Com. v. Deberry, T. ( 2020 )

J-S23030-20
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
TONEY DEBERRY :
:
Appellant : No. 160 EDA 2020
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 20, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-09-CR-0005529-1987,
CP-09-CR-0005530-1987, CP-09-CR-0005531-1987
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
TONEY DEBERRY :
:
Appellant : No. 161 EDA 2020
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 20, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-09-CR-0005529-1987,
CP-09-CR-0005530-1987, CP-09-CR-0005531-1987
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
TONEY DEBERRY :
:
Appellant : No. 162 EDA 2020
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 20, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Criminal Division at
J-S23030-20
No(s): CP-09-CR-0005529-1987,
CP-09-CR-0005530-1987, CP-09-CR-0005531-1987
BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., McCAFFERY, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.: FILED AUGUST 12, 2020
In these consolidated cases,1 Toney DeBerry (Appellant) appeals from
the order entered in the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas denying his
serial petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act2 (PCRA), seeking
collateral relief from his jury convictions of, inter alia, rape, burglary and
escape3 in three separate cases. On appeal, Appellant asserts the PCRA court
erred in dismissing his request for a new trial based on an admission by the
Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that
some FBI examiners before 2000 may have overstated their conclusions
regarding microscopic hair comparison testimony. We affirm.
The facts underlying Appellant’s arrest and conviction were summarized
by this Court in a prior appeal as follows:
In the early morning hours of August 8, 1987, [A]ppellant
. . . broke into a residence known as The Woman’s Place, by
cutting open and removing a window screen. The Woman’s Place,
located in Doylestown Township, is a temporary residential shelter
for women and their children, who have been physically, mentally,
or sexually abused. At the time [A]ppellant broke into the shelter,
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1 This Court granted Appellant’s application to consolidate these appeals on
February 3, 2020. Order, 2/3/20.
2 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
3 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3121, 3502, 5121(a).
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Pamela Weaver and Alfrea Styles were sleeping in separate first
floor bedrooms with their children.
Appellant first entered the room of Pamela Weaver and
awakened her while holding a knife to her throat. For the next
hour Ms. Weaver was sexually assaulted by [A]ppellant. She was
repeatedly raped and forced to commit oral sex upon [A]ppellant.
When finished, [A]ppellant gagged Ms. Weaver with her own
underwear and tied her hands with an electrical cord. Appellant
threatened to kill Ms. Weaver if she left the room to notify police.
He then exited into a lighted hallway.
Next, [A]ppellant proceeded into Alfrea Styles’ bedroom.
Again, [A]ppellant awakened his victim while holding a knife to
her throat. At knifepoint, [A]ppellant performed oral sex upon Ms.
Styles while she lay in her bed. Appellant then forced Ms. Styles
to leave with him. He took her to a secluded area behind the
spring house building at the far end of the parking lot and again
forced her to perform oral sex upon him. Appellant then raped
Ms. Styles. During the attack, [A]ppellant and Ms. Styles
observed lights flashing in the woods behind their location. During
the course of the attack on Ms. Styles, Ms. Weaver had summoned
the police. Appellant was soon after apprehended in a wooded
area adjacent to the spring house.
At the time of these attacks, [A]ppellant had been placed in
the work release program from the Bucks County Rehabilitation
Center. Under the rules of the program, [A]ppellant was supposed
to return to the center immediately after finishing work. On the
night of the attack, [A]ppellant had finished working at
approximately midnight. Instead of returning to the center,
[A]ppellant went to two separate bars and then proceeded with
the attacks at the woman’s shelter.
After being apprehended, [A]ppellant was presented to both
victims for identification. Pamela Weaver positively identified
appellant as the attacker. Alfrea Styles stated that [A]ppellant
looked like the attacker but did not make a positive identification.
Ms. Styles later testified at trial that she knew immediately that
[A]ppellant was the attacker but feared for her safety if she
positively identified him to police in his presence.
Commonwealth v. DeBerry, 207 PHL 1993 (unpub. memo. at 1-3) (Pa.
Super. 1993).
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Appellant was arrested and charged in three separate cases. At Docket
No. CP-09-CR-5529-1987 (5529), Appellant was charged with escape for his
failure to return the Bucks County Rehabilitation Center after work release.
At Dockets CP-09-CR-5530-1987 (5530) and CP-09-CR-5531-1987 (5531),
Appellant was charged with the sexual assault of Weaver (5530) and Styles
(5531), respectively. The cases were consolidated and tried together before
a jury commencing on February 1, 1988.
