In the Int. of: D.J.D., Appeal of: D.D. ( 2020 )

J. S06033/20
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
D.J.D., A MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: D.D., FATHER : No. 2648 EDA 2019
Appeal from the Decree Entered August 15, 2019,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Juvenile Division at No. CP-51-AP-0000195-2019
IN THE INTEREST OF: D.D., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: D.D., FATHER : No. 2649 EDA 2019
Appeal from the Order Entered August 15, 2019,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Juvenile Division at No. CP-51-DP-0000021-2018
IN THE INTEREST OF: : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
G.M.D., A MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: D.D., FATHER : No. 2650 EDA 2019
Appeal from the Decree Entered August 15, 2019,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Juvenile Division at No. CP-51-AP-0000196-2019
IN THE INTEREST OF: G.D., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: D.D., FATHER : No. 2651 EDA 2019
J. S06033/20
Appeal from the Order Entered August 15, 2019,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Juvenile Division at No. CP-51-DP-0000022-2018
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED FEBRUARY 28, 2020
In these consolidated appeals, D.D. (“Father”) appeals from the
August 15, 2019 decrees involuntarily terminating his parental rights to his
minor children, D.J.D., male child born in August 2009 (“Child 1”), and G.M.D.,
male child born in January 2012 (“Child 2”) (collectively, “Children”), under
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), and (b). Father also appeals from the orders
entered the same day that changed the Children’s permanency goal from
reunification to adoption pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351. We affirm.
At the outset, we note that Children’s natural mother voluntarily
terminated her parental rights to the Children on May 2, 2109. (Notes of
testimony, 8/15/19 at 5.) Although natural mother is not a party to this
appeal, the record reflects that the Philadelphia Department of Human
Services, Children and Youth Division (“DHS”) originally became involved with
this family on September 24, 2017, when the Children were living with natural
mother and her paramour. DHS’s involvement stemmed from allegations of
natural mother neglecting the Children, selling drugs from the home, and
illegally using drugs. Prior to filing a dependency petition on January 2, 2018,
DHS learned that Father was incarcerated.
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With respect to Father, the trial court set forth the following:
On January 17, 2018, the trial court adjudicated
Children based on present inability to provide proper
parental care and control. Children were committed
to the custody of DHS. DHS was ordered to make
outreach to Father. Father was not present for this
hearing.[Footnote 4] On February 28, 2018,
Community Umbrella Agency (“CUA”) held an initial
Single Case Plan (“SCP”) meeting. Father was
incarcerated at the time of the SCP meeting.
[Footnote 4] Between January 17, 2018,
and April 9, 2018, the trial judge assigned
to this matter was the Honorable Lyris
Younge. From June 29, 2018 to the
present, this matter is assigned to the
Honorable Joseph Fernandes.
A permanency review hearing was held for Children
on June 29, 2018.[Footnote 5] Father was present for
this hearing. The trial court determined that Father
was moderately compliant with the permanency plan
and that Father was on parole. The trial court ordered
Children to remain as committed. The trial court
referred Father to the Clinical Evaluation Unit (“CEU”)
for a forthwith drug screen, monitoring, and three
random drug screens. Father was also ordered to sign
releases and once Father obtained housing, CUA was
to complete a home assessment and clearances.
Father’s visits were modified to include unsupervised
visits with Children on Saturdays. Maternal Aunt was
to schedule the time of pick up and return. CUA was
ordered to supervise one of Children’s visits with
Father once per month.
[Footnote 5] A permanency review
hearing was originally scheduled for
April 9, 2019. The Juvenile Court Hearing
Officer granted a continuance due to the
appointment of new counsel for Father.
On August 17, 2018, CUA revised the SCP. Father did
not attend this meeting. Children’s alternate/
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concurrent goal was identified as adoption. Father’s
parental objectives were to comply with court orders;
provide verification of employment; comply with CEU
recommendations and complete three random drug
screens prior to the next court date; and attend visits
with Children.
