Com. v. Hushelpeck, C. ( 2020 )


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  • J-S73043-19
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :         PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    CHRISTOPHER ROBERT                         :
    HUSHELPECK,                                :
    Appellant                    :       No. 334 MDA 2019
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 16, 2019
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-38-CR-0001100-2018
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :         PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    CHRISTOPHER ROBERT HUSHELPECK              :
    :
    Appellant               :      No. 1022 MDA 2019
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 16, 2019
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-38-CR-0000903-2018
    BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., LAZARUS, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.:                          FILED FEBRUARY 26, 2020
    Christopher Robert Hushelpeck (“Hushelpeck”) appeals from the
    judgments of sentence entered following his guilty pleas to burglary, criminal
    trespass and theft by unlawful taking,1 at trial court docket number 903-2018
    ____________________________________________
    1   See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3502(a)(1)(ii), 3503(a)(1)(i), 3921(a).
    J-S73043-19
    (“No. 903”), and possession of controlled substances and possession of drug
    paraphernalia2 at trial court docket number 1100-2018 (“No. 1100”).          We
    affirm.
    On April 8, 2018, at about 7:30 a.m., Hushelpeck entered a residence
    located at 513 Jonestown Road, in Union Township. The home was owned by
    Hushelpeck’s father-in-law. Present inside the home were Hushelpeck’s wife
    and two nine-year-old daughters.           Two weeks prior, Hushelpeck had been
    thrown out of the home and was not permitted inside of the residence. Upon
    entering the home, Hushelpeck proceeded to remove $100 from two mason
    jars, which contained his daughters’ allowance.         Hushelpeck then left the
    residence.     Hushelpeck’s wife reported the incident to police.       Charges
    subsequently were filed against Hushelpeck related to the burglary.
    On May 18, 2018, Pennsylvania State Troopers served Hushelpeck with
    an arrest warrant at Hushelpeck’s place of employment. Because Hushelpeck
    was to be transported in a State Police vehicle, the troopers asked Hushelpeck
    whether he possessed any sharp objects on his person.                Hushelpeck
    responded in the affirmative, and removed two syringes from his pocket.
    Upon searching Hushelpeck, the troopers discovered three wax paper baggies,
    which, Hushelpeck indicated, contained heroin. Hushelpeck subsequently was
    ____________________________________________
    2   See 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16), (32).
    -2-
    J-S73043-19
    charged with possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug
    paraphernalia.
    In its Opinion, the trial court described what next transpired as follows:
    On December 17, 2018, [Hushelpeck] entered a plea of
    guilty [at No. 903] before the [the trial court]. His plea included
    both a written and a verbal colloquy during which [Hushelpeck]
    indicated that he understood his charges and that he was
    acknowledging that he was guilty of them. On December 4, 2018,
    [Hushelpeck had] entered a separate plea of guilty … [at No.
    1100]. Once again, [Hushelpeck] submitted a written plea form
    and answered questions posed by [the trial court] in an
    appropriate fashion.
    During the guilty plea proceedings, the parties were under
    the mistaken belief that the bottom of [Hushelpeck’s] standard
    sentencing range [for his burglary conviction, with his prior record
    score,] was twenty-one (21) months. Accordingly, the plea
    agreement that called for a sentence at the bottom of the standard
    range was communicated to [Hushelpeck] as requiring a twenty-
    one (21) month minimum sentence.
    Prior to sentencing, the District Attorney and [Hushelpeck’s]
    attorney realized that they had made a mistake regarding the
    sentencing ranges. That mistake was communicated to [the trial
    court] before [Hushelpeck’s] sentence was to be imposed….
    *      *      *
    During the subsequent Sentencing Hearing … [Hushelpeck’s]
    attorney stated[,] in [Hushelpeck’s] presence[,] the following:
    [Hushelpeck’s counsel]: [At No. 1100], as we discussed,
    there is an issue with the ranges. Originally, the plea was for
    21 months. However, because of a discrepancy with the
    ranges, it was actually 48 to 60 months. I did speak with my
    client prior to sentencing. At that time, he said he wanted to
    go ahead with the 48 months that is now being offered. He
    had some questions today in [c]ourt. Initially, I thought we
    were going to request a continuance to get more time to think
    about it. As I came up here for sentencing and spoke to him,
    -3-
    J-S73043-19
    he said he wanted to go ahead with the plea. So that is what
    we are doing.
    We just ask that [the court] accept the plea for the 48
    months, and we ask that you run the drug charge concurrent
    with that.
    Less than thirty (30) seconds later, [Hushelpeck] was offered the
    chance to speak.      He stated[,]     “I have nothing to say.”
    Thereafter, [the court] imposed the exact same four (4) to eight
    (8) year sentence that [Hushelpeck’s] counsel [had] asked [it] to
    impose.
    [Hushelpeck] appealed [the court’s] judgment[s] of
    sentence.[3] At this point, the record is clouded with confusion.
    Apparently, the Lebanon County Clerk of Courts sua sponte
    changed the docket number on one of [Hushelpeck’s] filings from
    [No. 1100] to [No. 903]. This created a cascade of events that
    eventually caused [the trial court to] pull and review both files.[4]
    In an effort to clear up confusion and preserve everyone’s ability
    to submit their substantive arguments, [the trial court] issued an
    Order on March 26, 2019. [The court] declared [Hushelpeck’s]
    [a]ppeals on both pending dockets to have been filed in a timely
    fashion. [The trial court] re-appointed the Public Defender with
    additional time to submit [s]tatements of [e]rrors [c]omplained of
    on [a]ppeal. Because the confusion surrounding [Hushelpeck’s]
    appeal efforts was caused[,] in part[,] by the mistake of the
    ____________________________________________
    3In its March 12, 2019 Order, the trial court indicated that the Lebanon County
    Clerk of Courts had misplaced Hushelpeck’s Notice of Appeal at No. 903.