The PCRA court summarized some of the additional evidence presented
at trial:
[A]n official from the Bucks County Men’s Correctional Center
testified that Appellant failed to return from a job within the
appointed time and was wanted for escape. The time he was
missing included the time the rapes occurred at the shelter.
Another corrections officer testified that after his capture,
Appellant, while in a cell, was “hollering” to no one in particular
that “you white dick, your white women love it.” Three days
before the rape, a fellow inmate on work release with Appellant
testified that, as they passed the shelter on the way to work at
the Doylestown Inn, Appellant said, “Yes, there is some nice
women. One day I might have me some of those . . . I have to
stop in there one day and have me one of those.” Additionally,
the Commonwealth offered expert testimony from an FBI agent
that [a pubic hair] found at the [Weaver] crime scene was
consistent with Appellant’s hair.
PCRA Ct. Op., 1/9/20, at 2 (unpaginated) (record citations omitted). On
February 3rd, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on the following charges:
(1) at Docket No. 5529, escape; (2) at Docket No. 5530, burglary, rape,
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involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (IDSI),4 terroristic threats,5 simple
assault,6 and possession of an instrument of crime (PIC);7 and (3) at Docket
No. 5531, burglary, rape, IDSI, kidnapping,8 unlawful restraint,9 terroristic
threats, simple assault, and PIC. On April 28, 1988, the trial court sentenced
Appellant to an aggregate term of 33½ to 67 years’ imprisonment.
This Court affirmed the judgment of sentence on direct appeal, and the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allocatur review.
Commonwealth v. DeBerry, 1638 PHL 1988 (unpub. memo.) (Pa. Super.
Jan. 10, 1989), appeal denied, 156 E.D. 1989 (Pa. Oct. 13, 1989). Appellant
filed his first PCRA petition, pro se, on June 18, 1992. The PCRA court denied
relief, and this Court affirmed on appeal. DeBerry, 207 PHL 1993. Appellant
filed several additional petitions for collateral relief in the ensuing years, none
of which resulted in relief.
On November 26, 2002, Appellant filed a pro se motion seeking DNA
testing, of, inter alia, the pubic hair recovered from Weaver’s bed. See 42
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4 18 Pa.C.S. § 3123.
5 18 Pa.C.S. § 2706.
6 18 Pa.C.S. § 2701(a)(3).
7 18 Pa.C.S. § 907.
8 18 Pa.C.S. § 2901.
9 18 Pa.C.S. § 2902.
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Pa.C.S. § 9543.1.10 Counsel was appointed, and on January 23, 2006, the
PCRA court ordered DNA testing be conducted. See Docket Entry, 1/23/06.11
The PCRA court reviewed the DNA reports in camera, and, on October 19,
2006, entered the following order:
AND NOW, this 19th day of October, 2006, having reviewed
the DNA testing results, it is hereby ORDERED that [Appellant’s]
Post Conviction Relief Petition filed November 11, 2002 is
dismissed, as the Post-Conviction DNA testing results did not
produce exculpatory results that would establish [Appellant’s]
actual innocence of the offense for which he was convicted.
Order, 10/19/06 (emphasis added). See also N.T., PCRA H’rg, 12/14/17, at
6. At that time, the DNA report was not made part of the certified record.
On July 17, 2015, Appellant filed the present PCRA petition, pro se,
asserting he was in possession of after-discovered evidence.12 Three days
later, on July 20th, Appellant’s former counsel, the Bucks County Public
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10 “An individual convicted of a criminal offense in a court of this
Commonwealth and serving a term of imprisonment . . . may apply by making
a written motion to the sentencing court for the performance of forensic DNA
testing on specific evidence that is related to the investigation or prosecution
that resulted in the judgment of conviction.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543.1(a),
subsequently amended by Act 2018-147 (S.B. 916), § 1, approved October
24, 2018, eff. December 24, 2018.
11 We note the January 23, 2006, order granting DNA testing is not included
in the certified record.
12 See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9542(a)(2)(vi) (petitioner may be entitled to post-
conviction collateral relief if they plead and prove their conviction resulted
from “[t]he unavailability at the time of trial of exculpatory evidence that has
subsequently become available and would have changed the outcome of the
trial if it had been introduced.”).
