Guirlene, J. v. Ryan, D. ( 2020 )

J-A24008-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
JEAN-BAPTISTE GUIRLENE : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
DONNA RYAN, AS ADMINISTRATIX : No. 1851 EDA 2018
OF THE ESTATE OF MYCHAJLO :
JAREMIJCZUK :
Appeal from the Order Entered June 7, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at
No(s): 170302707
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED FEBRUARY 24, 2020
Appellant, Guirlene Jean-Baptiste,1 appeals from the trial court’s June
7, 2018 order granting Appellee’s, Donna Ryan, as administratrix of the estate
of Mychajlo Jaremijczuk, motion for post-trial relief. In that order, the trial
court set aside the jury’s verdict and directed that a new trial on all issues
take place. After careful review, we affirm.
The trial court summarized the procedural history and factual
background of this case as follows:
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 We note that the caption incorrectly names Appellant as “Jean-Baptiste
Guirlene,” instead of “Guirlene Jean-Baptiste.” Because the caption
apparently has been incorrect throughout the entire proceedings below and
neither party asks us to amend it, we will leave it as is.
J-A24008-19
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 2, 2018, following trial, a jury returned a verdict against
[Appellee] and awarded [Ms. Jean-Baptiste] $600,000 in future
economic damages for future medical expenses. Liability was not
at issue. The jury found that [Ms. Jean-Baptiste] did not suffer
serious impairment of a body function.[2] See Verdict Slip [at]
Question 3. The jury did not award [Ms. Jean-Baptiste] non-
economic damages. See Verdict Slip [at] Question 4.
On May 10, 2018, [Appellee] filed a [p]ost-[t]rial [m]otion. On
June 7, 2018, this [c]ourt granted [Appellee’s] [p]ost-[t]rial
[m]otion, set aside the verdict, and ordered a new trial on all
issues.
On June 12, 2018, [Ms. Jean-Baptiste] filed a notice of appeal.[3]
On June 18, 2018, [Ms. Jean-Baptiste] file[d] a [m]otion for
[r]econsideration of the order granting [Appellee’s] [p]ost-[t]rial
[m]otion, which was denied on June 29, 2018. On July 2, 2018,
[Ms. Jean-Baptiste] filed [a timely Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise]
[s]tatement of [e]rrors [c]omplained of on [a]ppeal….
II. FACTS
[Ms. Jean-Baptiste] testified that on August 5, 2015[,] at
approximately 11:00 a.m.[,]1 … she was driving on Roosevelt
Boulevard in Philadelphia when she was rear[-]ended by a vehicle
operated by [Mr. Jaremijczuk]. [Ms. Jean-Baptiste] testified that
the impact was hard and that her neck, shoulder[,] and back hurt
immediately. [Ms. Jean-Baptiste] was transported by ambulance
to the hospital. At the hospital, [Ms. Jean-Baptiste] underwent a
CT scan. She was given a prescription for ibuprofen and
discharged. Shortly thereafter, [Ms. Jean-Baptiste] consulted her
____________________________________________
2 Ms. Jean-Baptiste is a limited-tort plaintiff. A limited-tort plaintiff “may seek
recovery for all medical and other out-of-pocket expenses, but not for pain
and suffering or other nonmonetary damages unless the injuries suffered fall
within the definition of ‘serious injury’….” 75 Pa.C.S. § 1705(a)(1). In
contrast, a full-tort plaintiff “may seek recovery for all medical and other out-
of-pocket expenses and may also seek financial compensation for pain and
suffering and other nonmonetary damages as a result of injuries caused by
other drivers.” Id.
3 An appeal may be taken as of right from an order in a civil action awarding
a new trial. See Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(6).
-2-
J-A24008-19
primary care physician, who recommended physical therapy. [Ms.
Jean-Baptiste] commenced physical therapy about a month later,
attending approximately three times a week for six to seven
months. [Ms. Jean-Baptiste] testified that she cannot bend her
back as well as she could before the accident and that she can no
longer lift heavy objects. As a result of the accident, [Ms. Jean-
Baptiste] testified that she missed three days of work as [a]
certified nursing assistant (“CNA”)[,] that she takes ibuprofen for
her pain[,] and that she received two injections for pain relief in
her neck just below the shoulder. [Ms. Jean-Baptiste] testified
that the pain has persisted, especially in the morning when her
neck and shoulder are stiff.