A permanency review hearing was held for Children
on September 24, 2018. The trial court determined
that Father was substantially compliant with the
permanency plan. Father was re-referred to the CEU
for a forthwith drug screen and three random drug
screens. Father was ordered to provide verification of
his employment to CUA and to comply with the
Achieving Reunification Center (“ARC”) referral. The
trial court ordered Father to have liberal unsupervised
visits with Children, as arranged by the parties, with
one visit per month supervised by CUA. On
September 27, 2018, Father tested positive for
amphetamines at the CEU.
A permanency review hearing was held for Children
on December 17, 2018. Father was not present for
this hearing. The trial court determined that Father
was incarcerated at [State Correctional Institute]
Phoenix. CUA was ordered to make outreach to
Father. The trial court ordered for Children to remain
as placed.
A permanency review hearing was held for Children
on February 13, 2019. Father was not present for this
hearing due to Father’s incarceration. The trial court
ordered for Children to remain as placed with Maternal
Aunt. The trial court referred Father to the CEU for an
assessment, full drug and alcohol screen, dual
diagnosis, and three random drug screens, once he
availed himself. The trial court permitted Father to
attend supervised visitation as arranged, when
appropriate.
Child[ren] ha[ve] been adjudicated dependent since
January 17, 2018. Father has been incarcerated on
and off throughout the life of the case. DHS filed
petitions to involuntarily terminate Father’s parental
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rights and change Children’s permanency goal from
reunification to adoption on March 19, 2019.
A permanency review hearing was held for Child[ren]
on May 9, 2019. Father was present for this hearing.
Father was referred to the CEU for a dual diagnosis
assessment, a forthwith drug screen, and three
random drug screens. Father was ordered to attend
weekly supervised visits with Children. The visits
were to be held at Children’s discretion. The trial court
continued the termination and goal change trial for
Children due to Mother’s decision to sign voluntary
relinquishments of her parental rights.
On August 15, 2019, the trial court held the
termination and goal change trial for Children. Father
was present for this hearing. Lawrence J. O’Connor,
Jr., Esq., Children’s special legal counsel
(“Legal Counsel”) was also present and made
representations regarding Children’s wishes. The trial
court found clear and convincing evidence to change
Children’s permanency goal from reunification to
adoption and to involuntarily terminate Father’s
parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(a)(1), (2),
and (b).
Trial court opinion, 10/29/19 at 3-5 (citation to notes of testimony omitted).
The record reflects that Father filed timely notices of appeal from the
termination decrees and the goal-change orders, together with concise
statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i). Thereafter, the trial court filed one
Rule 1925(a)(2)(ii) opinion in each termination and dependency docket for
each of the Children.
Father raises the following issues for our review:
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1. Did the [trial] court err in finding that grounds
for termination of parental rights had been
proven by “clear and convincing evidence”?
2. Did the [trial court] err in finding that [DHS] had
met its burden in proving grounds under
23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1) and (2)?
3. Did the [trial court] err in finding that DHS had
met its burden to prove that termination would
be in the [C]hildren’s best interests, under
§ 2511(b)?
4. Did the [trial court] err when it found that DHS
by clear and convincing evidence had met its
burden to change Children’s goal to adoption?
Father’s brief at 4.
In matters involving involuntary termination of parental rights, our
standard of review is as follows:
The standard of review in termination of parental
rights cases requires appellate courts “to accept the
findings of fact and credibility determinations of the
trial court if they are supported by the record.” In re
Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa. 2012). “If
the factual findings are supported, appellate courts
review to determine if the trial court made an error of
law or abused its discretion.” Id. “[A] decision may
be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon
demonstration of manifest unreasonableness,
partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” Id. The trial
court’s decision, however, should not be reversed
merely because the record would support a different
result. Id. at 827. We have previously emphasized
our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
observations of the parties spanning multiple
hearings. See In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d [1179, 1190 (Pa.
