, regardless
of how titled, and shall be free from any claim by me as a
consequence of our marriage.
Husband’s Ex. 8, R.R. at 1162a.
Wife agrees that the prenuptial agreement is silent on whether
Husband is jointly responsible for the $623,200 mortgage on the Dyers
Stone residence.   Wife’s Brief at 43; Trial Ct. Op., 4/14/16, at 5 & n.10.
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Wife contends, however, that the trial court misconstrued Paragraph 6 by
holding that because the Dyers Stone property is Wife’s separate property,
Wife is solely responsible for the mortgage.   She reasons that the parties
could have included explicit language in the agreement that any joint
mortgage would be Wife’s sole obligation. Id. at 44. Because the parties
did not do so, Wife concludes that the mortgage should be considered a joint
marital debt. Id. In support of this contention, Wife references what she
characterizes as Husband’s “active” involvement with the design and
construction of the home, as well as the subsequent litigation about that
design and construction. Id. In sum, although the Dyers Stone residence is
Wife’s non-marital property, Wife wants the mortgage on the property to be
considered marital debt and thus part of the marital estate.
Husband counters that this Court’s decision in Colonna,

793 A.2d 353

,
controls. In Husband’s view, the Court in Colonna addressed similar facts
involving a prenuptial agreement that was silent on the apportionment of
marital debt.   Husband’s Reply Brief at 10-11.      Colonna, according to
Husband, held that, notwithstanding that the bank required each party to
join each other’s mortgage on the non-marital property, the debt followed
the property. Id. at 11. Thus, Husband posits that although he co-signed
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the Dyers Stone mortgage,22 the mortgage remains Wife’s non-marital debt
because the Dyers Stone residence is Wife’s non-marital property.
Wife, in her sur-reply, contends Colonna is factually distinguishable
and highlights that, in contrast to Colonna, in which only one spouse held
title to the property, Husband and Wife have joint title, which underlies the
joint mortgage. Wife’s Sur-Reply Brief at 4. Wife also asserts that although
Husband waived any interest in the lot, he waived no such interest in the
home itself. Id. at 5.23
The trial court construed Paragraph 6 and held the Dyers Stone
mortgage was Wife’s separate, non-marital property. Trial Ct. Op., 4/14/16,
at 6. In the court’s view, to conclude that the Dyers Stone mortgage was
marital debt would render Paragraph 6, which states that one spouse and his
or her property may not be held liable for the debts of the other spouse,
superfluous.      Id.   The trial court reasoned that Husband co-signed the
mortgage note only because Wife could not obtain the mortgage on her own.
Id.
In Colonna, the parties executed a post-nuptial agreement that
limited each party’s interest in the other’s pre-marital property and any
“property acquired in individual names during the marriage.” Colonna, 791
____________________________________________
22
Husband agrees “that he has a contractual liability with the bank” for the
mortgage. Trial Ct. Op., 4/14/16, at 5.
23
Wife cites no authority in support of this assertion.
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A.2d at 354. The agreement did not apportion debt or mention a mortgage,
other than stating:
[E]ither party could encumber their own property, and the other
agreed to join in a mortgage if required by the lender. Restated,
each party agreed to cooperate in the other’s encumbering of
their own property.        Looking at this plan, we see the
requirement to join a mortgage as a marital accommodation to
facilitate getting a loan; such a mortgage may be an obligation
the bank can enforce, but it is not an agreement to undertake an
obligation to the other party for half the debt.
Id. at 358. The Court reasoned that the intent of this clause was to have
“the debt follow[] the property, regardless of the names on the mortgage.
This explains the requirement each join the other’s mortgage, and the
absence of provisions assigning it separate from the property encumbered.”
Id.
For the property that was jointly titled, this Court held that the trial
court correctly gave each party half of the net value of the property, that is,
the full value of the property minus the full value of the mortgage, divided in
half. Colonna,

791 A.2d at 358

. The trial court, however, also held that for
property titled solely in the wife’s name, the wife would receive the full value
of the property, and the husband was ordered to pay half of the outstanding
mortgage.

Goldblatt, B. v. Young, J. ( 2017 )

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