Com. v. Kennedy, E. ( 2020 )


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  • J-S21039-20
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :         PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                              :
    :
    :
    ERIC MATTHEW KENNEDY,                      :
    :
    Appellant                :          No. 1564 WDA 2019
    Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered September 17, 2019
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Somerset County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-56-CR-0000308-2011
    BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., DUBOW, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.:                                   FILED JUNE 09, 2020
    Eric Matthew Kennedy (“Kennedy”) appeals from the Order dismissing
    his second Petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act
    (“PCRA”). See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
    On March 5, 2012, Kennedy entered a negotiated guilty plea to two
    counts each of rape and rape of a child.1           The trial court ordered a pre-
    sentence    investigation report, and          directed    Kennedy   to   undergo   an
    evaluation by the Sexual Offenders Assessment Board. On June 20, 2012,
    following a hearing, the trial court sentenced Kennedy to an aggregate term
    of 10 to 40 years in prison, and designated him a sexually violent predator
    (“SVP”) pursuant to Megan’s Law. Kennedy did not file a direct appeal.
    ____________________________________________
    1   See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3121(a)(1), 3121(c).
    J-S21039-20
    On August 15, 2016, Kennedy, represented by counsel, filed his first
    PCRA Petition. On August 3, 2018, following a hearing, the PCRA court filed
    Notice of its intent to dismiss Kennedy’s Petition.        On August 23, 2018,
    Kennedy filed a Response. On August 31, 2018, the PCRA court dismissed
    Kennedy’s PCRA Petition.
    On November 26, 2018, Kennedy filed the instant, counseled, PCRA
    Petition, his second. On May 17, 2019, following a hearing, the PCRA court
    filed Notice of its intent to dismiss Kennedy’s second PCRA Petition. On June
    6, 2019, Kennedy filed a Response.             On September 17, 2019, the PCRA
    court dismissed Kennedy’s Petition. Kennedy filed a timely Notice of Appeal
    and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statement of matters
    complained of on appeal.
    On appeal, Kennedy presents the following questions for our review:
    1. Whether the [PCRA] court erred in dismissing [Kennedy’s]
    claim for post-conviction relief because [Commonwealth v.
    Muniz, 
    164 A.2d 1189
     (Pa. 2017),2] and its progeny confirmed
    United States and Pennsylvania substantive constitutional rights
    that cannot be abrogated by any statute[,] including the
    jurisdictional grounds under the PCRA timeliness exception at 42
    Pa.C.S.A. §[ ]9545(b)(1)(iii)?
    ____________________________________________
    2 Our Supreme Court in Muniz held that the registration requirements
    established by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”)
    (the successor to Megan’s Law) constitute criminal punishment, as opposed
    to a mere civil penalty, and therefore, their retroactive application violates
    the ex post facto clause of the U.S. Constitution. See Muniz, 164 A.3d at
    1192.
    -2-
    J-S21039-20
    2. Whether the lower court erred in dismissing [Kennedy’s] claim
    requesting [that] his [SVP] classification be vacated, because the
    statutory mechanism undertaking the adjudication of the [SVP]
    status is flawed per the rulings in Muniz and [Commonwealth
    v. Butler, 
    173 A.3d 1212
     (Pa. Super. 2017)3]?
    Brief for Appellant at 3.
    We review an order dismissing a petition under the PCRA
    in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA
    level. This review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and
    the evidence of the record. We will not disturb a PCRA court’s
    ruling if it is supported by evidence of record and is free of legal
    error.
    Commonwealth v. Ford, 
    44 A.3d 1190
    , 1194 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations
    omitted).
    Under the PCRA, any PCRA petition “shall be filed within one year of
    the date the judgment becomes final.”            42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).   A
    judgment of sentence becomes final “at the conclusion of direct review,
    including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and
    the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking
    the review.”     Id. § 9545(b)(3).        The PCRA’s timeliness requirements are
    jurisdictional in nature, and a court may not address the merits of the issues