2010)].
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In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). “The trial court is free to believe
all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is likewise free to make all
credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.” In re M.G.,
855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation omitted). “[I]f competent
evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will affirm even if the record
could also support the opposite result.” In re Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d
387, 394 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation omitted).
The termination of parental rights is guided by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated analysis
of the grounds for termination followed by the needs and welfare of the child.
Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511,
the court must engage in a bifurcated process prior to
terminating parental rights. Initially, the focus is on
the conduct of the parent. The party seeking
termination must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the
statutory grounds for termination delineated in
Section 2511(a). Only if the court determines that the
parent’s conduct warrants termination of his or her
parental rights does the court engage in the second
part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b):
determination of the needs and welfare of the child
under the standard of best interests of the child. One
major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond
between parent and child, with close attention paid to
the effect on the child of permanently severing any
such bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We have
defined clear and convincing evidence as that which is so “clear, direct,
weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear
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conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.”
In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc), quoting
Matter of Adoption of Charles E.D.M. II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998).
Here, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant to
Sections 2511(a)(1), (2), and (b). We have long held that, in order to affirm
a termination of parental rights, we need only agree with the trial court as to
any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b).
In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc). Here, we
analyze the trial court’s termination decrees pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(2)
and (b), which provide as follows:
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard
to a child may be terminated after a petition
filed on any of the following grounds:
....
(2) The repeated and continued
incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal
of the parent has caused the child
to be without essential parental
care, control or subsistence
necessary for his physical or mental
well-being and the conditions and
causes of the incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal cannot or will not
be remedied by the parent.
(b) Other considerations.--The court in
terminating the rights of a parent shall give
primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child. The rights of a parent shall not be
terminated solely on the basis of environmental
factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
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income, clothing and medical care if found to be
beyond the control of the parent. With respect
to any petition filed pursuant to subsection
(a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider
any efforts by the parent to remedy the
conditions described therein which are first
initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of
the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).
We first address whether the trial court abused its discretion by
terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2).
In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), the following three
elements must be met: (1) repeated and continued
incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) such
incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the
child to be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence necessary for his physical or mental
well-being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
remedied.
In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation
omitted). “The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that cannot
be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those
grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental
duties.” In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1216 (Pa.Super. 2015),
quoting In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa.Super. 2002). “Parents are
required to make diligent efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption
of full parental responsibilities. . . . [A] parent’s vow to cooperate, after a long
period of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity or availability of services,
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may properly be rejected as untimely or disingenuous.” In re A.L.D., 797
A.2d at 340 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
With respect to incarcerated parents, in In re Adoption of S.P., our
supreme court held as follows:
[W]e now definitively hold that incarceration, while
not a litmus test for termination, can be determinative
of the question of whether a parent is incapable of
providing “essential parental care, control or
subsistence” and the length of the remaining
confinement can be considered as highly relevant to
whether “the conditions and causes of the incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
remedied by the parent,” sufficient to provide grounds
for termination pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2511(a)(2). See e.g. Adoption of J.J., 511 Pa.
590, 515 A.2d 883, 891 (Pa. 1986) (“[A] parent who
is incapable of performing parental duties is just as
parentally unfit as one who refuses to perform the
duties.”); [In re:] E.A.P., [944 A.2d 79, 85
(Pa.Super. 2008)] (holding termination under
§ 2511(a)(2) supported by mother’s repeated
incarcerations and failure to be present for child,
which caused child to be without essential care and
subsistence for most of her life and which cannot be
remedied despite mother’s compliance with various
prison programs). If a court finds grounds for
termination under subsection (a)(2), a court must
determine whether termination is in the best interests
of the child, considering the developmental, physical,
and emotional needs and welfare of the child pursuant
to § 2511(b). In this regard, trial courts must
carefully review the individual circumstances for every
child to determine, inter alia, how a parent’s
incarceration will factor into an assessment of the
child’s best interest.
