Com. v. Jacob, J. ( 2020 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JOHN JACOB :
:
Appellant : No. 432 EDA 2019
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 19, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0204512-1998
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., STRASSBURGER, J., and COLINS, J. 
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED FEBRUARY 28, 2020
John Jacob appeals the judgment of sentence imposed after he was
resentenced pursuant to Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016),
and Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). As we find no basis to conclude
that Jacob’s new sentence is either illegal or unconstitutional, we affirm.
Jacob pleaded guilty to first-degree murder and related charges
stemming from an incident that occurred in 1997 when he was seventeen
years old. In 1999, Jacob was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment without
the possibility of parole.
After the United States Supreme Court decided Miller and then
Montgomery, Jacob filed a Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) petition
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 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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seeking a new sentence. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. Miller established
that “mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time
of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and
unusual punishments.’” 567 U.S. at 465. Correspondingly, Montgomery held
that “Miller announced a substantive rule that is retroactive in cases on
collateral review.” 136 S.Ct. at 732. Pursuant to these precedents, the PCRA
court granted Jacob post-conviction relief, vacated his original sentence, and
imposed a new sentence of thirty years to life in prison.
After the PCRA court crafted his new sentence, Jacob filed a timely post-
sentence motion, which was denied by operation of law. Jacob filed a timely
notice of appeal, and both Jacob and the PCRA court have complied with the
dictates of Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Jacob raises two issues for our review:
1) Should Jacob have been resentenced under the offense of third-
degree murder because the only legislatively authorized
punishment for first-degree murder committed by a juvenile was
stricken as unconstitutional pursuant to Miller, and the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court continually violates due process by
binding courts to mandatory minimums that only apply to post-
Miller offenders?
2) Is sentencing juveniles convicted of first-degree murder to a
maximum sentence of life imprisonment unconstitutional?
See Appellant’s Brief, at 3.
The gravamen of Jacob’s first argument is that, pursuant to the plain
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language of 18 Pa.C.S.A. §1102.1(a)1, “no valid punishment for first-degree
murder exists for pre-Miller juvenile offenders[.]” Id., at 8. Accordingly, he
believes his sentence is illegal as he “cannot be sentenced for [a first-degree
murder] offense, but only for a lesser included offense for which he may have
been convicted under his guilty plea and for which a lawful penalty is available
(i.e., third-degree murder).” Id.
Our Supreme Court has unequivocally rejected Jacob’s statutory
construction and interpretation argument. See Commonwealth v. Batts,
163 A.3d 410, 457 (Pa. 2017) (“Batts II”) (holding that there is “no support
for the proposition that juveniles convicted of first-degree murder pre-Miller
should be sentenced as though they were convicted of third-degree murder”);
see also Appellant’s Brief, at 8 n.2 (recognizing that his argument “was
rejected by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court”). Instead, Batts II clearly
permits the construction of a legal sentence for those convicted of first-degree
murder prior to the enactment of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102.1 and further directs
courts to use that section as a guideline at resentencing. See
Commonwealth v. Melvin, 172 A.3d 14, 20-21 (Pa. Super. 2017). As we
are bound by our Supreme Court’s decision in Batts II, see Commonwealth
v. Shaffer, 734 A.2d 840, 844 n.6 (Pa. 1999), Jacob’s contention necessarily
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1This sentencing subsection, enacted post-Miller, only affects those
“convicted after June 24, 2012[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102.1(a).
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fails.
However, Jacob, in the same section of his brief, additionally suggests
that the holding of Batts II2 expands the purview of section 1102.1(a) and
violates an individual’s right to due process because it impacts his “right to a
fair warning, notice, and liberty.” Appellant’s Brief, at 9. Similarly, Jacob avers
that Batts II effectively establishes the sentencing range for first-degree
murder committed by a juvenile, which is a function that belongs exclusively
to the legislature. See id., at 10.
