Com. v. Lesane, T. ( 2020 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
TAJ AARON LESANE : No. 1876 MDA 2019
Appeal from the Order Entered November 1, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Clinton County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-18-CR-0000253-2019
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED: JUNE 8, 2020
The Commonwealth appeals from the order entered in the Clinton
County Court of Common Pleas. The order granted Taj Aaron Lesane’s motion
to suppress evidence found during a search of his car after he was stopped
for a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code. We reverse the suppression court’s
order and remand for further proceedings.
Pennsylvania State Troopers Andrew Adams and Dennis Twigg were
traveling west bound, at night, on Interstate 80 when they noticed a black
Dodge Challenger weaving and swerving within its lane of travel. The troopers
decided to follow the vehicle because they suspected the driver was either
under the influence or text messaging. Thereafter, they observed the Dodge
Challenger cross over the fog line twice in violation of the Vehicle Code. The
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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troopers planned to initiate a traffic stop, but waited three miles until Exit 173
due to safety concerns. There, they activated the emergency lights and
effectuated a stop.
Trooper Adams and Trooper Twigg exited their cruiser and approached
Lesane to ask for his license. As they did so, they noticed the smell of
marijuana emanating from the driver and passenger sides of the vehicle.
Based on this observation, the troopers conducted a search of the vehicle and
discovered marijuana, heroin, methamphetamines, a digital scale, and two
knives. The troopers arrested Lesane.
Lesane was charged with possession with intent to deliver, possession
of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, driving under suspension,
failure to keep right, and disregarding traffic lanes.1 He filed a pretrial motion
to suppress all evidence related to the stop, arguing that police lacked
probable cause to stop his vehicle. The suppression court held a hearing on
the motion, and ultimately granted it. Thereafter, the Commonwealth filed a
timely appeal challenging the order granting Lesane’s suppression motion.
On appeal, the Commonwealth asserts that the suppression court erred
in finding that Trooper Adams and Trooper Twigg lacked the requisite level of
suspicion to stop Lesane. See Appellant’s Brief, at 4. Specifically, the
Commonwealth contends that the troopers had probable cause to stop Lesane
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135 P.S. § 780-113 (a)(30); 35 Pa.C.S.A. § 780-113(a)(31); 35 P.S. § 780-
113(a)(32); 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(a); 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3301(a); and 75 Pa.
C.S.A. § 3309(1).
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for disregarding traffic lanes pursuant to 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 3309(1) of the Vehicle
Code. See Appellant’s Brief, at 10. However, even if probable cause did not
exist, the Commonwealth argues that the troopers had reasonable suspicion
to stop Lesane and investigate whether he was driving under the influence
(“DUI”) or texting while driving. See id., at 4.
Our standard of review when the Commonwealth appeals from a
suppression order is well settled. A reviewing court must consider only the
defendant’s evidence and so much of the Commonwealth’s evidence as
remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole.
See Commonwealth v. Hemingway, 192 A.3d 126, 129 (Pa. Super. 2018).
Further, in reviewing a suppression ruling, we must ascertain whether the
record supports the factual findings of the suppression court and then
determine if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error. See
Commonwealth v. Dean, 940 A.2d 514, 516 (Pa. Super. 2008).
We first address whether Trooper Adams and Trooper Twigg had
reasonable suspicion to stop Lesane. If a police officer possesses reasonable
suspicion that a violation of the Vehicle Code is occurring or has occurred, he
may stop the vehicle involved for the purpose of obtaining information
necessary to enforce the provisions of the Code. See 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 6308(b).
Reasonable suspicion is a relatively low standard and depends on the
information possessed by police and its degree of reliability in the totality of
the circumstances. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 996 A.2d 473, 477 (Pa.
2010). Thus, in order to justify the stop, an officer must be able to point to
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specific and articulable facts which led him to reasonably suspect a violation
of the Vehicle Code. See Commonwealth v. Holmes, 14 A.3d 89, 95 (Pa.
2011). The standard for assessing whether a given set of observations
constitutes reasonable suspicion is an objective one, based on the totality of
the circumstances. See id.
