Com. v. Chambers, J. ( 2020 )

J-S71011-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JAYSON CHAMBERS :
:
Appellant : No. 739 EDA 2019
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 15, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0911081-2003
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JAYSON CHAMBERS :
:
Appellant : No. 740 EDA 2019
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 15, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0911091-2003
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JAYSON CHAMBERS :
:
Appellant : No. 746 EDA 2019
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 15, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-1109611-2004
BEFORE: BOWES, J., MURRAY, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.
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MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED APRIL 22, 2020
Jayson Chambers appeals from the dismissal of his Post-Conviction
Relief Act (“PCRA”) petition. After careful review, we affirm.
This Court previously summarized the relevant factual history of these
cases as follows:
. . . . Between the summer of 2000 and December 2002,
[A]ppellant, approximately [thirty] years of age, sexually abused
A.L. . . ., C.E. . . ., and A.R. . . ., all minors under the age of 16.
A.L. resided with [A]ppellant for about three years, from age
eight to age eleven. During that time, A.L. slept in the same room
as [A]ppellant and his two other children.1 Appellant
inappropriately touched A.L. when she was [eleven] years old.
During the act, [A]ppellant unzipped and pulled down A.L.’s pants,
pulled down her underwear, and completely undressed himself.
Thereafter, [A]ppellant sexually abused A.L., forcibly penetrating
her vagina with his penis while groping her breasts. He continued
the assault despite her cries and pleas to cease. A.L. testified that
she refrained from immediately telling someone because
[A]ppellant threatened to kill her. She felt justified in this belief
because [A]ppellant had physically assaulted her on numerous
occasions, sometimes using an extension cord. Appellant’s son
testified that he witnessed A.L. lying on the bed while [A]ppellant
hovered over her unclothed, and that [A]ppellant also had
physically abused him. Appellant eventually asked A.L. to leave
his residence and return to her mother because of a sexual abuse
allegation lodged against him by C.E.
C.E., A.L.’s sister, testified that [A]ppellant inappropriately
touched her on two separate occasions. On both occasions, she
was visiting for the weekend to spend time with her sister. The
first time [A]ppellant touched her breasts. During the second
instance of abuse, he placed his hands underneath her shirt and
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1 Appellant’s two children share the same initials. Therefore, for ease of
identification we refer to them, in order of age, as J.C. and J.C.2. See N.T.
Jury Trial Transcript, 12/6/04, at 40 (indicating the dates of birth of J.C. and
J.C.2).
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groped her breasts while standing behind her and penetrated her
vaginally with his fingers. C.E. later relayed these events to her
aunt and mother.
A.R., [A]ppellant’s cousin, testified her first sexual
relationship with [A]ppellant ensued around November 2012.5
She testified that she considered [A]ppellant her best friend prior
to the sexual abuse. On the first occasion, [A]ppellant pushed
A.R. down on the bed, pulled her pants and underwear down, and
forcibly penetrated her vagina. She testified that despite her
cries, [A]ppellant persisted. A.L. and [A]ppellant’s son testified
they witnessed [A]ppellant having sexual intercourse with A.R.
Appellant engaged in sexual intercourse a second time with A.R.
and she testified she cried “hysterically, like loud” this time.6 As
a result of one of these sexual encounters, A.R. became
impregnated and delivered a baby boy on September 23, 2003.7
A.R. did not immediately disclose the identity of the father to her
family. Over objection, A.R. testified she fears [A]ppellant
because he physically abused her on numerous occasions and
choked her mother during a disagreement.
_______
5 During direct examination A.R. testified the first time
she engaged in sex with [A]ppellant was in December
2002, however, during cross-examination she
testified that the sexual encounter actually occurred
in November 2002.
6 Appellant resided with A.R. and her family at the
time of this assault.
7 DNA tests later confirmed [A]ppellant is the father
of the child.
Commonwealth v. Chambers, 959 A.2d 458 (Pa.Super. 2008) (unpublished
memorandum) (“Chambers II”) (citations to the record omitted).
