In the Interest of: E.S., Appeal of: A.L. ( 2020 )

J-A18027-20 & J-A18028-20
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF E.S., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: A.L. :
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: No. 301 WDA 2020
Appeal from the Order Entered February 5, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans' Court at
No(s): CP-02-AP-0000168-2019
IN THE INTEREST OF: E.S., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: Z.S. :
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:
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: No. 322 WDA 2020
Appeal from the Order Entered February 3, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans' Court at
No(s): CP-02-AP-0000168-2019
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and NICHOLS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED JULY 16, 2020
In these appeals, Z.S. (“Father”) and A.L. (“Mother”) challenge the
Orders entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans’
Court, dated February 3, 2020, and entered on February 5, 2020, involuntarily
terminating their parental rights to their daughter, E.S., born in September
J-A18027-20 & J-A18028-20
2017 (“Child”).1 Because the record supports the decision of the orphans’
court, we affirm the Orders.
SUMMARY OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
We glean the following factual and procedural history from the orphans’
court’s opinion, which is supported by the certified record. Orphans’ Court
Opinion, 4/6/20, at 4-11. On November 20, 2017, Child’s pediatrician noticed
bruising on Child’s face during a routine examination and directed Mother and
Father, who are Child’s primary caregivers, to take Child to the emergency
room. At Children’s Hospital of Pittsburgh (“CHP”), hospital staff discovered
that, in addition to facial bruising, then two-month-old Child had four fractured
ribs in various stages of healing. Mother and Father could not provide a
plausible explanation for Child’s injuries. Accordingly, the Allegheny County
Office of Children, Youth, and Families (“CYF”) obtained emergency protective
custody of Child.
CYF filed a dependency petition and, at the adjudication hearing on
December 21, 2017,2 Mother and Father stipulated to the testimony of Dr.
Jennifer Wolford, CHP physician, namely, that Child’s facial bruising was
caused by direct trauma, not a pacifier as Mother and Father claimed. Mother
and Father further stipulated that Child’s multiple rib fractures had been
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1On March 5, 2020, this Court ordered, sua sponte, that the appeals be listed
consecutively.
2 The court appointed KidsVoice to be Child’s guardian ad litem.
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healing for three to four weeks, were caused by squeezing, and would have
caused substantial pain. Child was adjudicated dependent.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the Commonwealth arrested Mother
and Father and charged them both with Endangering the Welfare of Children
(“EWOC”).3 Ultimately they both pleaded guilty to EWOC. The court sentenced
them each to three years’ probation, and ordered them to take a parenting
class.
The dependency court developed a Permanent Placement Plan (“Plan”)
with a goal of reunification. Mother’s and Father’s objectives, essentially
identical, included: completing a non-offenders’ parenting class; continuing
visits with Child; cooperating with the criminal process and alleviating any
criminal restrictions; working with in-home services and completing a coached
parenting program; completing budgeting and independent living programs;
obtaining appropriate housing; and undergoing a mental health evaluation and
attending treatment as needed. Notes of Testimony (“N.T.”), 2/3/20, at 42-
45.
On May 29, 2018, September 11, 2018, and December 4, 2018, the
court held permanency review hearings. At each hearing, the court found
both parents in substantial compliance with the Plan, and having made
moderate progress towards alleviating the circumstances necessitating the
placement. The placement goal remained reunification after each hearing.
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3 18 Pa.C.S. § 4304.
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On March 6, 2019, the court held a permanency review hearing and
again found Mother and Father had made moderate progress and were in
substantial compliance with the Plan. The court noted that Parents had
participated in supervised visits with Child three times a week and the
overseeing agency had reported no concerns. However, the court entered a
finding of aggravated circumstances against Mother and Father because
Mother testified that she still believed that Child’s pacifier caused her facial
bruising and both parents continued to deny abusing Child despite their guilty
pleas to EWOC. The court, nonetheless, kept the reunification goal and
ordered that reasonable efforts to reunify continue.
On June 12, 2019, the court held a permanency review hearing and
again found Mother and Father were in substantial compliance with the Plan
and had made moderate progress. At that time, the court expanded Mother’s
and Father’s visitation to three overnights per week, unsupervised. Child’s
permanency goal remained reunification.
On July 6, 2019, following an unsupervised visit with her parents, Child
returned to her foster home with bruising around her ear. Foster Parents took
Child to an urgent care center and then to the emergency room at CHP.