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Defender’s Office, also filed a PCRA petition on Appellant’s behalf, invoking
the newly-discovered facts exception to the PCRA’s time restrictions.13 See
Appellant’s Post-Conviction Relief Act Petition (Counseled PCRA Petition),
7/20/15, at 4 (unpaginated), citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii). Both petitions
were based upon a letter former counsel received from the DOJ, dated May
28, 2015. The letter informed counsel that the DOJ “recently undertook a
review of certain evidence that was presented in [Appellant’s] case.” DOJ
Letter to Counsel, 5/28/15.14 Attached to the May 28th letter, was a letter
dated May 21, 2015, which the DOJ sent to the Bucks County District
Attorney’s office, which prosecuted Appellant. The May 21st letter stated, in
relevant part:
DOJ has been engaged in a review of microscopic hair
comparison reports and testimony presented by the FBI
Laboratory before December 31, 1999, after which mitochondrial
DNA testing[15] became routine. [I]n some cases, FBI Laboratory
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13It appears counsel filed this petition unaware Appellant had filed a pro se
petition a few days earlier.
14 The DOJ’s letter to Appellant’s former counsel, dated May 28, 2015, was
attached to Appellant’s pro se PCRA petition, filed on July 17, 2015. The May
28th letter referred to a May 21, 2015, letter — which the DOJ sent to the
Bucks County District Attorney’s Office — that detailed the DOJ’s findings. The
May 21st letter was also attached to Appellant’s July 2015 pro se petition.
15In Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 889 A.2d 501 (Pa. 2005) (direct appeal),
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained:
Humans have both nuclear DNA and mitochondrial DNA.
Mitochondrial DNA is found outside of the cell nucleus, in the
mitochondria, and is inherited only from one’s mother
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examiners exceeded the limits of science by overstating the
conclusions that may appropriately be drawn from a positive
association between evidentiary hair and a known hair sample.
. . .
DOJ Letter to Commonwealth, 5/21/15, at 1. However, the letter stated that
the DOJ “found no error either in the FBI Laboratory report or in any examiner
testimony” in Appellant’s case. Id. Nevertheless, the letter also stated that
“the Innocence Project and the National Association of [Criminal] Defense
Attorneys (“IP/NACDL”) believe that an erroneous report or testimony was
used in [Appellant’s] case.” Id. Counsel’s petition averred that the improper
hair analysis testimony tainted Appellant’s conviction, and the petition was
timely filed within 60 days of the date Appellant received the DOJ letter.
Counseled PCRA Petition at 3-4.
On November 13, 2015, the Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss
the petition as time-barred. Specifically, the Commonwealth averred the
newly-discovered fact Appellant relied upon was the opinion of the IP/NACDL
that the examiner who testified at Appellant’s trial exceeded the limits of
appropriate testimony. Commonwealth’s Motion to Dismiss Serial Petition,
11/13/15, at 5-6 (unpaginated). Moreover, the Commonwealth emphasized
that the hair sample at issue had already been tested for mitochondrial DNA
and the results established that Appellant could not be excluded as the
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(distinguishable from DNA forming the nucleus of each cell, which
is inherited from both parents).
Id. at 513 n.9 (record citations omitted).
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source of the hair. Id. at 6. The Commonwealth also argued: (1) the
evidence presented at trial apart from the hair analysis was “substantial;” (2)
Appellant previously challenged counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to
adequately investigate the FBI hair analysis testimony; and (3) the
Washington Post published an article in April of 2015, stating that the FBI
admitted its hair analysis testimony was flawed, which was more than 60 days
before Appellant filed his pro se petition. Id. at 7-8.
New counsel, Stuart Wilder, Esquire, was appointed,16 and filed an
amended petition on September 15, 2017. Attorney Wilder asserted the
petition was timely based upon the newly-discovered facts exception and
Commonwealth v. Burton, 158 A.3d 618 (Pa. 2017). See id. at 638 (“[T]he
presumption that information which is of public record cannot be deemed
‘unknown’ for purposes of subsection 9545(b)(1)(ii) does not apply to pro
se prisoner petitioners.”). However, his only request for relief was to order
the Commonwealth to submit the results of the DNA test to “the Combined
DNA Index System (CODIS) to determine if anyone else in the system has
DNA that matches his, proving [Appellant’s] long stated claim of innocence.”
Appellant’s Motion to Amend PCRA Petition, 9/15/17, at 4.
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16 The Office of the Public Defender requested the appointment of private
counsel because Appellant had previously alleged his public defender was
ineffective. See Appellant’s Petition for Appointment of Private Counsel,
7/20/15, at 1.
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The PCRA court conducted an evidentiary hearing on December 14,
2017, at which time the 2006 mitochondrial DNA test results were made part
of the record. See N.T., 12/14/17, at 6-7. The report concluded that
mitochondrial DNA “sequences obtained from [the pubic hair and from
Appellant] are the same. Therefore, [Appellant] (or another member of the
same maternal lineage) cannot be excluded as the source of [the pubic hair].”