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 830-831.
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Here, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights under
Section 2511(a)(2) and thoroughly explained its reasoning for doing so as
follows:
Throughout the time that Children have been in the
custody of DHS, Father’s SCP objectives were to
complete a dual diagnosis assessment and a drug and
alcohol and mental health program, housing, provide
proof of employment, attend the ARC for parenting,
employment, and anger management, and visitation.
Father has previously participated in [an] SCP
meeting via telephone with CUA so he is aware of his
objectives. Father was incarcerated from the time
that the case was opened in December 2017 to April
2018. Father was then re-incarcerated between
November 2018 and March 2019. Father failed to
complete a dual diagnosis program or complete a dual
diagnosis assessment. When CUA spoke with Father
regarding his compliance with his dual diagnosis
objective, Father indicated that he was “doing
everything he needs to do.” Father never provided
CUA with any documentation regarding his dual
diagnosis treatment or random drug screens.
Although Father claims that he has completed multiple
drug screens, there is no documentation that indicates
that Father completed any drug screens since
September 2018. On September 27, 2018, Father
tested positive for amphetamines. Father also claims
that he completed two drug programs while he was
incarcerated and that he is currently active in an
Alcoholics Anonymous (“AA”) program, although
Father did not provide any documentation confirming
his completion or participation in any program. Father
does not have appropriate housing for reunification
with Children. Father previously indicated to the CUA
worker that the home is in the process of being
renovated. Father confirmed that the home is
currently inappropriate for reunification.[1] Father
1 The record reflects that at the time of the termination and goal-change
hearing, Father was living with his mother. (Notes of testimony, 8/15/19 at
45-46.)
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never provided documentation of his employment to
CUA. Father has not completed parenting,
employment, or housing at the ARC. Father was
enrolled in parenting at the ARC, but was discharged
on June 3, 2019, for non-participation after only
attending one session. Father enrolled in parenting
on August 8, 2019, and anger management on
August 7, 2019, one week before the termination and
goal change trial. Although Father indicated that he
was enrolled in employment at the ARC, his first class
did not begin until after the termination and goal
change trial. Father claims that he completed a
parenting program while he was incarcerated, but he
did not complete a housing or anger management
program. Father also indicated that the day after his
release from prison in April 2019, Father was injured
and was hospitalized in the intensive care unit
(“ICU”). Father claimed that his injury delayed his
ability to secure employment and housing, as well as
cause issues in creating a schedule with the ARC.
Father confirmed that he is not currently employed
due to his ongoing injury. Father’s visitation schedule
is weekly, supervised at the agency. Father has
struggled to maintain regular visits throughout the life
of the case, especially after he was re-incarcerated in
November 2018. Before Father was re-incarcerated,
Father had graduated from supervised to
unsupervised visitation, but Father’s visits have since
reverted back to supervised visitation. Father was
consistent when visits were originally supervised in
early 2018. When Father graduated to unsupervised
visitation, Father became inconsistent. While Father
was incarcerated between November 2018 and April
2019, Father’s contact with Children was limited to
telephone communication. Prior to the termination
and goal change trial, Father missed the last three
scheduled visits. CUA does not believe it would be
appropriate to graduate beyond supervised visits at
this time due to Children’s reluctance to attend the
visits with Father. Child 1 is not interested in
attending visits with Father, and Child 2 is only
sometimes interested in attending. CUA has indicated
that although visits go well between Father and
Child 2, Father will try to get information from Child 2
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regarding his current placement. Father has indicated
that those concerns from CUA are untrue. Father has
indicated that Child 1 has never attended a visit with
Father. Father has only been minimally compliant
with his SCP objectives and non-compliant in terms of
his progress of alleviating the initial dependency
concerns. Children need permanency and Father has
demonstrated that he is unwilling to provide Children
with essential parental care, control, or subsistence
necessary for their physical and mental well-being.
