Com. v. Hakes, C. ( 2020 )


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  • J-S05033-20
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :         PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    CHARLES LEONARD HAKES,                     :
    :
    Appellant               :      No. 1575 MDA 2019
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 29, 2019
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Bradford County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-08-CR-0000848-2018
    BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.:                              FILED APRIL 21, 2020
    Charles Leonard Hakes (“Hakes”) appeals from the judgment of
    sentence imposed following his conviction of corruption of minors, graded as
    a felony of the third degree (“COM – Felony”).1 We reverse the conviction,
    vacate the judgment of sentence, and discharge Hakes.
    Hakes was arrested and charged with multiple counts of involuntary
    deviate sexual intercourse with a child (“IDSI”), aggravated indecent assault
    of a child,2 and COM – Felony, following allegations of sexual abuse made by
    his granddaughter.
    On April 2, 2019, a jury found Hakes guilty of one count of COM –
    Felony, and not guilty of all counts of IDSI and aggravated indecent assault
    ____________________________________________
    1   See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(a)(1)(ii).
    2   See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3123(b), 3125(b).
    J-S05033-20
    of a child. The trial court deferred sentencing and ordered the preparation of
    a pre-sentence investigation report. The trial court subsequently sentenced
    Hakes to a term of 11½ to 23 months in prison, followed by 37 months of
    probation.3 The trial court also ordered Hakes to pay a $500 fine.
    Hakes filed a timely Notice of Appeal and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P.
    1925(b) Concise Statement of errors complained of on appeal.
    Hakes now presents the following questions for our review:
    I. Whether the jury’s verdict on the charge of [COM – Felony] was
    supported by sufficient evidence since a material element of the
    offense was the commission of a Chapter [314] sex crime offense
    that [Hakes] was acquitted of[?]
    II. [Whether] the court erred in sentencing [Hakes] on a [COM –
    Felony] charge[?]
    Brief for Appellant at VII (some capitalization omitted; footnote added).
    We   will   address    Hakes’s    claims   together.   First,   Hakes   cites
    Commonwealth v. Baker-Myers, 
    210 A.3d 1093
     (Pa. Super. 2019) (en
    ____________________________________________
    3The original Sentencing Order addressed only the count of COM – Felony for
    which Hakes was convicted. On September 26, 2019, the trial court entered
    an Order clarifying that, upon agreement by the parties, the remaining four
    counts of COM – Felony were dismissed prior to the start of trial.
    4   See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3121-3131.
    -2-
    J-S05033-20
    banc), appeal granted, 
    221 A.3d 182
     (Pa. 2019),5 and avers that the
    evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of COM – Felony, because
    the jury found him not guilty of each of the predicate Chapter 31 sexual
    offenses for which he was charged. Id. at 9, 13. Hakes also points out that
    he was never charged with corruption of minors as a misdemeanor, nor was
    the jury instructed that it is a lesser-included offense of COM – Felony. Id. at
    9. In his second claim, Hakes argues that the trial court improperly imposed
    a sentence for COM – Felony, where the conviction was not supported by
    sufficient evidence.6 Id. at 13-14.
    We observe the following standard of review:
    The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
    is whether[,] viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light
    most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence
    to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond
    a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh
    the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In
    addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by
    the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
    innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be
    resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and
    inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be
    drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
    ____________________________________________
    5 This Court issued the Baker-Myers decision on May 21, 2019, after Hayes
    was convicted, but prior to the scheduled sentencing hearing. Accordingly,
    the trial court rescheduled the sentencing hearing, and permitted both parties
    to file briefs relevant to the issue of whether the Baker-Myers decision would
    affect Hakes’s sentencing.
    6 Hakes includes in his appellate brief a separate Statement of reasons for
    allowance of appeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). See Brief for Appellant
    at 8. However, Hakes’s claim does not challenge the discretionary aspects of
    his sentence.
    -3-
    J-S05033-20
    may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime
    beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
    evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record
    must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be
    considered. Finally, the finder of fact, while passing upon the
    credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced[,]
    is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.
    Commonwealth v. Talbert, 
    129 A.3d 536
    , 542-43 (Pa. Super. 2015)
    (citation omitted).
    The Crimes Code defines the offense of COM – Felony, in relevant part,
    as follows:
    Whoever, being of the age of 18 years and upwards, by any course
    of conduct in violation of Chapter 31 (relating to sexual offenses)
    corrupts or tends to corrupt the morals of any minor less than 18
    years of age, or who aids, abets, entices or encourages any such
    minor in the commission of an offense under Chapter 31 commits
    a felony of the third degree.
