Com. v. Rose, G. ( 2020 )


Menu:
  • J-S16032-20
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :         PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                              :
    :
    :
    GIANNA MARIE ROSE,                         :
    :
    Appellant                :      No. 2059 EDA 2019
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 13, 2019
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Pike County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-52-CR-0000390-2018,
    CP-52-CR-0000401-2018, CP-52-CR-0000402-2018
    BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.:                             FILED AUGUST 07, 2020
    Gianna Marie Rose (“Rose”) appeals from the judgment of sentence
    imposed following her negotiated guilty plea to criminal conspiracy and drug
    delivery resulting in death at Pike County docket number 390-2018 (“390-
    2018”), and delivery of a controlled substance at Pike County docket
    numbers 401-2018 (“401-2018”) and 402-2018 (“402-2018”).1 Additionally,
    Rose’s counsel, Lindsey Collins, Esquire (“Attorney Collins”), has filed a
    Petition to Withdraw as counsel and an accompanying brief pursuant to
    Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
    , 744 (1967).              We grant Attorney
    Collins’s Petition to Withdraw and affirm Rose’s judgment of sentence.
    ____________________________________________
    1   18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 903(a)(1), 2506(a); 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).
    J-S16032-20
    On April 18, 2019, Rose entered a guilty plea to the above-mentioned
    offenses. On June 13, 2019, the trial court sentenced Rose, at 390-2018, to
    66 months to 12 years in prison for the charge of criminal conspiracy and a
    consecutive term of 78 months to 13 years in prison for the charge of drug
    delivery resulting in death; and at 401-2018 and 402-2018, to 6 to 12
    months in prison at each, to be served concurrently with each other and the
    charges at 390-2018.       Rose did not file any post-sentence motions.   Rose
    filed timely Notices of Appeal, one at each docket number, and with all three
    docket numbers listed on each.        Rose additionally filed a court-ordered
    Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statement of matters complained of on appeal.
    On August 9, 2019, this Court issued a Rule to Show Cause why Rose’s
    appeal should not be quashed in light of Commonwealth v. Walker, 
    185 A.3d 969
    , 977 (Pa. 2018) (stating that “when a single order resolves issues
    arising on more than one lower court docket, separate notices of appeal
    must be filed.   The failure to do so will result in quashal of the appeal.”
    (citing Pa.R.A.P. 341)).    See also Commonwealth v. Creese, 
    216 A.3d 1142
    , 1144 (Pa. Super. 2019) (quashing an appeal, pursuant to Walker,
    where the appellant filed a notice of appeal at each docket number, but each
    notice of appeal contained multiple docket numbers).      Attorney Collins did
    not file a response. On August 21, 2019, Attorney Collins filed a “Petition for
    Leave of Court to Amend the Notice of Appeal and Submit Nunc Pro Tunc.”
    On October 4, 2019, this Court entered an Order informing the parties that
    -2-
    J-S16032-20
    disposition of the Walker issue and Attorney Collins’s Petition would be
    deferred to the merits panel.
    Subsequently, this Court granted en banc review of two cases to
    address the issue presented by Walker and Creese; i.e., whether the
    inclusion of multiple docket numbers on a notice of appeal violates Walker
    and Pa.R.A.P. 341. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 
    2020 Pa. Super. 164
    ,
    at *4 (Pa. Super. filed July 9, 2020) (en banc); Commonwealth v. Larkin,
    
