Daniels, M. v. Fisher, G. ( 2020 )


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  • J-S15012-20
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    MATTHEW R. DANIELS AND YOCELIN             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    HERNANDEZ                                  :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    GORDON D. FISHER                           :
    :   No. 1437 WDA 2019
    Appellant               :
    Appeal from the Judgment Entered September 17, 2019
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Civil Division at
    No(s): AR 18-003466
    BEFORE:      BENDER, P.J.E., OLSON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
    MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                              FILED JUNE 8, 2020
    In this landlord/tenant action, Appellant, Gordon D. Fisher (Landlord),
    appeals pro se from the trial court’s judgment in favor of Appellees, Matthew
    R. Daniels and Yocelin Hernandez (Tenants), in the amount of $14,635.1 After
    careful review, we affirm.
    ____________________________________________
    *   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    1 While Landlord purported to appeal from the order entered August 7, 2019,
    denying his post-trial motion, the appeal properly lies from the judgment
    entered on September 17, 2019. See Johnson the Florist, Inc. v. TEDCO
    Constr. Corp., 
    657 A.2d 511
    , 514 (Pa. Super. 1995) (en banc). Furthermore,
    although Landlord’s appeal was filed prior to the entry of judgment, we have
    held that “jurisdiction in appellate courts may be perfected after an appeal
    notice has been filed upon the docketing of a final judgment.”
    Id. at 513.
    We
    have corrected the caption accordingly.
    J-S15012-20
    Tenants provide the following summary of the facts and procedural
    history of this case, to which [Landlord] has not objected:2
    This case was initiated by a September 19, 2018 appeal
    from the judgment of a magisterial district judge in favor of
    [Tenants]. [Tenants] are husband and wife and former residential
    tenants of [Landlord], who is an attorney representing himself.
    [Tenants] leased an apartment in a duplex owned by [Landlord]
    at 212 West Street, 2nd Floor, Pittsburgh, PA 15221. [Tenants]
    signed their lease with “The Maerlin Company,” which is not
    incorporated and was a fictitious name used by [Landlord].1 As
    [Tenants] could not locate a signed copy of the lease, they
    attached an unsigned version to their Complaint. Appellee Yocelin
    Hernandez (“Hernandez”) has at all relevant times been a service
    member of the U.S. Navy.
    1 The name of [Landlord] in the caption in this case is
    “Gordon D. Fisher d/b/a The Maerlin Company” as was
    indicated by the participant list on the magisterial district
    judge Notice of Judgment. In some instances[,] the [trial]
    court and [Landlord] have omitted the “d/b/a The Maerlin
    Company” portion of the name of [Landlord].
    At the initiation of the lease term on May 19, 2016, [Tenants]
    paid [Landlord] the sum of $2,050.00 for a security deposit and
    an additional $1,025 for rent for June [of] 2016. [Landlord] issued
    [Tenants] a handwritten receipt for the payments. The Lease was
    renewed under its terms for an additional term from June 1, 2017
    through May 30, 2018. During this renewal term, on October 30,
    2017[,] Hernandez received travel orders from the U.S. Navy for
    temporary duty in excess of three months.
    On December 7, 2017[,] Appellee Matthew Daniels (“Daniels”)
    notified [Landlord] via certified mail and by personal delivery of
    the military travel orders [of] the intent to thereby terminate the
    Lease by operation of law. [Tenants] vacated the Property on
    December 15, 2017[,] and provided [Landlord] with a forwarding
    address in writing. [Tenants] paid [Landlord] all rent amounts
    ____________________________________________
    2 We note that the trial court did not provide a factual or procedural history in
    its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion.
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    through January 6, 2018, which was calculated to be the lease
    termination date pursuant to 51 Pa.C.S. § 7315.1(a).
    [Landlord] failed to return to [Tenants] their security deposit
    within 30 days[,] or provide them with a list of claimed damages.
    [Tenants] received no writing or other justification for withholding
    the security deposit from them until this litigation initiated.
    [Landlord] filed an appeal of the magistrate decision on
    September 19, 2018[,] and listed his address as counsel as:
    Fourth Floor, Three Gateway Center, Pittsburgh, PA 15222. On
    October [8], 2018[,] [Tenants] filed a Complaint alleging counts
    under the Pennsylvania Landlord and Tenant Act, as amended,
    under 68 P.S. § 250.512(c) (Count I) and violation of the
    Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law
    (UTPCPL) (Count II). On November 27, 2018, [Tenants] timely
    served [Landlord] with Evidence Admissible Pursuant to Pa.R.C.P.
    1305 containing Temporary Additional Duty (TEMADD) Travel
    Orders from the U.S. Navy, a USPS tracking receipt, and a Navy
    Federal Credit Union Transfer Receipt.
    During the pleadings stage[, Tenants] duly presented a Motion
    for Sanctions against [Landlord] which was granted on January 9,
    2019[,] awarding $600 in attorney's fees to [Tenants]. The
    subject of the motion for sanctions was [Landlord’s] improper
    filing of an arbitration hearing continuance stipulation
    representing that he had obtained the consent of [Tenants] when
    in fact he had not.