Appellant was arrested and charged with various sexual offenses as to
all three minors. Appellant waived his right to a jury trial and proceeded to a
bench trial. At trial, all three victims testified and DNA evidence was
introduced that Appellant was the father of A.R.’s baby. At the conclusion of
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the trial, the court found Appellant guilty of rape, indecent assault, and
endangering the welfare of a child as to A.L.; indecent assault as to C.E.; and
statutory sexual assault as to A.R. On March 30, 2005, Appellant was
sentenced to an aggregate term of fifteen to thirty years of incarceration.
Appellant filed post-sentence motions, which were denied, and a timely notice
of appeal. After Appellant failed to timely comply with the trial court’s
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) order, we dismissed the appeal. See Commonwealth v.
Chambers, 913 A.2d 939 (Pa.Super. 2006) (“Chambers I”) (unpublished
memorandum).2
On July 17, 2007, Appellant filed a PCRA petition requesting the
reinstatement of his direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc, which the PCRA court
granted. On appeal, Appellant challenged the trial court’s consolidation of the
charges against him; its allowance of A.R.’s testimony regarding Appellant’s
physical abuse as an explanation for her delay in reporting the abuse; and
that the rape, endangering the welfare of a minor, and two indecent assault
verdicts were against the weight of the evidence. We rejected Appellant’s
arguments and affirmed his judgment of sentence. See Chambers II,
supra. After another successful PCRA petition seeking the reinstatement of
appellate rights, Appellant filed a petition for allowance of appeal nunc pro
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2While the direct appeal was pending, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition
which was dismissed.
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tunc, which was denied. See Commonwealth v. Chambers, 78 A.3d 1089
(Pa. 2013) (“Chambers III”).
On June 27, 2014, Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition in which
Appellant raised numerous allegations of trial counsel, appellate counsel, and
PCRA counsel ineffectiveness. Additionally, he alleged the discovery of new
evidence that would exonerate him in the form of a witness recantation.
Finally, he listed a multitude of alleged instances of prosecutorial misconduct
and attached numerous exhibits. On January 22, 2018, following years of
litigation and changes of counsel, Appellant, through Peter Levin, Esquire, filed
an amended PCRA petition raising the issues alleged by Appellant in his pro
se petition. After the Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss, the PCRA court
issued notice of its intent to dismiss the petition as meritless and without a
hearing. On February 15, 2019, the PCRA court dismissed the PCRA petition.
This timely appeal followed. Appellant was not ordered to file a Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b) statement; however, the PCRA court did file a Rule 1925(a) opinion.
Appellant raises four issues, which we have reordered for ease of
disposition:
I. Whether the court erred in not granting relief on the PCRA
petition alleging counsel was ineffective.
II. Whether the court erred in not granting relief on the PCRA
petition due to newly discovered evidence.
III. Whether the court erred in not granting relief on the PCRA
petition alleging prosecutorial misconduct.
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IV. Whether the court erred in denying the Appellant’s PCRA
petition without an evidentiary hearing on the issues raised
in the amended PCRA petition regarding trial counsel’s
ineffectiveness.
Appellant’s brief at 10.
We begin with a discussion of the pertinent legal principles. Our “review
is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record,” and
we do not “disturb a PCRA court’s ruling if it is supported by evidence of record
and is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Rykard, 55 A.3d 1177, 1183
(Pa.Super. 2012). Similarly, “[w]e grant great deference to the factual
findings of the PCRA court and will not disturb those findings unless they have
no support in the record. However, we afford no such deference to its legal
conclusions.” Id. “[W]here the petitioner raises questions of law, our
standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Finally, we
“may affirm a PCRA court’s decision on any grounds if the record supports it.”
Id.
Appellant’s first claim contains two sub-parts, alleging trial and appellate
counsel ineffectiveness. In reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel, counsel is presumed to be effective, and a PCRA petitioner bears the
burden of proving otherwise. See Commonwealth v. Becker, 192 A.3d 106,
112 (Pa.Super. 2018). To do so, a petitioner must plead and prove that: (1)
the legal claim underlying his ineffectiveness claim has arguable merit; (2)
counsel’s decision to act (or not) lacked a reasonable basis designed to
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effectuate the petitioner’s interests; and (3) prejudice resulted. Id. The
failure to establish any of the three prongs is fatal to the claim. Id. at 113.