Mother and Father claimed that Child had fallen out of her toddler bed.
However, Dr. Adelaide Eichman, a CHP physician, opined that the bruising was
suspicious for abuse and not consistent with a short fall.
On September 4, 2019, the court held a permanency review hearing and
again found that Mother and Father were in substantial compliance with the
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Plan, and had made moderate progress towards reunification. However, the
court found Mother’s and Father’s explanations for Child’s new injuries
suspicious. Although Mother and Father had completed classes through
Arsenal and Family Resources, the court ordered CYF to determine if there
were additional parenting classes that might be appropriate for them.
On that same date, CYF filed petitions to involuntarily terminate
Mother’s and Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2),
(5), (8), and (b). Child was then two years old and had been in foster care
all but two months of her life. The court appointed the Office of Conflict
Counsel to represent Child’s legal interests.
The court held a permanency review hearing on November 13, 2019,
and again found Mother and Father in substantial compliance with the Plan,
and having made moderate progress towards reunification. At that time,
Child’s permanency goal remained reunification.
However, following a weekend visit with Mother and Father from January
3, 2020, to January 6, 2020, Child again returned to her foster home with
facial bruising. Foster parents took her to CHP, where she was examined by
Dr. Eichman. Parents claimed that Child was hit in the face with a basketball.
However, Dr. Eichman testified that, in her opinion, Child’s injury was
consistent with impact trauma inflicted by a hand. Dr. Eichman expressed
concerns that Child continued to be injured and abused, and that her head
was a consistent target. Father was again charged with EWOC and aggravated
assault in connection with Child’s injuries.
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The orphans’ court conducted a hearing on the TPR petition on February
3, 2020, when Child was 28 months old.4 Mother and Father were represented
by separate counsel. CYF presented the testimony of Kathy Gary, Mother’s
and Father’s probation officer; Dr. Adelaide Eichman, CHP physician; Erin
Burzynski, CYF caseworker; and Dr. Terry O’Hara, a forensic psychologist who
performed evaluations of both Mother and Father. Mother testified on her own
behalf and presented the testimony of Anjel Gilliam, the Holy Family Institute
in-home family counselor. Father testified on his own behalf.5 Attorney Spurr
presented the testimony of Shelva Ulery, foster care specialist with the Bair
Foundation.6
On February 5, 2020, the orphans’ court entered Orders involuntarily
terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to Child pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). Thereafter, Mother and Father timely
filed Notices of Appeal and Concise Statements of Errors Complained of on
Appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).
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4 At the hearing, Attorney Andrea Spurr represented Child’s legal interests.
KidsVoice remained guardian ad litem, although no representative from
KidsVoice appeared at the hearing.
5Father was incarcerated at the time of the hearing in connection with an
unrelated case.
6 At the conclusion of the hearing, Attorney Spurr noted that she had spoken
with Child and that Child did not understand the concept of adoption,
termination of parental rights, or a “forever home.” N.T., 2/3/20, at 192-93.
Attorney Spurr argued in favor of the involuntary termination of Mother’s and
Father’s parental rights. Id. at 192-94. In this Court, she has filed a brief in
support of the orphans’ court’s decision. Appellee’s Brief at 12-22.
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ISSUES ON APPEAL
Mother raises the following issues for our review:
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter of
law in granting the petition to involuntarily terminate Mother’s
parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (5), and (8)?
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter of
law in concluding that CYF met its burden of proving by clear and
convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights
would best serve the needs and welfare of [Child] pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S. § 2511(b)?
Mother’s Brief at 6.
Father raises the following issues for our review:
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter of
law in granting the petition to involuntarily terminate Father’s
parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2)?
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter of
law in granting the petition to involuntarily terminate Father’s
parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(5), and (8)?
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter of
law in concluding that CYF met its burden of proving by clear and
convincing evidence that termination of Father’s parental rights
would best serve the needs and welfare of [Child] pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S. § 2511(b)?
Father’s Brief at 6-7 (answers omitted).
LEGAL ANALYSIS
In reviewing cases in which the orphans’ court involuntarily terminated
parental rights, appellate courts must accept the findings of fact and credibility
determinations of the orphans’ court if the record supports them. In re
T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). If the record supports the factual
findings, appellate courts then determine if the orphans’ court made an error
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of law or abused its discretion. Id. Where the competent record evidence
supports the court’s findings, we must affirm the orphans’ court decree even
though the record could support an opposite result. In re Adoption of
Atencio, 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Pa. 1994).