1 [Ms. Jean-Baptiste’s] [c]omplaint indicates that the
accident occurred on August 7, 2015; also see N.T.,
4/30/18[,] at 99-100.
[Ms. Jean-Baptiste’s] expert, Dr. Lance Yarus (“Dr. Yarus”),
testified that he believed [Ms. Jean-Baptiste] would require future
medical care. Dr. Yarus testified about possible future medical
care and associated costs. The future medical expenses included:
rhizotomy or the burning of the nerves ($3,500-4,000, with
associated surgical fees of $2,500-3,000), epidural injections
($850-1,100), ultrasound ($250-300), additional medications
other than ibuprofen including opioids, anti-inflammatories,
muscle relaxers, membrane stabilizers ($850-1,200/month),
MRIs ($1,800-1,900),[4] another round of physical therapy ($950-
1,250/week), electrodiagnostic testing on a yearly basis,
epidurography (injecting dye into the area of pain to image the
nerves), and possibly two different types of surgery: (1) disc
removal ($22,000-25,000) and (2) fusion and stabilization
($165,000-170,000).
Based on the testimony and [Ms. Jean-Baptiste’s] life expectancy
of 34 years, a jury returned a verdict against [Appellee] and
awarded [Ms. Jean-Baptiste] $600,000 in future economic
damages.
Trial Court Opinion (“TCO”), 11/14/18, at 1-3 (most internal citations omitted;
commas added to some numbers).
____________________________________________
4 MRI stands for magnetic resonance imaging.
-3-
J-A24008-19
As mentioned supra, upon granting Appellee’s post-trial motion, the trial
court set aside the jury’s $600,000 verdict in favor of Ms. Jean-Baptiste and
ordered that a new trial take place on all issues. The trial court set forth two
grounds for its decision: first, it explained that the jury’s verdict of $600,000
in future economic damages was against the weight of the evidence and so
grossly excessive as to shock its sense of justice; and, second, it stated that
the verdict slip incorrectly permitted the jury to consider the question of future
economic damages before determining whether Ms. Jean-Baptiste had
suffered a serious injury. See TCO at 6, 10-11. As a result of this ruling, Ms.
Jean-Baptiste submits a single issue for our review:
Whether the trial court abused its discretion and otherwise
committed an error of law when it improperly set aside [Ms. Jean-
Baptiste’s] verdict of $600,000?
Ms. Jean-Baptiste’s Brief at 9.5
Though Ms. Jean-Baptiste raises a single issue in her statement of
questions involved, she divides her argument into two sections in
contravention of Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (“The argument
shall be divided into as many parts as there are questions to be argued; and
shall have at the head of each part—in distinctive type or in type distinctively
displayed—the particular point treated therein, followed by such discussion
and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent.”); Donaldson v.
Davidson Bros., Inc., 144 A.3d 93, 99 n.9 (Pa. Super. 2016) (determining
____________________________________________
5We note that the Pennsylvania Association for Justice has filed a brief of
amicus curiae in support of Ms. Jean-Baptiste.
-4-
J-A24008-19
that the appellant failed to comply with Rule 2119(a) where the appellant’s
brief did not “present and develop eight arguments in support of the eight
questions raised”). Notwithstanding Ms. Jean-Baptiste’s noncompliance, our
review is not precluded.
In the first section of Ms. Jean-Baptiste’s brief, she challenges the trial
court’s determination that the jury’s verdict of $600,000 for future economic
damages was against the weight of the evidence and so excessive that it
shocked its sense of justice. For such claims, we apply the following standard
of review:
Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the [trial
court’s] exercise of discretion, not of the underlying
question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the
evidence. Because the trial judge has had the opportunity
to hear and see the evidence presented, an appellate court
will give the gravest consideration to the findings and
reasons advanced by the trial judge when reviewing a trial
court’s determination that the verdict is against the weight
of the evidence. One of the least assailable reasons for
granting or denying a new trial is the lower court’s
conviction that the verdict was or was not against the weight
of the evidence and that a new trial should be granted in the
interest of justice.
The factfinder is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence
and to determine the credibility of the witnesses. The trial court
may award a … new trial only when the jury’s verdict is so contrary
to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice. In determining
whether this standard has been met, appellate review is limited to
whether the trial judge’s discretion was properly exercised, and
relief will only be granted where the facts and inferences of record
disclose a palpable abuse of discretion. When a fact finder’s
verdict is so opposed to the demonstrative facts that looking at
the verdict, the mind stands baffled, the intellect searches in vain
for cause and effect, and reason rebels against the bizarre and
erratic conclusion, it can be said that the verdict is shocking.