In his first sub-claim, Appellant alleges that direct appeal counsel was
ineffective in the manner that he litigated certain weight-of-the-evidence
issues on appeal. See Appellant’s brief at 21-24. Specifically, Appellant
argues that the outcome of the direct appeal would have been different if
counsel had included weight of the evidence claims regarding the
inconsistencies between the testimony of A.L. and J.C. regarding the dates
and locations of the assaults, and the absence of any physical evidence to
support A.L.’s testimony that Appellant physically assaulted her with an
extension cord. Id.
By way of background, direct appeal counsel included a claim that the
convictions regarding A.L. were against the weight of the evidence because
the medical records, school records, and testimony of the witnesses failed to
corroborate the traumatic effects of the abuse described by A.L. As a result,
the Commonwealth contends that this claim is a thinly-veiled attempt to re-
litigate the previously unsuccessful challenge to the weight of the evidence by
slightly altering the attack on A.L.’s credibility. See Commonwealth’s brief at
15; see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(3) (in order to be eligible for PCRA relief,
the allegation of error must not have been previously litigated). The PCRA
court agreed, rejecting the current weight of the evidence claim. See PCRA
Court Opinion, 4/29/19, at 8-10.
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The record supports the PCRA court’s conclusion that the trial court
expressly found A.L’s testimony credible in spite of the inconsistencies
Appellant points to here, rendering an additional appellate challenge on these
grounds meritless. See Commonwealth v. Hannibal, 156 A.3d 197, 217
(Pa. 2016) (“[C]ounsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a
meritless claim.”). During closing argument, trial counsel specifically argued
that Appellant should be acquitted on the basis that there were inconstancies
between all of the victims’ statements from when they were initially made, to
the preliminary hearing, and then at trial as to when and where the assaults
happened. See N.T. Jury Trial, 12/16/04, at 90-92. The trial court agreed
that inconsistencies existed, even giving an example that one victim testified
that an assault happened on a day that it could not have occurred because
Appellant was still in prison. Id. at 92. Despite these inconsistencies, the
court still found the victims’ testimonies to be the most persuasive evidence
in the case:
[Trial Court]: But, again, you know, you’re not talking about
– you know, I had a case in which the defendant
was in prison, okay, and the period that was
involved definitely convinced me that he
couldn’t have done it; so, as a result thereof, he
was found not guilty.
Here we have a youngster talking about – and
she testified on the witness stand, “Well, it was
about this time.” And it’s not a question of he
was off [sic]–she was off ten months, a year, a
year and a half. She was off, what, about a
month, a month and a half, two months. You
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know, so that’s the – again, I’m telling you
what’s going to influence me and what’s not.
[Trial Counsel]: Right. But—
[Trial Court]: That’s not going to influence me.
N.T. Jury Trial, 12/16/04, at 92-93.
After the Court announced its verdict, Appellant immediately uttered,
“[t]his is crazy.” Id. at 99. The court responded to Appellant’s comment by
offering an explicit explanation as to why it found A.L. and J.C.’s testimonies
so convincing:
Sir, I sat right over there and I watched that young lady testify –
....
I saw that little girl testify and I watched her like a hawk, okay.
And let me tell you something, that little girl came across very,
very candidly. She came across very, very candidly. In fact, I
watched her. And that’s why I sit over there, because over here
I can’t see her face. And I don’t know how any judge could
determine the demeanor – because that’s one of the factors that
I have to take into consideration, is the demeanor of a witness. If
I sit over here and see the back of her head, you got a perfect
right later on to go up to the Superior Court and say, “The judge
didn’t do his job right, because he didn’t see what that little girl’s
– what her actions were when she was testifying, he could only
see her head.”
And I watched your son very, very closely. And with that boy
there might have been some inconsistencies there, yes. But let
me tell you something, I’m convinced that he saw what he saw.
And so it’s because of all those reasons I just stated, sir.
Id. at 99-101.