Id., Exhibit C-1, Mitochondrial DNA Report, 8/11/05, at 1 (unpaginated). At
the hearing, Attorney Wilder stated that while he believed the petition was
timely filed, he “couldn’t find anything else that could be done that wasn’t
done” by prior counsel who represented Appellant during the DNA testing
period. N.T., 12/14/17, at 12. Moreover, the Commonwealth pointed out that
the remedy offered in the DOJ letter is mitochondrial DNA testing, which had
already occurred in Appellant’s case. Id. at 16. On December 20, 2017, the
PCRA court entered an order dismissing Appellant’s petition. Appellant filed a
timely appeal. In its opinion, the court clarified that it dismissed the petition
because it was untimely filed. See PCRA Ct. Op., 2/6/18, at 6 (concluding
Appellant relied on a “new source of previously knowable facts and not a
newly-discovered fact” since Appellant had challenged the “integrity of the
field of microscopic hair comparison analysis” at trial).
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On appeal, Attorney Wilder filed a Turner/Finley17 “no merit” letter and
petition to withdraw. However, a panel of this Court denied counsel’s petition
to withdraw, vacated the order dismissing Appellant’s petition, and remanded
for further proceedings, directing the PCRA court to “make a timeliness
determination in light of” Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 173 A.3d 617 (Pa.
2017) (PCRA appeal).18 Commonwealth v. DeBerry, 86 EDA 2018 (unpub.
memo. at 9-10) (Pa. Super. 2018).
Upon remand, on January 24, 2019, the PCRA court entered an order
directing both Appellant and the Commonwealth to submit memoranda of law
“addressing the issues of jurisdiction and merit in regards to [Appellant’s]
PCRA.” Order, 1/24/19. Attorney Wilder again filed an application for leave
to withdraw and a Turner/Finley “no merit” letter. In the “no merit” letter,
counsel argued the petition was timely filed within 60 days of the date the
DOJ informed Appellant of the FBI’s possible flawed analysis. Attorney
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17 Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1998); Commonwealth
v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).
18 In Chmiel, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined the petitioner
established the 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii) newly-discovered facts exception
when he filed a petition within 60 days of the publication of the same
Washington Post article the Commonwealth referenced herein. The article
reported that the FBI, for the first time, “publicly admitted that the testimony
and statements provided by its analysts about microscopic hair comparison
analysis were erroneous in the vast majority of cases.” Chmiel, 173 A.3d at
625. The Chmiel Court held that the FBI’s acknowledgment of the flawed
science involved in hair analysis constituted a “newly-discovered fact”
sufficient to invoke the PCRA’s time for filing exception. Id. at 626-27.
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Wilder’s “No Merit” Letter, 1/31/19, at 5 (unpaginated). However, counsel
acknowledged he could not demonstrate Appellant was entitled to relief since
DNA testing of the hair sample revealed inculpatory results, and the sample
was consumed during the testing.19 Id. On February 13th, the
Commonwealth filed a memorandum in opposition to PCRA relief.
Thereafter, on April 30, 2019, Attorney Wilder withdrew his application
to withdraw, and filed a motion seeking both leave to amend the PCRA petition
and a hearing. Specifically, counsel argued this Court’s decision in
Commonwealth v. Payne, 210 A.3d 299 (Pa. Super. 2019) (en banc),
appeal denied, 218 A.3d 1201 (Pa. 2019), represented a “change in the law”
with respect to a petitioner’s burden of proof in an after-discovered evidence
challenge. Appellant’s Motion for Hearing, 4/30/19, at 2 (unpaginated). He
asserted the Payne Court held a petitioner must establish only by a
preponderance of the evidence that the after-discovered evidence would have
changed the outcome of the trial — not, as previously held, that the new
evidence if presented would have “resulted in an acquittal.” Id. Thereafter,
the Commonwealth filed a supplemental motion to dismiss the petition
asserting, inter alia, that Appellant’s reliance on Payne was “wholly
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19 Counsel averred that he had “consulted with a private DNA specialist who
performs work for defense counsel[, and s]he informed [him] that after
looking at the testimony from the original trial, and the results of the testing
reported in 2006 and 2009, that she would not be able to adduce any evidence
that would indicate that [Appellant] was not a person likely to possess the
DNA on the hair sample attributable to him.” Attorney Wilder’s “No Merit”
Letter at 5.
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unfounded.” Commonwealth’s Supplemental Motion to Dismiss, 7/16/19, at
7 (unpaginated).
On September 9, 2019, the PCRA court issued notice of its intent to
dismiss Appellant’s petition as both untimely filed and meritless. Appellant
filed a responsive brief on September 30th. Nevertheless, on December 20,
2019, the PCRA court entered an order denying relief. Specifically, the court
found Appellant’s petition “was timely,” but denied relief “for lack of merit.”