“The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence
presented, and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and
resolve conflicts in the evidence.” In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73–74 (Pa. Super.
2004) (citations omitted). Appellate courts defer to the orphans’ court that
often has “first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple
hearings.” In re T.S.M., supra at 267 (citations and quotation marks
omitted). Importantly, “[t]he court cannot and will not subordinate
indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to a parent’s claims of
progress and hope for the future. Indeed, we work under statutory and case
law that contemplates only a short period of time . . . in which to complete
the process of either reunification or adoption for a child who has been placed
in foster care.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa. Super.
2006) (emphasis in original; citations omitted).
In addressing petitions to terminate parental rights involuntarily, the
Adoption Act requires the court to conduct a bifurcated analysis. See 23
Pa.C.S. § 2511(a) and (b). The court first focuses on the conduct of the
parent, and, if the party seeking termination presents clear and convincing
evidence that the parent’s conduct meets one of the grounds for termination
set forth in Section 2511(a), then the court will analyze whether termination
of parental rights will meet the needs and welfare of the child, i.e., the best
interests of the child, as provided in Section 2511(b). The courts must
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examine the existence of the child’s bond with the parent, if any, and the
potential effect on the child of severing such bond. In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505,
511 (Pa. Super. 2007). A parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody
and rearing of his child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill his parental
duties, to the child’s right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of the
child’s potential in a permanent, healthy, safe environment. In re B.N.M.,
856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa. Super. 2004) (internal citations omitted).
While the orphans’ court here found that CYF met its burden of proof
under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8) and (b) with regard to Mother and
Father, we need only agree with its decision as to any one subsection of
Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b), in order to affirm the termination
of parental rights. See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004)
(en banc). Here, we will focus our analysis on Section 2511(a)(2) and (b),
which provide as follows:
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
***
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for
his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and
causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or
will not be remedied by the parent.
***
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
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physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2) and (b).
Termination Pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2)
We first conclude that the court properly exercised its discretion by
terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section
2511(a)(2). Section 2511(a)(2) provides for termination of parental rights
where the petitioner demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that
“[t]he repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the
parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions
and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
remedied by the parent.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2); In re Adoption of S.P.,
47 A.3d 817, 827 (Pa. 2012) (citations omitted). The grounds for termination
of parental rights under Section 2511(a)(2) due to parental incapacity are not
limited to affirmative misconduct; to the contrary, those grounds may include
acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties. In re A.L.D.,
797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002). This Court has long recognized that a
parent is required to make diligent efforts towards the reasonably prompt
assumption of full parental responsibilities. Id.- 10 -
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Mother’s Appeal
Mother contends that that there was insufficient evidence to support the
conclusion that the conditions leading to the removal of Child cannot be
remedied by Mother within a reasonable amount of time. Mother’s Brief at
31. Mother argues that the doctor’s diagnoses of Child’s injuries as indicative
of child abuse were subjective and unreliable, particularly where Mother could
not provide a plausible explanation to the doctor for injuries she did not cause
or witness. Id. at 32.
In its opinion, the orphans’ court concluded that Child had spent twenty-
six consecutive months in foster care, and that Mother was unable to make
the necessary progress and acknowledgement of her parental deficiencies to
remedy the conditions leading to Child’s removal. Orphans’ Court Opinion,
4/6/20, at 12. The court noted that, although Mother had cooperated with
and completed many of her Plan objectives, she still could not demonstrate
that she could keep Child safe from intentionally inflicted injuries that
amounted to child abuse. Id. at 13-17. Specifically, the court noted
unrefuted evidence that, during unsupervised visitation with parents, there
were two additional injuries that occurred to Child in July 2019 and January
2020. Id. Expert testimony and medical records supported that the distinct,
parallel linear bruising on Child’s left cheek and temple in January 2020 did
not match Mother’s and Father’s explanations for the injury, and were
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indicative of child abuse.7 Id. at 17. Additionally, Mother entered a guilty
plea to EWOC based on the injuries which had caused Child’s removal, despite
her continued insistence at later proceedings that she had not injured Child.
Id. at 18. Finally, the court concluded that there was no competent evidence
or testimony that Mother “can or will be able to soon demonstrate, with any
degree of confidence, an independent ability to ensure this child’s long-term
safety.” Id. at 17-18.