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Here, the trial court plainly found A.L. and J.C.’s testimony convincing.
To the extent there were inconsistencies in A.L.’s testimony, the trial court
was free to weigh the evidence and resolve those inconsistencies in A.L.’s
favor. See Widmer, supra. Given the trial court’s findings, Appellant’s
previously unsuccessful appellate challenge to A.L.’s credibility, and our
narrow standard of review, Appellant has not convinced us that the PCRA court
incorrectly concluded that his claim lacks arguable merit. Accordingly, no
relief is due.
In his second sub-claim, Appellant alleges that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to interview Appellant’s son J.C.2, the victims’ aunt Mia
Granger, and various unnamed DHS employees. See Appellant’s brief at 24-
27. He also attacks trial counsel’s failure to call these witnesses to testify on
his behalf. Id. In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance claim for failing
to call a witness, a petitioner must show that: (1) the witness existed; (2)
the witness was available to testify for the defense; (3) counsel knew of, or
should have known of, the existence of the witness; (4) the witness was willing
to testify for the defense; and (5) the absence of the testimony of the witness
was so prejudicial as to have denied the defendant a fair trial. See
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 966 A.2d 523, 536 (Pa. 2009). Thus, counsel
will not be found ineffective for failing to call a witness unless the petitioner
can show that the witness’s testimony would have been helpful to the defense.
See Commonwealth v. Snead, 45 A.3d 1096, 1109 (Pa. 2012).
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In its opinion, the PCRA court gave a thorough explanation for denying
all three of Appellant’s allegations regarding counsel’s alleged failures to call
witnesses:
In the case at bar, [Appellant] claims that [t]rial [c]ounsel
was ineffective for failing to interview two witnesses. [Appellant]
claims that trial counsel failed to interview [Appellant’s] son
[J.C.2], and [A.L. and C.E.’s] aunt, Mia Granger. However,
[Appellant] failed to state the information these witnesses had
that would have assisted [Appellant] or changed the outcome of
the trial. Nothing is known about the content of the prospective
testimony from either witness, therefore [Appellant] is unable to
carry his burden to demonstrate that the absence of these
witnesses’ testimony was so prejudicial as to have denied
[Appellant] a fair trial.
Furthermore, [Appellant] is incorrect that trial counsel failed
to reach out to Granger. During closing arguments, trial counsel
stated the following:
And certainly there has been no testimony from
the aunt, Mia Granger, Your Honor. And, rest assured,
we have made every effort to locate her, Judge. We
have made every effort to locate her. But that’s just
the way things turned out.
Clearly, trial counsel made the attempt to contact this witness.
This witness apparently made herself unavailable, which may be
because she was not willing to testify at trial.
Moreover, [Appellant] claims that trial counsel should have
interviewed employees of the Philadelphia Department of Human
Services (“DHS”) concerning the homicide of a young girl by
[Appellant’s] brother, Jerry. According to [Appellant], he was
charged with the instant sexual assaults because his brother
would not lie on behalf of DHS in his own homicide case in which
Jerry was convicted of murdering his niece by beating her to
death. [Appellant] presented mere speculation without
evidentiary support. Additionally, trial counsel could not have
interviewed any of the DHS workers involved in Jerry Chambers’s
unrelated homicide of his niece because [Appellant] was not a
party to its investigation and DHS’s work is confidential. On top
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of that, any evidence involving the homicide trial or investigation
of [Appellant’s] brother would not have been admissible at trial in
this case because it is completely irrelevant.
PCRA Court Opinion, 4/29/19, at 7-8 (citations and unnecessary capitalization
omitted).