While Jacob frames Batts II as the establishment of a sentencing range
for juveniles convicted of first-degree murder pre-Miller, the Court merely
declared that 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102.1(a) should act as a guidepost at
resentencing. See 163 A.3d at 480. In doing so, it sought to adhere to the
“policy determination made by the General Assembly as to the minimum
sentence a juvenile convicted of first-degree murder must receive.” Id., at
481; see also 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1901 (identifying that statutes should be
observed in a manner consistent “with the manifest intent of the General
Assembly”).
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2Batts II instructs the sentencing court to “be guided by section 1102.1(a) in
determining the minimum term of imprisonment,” 163 A.3d at 480-81, when
resentencing those convicted prior to June 24, 2012. Further, the Supreme
Court clarified that “guidance from the statute is not intended to intrude upon
a sentencing court’s discretion to determine an appropriate, individual
sentence for a given offender, but instead to advance the long-recognized
goals of uniformity and certainty in sentencing decisions.” Id., at 481.
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Here, while section 1102.1(a) necessitates a minimum sentence of
thirty-five years, see 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102.1(a), Jacob notably received a
minimum sentence of thirty years. Although Jacob is correct that section
1102.1(a) exclusively applies to juveniles convicted after June 24, 2012, see
Appellant’s Brief, at 9, the Court in Batts II interpreted the General
Assembly’s intent as desiring a similar application of the law to those convicted
prior to that date. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1922(1) (identifying the presumption
that “the Generally Assembly does not intend a result that is absurd”).
Therefore, the Supreme Court did not, as Jacob avers, set up a rigid and quasi-
statutory sentencing range at the expense of the General Assembly nor did it
create an absurd result by treating those juveniles convicted prior to June 24,
2012, differently from those juveniles convicted after that date. Instead,
Batts II provided sentencing courts with a guideline that roughly
approximates what the Court ascertained the General Assembly’s intent to be,
which it was completely within its power to do. Accordingly, Jacob’s argument
fails.
Jacob’s second issue asks us “whether it is unconstitutional to mandate
a maximum sentence of life imprisonment on juveniles convicted of murder.”
Appellant’s Brief, at 12. Jacob contends that Miller obligates sentencing courts
to fashion sentences that “appropriately reflect[] the individual circumstances
of each juvenile and the offense.” Id., at 14. Conversely, he argues that by
requiring the imposition of a mandatory maximum sentence of life
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imprisonment, just as has happened here, our courts are continually operating
in violation of Miller.
Our Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Batts (“Batts I”) held that
a juvenile convicted of first-degree murder prior to Miller would be subject to
“a mandatory maximum sentence of life imprisonment as required by
[s]ection 1102(a), accompanied by a minimum sentence determined by the
common pleas court upon resentencing.” 66 A.3d 286, 297 (Pa. 2013). The
Court further identified that this sentencing scheme is “in accord with the
dictates of the Eighth Amendment as set forth in Miller, as well as the
Pennsylvania Legislature’s intent as reflected in the relevant statutory
provisions.” Id. While Jacob frames this specific component of Batts I as
having not been “presented to or addressed by the Court in Batts II,”
Appellant’s Brief, at 13, there is nothing to suggest, in Batts II or its progeny,
that this pronouncement does not remain the law to this day.
As such, we are bound by our Supreme Court’s mandate in Batts I when
it concluded that a mandatory maximum sentence of life imprisonment for
juveniles convicted of first-degree murder is constitutionally permissible. See
Commonwealth v. Ligon, 206 A.3d 1196, 1200-01 (Pa. Super. 2019)
(maintaining that a maximum term of life imprisonment for pre-Miller
juveniles is statutorily required under Batts I and Batts II and that reliance
on Songster v. Beard, 201 F.Supp.3d 639 (E.D. Pa. 2016), as a federal case
with no precedential value in Pennsylvania’s state courts, is unavailing).
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Accordingly, Batts I requires courts to sentence pre-Miller juveniles to a
mandatory term of life imprisonment, and it was not error for the sentencing
court in this instance to adhere to that dictate.
As both of Jacob’s issues invoke subjects explicitly governed by the
decisional case law of our Supreme Court, we are constrained to conclude that
there was nothing illegal or unconstitutional about Jacob’s new sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/28/20
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