Thus, the court concluded that Child lacked essential parental care, and
that Mother’s inability to ensure Child’s safety was the source of her repeated
and continued parental incapacity. Id.
Having reviewed the record, we conclude that it supports the findings of
the orphans’ court that Mother has not provided Child with the essential
parental care, control and subsistence necessary for Child’s mental and
physical well-being, and that Mother is unable to remedy the causes of her
parental incapacity, neglect or refusal any time in the foreseeable future.
Thus, Mother is not entitled to relief.
Father’s Appeal
Father contends that the orphans’ court erred when it determined that
CYF had met its burden and proved that Child was without essential parental
care and control, and that repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect,
or refusal existed. Father’s Brief at 19. Father argues that his completion of
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7 Dr. Eichman testified that she found the parents’ explanation for the July
2019 injuries unlikely because a child falling from a toddler bed “would not be
expected to cause really any injury, but particularly not ear bruising or scalp
petechia.” N.T., 2/3/20, at 19.
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all of the services ordered for him, as well as his court-ordered goals, displays
competent evidence that he can ensure Child’s long-term safety. Id. at 21-
22.
The orphans’ court’s analysis regarding Father’s claims mirrors its
analysis of Mother’s claims. Specifically, the court noted that Child had spent
the majority of her life in care and that Father had not made the necessary
progress to remedy the conditions leading to Child’s removal. Orphans’ Court
Opinion, 4/6/20, at 12. Although Father had completed many of his Plan
objectives and services, the court emphasized that Child was still injured twice
during unsupervised visitation with her parents, and testimony and evidence
supported the conclusion that the injuries were indicative of Child abuse. Id.
at 13-17. Further, although Father had entered a guilty plea to EWOC, he
continued to deny having injured Child, and offered implausible explanations
for Child’s July 2019 and January 2020 injuries. Id. Finally, the court
concluded that there was no competent evidence or testimony that Father
“can or will be able to soon demonstrate, with any degree of confidence, an
independent ability to ensure this child’s long-term safety.” Id. at 17-18.
Having reviewed the record, we conclude that it supports the findings of
the orphans’ court that Father has not provided Child with the essential
parental care, control and subsistence necessary for Child’s mental and
physical well-being, and that Father is unable to remedy the causes of his
parental incapacity, neglect or refusal any time in the foreseeable future.
Thus, Father is not entitled to relief.
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Termination Pursuant to 2511(b)
With respect to Section 2511(b), we consider whether termination of
parental rights will best serve Child’s developmental, physical, and emotional
needs and welfare. See In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010).
“In this context, the court must take into account whether a bond exists
between child and parent, and whether termination would destroy an existing,
necessary and beneficial relationship.” Id. “[A] parent’s basic constitutional
right to the custody and rearing of . . . her child is converted, upon the failure
to fulfill . . . her parental duties, to the child’s right to have proper parenting
and fulfillment of [the child’s] potential in a permanent, healthy, safe
environment.” In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa. Super. 2004) (internal
citations omitted).
It is sufficient for the orphans’ court to rely on the opinions of social
workers and caseworkers when evaluating the impact that termination of
parental rights will have on a child. In re Z.P., supra at 1121. The trial court
may consider intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability the
child might have with the foster parent. See In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103
(Pa. Super. 2011). Ultimately, the concern is the needs and welfare of a child.
In re Z.P., supra at 1121.
The orphans’ court may equally emphasize the safety needs of the child
and may consider intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability
the child might have with the foster parent. In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d at 103.
Where there is no evidence of a bond between the parent and child, it is
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reasonable to infer that no bond exists. See In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 763
(Pa. Super. 2008). Where there is evidence of a bond, the court must
determine whether the child’s welfare and safety outweighs any benefits
provided by that bond. See In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121.
Mother’s Appeal
Mother contends that the court erred in concluding that CYF met its
burden under Section 2511(b), because the testimony supports the contention
that Child loves and is bonded with Mother. Mother’s Brief at 36-37. Mother
additionally argues that there is no expert opinion supporting a determination
that termination of Mother’s parental rights best serves the needs and welfare
of Child. Id. at 37.