As the PCRA court observed, Appellant has not shown that any of these
witnesses were available and willing to testify, or that if their testimony was
admitted, it would have been helpful to the defense. A review of his pro se
and amended petitions also reveals that he has never provided certifications
for these witnesses, despite requesting an evidentiary hearing.3 Nonetheless,
Appellant argues that J.C.2 and Mia Granger’s testimony “would have been
beneficial” to his defense. See Appellant’s brief at 24. However, he does not
name any DHS witnesses or proffer what this alleged testimony might have
revealed. Further, without certifications pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(d)(1),
he would not have been able to call these witnesses to testify at an evidentiary
hearing even if they were available and willing to testify. Accordingly, we find
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3 In order to call witnesses at a PCRA hearing, a petitioner must first submit
witness certification forms prior to the hearing. More specifically, the PCRA
requires:
Where a petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing, the petition
shall include a signed certification as to each intended witness
stating the witness’s name, address, date of birth and substance
of testimony. Failure to substantially comply with the
requirements of this paragraph shall render the proposed
witness’s testimony inadmissible.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(d)(1).
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that the PCRA court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Appellant
had failed to demonstrate that trial counsel was ineffective. Accord Snead,
supra.
Next, Appellant alleges that he has uncovered evidence that exonerates
him. See Appellant’s brief at 28-31. In order to obtain relief on an after-
discovered evidence claim, a petitioner must demonstrate that: (1) the
evidence has been discovered after trial and it could not have been obtained
at or prior to trial through reasonable diligence; (2) the evidence is not
cumulative; (3) it is not being used solely to impeach credibility; and (4) it
would likely compel a different verdict. See Commonwealth v.
Washington, 927 A.2d 586, 595-96 (Pa. 2007).
By way of background, the investigation that led to the charges against
Appellant arose from an interview of J.C. by a homicide detective who was
investigating Appellant’s brother Jerry. See N.T. Jury Trial, 12/6/04, at 36-
38; see also N.T. Jury Trial, 12/16/04, at 71-78. During the course of the
interview, J.C. spontaneously volunteered that he had seen Appellant have
sex with A.L. and A.R. The homicide unit passed this information on to the
special victims unit, which sent a detective to interview A.L. at her elementary
school. During the interview, A.L. disclosed that Appellant had sexually and
physically assaulted her and her sister, C.E. The detective than proceeded to
interview C.E. and A.R. separately. Both of them confirmed that they were
sexually assaulted by Appellant. Additionally, A.R. confirmed that Appellant
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was the father of her baby, which DNA testing later corroborated. At trial,
J.C., A.L., C.E., and A.R. all testified about Appellant’s sexual and physical
abuse.
Appellant’s after-discovered evidence claim is derived from a letter that
J.C. wrote to Appellant’s brother, Jerry Chambers, recanting a statement that
he made in Jerry Chambers’ separate trial for murder. In the letter, J.C. states
that he never saw his uncle physically assault anyone, but was enticed to lie
by agents of the Commonwealth with promises of a better life. See
Appellant’s brief at 29. However, J.C. does not recant his eyewitness accounts
of Appellant’s sexual assaults of A.L. and A.R. While Appellant acknowledges
that this letter does not reference or concern his case, he nonetheless argues
that because J.C. was the “most important witness for the Commonwealth” in
his trial and this letter “proves the point that his son was told to lie in general,”
it would have provided powerful impeachment evidence in his own case. Id.
at 27, 30.
The Commonwealth counters that Appellant has not uncovered new
evidence. Instead, the Commonwealth asserts that Appellant has only
provided “speculation” that his son may have testified inaccurately at trial.
See Commonwealth’s brief at 18. Even if this letter is considered evidence,
the Commonwealth argues that Appellant has failed to show that it would be
used for anything more than impeachment. Id. The PCRA court agreed,
finding that Appellant had failed to adequately develop this claim, and that
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the evidence against him was so overwhelming that this impeachment
testimony would not have changed the outcome of the trial. See PCRA Court
Opinion, 4/29/19, at 11-12. We concur.
Appellant’s claim is frivolous and deficiently pled. Importantly,
Appellant concedes that J.C. does not even refer to Appellant’s case in the
letter. See Appellant’s brief at 30. Simply put, an unsworn letter recanting
testimony in a different case, does not constitute a recantation in this case.