Order, 12/20/19. These timely appeals followed.20
On January 13, 2020, Appellant filed an application seeking
consolidation of the three appeals. The following day, this Court issued
Appellant, at each docket, a per curiam rule to show cause why the appeals
should not be quashed as violative of the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969, 977 (Pa. 2018) (holding that
“when a single order resolves issues arising on more than one lower court
docket, separate notices of appeal must be filed”). Appellant filed timely
responses to the show cause orders, and on January 28, 2020, the Court
entered an order at each docket referring the matter to the merits panel.
Subsequently, on February 3, 2020, this Court granted the application for
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20 On December 23, 2019, the PCRA court entered an order at each docket,
directing Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on
appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant complied with the orders,
and filed a Rule 1925(b) statement at each docket. The PCRA court filed a
joint opinion on January 9, 2020.
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consolidation “without prejudice for the merits panel to quash any or all of
[the] appeals upon review.” Order, 2/3/20.
Appellant raises the following two issues on appeal, which we have
reordered for ease of disposition:
1. Do separate notices of appeal in three related cases that
visibly, patently and obviously only refer to a single docket
number satisfy the requirement that separate notices of appeal
referencing only a single docket number be filed in an appeal?
2. Is the admission by an agency that its expert’s testimony, more
than twenty years earlier on behalf of the Commonwealth, was
scientifically invalid of sufficient weight to require the award of a
new trial?
Appellant’s Brief at 3.
First, Appellant contends that we should not quash this appeal pursuant
to Walker. We agree.
In Walker, “the Commonwealth filed a single notice of appeal from an
order that disposed of four motions to suppress evidence filed by four criminal
defendants . . . at four different docket numbers.” Walker, 185 A.3d at 971.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the common practice of filing a
single notice of appeal from an order disposing of cases at more than one
docket violated the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. Id. at 976.
See also Pa.R.A.P. 341(a), note (“Where . . . one or more orders resolves
issues arising on more than one docket or relating to more than one judgment,
separate notices of appeal must be filed.”). Thus, the Court announced a
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prospective ruling21 that now requires appellants to file separate notices of
appeal “when a single order resolves issues arising on more than one lower
court docket[.]” Walker, 185 A.3d at 977. The Court further held: “The
failure to do so will result in quashal of the appeal.” Id.
Subsequently, in Commonwealth v. Creese, 216 A.3d 1142 (Pa.
Super. 2019), a panel of this Court applied the Walker holding narrowly. In
that case, the defendant filed one notice of appeal from an order dismissing
his post-conviction collateral petition dealing with four, related lower court
dockets. Id. at 1143. The defendant listed all four docket numbers on the
notice of appeal, which was then, presumably, photocopied by the clerk of
courts so that one identical copy of the notice was placed in each of the
certified records. Id. at 1143, 1144 n.1. This Court quashed the appeal,
finding it violated the ruling in Walker.22 Id. at 1144. The Creese panel
opined:23
We read our Supreme Court’s decision in Walker as
instructing that we may not accept a notice of appeal listing
multiple docket numbers, even if those notices are included in
the records of each case. Instead, a notice of appeal may
contain only one docket number.
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21 The Walker decision was filed on June 1, 2018.
22 We note the notice of appeal in Creese was filed on December 20, 2018;
thus, it was subject to Walker’s prospective ruling. See Creese, 216 A.3d
at 1143.
23 We note the ruling was divided, with one judge filing a dissenting opinion.
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Id. (emphases added). The Creese Court did not apply its ruling
prospectively, so that were we to apply the holding herein, we would have no
choice but to quash Appellant’s appeal.
Recently, however, an en banc panel of this Court overruled the
language in Creese mandating that a notice of appeal may contain only one
docket number. In Commonwealth v. J. Johnson, ___ A.3d ___, 1620 WDA
2018 (Pa. Super. 2020) (en banc),24 the defendant, who was appealing his
judgment of sentence entered at four separate dockets, filed four notices of
appeal pursuant to Walker. Id. at 3. Each notice of appeal listed all four
docket numbers; however, the defendant italicized one docket number on
each notice “to identify which notice corresponded with each appealed case.”
Id. The en banc panel overruled the pronouncement in Creese that “a notice
of appeal may contain only one docket number.” J. Johnson, 1620 EDA 2018
at 12 (citation and emphasis omitted). The panel opined:
Importantly, we observe that Rule 341 and Walker make
no mention of case numbers on a notice of appeal. To be sure,
the error in Walker was the filing of a single notice of appeal
affecting multiple cases and several defendants. The bright-line
rule set forth in Walker only required an appellant to file a
“separate” notice of appeal for each lower court docket the
appellant was challenging.