Father has refused to remedy the conditions and
causes of Father’s incapacity. Father is aware of his
objectives. Father had ample opportunity to put
himself in a position to parent. Father has been
incarcerated on and off throughout the life of the case,
which has created a strain on his relationship with
Children. Father’s repeated and continued incapacity
has not been mitigated.
Trial court opinion, 10/29/19 at 9-11 (citations to notes of testimony omitted).
We have thoroughly reviewed the record in this case and conclude that
it supports the trial court’s factual findings and that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in terminating Father’s parental rights under
Section 2511(a)(2). The record demonstrates that the conditions that existed
upon removal establish repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, or
refusal of Father that caused the Children to be without essential parental
care, control, or subsistence necessary for their physical or mental well-being.
The record also supports the trial court’s conclusion that Father continued to
lack capacity to parent the Children.
We now turn to whether termination was proper under Section 2511(b).
As to that section, our supreme court has stated as follows:
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[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a)
are met, a court “shall give primary consideration to
the developmental, physical and emotional needs and
welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(b). The
emotional needs and welfare of the child have been
properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such as
love, comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 53
A.3d 781, 791 (Pa.Super. 2012). In In re E.M., 620
A.2d [481, 485 (Pa. 1993)], this Court held that the
determination of the child’s “needs and welfare”
requires consideration of the emotional bonds
between the parent and child. The “utmost attention”
should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of
permanently severing the parental bond. In re K.M.,
53 A.3d at 791. However, as discussed below,
evaluation of a child’s bonds is not always an easy
task.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. “In cases where there is no evidence of any
bond between the parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond
exists. The extent of any bond analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on
the circumstances of the particular case.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753,
762-763 (Pa.Super. 2008) (citation omitted).
When evaluating a parental bond, “the court is not required to use
expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as
well. Additionally, Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding
evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121 (internal citations omitted).
Moreover,
While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child
is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b)
best-interest analysis, it is nonetheless only one of
many factors to be considered by the court when
determining what is in the best interest of the child.
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[I]n addition to a bond examination, the
trial court can equally emphasize the
safety needs of the child, and should also
consider the intangibles, such as the love,
comfort, security, and stability the child
might have with the foster parent. . . .
In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d at 1219, quoting In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d
95, 103 (Pa.Super. 2011) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
Our supreme court has stated that, “[c]ommon sense dictates that
courts considering termination must also consider whether the children are in
a pre-adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster parents.”
T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268. The court directed that, in weighing the bond
considerations pursuant to Section 2511(b), “courts must keep the ticking
clock of childhood ever in mind.” Id. at 269. The T.S.M. court observed,
“[c]hildren are young for a scant number of years, and we have an obligation
to see to their healthy development quickly. When courts fail . . . the result,
all too often, is catastrophically maladjusted children.” Id.
Here, the trial court thoroughly explained its reasoning for terminating
Father’s parental rights under Section 2511(b) as follows:
Although Child 2 has attended occasional visits with
Father, Child 2 and Father do not have a parent-child
relationship. Children would not suffer any irreparable
harm if Father’s parental rights were terminated and
it is in Children’s best interest to be adopted. Father
has not participated in Children’s medical care or
school programs throughout the life of the case.
Children are currently placed together in a
pre-adoptive home with Maternal Aunt. Children look
to Maternal Aunt for their day-to-day needs. In
Maternal Aunt’s home, Children do not have any issue
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with academics or attendance at their elementary
school. [The Children’s guardian ad litem (“GAL”)]
met with Children in Maternal Aunt’s home on May 8,
2019.[2] Child 1, a nine-year-old boy at the time of
the termination and goal change trial, indicated to
[the GAL] that he did not want any contact with
Father. Child 2, a seven-year-old boy, indicated to
[the GAL] that he did attend some visits with Father.