Furthermore, Appellant plainly states that he seeks to use this evidence solely
for the purposes of impeachment. Id. Even if Appellant had presented
recantation testimony relevant to this case - which he did not do - his
challenge still would have been unsuccessful. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Moore, 633 A.2d 1119, 1136 (Pa. 1993) (rejecting witness’s statement
against penal interest as reliable after-discovered evidence, where sole
purpose of statement was to impeach testimony connecting defendant to
crime). Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion in the PCRA court’s
determination that Appellant’s claim failed to meet the after-discovered
evidence requirements. No relief is due.
In his third claim, Appellant lists eleven instances of alleged
prosecutorial misconduct by referring to eleven exhibits. See Appellant’s brief
at 31-32. However, these exhibits were not attached to Appellant’s PCRA
petition, and he has not included them in any submissions to this Court. While
Appellant has detailed what each exhibit prospectively contains, he has not
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offered any explanation as to how any of these exhibits amounts to
prosecutorial misconduct, or why copies of this documentation were never
adduced. Consequently, the PCRA court found these claims were waived, both
as “completely undeveloped” and because Appellant did not litigate these
allegations of prosecutorial misconduct on direct appeal. See PCRA Court
Opinion, 4/29/19, at 10. We agree with the PCRA court that Appellant’s claims
are insufficiently pled; hence, they cannot succeed and dismissal without a
hearing was appropriate.
In order to succeed on a prosecutorial misconduct claim, Appellant must
prove that the prosecutor’s misconduct violated a constitutionally or
statutorily protected right, such as the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination or the Sixth Amendment’s right to a fair trial.
See Commonwealth v. Burno, 94. A.3d 956, 974 (Pa. 2012). In order “[t]o
constitute a due process violation, the prosecutorial misconduct must be of
sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant’s right to a fair
trial. The touchstone is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the
prosecutor.” Commonwealth v. Spotz, 47 A.3d 63, 97 (Pa. 2012) (internal
citations omitted).
Here, Appellant has alleged that prosecutorial misconduct occurred and
listed multiple exhibits to support his contentions. However, he has not
offered any analysis identifying the precise misconduct, or connected that
alleged misfeasance to his list of exhibits. As such, Appellant’s deficient
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pleading has deprived us of the ability to discern what his specific allegations
are and we are unable to meaningfully review his claim. Therefore, he has
failed to convince us that the PCRA court erred when it dismissed this claim
as waived.
In his final allegation of error, Appellant argues that the PCRA court
wrongly denied his request for an evidentiary hearing. See Appellant’s brief
at 18-19. Without any elaboration, he asserts that he was entitled to an
evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Id. We
are unpersuaded by Appellant’s boilerplate allegation.
It is well-settled that “[t]here is no absolute right to an evidentiary
hearing on a PCRA petition, and if the PCRA court can determine from the
record that no genuine issues of material fact exist, then a hearing is not
necessary.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 942 A.2d 903, 906 (Pa.Super. 2008).
In order “to obtain reversal of a PCRA court’s decision to dismiss a petition
without a hearing, an appellant must show that he raised a genuine issue of
fact which, if resolved in his favor, would have entitled him to relief, or that
the court otherwise abused its discretion in denying a hearing.”
Commonwealth v. Hanible, 30 A.3d 426, 452 (Pa. 2011).
Appellant has done nothing to refute the PCRA court’s conclusion that a
PCRA hearing was unnecessary. See Commonwealth v. Watkins, 108 A.3d
692, 735 (Pa. 2014) (concluding that if an appellant makes no attempt to
identify specifically the “legitimate material factual disputes” that he alleges
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warranted a hearing, as well as develop relevant argument, his “claim of PCRA
court procedural error cannot succeed”); see also Commonwealth v.
Jones, 912 A.2d 268, 290 (Pa. 2006) (rejecting an appellant’s assertion that
his other claims warranted a hearing when he failed both to identify and argue
with specificity what factual issues remained in contention).
Accordingly, we cannot find that the PCRA court’s denial of an
evidentiary hearing was an abuse of discretion. See Hanible, supra at 452-
53 (“Appellant has failed to satisfy [his] burden as his reliance on speculation
and failure to assert facts, which, if believed, would support his claim cannot
be equated with a genuine issue concerning a material fact that warrants an
evidentiary hearing”). As such, no relief is due on this claim.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/22/2020
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