    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(a)(1)(ii). “In other words, the jury must find, inter alia,
    that a defendant acted ‘in violation of Chapter 31 (relating to sexual
    offenses).’”   Baker-Myers, 210 A.3d at 1095 (citing 18 Pa.C.S.A.
    § 6301(a)(1)(ii)).
    This Court has recently addressed whether a conviction of COM – Felony
    could be sustained where the jury had acquitted the defendant of the Chapter
    31 sexual offenses:
    While we have not identified any authority directly on this
    issue, a review of an analogous case, Commonwealth v.
    Magliocco, 
    584 Pa. 244
    , 
    883 A.2d 479
     (2005), guides our
    analysis. In Magliocco, a jury convicted the defendant of Ethnic
    Intimidation, but did not convict him of Terroristic Threats. The
    Ethnic Intimidation statue requires, inter alia, that the
    Commonwealth prove that the defendant committed Terroristic
    -4-
    J-S05033-20
    Threats and did so “with malicious intention toward the race,
    color, religion, or national origin of another individual or group of
    individuals.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2710(a). The Supreme Court concluded
    that since the Commonwealth charged and prosecuted [a]ppellant
    with the predicate offense of Terroristic Threats, but failed to
    obtain a conviction, the evidence was insufficient to convict the
    defendant of Ethnic Intimidation. Id. at 493.
    Analogously, in the instant case, the Commonwealth
    charged and prosecuted [a]ppellant for COM – Felony and the
    Sexual Offenses, but failed to obtain a conviction on any of the
    Sexual Offenses. By acquitting [the a]ppellant of the Chapter 31
    Sexual Offenses, the jury found that the Commonwealth had failed
    to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that [the a]ppellant acted
    “in violation of Chapter 31.” Thus, because the jury found that
    [the a]ppellant had not acted “in violation of Chapter 31,” an
    essential element of COM – Felony, the Commonwealth was
    unable to establish every element of COM – Felony.           See
    Magliocco, 
    supra at 493
     (reiterating that to “secure a conviction
    for any crime, the Commonwealth must prove all necessary
    elements     beyond    a    reasonable    doubt.”);  see     also
    [Commonwealth v.] Miller, 172 A.3d [632,] 640 [(Pa. Super.
    2017)].
    Baker-Myers, 210 A.3d at 1096 (some brackets omitted).
    Here, the trial court attempts to distinguish this case from Baker-Myers
    on the basis that the criminal information filed in Baker-Myers charged the
    defendant with COM – Felony, which it defined as “any course of conduct
    related to sexual offenses.” Sentencing Opinion, 8/28/19, at 2. In contrast,
    the trial court notes that its jury instruction concerning COM – Felony in the
    instant case required the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the
    defendant engaged in a course of conduct constituting IDSI or aggravated
    indecent assault of a child. Id. at 2, 4. The trial court also explained that the
    jury submitted a question, specifically asking whether, in light of this
    instruction, it could find him guilty of COM – Felony if it found him not guilty
    -5-
    J-S05033-20
    of IDSI and aggravated indecent assault of a child. Id. at 4. The trial court
    answered that “[e]ach verdict is independent of each other.           You must
    determine whether the elements of each count have been proven beyond a
    reasonable doubt.” Id. (citing Question #2). The trial court therefore submits
    that the jury was clear that it was required to find the elements of IDSI or
    aggravated indecent assault of a child, and its finding of guilt as to COM –
    Felony necessarily included a finding of a violation of Chapter 31. Id. at 4;
    see id. at 5 (stating that “because the verdict was rendered knowingly by the
    jury after inquiry into this very issue of inconsistent verdicts, this court does
    not attach any significance to the not guilty verdicts in this case insofar as
    they related to or undermine the guilty verdict for [COM – Felony].”). The
    trial court’s attempts to distinguish this case are unavailing.
    This case is directly controlled by the en banc Court’s decision in Baker-
    Myers, and we cannot agree with the trial court’s proposition that that the
    jury’s question concerning inconsistent verdicts requires a different result.
    The jury acquitted Hakes of all Chapter 31 sexual offenses.           Thus, the
    Commonwealth failed to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, an essential
    element of COM – Felony. See Baker-Myers, 210 A.3d at 1096. Accordingly,
    we reverse Hakes’s conviction of COM – Felony, vacate the judgment of
    sentence, and discharge Hakes.7
    ____________________________________________
    7 Because there are no remaining convictions, we need not remand for
    resentencing.
    -6-
    J-S05033-20
    Conviction reversed.   Judgment of sentence vacated.   Appellant is
    discharged. Jurisdiction relinquished.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 04/21/2020
    -7-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1575 MDA 2019

Filed Date: 4/21/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021