Here, it is indisputable that [the defendant] filed a separate
notice of appeal for each of the four dockets below, because he
italicized only one case number on each notice of appeal. Unlike
Creese, the clerk of courts played no role in typing four separate
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24The appeals at J. Johnson were also docketed in this Court at Nos. 2045
EDA 2018, 2046 EDA 2018, and 2047 EDA 2018.
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notices of appeal and italicizing the individual docket numbers on
[the defendant’s] behalf. Based on our review of Walker and Rule
341, [the defendant] filed separate notices that perfected four
appeals from each of the four common pleas court dockets. The
fact that the notices contained all four lower court numbers is of
no consequence. Indeed, the Rules of Appellate Procedure are to
be liberally construed to effectuate justice. Pa.R.A.P. 105(a); see
also 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1928(c). We should not invalidate an otherwise
timely appeal based on the inclusion of multiple docket numbers,
a practice that the Rules themselves do not expressly forbid.
By stating that each notice of appeal may contain only one
number, Creese imposed upon appellants an additional
requirement found in neither Walker nor Rule 341. Although our
Supreme Court may adopt such a rule in the future, it did not do
so in Walker. As such, in so far as Creese stated “a notice of
appeal may contain only one docket number,” 216 A.3d at 1144
(emphasis added), that pronouncement is overruled.
Id. at 11-12 (footnotes omitted).
We conclude the holding in J. Johnson is controlling under the facts of
the present case. Here, the record reveals Appellant filed three separate
notices of appeal. Although each notice listed all three docket numbers, two
docket numbers were crossed out. Thus, each notice featured one (different)
docket number that was not crossed out, signifying the appeal was from that
docket number. See Appellant’s Notices of Appeal, 12/20/19. Moreover,
although all three notices were time-stamped at 3:51, the location of the
stamps on the documents revealed they were not simply duplicates, copied
by the clerk of courts. See id. Accordingly, because we conclude Appellant
properly complied with the requirements of Walker, we decline to quash this
appeal.
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In his second issue, Appellant contends he is entitled to PCRA relief
based upon after-discovered evidence, namely “the 2015 admission by the
FBI that its hair analysis technique was unreliable.” Appellant’s Brief at 16.
Further, he insists “the Commonwealth’s reliance on the junk science
fundamentally altered the [jury’s] decision on guilt or innocence” regardless
of whether he would have been convicted without the evidence. Id. at 19.
Thus, Appellant argues he is entitled to a hearing on his claim. Id. at 22.
Our standard of review of an order denying PCRA relief is well-
established. “[W]e examine whether the PCRA court’s determination ‘is
supported by the record and free of legal error.’” Commonwealth v.
Mitchell, 141 A.3d 1277, 1283–84 (Pa. 2016) (citation omitted).
Furthermore, “[t]he PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is
no support for the findings in the certified record.” Commonwealth v. Cruz,
223 A.3d 274, 277 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted).
The statutory requirement that a PCRA petition be filed within one year
of the date the judgment of sentence becomes final is both “mandatory and
jurisdictional in nature[,]” and a PCRA court may not ignore the untimeliness
of a petition to address the merits of the issues raised therein.
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 67 A.3d 1245, 1248 (Pa. 2013). See also 42
Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). Here, Appellant’s judgment of sentence was final on
December 12, 1989, 60 days after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied
Appellant’s petition for allocatur review, and Appellant did not file a petition
for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. See U.S. Sup. Ct. Rule 20.1
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(eff. June 30, 1980, repealed Jan. 1 1990). Thus, the present petition, filed
more than 25 years later, is facially untimely.25 See 42 Pa.C.S. §
9545(b)(1).
Nevertheless, an untimely petition may be considered if one of the three
timeliness exceptions applies. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). A petition
invoking one of the exceptions must be filed “within 60 days of the date the
claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2). 26 Here,
Appellant invoked the “newly-discovered facts” exception set forth in Section
9545(b)(1)(ii).
Under this subsection, a petitioner must plead and prove “the facts upon
which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not
have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence[.]” 42 Pa.C.S. §
9545(b)(1)(ii). “[T]he focus of this exception ‘is on the newly discovered
facts, not on a newly discovered or newly willing source for previously known
____________________________________________
25 We note that when the Section 9545 timing requirements were enacted in
1995, the statute provided a grace period for those petitioners whose
judgments of sentence were final before the effective date of the Act,
permitting them to file a first PCRA within one year of the act’s effective date,
or no later than January 16, 1997. Commonwealth v. Williams, 828 A.2d
981, 987 n.9 (Pa. 2003), citing Section 3(1) of the Act of Nov. 17, 1995 (Spec.