    raised if the PCRA petition was not timely filed.            Commonwealth v.
    Albrecht, 
    994 A.2d 1091
    , 1093 (Pa. 2010).
    ____________________________________________
    3 Our decision in Butler was recently reversed and remanded by our
    Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Butler, 
    2020 WL 1466299
    , ___ A.3d
    ___ (Pa. Mar. 26, 2020).
    -3-
    J-S21039-20
    Here, Kennedy’s judgment of sentence became final on July 20, 2012,
    when the time to appeal to this Court expired. See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). Thus,
    Kennedy had until July 22, 2013,4 to file a timely PCRA Petition. The instant
    Petition, which was filed on November 26, 2018, is thus facially untimely.
    See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b).
    However, Pennsylvania courts may consider an untimely petition if the
    petitioner can explicitly plead and prove one of three exceptions set forth at
    42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).            Any PCRA Petition invoking one of the
    exceptions “shall be filed within one year of the date the claim could have
    been presented.” Id. § 9545(b)(2). The PCRA petitioner bears the burden
    of proving the applicability of one of the exceptions.            Commonwealth v.
    Edmiston, 
    65 A.3d 339
    , 346 (Pa. 2013).
    Kennedy purports to invoke the newly-recognized constitutional right
    exception at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(iii), alleging that his sentence is
    illegal as a result of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Muniz.
    However,      Kennedy      has    failed    to   prove   the   newly-recognized
    constitutional right exception.         As our Supreme Court has explained, this
    exception has two requirements:
    First, it provides that the right asserted is a constitutional right
    that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States
    or [the Pennsylvania Supreme Court] after the time provided in
    ____________________________________________
    4July 20, 2013, was a Saturday. Therefore, Kennedy was required to file his
    Petition by Monday, July 22, 2013. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908.
    -4-
    J-S21039-20
    this section. Second, it provides that the right “has been held”
    by “that court” to apply retroactively. Thus, a petitioner must
    prove that there is a “new” constitutional right and that
    the right “has been held” by that court to apply
    retroactively. The language “has been held” is in the past
    tense. These words mean that the action has already occurred,
    i.e., “that court” has already held the new constitutional right to
    be retroactive to cases on collateral review. By employing the
    past tense in writing this provision, the legislature clearly
    intended that the right was already recognized at the time the
    petition was filed.
    Commonwealth v. Spotz, 
    171 A.3d 675
    , 679 (Pa. 2017) (citation omitted,
    emphasis added).
    This    Court   has   previously   recognized   that   “Muniz   created   a
    substantive rule that retroactively applies in the collateral context.”
    Commonwealth v. Rivera-Figueroa, 
    174 A.3d 674
    , 678 (Pa. Super.
    2017).     However, because Kennedy’s PCRA Petition is facially untimely
    (unlike the timely filed first petition at issue in Rivera-Figueroa), he must
    demonstrate that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that Muniz
    applies retroactively in order to satisfy Section 9545(b)(1)(iii).            See
    Commonwealth v. Murphy, 
    180 A.3d 402
    , 405-06 (Pa. Super. 2018)
    (recognizing that to invoke the timeliness exception at subsection (iii), the
    petitioner must demonstrate that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held
    that Muniz applies retroactively); accord Commonwealth v. Greco, 
    203 A.3d 1120
    , 1124 (Pa. Super. 2019).           To date, the Pennsylvania Supreme
    Court     has    not    expressly   held    that   Muniz   applies   retroactively.
    -5-
    J-S21039-20
    Consequently, Kennedy cannot rely on Muniz to meet that timeliness
    exception.5 See 
    id.
    Because Kennedy has not demonstrated an exception to the PCRA’s
    timeliness requirement, we affirm the Order of the PCRA court.
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 6/9/2020
    ____________________________________________
    5 We note that Kennedy was sentenced under Megan’s Law, not SORNA, and
    there is no indication in the record that SORNA was retroactively applied to
    Kennedy.
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1564 WDA 2019

Filed Date: 6/9/2020

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024