    [Tenants] were relocated to a military base in Japan prior to
    the hearing date. On January 9, 2019[,] [Tenants] motioned the
    court and were granted the ability to participate in all court
    proceedings via telephone. The case was heard at compulsory
    arbitration on February 27, 2019[,] and [Tenants] were awarded
    $5,810.00.
    On March 27, 2019 [Landlord] timely appealed the arbitration
    award. On March 28, 2019[, Landlord] filed a Reply to New
    Matter, again endorsing his address on the pleading as: Fourth
    Floor, Three Gateway Center, Pittsburgh, PA 15222-1004.
    Notably, this was to be [Landlord’s] last filed pleading before the
    case was scheduled for trial. This is also the address listed in the
    docket for [Landlord, acting as his own counsel].
    The case was scheduled for a non-jury trial on July 23, 2019.
    The trial court, in its Memorandum in Lieu of Opinion, stated that
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    court staff called and left [Landlord] a message prior to issuing
    the July 12, 2019 scheduling order. The trial court wrote[,] “The
    [c]ourt received no response back, and on July 12, 2019[,] an
    Order was sent to Attorney Fisher at the address provided in the
    docket: 4th Floor, Three Gateway Center, Pittsburgh, PA 15222.”
    On July 23, 2019[, Tenants’] counsel appeared for trial but
    [Landlord] … failed to appear. The trial court and [Tenants’]
    counsel both called [Landlord,] only to be prompted to leave
    another voicemail. The court and [Tenants] delayed the trial by
    over an hour to attempt to phone [Landlord], but [Landlord] did
    not respond or answer.
    At trial, with [Tenants] appearing via telephone from Japan,
    testimony and a record were developed through documents.
    [Tenants’] counsel provided summary to the trial court along with
    exhibits, some of which had been part of [Tenants’] Pa.R.C.P.
    1305 statement, [and Tenants’] and [Landlord’s] pleadings, all of
    which were introduced as evidence in this case and made part of
    the record. At the conclusion of the trial[,] the [court] issued a
    [v]erdict in favor of [Tenants] and against [Landlord] in the
    amount of $14,635.00.
    Tenants’ Brief at 6-11 (citations to the record omitted).
    On August 1, 2019, Landlord filed a post-trial motion, which the trial
    court denied on September 12, 2019. Landlord filed a timely notice of appeal.
    Tenants thereafter praeciped for the entry of judgment on September 17,
    2019. The court ordered Landlord to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, and
    he timely complied. The court thereafter filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion.
    Herein, Landlord states two issues for our review, which we reproduce
    verbatim (except for modifying the parties’ names):
    1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in an error or
    misapplication of the law, failure to follow proper legal procedure,
    or in a manifestly unreasonable determination in denying
    [Landlord’s] post-trial motion regarding lack of notice of trial?
    2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in an error or
    misapplication of the law, failure to follow proper legal procedure,
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    or in a manifestly unreasonable determination based upon the
    statements of [Tenants’] counsel as the basis for its award and
    based upon exhibits and trial aids which were not offered into
    evidence?
    Landlord’s Brief at 4-5 (unnecessary capitalization and emphasis omitted).
    Preliminarily, we note that Landlord presents three separate issues in
    his Argument section of his brief, beginning with a claim that was not set forth
    in his Statement of the Questions Involved. Specifically, he contends that the
    trial court erred in entering judgment in favor of Tenants where their
    termination of the lease did not comply with the requirements of 50 U.S.C. §
    3955(d)(1) of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act.           See
    id. at 14-15.
    Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure directs that “[n]o question will be
    considered unless it is stated in the statement of questions involved or is fairly
    suggested thereby.” Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a). Therefore, we will not consider this
    claim.
    In Landlord’s next issue, he avers that the court erred by proceeding
    with the non-jury trial in his absence. Landlord claims that the notice of trial
    was sent to his office address in the same building but on a
    different floor, from which he had moved three months earlier. A
    change of address was in effect at all times through the U.S. Postal
    Service, however the trial notice was nonetheless returned by the
    U.S. Postal Service to the [trial judge’s chambers].
    Landlord’s Brief at 16. Landlord contends that this “constitutes a breakdown
    in the system” that requires a new trial.
    Id. at 19.
    We disagree.     Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 218 states, in
    pertinent part:
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    (b) If without satisfactory excuse a defendant is not ready, the
    plaintiff may
    (1) proceed to trial, or,
    (2) if the case called for trial is an appeal from compulsory
    arbitration, either proceed to trial or request the court to
    dismiss the appeal and reinstate the arbitration award.
    (c) A party who fails to appear for trial shall be deemed to be not
    ready without satisfactory excuse.
    Pa.R.C.P. 218(b)-(c). In the note to Rule 218, it states: “A decision of the
    court following a trial at which the defendant failed to appear is subject to the
    filing of a motion for post-trial relief which may include a request for a new
    trial on the ground of a satisfactory excuse for the defendant’s failure to
    appear.” Pa.R.C.P. 218, Official Note.