-5-
J-A24008-19
Haan v. Wells, 103 A.3d 60, 70 (Pa. Super. 2014) (brackets in original;
internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Here, the trial court provided the following rationale for why it set aside
the jury’s verdict and ordered a new trial:
“It is well-settled that an item of damage claimed by a plaintiff
can properly be submitted to the jury only where the burden of
establishing damages by proper testimony has been met.”
Mendralla v. Weaver Corp., 703 A.2d 480, 485 (Pa. Super. …
1997); Cohen v. Albert Einstein Medical Center, 592 A.2d
720, 729 (Pa. 1991). “In the context of a claim for future medical
expenses, the movant must prove, by expert testimony, not only
that future medical expenses will be incurred, but also the
reasonable estimated cost of such services.” Id. (emphasis
added). “Because the estimated cost of future medical services is
not within the layperson’s general knowledge, the requirement of
such testimony eliminates the prospect that the jury’s award will
be speculative.” Id.; Cohen, 592 A.2d at 729.
In determining whether a jury’s award of damages is supported
by the evidence, the following factors are taken into account:
1. the severity of the injury[;]
2. whether the injury is demonstrated by objective physical
evidence or subjective evidence[;]
3. whether the injury is permanent[;]
4. the plaintiff’s ability to continue employment[;]
5. the disparity between the amount of out of pocket
expenses and the amount of the verdict; and
6. damages plaintiff requested in his complaint.
Gillingham v. Consol Energy, Inc., 51 A.3d 841, 861 (Pa.
[Super.] 2012).
Based upon testimony from [Ms. Jean-Baptiste’s] expert, Dr.
Yarus, which included estimated values for future medical care,
the jury was instructed on future medical expenses. See 7.30
(CIV) Future Medical Expenses, Pa. SSJI. This instruction may be
appropriately given where the jury could reasonably infer that the
-6-
J-A24008-19
plaintiff would require future medical treatment based on evidence
of past medical expenses and evidence of the permanent nature
of the disability. Pratt v. Stein, 444 A.2d 674, 697 (Pa. Super.
… 1982).
The jury’s verdict of $600,000 for future economic damages is
against the weight of the evidence and so grossly excessive as to
shock the [c]ourt’s sense of justice. This is especially true under
the particular circumstances of this case, where the jury found
that [Ms. Jean-Baptiste] did not suffer a serious impairment of a
body function. See Verdict [S]lip at [Q]uestion 3.
[Ms. Jean-Baptiste’s] own expert, Dr. Yarus, testified to the
severity of [Ms. Jean-Baptiste’s] injuries and whether the injury
was demonstrated by objective evidence. Dr. Yarus testified that
[Ms. Jean-Baptiste] suffered … a herniated disc at C5-C6. N.T.,
4/30/18[,] at 77. However, Dr. Yarus did not testify that [Ms.
Jean-Baptiste’s] injuries were permanent. Dr. Yarus further
testified that [Ms. Jean-Baptiste] suffered soft tissue injuries to
the neck; a C5-C6 bilateral radiculopathy; and chronic pain
syndrome. Id. at 76-77.
[Ms. Jean-Baptiste] testified that she missed just three days of
work as a CNA as a result of this accident. Id. at 61, 98.
According to [Ms. Jean-Baptiste], most of her neck and shoulder
pain occurred in the morning; she has never taken anything other
than ibuprofen for pain; her social activities were not affected by
her injuries; and … her treatment consisted of physical therapy
and two injections. Id. at 63, 97, 105[.]
The jury’s verdict is against the weight of the evidence and so
grossly excessive as to shock the [c]ourt’s sense of justice
because [Ms. Jean-Baptiste] did not suffer a serious injury and the
evidence did not warrant an award of $600,000.
TCO at 5-7.
In response, Ms. Jean-Baptiste argues that “credible evidence was
presented to the jury without objection of required future care for [Ms. Jean-
Baptiste]; the cost of the future care was estimated to be approximately
$700,000; [and] the jury returned a verdict of $600,000. The verdict is 100%
-7-
J-A24008-19
in line with the evidence presented and should not have been set aside.” Ms.