When [the GAL] asked Child 2 if he wanted to
continue visits with Father, Child 2 avoided the
question. Child 2 appeared nervous when asked
about his preferences. Both Children indicated that
they wanted to be adopted by Maternal Aunt and
remain in their “forever home.” [The GAL]
determined that Children were capable of
understanding the concept of adoption. The record
establishes by clear and convincing evidence that
termination would not sever an existing and beneficial
relationship with Father. Children share a parental
bond with Maternal Aunt, not Father. Child 1 has no
bond with Father and has no desire to continue any
contact with Father. Any bond or relationship of
Father with Child 2 is attenuated since Father’s
visitation has been inconsistent throughout the life of
the case. The DHS witness was credible.
Trial court opinion, 10/29/19 at 13.
Our thorough review of the record supports the trial court’s
determination that termination was proper under Section 2511(b).
2 In its Rule 1925(a)(2)(ii) opinion, the trial court erroneously states that the
Children’s legal counsel met with the Children at maternal aunt’s home on
May 8, 2019. Our review of the record, however, demonstrates that it was
the Children’s GAL who visited them at maternal aunt’s home on May 8, 2019.
(Notes of testimony, 8/15/19 at 70.) The record further reflects that the GAL
determined that no conflict existed between the Children’s legal and best
interests. (Id. at 70-72.) Even though no conflict existed, the Children were
nevertheless represented by legal counsel who expressed her agreement that
it is in the Children’s best interest to involuntarily terminate Father’s parental
rights. (Id. at 72-73.)
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Father also challenges the orders that changed the Children’s goals from
reunification to adoption. In dependency cases, our standard of review is as
follows:
[W]e must accept the facts as found by the trial court
unless they are not supported by the record. Although
bound by the facts, we are not bound by the trial
court’s inferences, deductions, and conclusions
therefrom; we must exercise our independent
judgment in reviewing the court’s determination as
opposed to the findings of fact, and must order
whatever right and justice dictate. We review for
abuse of discretion. Our scope of review, accordingly,
is of the broadest possible nature. It is this Court’s
responsibility to ensure that the record represents a
comprehensive inquiry and that the hearing judge has
applied the appropriate legal principles to that record.
Nevertheless, we accord great weight to the court’s
fact-finding function because the court is in the best
position to observe and rule on the credibility of the
parties and witnesses.
In re D.P., 972 A.2d 1221, 1225 (Pa.Super. 2009), quoting In re C.M., 882
A.2d 507, 513 (Pa.Super. 2005). In considering a goal change, “the best
interests of the child, and not the interests of the parent, must guide the trial
court, and the parent’s rights are secondary.” Id. at 1227 (citation omitted).
The trial court thoroughly explained its reasoning for entering the
goal-change orders by first reiterating its findings with respect to its
termination of Father’s parental rights under Section 2511(a)(2) and adding
that
Child 1 has no relationship with Father. Father has
indicated that Child 1 is angry with Father because
Child 1 believes that Father broke his promise of
staying in contact every day, due to his injury and
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J. S06033/20
re-incarceration. Although Child 2 has attended
occasional visits with Father, Child 2 and Father do not
have a parent-child relationship. It is in Children’s
best interest to be adopted. Father has not
participated in Children’s medical care or school
programs throughout the life of the case. Children are
currently placed together in a pre-adoptive home with
Maternal Aunt. Children look to Maternal Aunt for
their day-to-day needs. In Maternal Aunt’s home,
Children do not have any issue with academics or
attendance at their elementary school. The DHS
witness was credible. The record established by clear
and convincing evidence that the court’s change of
Children’s permanency goal from reunification to
adoption was proper. Children need permanency,
which Father is unable to provide. Consequently, it is
in Children’s best interest to remain with Maternal
Aunt in her home and to be freed for adoption.
Trial court opinion, 10/29/19 at 15-16.
After thoroughly reviewing the record, we conclude that it supports the
trial court’s factual findings and that the trial court applied the appropriate
legal principles to the record when it entered the goal-change orders.
Decrees affirmed. Orders affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/28/20
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