    2020 Pa. Super. 163
    , at *3 (Pa. Super. filed July 9, 2020) (en banc). On July
    9, 2020, this Court in Johnson and Larkin held that where separate notices
    of appeal are filed at each docket number, the inclusion of multiple docket
    numbers on each notice of appeal does not invalidate the notices of appeal,
    thereby overruling Creese, and declined to quash the appeals.            See
    Johnson, 
    2020 Pa. Super. 164
    , at *12; Larkin, 
    2020 Pa. Super. 163
    , at *3.
    Instantly, Rose filed three notices of appeal, one at each docket, and
    each of which contained all three docket numbers.      Pursuant to Johnson
    and Larkin, we conclude that Rose has complied with Walker and Pa.R.A.P.
    341.
    Before addressing Rose’s claim on appeal, we must determine whether
    Attorney Collins has complied with the dictates of Anders and its progeny in
    petitioning to withdraw from representation.       See Commonwealth v.
    Mitchell, 
    986 A.2d 1241
    , 1244 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2009) (stating that “[w]hen
    presented with an Anders brief, this Court may not review the merits of the
    underlying issues without first passing on the request to withdraw.”).
    -3-
    J-S16032-20
    Pursuant to Anders, when counsel believes that an appeal is frivolous
    and wishes to withdraw from representation, he or she must
    (1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that after
    making a conscientious examination of the record and
    interviewing the defendant, counsel has determined the appeal
    would be frivolous, (2) file a brief referring to any issues in the
    record of arguable merit, and (3) furnish a copy of the brief to
    defendant and advise him of his right to retain new counsel or to
    raise any additional points that he deems worthy of the court’s
    attention. The determination of whether the appeal is frivolous
    remains with the court.
    Commonwealth v. Burwell, 
    42 A.3d 1077
    , 1083 (Pa. Super. 2012)
    (citation omitted).
    Additionally, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained that a
    proper Anders brief must
    (1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with
    citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that
    counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth
    counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state
    counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous.
    Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling
    case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the
    conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.
    Commonwealth v. Santiago, 
    978 A.2d 349
    , 361 (Pa. 2009).
    After determining that counsel has satisfied the technical requirements
    of Anders and Santiago, this Court must then “conduct a simple review of
    the record to ascertain if there appear on its face to be arguably meritorious
    issues   that   counsel,   intentionally   or   not,   missed   or   misstated.”
    -4-
    J-S16032-20
    Commonwealth v. Dempster, 
    187 A.3d 266
    , 272 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en
    banc).
    In the instant case, our review of the Anders Brief and the Petition to
    Withdraw reveals that Attorney Collins has substantially complied with each
    of the requirements of Anders/Santiago.            See Commonwealth v.
    Wrecks, 
    934 A.2d 1287
    , 1290 (Pa. Super. 2007) (stating that counsel must
    substantially comply with the requirements of Anders).        Attorney Collins
    indicates that she has made a conscientious examination of the record and
    determined that an appeal would be frivolous.      Further, Attorney Collins’s
    Anders Brief comports with the requirements set forth by the Supreme
    Court of Pennsylvania in Santiago. Finally, Attorney Collins provided Rose
    with a copy of the Anders Brief, and advised her of her rights to proceed
    pro se, retain new counsel, or raise any additional points deemed worthy of
    the Court’s attention.      Thus, Attorney Collins has complied with the
    procedural requirements for withdrawing from representation.         We next
    examine the record and make an independent determination of whether
    Rose’s appeal is, in fact, wholly frivolous.
    Attorney Collins presents the following issue, on behalf of Rose, for our
    review:   “Whether the trial court erred in imposing an excessive sentence
    when sentencing [Rose] at the highest range of the sentencing guidelines on
    the charges of drug delivery resulting in death and criminal conspiracy to
    -5-
    J-S16032-20
    commit drug delivery resulting in death?” Anders Brief at 7 (capitalization
    omitted).
    This issue challenges the discretionary aspects of Rose’s sentence. “A
    challenge to the discretionary aspects of sentencing is not automatically
    reviewable as a matter of right.” Commonwealth v. Grays, 
    167 A.3d 793
    ,
    815 (Pa. Super. 2017).     Prior to reaching the merits of a discretionary
    sentencing issue,
    [w]e conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether
    appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902
    and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at
    sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence,
    see [Pa.R.Crim.P. 720]; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal
    defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial
    question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate
    under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).
    
    Grays, 167 A.3d at 815-16
    (citation omitted).
    Rose, via Attorney Collins, filed a timely Notice of Appeal. However,
    Rose failed to preserve her claim in a post-sentence motion.             See
    Commonwealth v. Conte, 
    198 A.3d 1169
    , 1173 (Pa. Super. 2018) (stating
    that “issues challenging the discretionary aspects of a sentence must be
    raised in a post-sentence motion or by presenting the claim to the trial court
    during the sentencing proceedings. Absent such efforts, an objection to a
    discretionary aspect of a sentence is waived.”); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a)
    (stating that “[i]ssues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot
    -6-
    J-S16032-20
    be raised for the first time on appeal.”).2 Moreover, we are unable to review
    Rose’s claim, because Rose has failed to request with the trial court, and
    include in the certified record, the transcript for Rose’s sentencing hearing.
    See Commonwealth v. Lopez, 
    57 A.3d 74
    , 82 (Pa. Super. 2012) (stating
    that “it is an appellant’s duty to ensure that the certified record is complete
    for purposes of review. … [F]ailure to ensure that the record provides
    sufficient information to conduct a meaningful review constitutes waiver of
    the issue sought to be reviewed.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)).
    Accordingly, Rose’s claim is waived.
    Finally, our independent review of the record discloses no additional
    non-frivolous issues that could be raised on appeal. See 
    Dempster, supra
    .
    We therefore grant Attorney Kelly’s Petition, and affirm Rose’s judgment of
    sentence.
    Petition to Withdraw granted. Petition for Leave of Court to Amend the
    Notice of Appeal denied as moot. Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    ____________________________________________
    2 We note that Attorney Collins also did not include a Rule 2119(f) statement
    within the Anders brief. See 
    Grays, supra
    . Nevertheless, we decline to
    waive Rose’s claim on this ground because the Commonwealth has not
    objected to this deficiency. See Commonwealth v. White, 
    193 A.3d 977
    ,
    982 (Pa. Super. 2018) (declining to waive an appellant’s claim for failure to
    include a Rule 2119(f) statement where the Commonwealth did not object).
    -7-
    J-S16032-20
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 8/7/20
    -8-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2059 EDA 2019

Filed Date: 8/7/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/7/2020