Jean-Baptiste’s Brief at 13. She advances, verbatim:
The critical evidence presented was that of the cost of future
medical care. As explained above, Dr. Yarus testified to the future
care that Ms. Jean-Baptiste grows older and her condition worsens
as a result of the trauma from the crash. Again, no objections
were lodged to the presentation of the need for future medical
care, nor was an objection lodged to the cost of the future care
being presented to the jury. RR-93.
Dr. Yarus testified to the estimated cost of the future treatment.
He explained that Ablation procedures can cost between $3,500
to $4,000, with surgical fees ranging from $2,500 to $3,000. RR-
91. Facet injections cost between $850 to $1,100 and further
diagnostic testing costs $1,800 per MRI. RR-91. Therapy was
determined to cost Ms. Jean-Baptiste $1,200 a week. RR-92. The
first surgical procedure recommended, the discectomy, costs
$22,000 to $25,000 and the fusion stabilization surgery costs
$165,000 to $170,000. RR-93. Dr. Yarus testified in accordance
with his report and estimated conservatively that Ms. Jean-
Baptiste will require treatment going forward that will potentially
cost as much as $695,000. RR-93.
The jury is certainly within its discretion to decide to award future
medical expenses without a finding a serious impairment. Despite
the seriousness of the injuries, the jury found that she did not
sustain a serious impairment of a body function. Perhaps, the jury
felt that her injuries are manageable by the future care she will
be able to pay for with the damages awarded. It is certainly
reasonable to assume that the jury relied on the testimony of Ms.
Jean-Baptiste when she explained that the therapy and injections
gave her relief and determined that with continued treatment a
serious impairment of a body function would not be present.
Ms. Jean-Baptiste’s Brief at 16-17 (emphasis in original).
No relief is due. Initially, Ms. Jean-Baptiste does not cite, nor does our
review of the transcript show, where Dr. Yarus testified that Ms. Jean-
Baptiste’s condition will worsen as she grows older as a result of the trauma
from the accident. Similarly, the transcript does not demonstrate that Dr.
-8-
J-A24008-19
Yarus testified that Ms. Jean-Baptiste will require treatment going forward
that will potentially cost as much as $695,000. Though Dr. Yarus outlined the
costs of various treatments, he did not specifically explain which treatments
Ms. Jean-Baptiste is likely to require in the future, and he failed to offer a clear
estimation of how frequently — and for how long — such treatments will likely
occur. For instance, Dr. Yarus stated that “[e]pidural and/or facet injections
are [$]850 to $1,100[,]” but he did not say how often Ms. Jean-Baptiste would
likely need to receive them. See N.T. at 91; see also Appellee’s Brief at 14
(listing other ways in which Dr. Yarus’s testimony was unclear; for example,
observing that “Dr. Yarus discussed the costs of two types of surgery … but
[he] failed to state which if any surgery were required or recommended for
[Ms. Jean-Baptiste’s] treatment”). Given that the evidence of future medical
expenses is so vague and undeveloped, the trial court did not palpably abuse
its discretion in finding that the jury’s $600,000 verdict shocked its
conscience. See Haan, supra.
Moreover, Ms. Jean-Baptiste’s care during the almost 3 years between
the accident and trial does not support such a large award for future medical
expenses. At trial, Ms. Jean-Baptiste stated that she feels basically the same
pain as she did at the time of the accident. N.T. at 49, 62. At the time of the
accident, Ms. Jean-Baptiste went to the hospital, where she was discharged
later that same day and told to take ibuprofen. Id. at 57. Since the accident,
Ms. Jean-Baptiste has treated her injury with physical therapy, ibuprofen, two
injections, and a few MRIs and EMGs. Id. at 42-43, 46-48, 61, 86, 97-98,
-9-
J-A24008-19
105-06.6 Dr. Yarus acknowledged that Ms. Jean-Baptiste has experienced
some improvement with her pain through ibuprofen and therapy, and he noted
that she has not been affected in her social activities, missed only three days
of work as a CNA because of the accident, and continues to work full-time.
Id. at 97-98. This evidence of her past medical care and her ability to continue
with her regular activities, albeit with some limitations like lifting heavy things,
does not suggest that her future medical expenses will amount to $600,000.
Based on the foregoing, we discern no palpable abuse of discretion by the trial
court in awarding a new trial to Appellee. See Haan, supra.7
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/24/20
____________________________________________
6 Though the parties do not state what ‘EMG’ signifies, our research shows
that it is an abbreviation for electromyogram.
7 Given our disposition, we need not address Ms. Jean-Baptiste’s issue
pertaining to the propriety of the verdict slip.
- 10 -