Sess. No. 1) P.L. 1118, No. 32, found as a note to 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9542, 9543,
9544, 9545, and 9546. Because the present petition is not Appellant’s first,
and was filed after the January 1997 extended deadline, he cannot benefit
from the grace period.
26 This subsection was amended in 2018 to provide petitioners with one year
to invoke a timeliness exception. However, the amendment applies only to
“claims arising on Dec. 24, 2017 or thereafter.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).
Thus, is it not applicable here.
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facts.’” Commonwealth v. Brown, 111 A.3d 171, 176 (Pa. 2015) (citation
omitted). Furthermore, we note Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) is a jurisdictional
threshold, which “does not require any merits analysis of an underlying after-
discovered-evidence claim.” Id. at 177 (emphasis added). “Once jurisdiction
is established, a PCRA petitioner can present a substantive after-discovered-
evidence claim” pursuant to Section 9543(a)(2)(vi). Id. at 176. See 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(vi) (providing relief under the PCRA if a petitioner
pleads and proves “[t]he unavailability at the time of trial of exculpatory
evidence that has subsequently become available and would have changed
the outcome of the trial if it had been introduced”).
In the present case, the PCRA court found Appellant established the
newly-discovered evidence exception to the time-for-filing requirements.
PCRA Ct. Op., 1/9/20, at 3. We agree.
The DOJ letter forwarded to Appellant in May of 2015 from his former
counsel was the first time Appellant (an incarcerated, unrepresented
defendant) learned that his case had been reviewed by the DOJ to determine
if the expert hair analysis testimony “exceeded the limits of science.” See
DOJ Letter to Commonwealth at 1. Although the DOJ “found no error,” the
letter stated that the IP/NADCL disagreed. Id.
The Commonwealth insists, however, that the only “newly-discovered
fact” in Appellant’s pro se and original counseled petitions is the DOJ letter.
Commonwealth’s Brief at 19. To the extent present counsel also referred to
the Washington Post article, the Commonwealth maintains that the DOJ letter
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did not mention the Washington Post article, and none of Appellant’s
counseled or pro se petitions established when he learned the information in
that article. See Commonwealth’s Brief at 19-21. Furthermore, it emphasizes
that the DOJ’s letter informed Appellant that “both the DOJ and FBI found no
error in the testimony of the FBI examiner at Appellant’s trial.” Id. at 24
(emphasis added).
However, our review of the record reveals Attorney Wilder asserted, in
the September 2017 amended petition, that Appellant first learned of the
potentially flawed testimony when prior counsel forwarded him the DOJ letter:
[Appellant] filed his petition within sixty days of learning of
information published by the Innocence Project and the
Washington Post on April 18 and April 20, 2015, and from M[a]y
21, 2015 letter received by the Bucks County Public Defender’s
Office, concerning the unreliability of evidence presented at his
trial, which he only learned about when he received the May
28, 2015 letter from the Public Defenders’ Office.
Appellant’s Amended PCRA Petition, 9/15/17, at 4 (emphasis supplied). See
also Attorney Wilder’s “No Merit” Letter at 5. Although the Washington Post
article and FBI press release — which first reported the FBI’s admission that
its hair analysis was flawed — were in the public domain as early as April of
2015, the PCRA court explained that Appellant was incarcerated and not
represented by counsel at that time. PCRA Ct. Op., 1/9/20, at 5. In
Burton, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that “the presumption that
information which is of public record cannot be deemed ‘unknown’ for
purposes of subsection 9545(b)(1)(ii) does not apply to pro se prisoner
petitioners.” Burton, 158 A.3d. at 638 (emphasis added). Thus, we conclude
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the record supports the PCRA court’s finding that Appellant was first “made
aware of the faulty FBI hair evidence by way of letter from the [DOJ] to the
Bucks County Public Defender on May 28, 2015 and subsequent forwarding to
him.” PCRA Ct. Op., 1/9/20, at 5.
Furthermore, although the May 2015 letter stated that the DOJ found
“no error” in the testimony at Appellant’s trial, Appellant was not required to
accept the DOJ’s findings, particularly since the letter itself acknowledged that
the IP/NACDL came to a contrary conclusion. See DOJ Letter to
Commonwealth at 1 (stating the IP/NACDL “believe that an erroneous report
or testimony regarding microscopic hair comparison analysis was used in this
case”). Thus, Appellant was entitled to rely on the “newly-discovered fact”
that the FBI’s hair comparison was flawed in many cases, and to argue that it
may have been so in his case.27 Accordingly, we agree Appellant’s petition
was timely filed pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii).