In the present case, the suppression court found that the troopers did
not have reasonable suspicion to believe Lesane was driving under the
influence. See Trial Court Opinion, 11/01/2019, at 6. The court emphasized
that there was no testimony offered as to whether either trooper had training
and experience with DUI investigations. See id. Even more concerning to the
court was that, after the second crossover, the troopers followed Lesane for
an additional three miles and did not observe any motor vehicle infractions.
See id. Furthermore, although the troopers’ cruiser was equipped with a video
recording device, the court noted that the video did not include footage of the
alleged Vehicle Code violations. See id. As such, the court concluded that the
troopers did not have reasonable suspicion to stop Lesane. See id.
Here, as discussed above, Trooper Adams and Trooper Twigg, after
entering onto Interstate 80, noticed Lesane’s vehicle weaving and swerving
within its lane of travel. See N.T., Suppression Hearing, 10/22/19, at 22. As
they followed Lesane, the troopers observed the passenger tires of Lesane’s
vehicle cross the fog line twice within the span of a mile. See id., at 7, 31.
Because of his training and experience, which included DUI stops on the
interstate, Trooper Adams suspected Lesane was driving impaired or on his
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phone. See id., at 7. As a result, the troopers conducted a traffic stop to
further investigate whether there was a violation of the Vehicle Code. See id.,
at 7.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Trooper Adams and Trooper
Twigg had reasonable suspicion to stop Lesane and investigate whether he
was driving under the influence or texting while driving. The fact that the
troopers followed Lesane for an additional three miles and did not observe any
other motor vehicle infractions is not fatal to this conclusion. Even a
combination of innocent factors, when viewed together, may warrant further
investigation by the police. See Holmes, 14 A.3d at 96.
Moreover, the suppression hearing transcript does not support any
implicit finding that either trooper’s testimony was not credible. In fact, the
court found that Trooper Twigg observed Lesane’s vehicle swerving within its
lane of travel. See Trial Court Opinion, 11/1/19, at 2. Further, the court found
that both troopers observed Lesane’s vehicle cross the white fog line twice in
about a mile of driving. See id. Finally, the court found that, based on these
observations, the troopers decided to pull Lesane over to investigate whether
Lesane was engaged in a violation of the vehicle code. See id.
The court was concerned with the paucity of evidence regarding the
troopers’ experience in investigating DUI. While we cannot fault the court for
being troubled by this lack of evidence, we conclude that the testimony
provided by the troopers was not expert in nature. Any reasonable person
observing a car weaving within its lane, and then crossing the fog line within
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one mile could reasonably suspect the driver was impaired or distracted. And
reasonable suspicion was all that was required to initiate the stop and perform
a further investigation.
Although the dash cam video failed to confirm the erratic driving,
Trooper Adams, in his testimony, provided specific and articulable facts that
led him to believe that an investigation might reveal a violation of the Vehicle
Code. Once again, we note that the court, while highlighting the absence of
evidence from the dash cam video, did not explicitly find the troopers’
testimony incredible. Rather, a plain reading of the court’s findings of fact
reveals the court found the troopers credible regarding their observations. The
court’s analysis in support of suppression focuses on the legal conclusions that
can be drawn from those observations.
We cannot agree with the suppression court that the troopers’
observations were legally insufficient to support a finding of reasonable
suspicion. This Court has held that reasonable suspicion of DUI is formed when
a qualified officer observes a vehicle weaving and drifting over the fog line.
See Commonwealth v. Walls, 206 A.3d 537, 543 (Pa. Super. 2019).
Therefore, we conclude the troopers had reasonable suspicion to conduct an
investigatory stop.
Because we conclude that the troopers had reasonable suspicion to stop
Lesane, we need not address whether the stop was also valid based on
probable cause of a § 3309(1) violation.
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Consequently, we find the court erred by granting Lesane’s motion to
suppress. Accordingly, we reverse the suppression court’s order.
Order reversed. Case remanded for proceedings consistent with this
memorandum. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 06/08/2020
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