    Further, the court observed that the Notice of Appeal filed at No. 1100 is also
    missing from the certified record. However, the trial court acknowledged the
    agreement of the Commonwealth and Hushelpeck’s counsel that the “[a]ppeal
    papers were[,] in fact[,] filed.” Trial Court Order, 3/12/19, at 2. Accordingly,
    we conclude that the requirements of Commonwealth v. Walker, 
    185 A.3d 969
     (Pa. 2018), have been met. See 
    id. at 977
     (holding that quashal is
    required where litigants fail to file separate notices of appeal from an order
    resolving issues on more than one docket number).
    4  In its March 12, 2019, Order, the trial court additionally stated that on
    February 22, 2019, Hushelpeck’s counsel filed a Motion to Withdraw his
    appearance at both docket numbers, representing that no appeals had been
    filed. The trial court initially had granted the Motion.
    -4-
    J-S73043-19
    Lebanon County Clerk of Courts, [the trial court asked] the
    Pennsylvania Superior Court to honor [the trial court’s] Order of
    March 26, 2019[,] and substantively address [Hushelpeck’s]
    current arguments….
    Trial Court Opinion, 5/1/19, at 1-5 (citations omitted, footnote added).
    Hushelpeck presents the following claims for our review:
    I. Should [Hushelpeck] be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea
    because it was not entered knowingly, intelligently, and
    voluntarily?
    II. Should [Hushelpeck’s] sentence be modified to a lesser period
    of incarceration because the sentence was excessive?
    Brief of Appellant at 4.
    Hushelpeck first claims that his guilty plea was not knowingly,
    intelligently and voluntarily entered. Id. at 10. Hushelpeck argues that his
    negotiated guilty plea at No. 1100 was for a 21-month sentence. Id. at 11.
    According to Hushelpeck, “due to different ranges in the presentence
    investigation report[,] Hushelpeck was sentenced to a forty-eight (48) month
    minimum sentence.” Id.
    In its Opinion, the trial court discussed the relevant law, and concluded
    that Hushelpeck’s plea was knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily tendered.
    See Trial Court Opinion, 5/1/19, at 5-10. We agree with the sound reasoning
    of the trial court, as set forth in its Opinion, and affirm on the basis of the trial
    court’s Opinion with regard to this claim. See id.
    In his second claim, Hushelpeck challenges the discretionary aspects of
    his sentence. See Brief for Appellant at 9. “A challenge to the discretionary
    -5-
    J-S73043-19
    aspects of sentencing is not automatically reviewable as a matter of
    right.” Commonwealth v. Grays, 
    167 A.3d 793
    , 815 (Pa. Super. 2017).
    An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence
    must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:
    [W]e conduct a four-part analysis to determine[] (1) whether
    appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902
    and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at
    sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see
    Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether appellant's brief has a fatal
    defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial
    question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under
    the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).
    Commonwealth v. Moury, 
    992 A.2d 162
    , 170 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation
    omitted; brackets in original).
    Our review discloses that the trial court sentenced Hushelpeck, at both
    docket numbers, on January 16, 2019. The record further reflects that at both
    docket numbers, Hushelpeck filed pro se Notices of Appeal on February 14,
    2019. Hushelpeck timely filed counseled Notices of Appeal on February 15,
    2019. Hushelpeck filed pro se Motions to Modify Sentence, at both docket
    numbers, on March 13, 2019. In his pro se Motions, Hushelpeck stated that
    his original plea agreement specified a minimum sentence, at No. 1100, of 21
    months, and that the agreement was “pulled” less than 24 hours before
    sentencing, at the request of the district attorney.     Pro Se Post-Sentence
    Motion, 3/13/19. Hushelpeck’s pro se Motion did not claim that the sentence
    was excessive. No counseled post-sentence motion was filed, and the trial
    court did not address this claim in its Opinion.
    -6-
    J-S73043-19
    Thus, it appears that Hushelpeck filed his pro se post-sentence Motion
    after filing his Notice of Appeal, and did not raise his challenge to the sentence
    as excessive in that Motion. On this basis, we conclude that Hushelpeck failed
    invoke this Court’s jurisdiction to review his challenge to the discretionary
    aspects of his sentence. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (stating that an issue cannot
    be raised for the first time on appeal); Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 
    931 A.2d 717
    , 719 (Pa. Super. 2007) (stating that “[a]n untimely post-sentence motion
    does not preserve issues for appeal.” (citation omitted)); Commonwealth v.
    Reid, 
    642 A.2d 453
     (Pa. 1994) (explaining that hybrid representation is
    improper).
    Further, “[w]here the plea agreement contains a negotiated sentence
    which is accepted and imposed by the sentencing court, there is no authority
    to permit a challenge to the discretionary aspects of that sentence.”
    Commonwealth v. Reichle, 
    589 A.2d 1140
    , 1141 (Pa. Super. 1991). For
    that reason as well, we cannot grant Hushelpeck relief on his claim.
    Judgments of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 2/26/2020
    -7-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 334 MDA 2019

Filed Date: 2/26/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/26/2020