    Here, Landlord filed a post-trial motion claiming that he did not receive
    notice of the trial at his new address. In rejecting this excuse, the trial court
    explained that prior to sending the trial notice, it had attempted to
    contact both counsel [for Landlord and Tenants] and schedule an
    agreeable date for the de novo hearing on [Landlord’s] appeal.
    The docket entries did not disclose a telephone number for
    [Landlord], but one was found in the file. This [c]ourt tried to
    contact [Landlord] at that number. A phone call to [the listed
    phone number] did verify that it was [Landlord’s] number and
    prompted the [c]ourt to leave a message. A message was left
    informing [Landlord] that this [c]ourt was scheduling a hearing
    date for his appeal and to contact the [c]ourt. The [c]ourt
    received no response back, and on July 12, 2019[,] an Order was
    sent to [Landlord] at the address provided in the docket: 4th Floor,
    Three Gateway Center, Pittsburgh PA 15222.           This address
    appeared on the docket sheet in a box marked “Defendant’s
    Attorney.”
    At the July 24, 2019 hearing, [Landlord] failed to appear,
    but prior to taking any testimony, this [c]ourt and opposing
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    counsel telephoned him, only to be prompted to leave another
    phone message.
    Therefore, after testimony was taken, a [d]efault [v]erdict
    was entered in favor of [Tenants]. It is this [c]ourt’s position that
    [Landlord] is not entitled to [relief on] appeal, since he failed to
    provide an address where he can receive important
    communications from the [c]ourt and [o]rders[,] such as the
    August 6, 2019 Order denying his Post-Trial Motion. That Order
    was returned [as] “Not deliverable as addressed.”
    This failure was completely due to [Landlord’s] neglect to
    correct the docket. Since the [a]ppeal, this [c]ourt did receive
    communications from [Landlord] on his letterhead[,] which
    contained a different address, but the same phone number which
    was used to contact him prior to trial. Therefore, it was also
    [Landlord’s] neglect to check his phone messages, which
    contributed to his failure to appear.
    For the foregoing reasons, [Landlord’s] failure to appear was
    unexcused[,] and the default verdict in favor of [Tenants] should
    not be subject to appeal.
    Trial Court Opinion, 10/31/19, at 1-2.
    We discern no abuse of discretion in the court’s decision to reject
    Landlord’s excuse for his failure to appear at trial. Landlord concedes that he
    changed his address approximately three months before the court mailed its
    notice of trial in July of 2019.   See Landlord’s Brief at 16.    Nevertheless,
    Landlord does not dispute that he failed to notify the court of his new address,
    or correct the address listed on the court’s docket. He also did not return the
    multiple telephone calls made to him by the court and opposing counsel.
    Consequently, the court did not err in conducting the trial in Landlord’s
    absence.
    Next, Landlord challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the
    court’s verdict in favor of Tenants. He argues that the verdict was based only
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    on arguments by Tenants’ counsel, and exhibits and trial aids that were never
    admitted as evidence.
    The record belies Landlord’s claims. First, Tenants’ counsel presented a
    document to the court that summarized the damages that Tenants were
    seeking.   N.T. Trial, 7/23/19, at 5.   The court admitted this document as
    evidence, directing that it be “marked as an exhibit and placed in the record
    of this case.”
    Id. at 7.
    As Landlord was not there to object, he cannot now
    argue that it should not have been admitted because there was no “testimony
    by a witness to corroborate the contents thereof.” Appellant’s Brief at 23; see
    also Bell v. City of Philadelphia, 
    491 A.2d 1386
    , 1390 (Pa. Super. 1985)
    (“To avoid waiver, a party must make a timely objection.”).
    Second, Tenants’ counsel presented the court with eight exhibits,
    including a copy of the lease; a receipt from Landlord for Tenants’ $2,050
    security deposit; emails between Landlord and Tenants regarding their
    termination of the lease; a letter sent by Tenants to Landlord terminating the
    lease and providing copies of Tenants’ military orders for relocation; a letter
    to Landlord from Tenants’ attorney explaining that the lease had been
    terminated, and requesting that Landlord return Tenants’ security deposit;
    photographs of the apartment showing that Tenants had left it relatively clean
    and undamaged; and copies of the legal invoices that Tenants had paid to
    their attorney.
    Id. at 8-11.
    The court effectively admitted those documents
    by directing counsel to “submit all of those exhibits[,]” and stating that it
    would “put all of them in the file.”
    Id. at 13.
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    Therefore, contrary to Appellant’s argument, the court’s verdict was
    premised on evidence that was admitted into the record, without objection
    from Landlord, who was absent from the trial without a satisfactory excuse.
    Accordingly, no relief is due.
    Judgment affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 6/8/2020
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Document Info

Docket Number: 1437 WDA 2019

Filed Date: 6/8/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 6/8/2020