The orphans’ court relied on the testimony of CYS caseworker Burzynski,
Bair Foundation caseworker Ulery, and Dr. O’Hara. Orphans’ Court Opinion,
4/6/20, at 20-22. Ms. Burzynski testified that Child referred to both parents
as mom and dad, and did not seem uncomfortable in their care; however,
Child also referred to her foster parents as mom and dad and was unphased
with lapses in visit with Mother and Father. Id. at 20. Ms. Burzynski testified
that Child was in care for all but two months of her life, and that, on
unsupervised visitations, sustained injuries consistent with child abuse. Id.
Ms. Burzynski testified that it was in Child’s best interests for parents’ rights
to be terminated. Id. Ms. Ulery testified that Child loves and adores her
foster brothers and views her foster parents as her parents. Id. at 20-21. Dr.
O’Hara observed an interactional between Mother and Child, and Child showed
some signs of attachment to Mother. Id. at 21. Mother praised Child, showed
affection, was interactively playful, and could gain Child’s compliance. Id.
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However, foster mother also showed positive parenting skills, and Child
interacted very well with foster mother. Id. 8 Dr. O’Hara’s opinion was that
the foster home was an appropriate potential adoptive resource. Id.
The court concluded that severing Child’s bond with Mother would “not
cause extreme emotional consequences . . . and any negative consequences
would be mitigated by the strong, healthy and secure bond that [Child] had
established with the foster family that she had resided [with] for the last
twenty months.” Id. at 22. The termination would be able to provide Child
with the stability and permanence needed at her young age. Id.
Further, the court may consider the safety needs of a child and prioritize
those needs over the existence of a parental bond. In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d at
103. Here, the safety needs of Child were implicated, as she suffered two
additional injuries diagnostic of child abuse while in the unsupervised custody
of Mother. Although there was affection between Mother and Child, Child’s
need for safety, permanency, and stability outweighed the need to keep that
bond. Id.Thus, the record confirms that the orphans’ court properly determined
that terminating Mother’s parental rights would best serve Child’s needs and
welfare. While Child had a relationship with Mother, their relationship is not
one that is necessary and beneficial. See In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121.
Father’s Appeal
Father contends that the orphans’ court erred in finding that CYF met
its burden under Section 2511(b), because there was clearly a bond of love
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8 Dr. O’Hara did not observe Child interacting with Father as he was in the
military and deployed overseas at the time. Ms. Ulery testified that Child and
foster father communicate regularly over Facetime.
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and affection between Child and Father. Father’s Brief at 24-27. Father
contends that the orphans’ court focused, in error, on the testimony of Dr.
O’Hara regarding Child’s ability to better weather the stress of termination due
to her bond with foster mother. Id. at 26.
The orphans’ court’s analysis of the evidence presented at the hearing
was identical to the analysis with regard to Mother. Specifically, the testimony
of Ms. Burzsynski, Ms. Ulery, and Dr. O’Hara that Child was comfortable and
affectionate with Father, but also comfortable and affectionate with her foster
mother, and that the foster home was an appropriate adoptive resource.
Orphans’ Court Opinion, 4/6/20, supra. In contrast, Father’s argument
focuses on his bond with Child and contends that the trial court focused solely
on Dr. O’Hara’s testimony that Child would be better equipped to handle the
stress of termination due to her bond with foster mother.
Our review indicates that the court appropriately considered the bond
between foster mother and Child as provided in Dr. O’Hara’s testimony and
established case law. Here, when asked whether there would be a detriment
to Child if Father’s rights were terminated, Dr. O’Hara answered in the
affirmative, but noted that Child’s bond with the foster mother would alleviate
some of that stress. N.T., 2/3/20, at 93-94.
Father’s argument is unpersuasive and discounts the fact that the court
may focus on safety concerns regarding the Child in addition to the bonds the
Child may or may not have with parents or foster parents. In re N.A.M., 33
A.3d at 103. See also In re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267 (observing that “courts
considering termination must also consider whether the children are in a pre-
adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster parents.”). In
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the instant case, the court weighed the positive interactions between Father
and Child against the injuries that occurred repeatedly while Child was in
Father’s care. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 4/6/20, supra. Here, the record
supports the contention that, despite the bond between Father and Child,
safety concerns and Child’s need for permanency outweighed any positive
value from that bond. In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d at 103.
Our review of the record supports the orphans’ court’s determination
and we discern no abuse of discretion or error of law. We, thus, affirm the
court’s determination that involuntary termination of Mother’s and Father’s
parental rights is in the best interests of Child. Therefore, we affirm the
orphans’ court’s February 5, 2020, Orders.
Orders affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/16/2020
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