____________________________________________
27 We do not agree with the Commonwealth’s assertion that this Court’s
decision in Cruz, 223 A.3d 274, compels a different result. See
Commonwealth’s Brief at 21-23. In that case, like here, the PCRA petitioner
was convicted based upon hair analysis testimony, and in July of 2015, the
petitioner received a letter from the DOJ concerning its investigation of such
testimony. See Cruz, 223 A.3d at 275. However, in Cruz, the DOJ letter
informed the petitioner that the testimony in his case “contained erroneous
statements.” Id. The petitioner filed a PCRA petition in September of 2015
asserting newly-discovered facts. Id. The PCRA court initially dismissed the
petition without a hearing, and this Court affirmed, finding the petition was
not based on a newly-discovered fact, but rather, on “a new source of
previously knowable facts.” Id. at 276. The Supreme Court subsequently
vacated that ruling, and remanded the case to the PCRA court for
reconsideration in light of Chmiel. Id.
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Nevertheless, in order to obtain relief on his after-discovered evidence
claim, Appellant must prove his conviction resulted from “[t]he unavailability
at the time of trial of exculpatory evidence that has subsequently become
available and would have changed the outcome of the trial if it had been
introduced.” See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(vi). In Burton, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court explained:
[T]o prevail on an after-discovered evidence claim for relief under
subsection 9543(a)(2)(vi), a petitioner must prove that (1) the
exculpatory evidence has been discovered after trial and could not
have been obtained at or prior to trial through reasonable
diligence; (2) the evidence is not cumulative; (3) it is not being
used solely to impeach credibility; and (4) it would likely compel
a different verdict.
____________________________________________
The PCRA court again dismissed the petition, finding that the 60-day
“time limit for asserting the newly-discovered fact exception started on April
20, 2015, the date of the FBI press release[,]” so that the petition, filed in
September of 2015, was untimely. Cruz, 223 A.3d at 276. On appeal, this
Court disagreed, concluding:
Here, [the petitioner’s] newly-discovered fact is the DOJ and FBI’s
specific admission that [the analyst’s] testimony, in particular
contains erroneous statements, not the DOJ and FBI’s general
admission that [the petitioner’s] case might be one of the
thousands of cases that was based on bad science. Thus, the July
27, 2015 DOJ letter, and not the FBI press release, triggered the
sixty-day time limit.
Id. at 277. We do not conclude this decision undermines our conclusion
herein. As noted above, Appellant averred he first learned of the potentially
flawed testimony when he received the DOJ letter, and he filed the petition
within 60 days of receipt of that letter. Although his letter stated the DOJ and
FBI found no error in the analyst’s trial testimony, it also stated that the
IP/NACDL disagreed with that conclusion, and put Appellant on notice, for the
first time, that the testimony might be flawed. Thus, Cruz does not compel a
different result.
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Burton, 158 A.3d at 629 (citations omitted).
Here, Appellant argues “[t]he ‘fact’ at issue in this matter is the 2015
admission by the FBI that its hair analysis technique was unreliable, and an
offer of expert testimony to show that the FBI’s 2015 admission was true.”
Appellant’s Brief at 16. Relying on Payne, 210 A.3d 299, Appellant asserts
the focus should be on whether the after-discovered evidence “significantly
refutes an assertion on which the [jury] and the Commonwealth placed
significant weight” and not whether he would have been convicted of first-
degree murder without the now discredited evidence. Appellant’s Brief at 17,
quoting Payne, 210 A.3d at 302. He claims the Payne Court established a
new standard “when evidence debunking Commonwealth scientific evidence
requires a new trial.” Id.
We conclude Appellant’s reliance on Payne is misplaced. In that case,
the defendant pled guilty to murder generally in 1977. Payne, 210 A.3d at
300. The case proceeded to a degree of guilt hearing before three judges,
who convicted the defendant of first-degree murder, based upon the
Commonwealth’s theory that the defendant murdered the victim while he
raped her. Id. at 300, 302. In 2014, a DNA test “established conclusively
that [the defendant] was excluded as a contributor to [ ] seminal fluid found
on the victim’s body.” Id. at 301. The defendant sought PCRA relief based
upon this after-discovered evidence. Id. However, the PCRA court denied
relief because it concluded the “DNA evidence was not likely to change the
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results of the Degree of Guilt Panel” because there was other evidence in the
record to support the first-degree murder conviction. Id. at 301-02.
In rejecting the PCRA court’s analysis, the en banc panel opined:
The proper focus is whether the after-discovered evidence
significantly refutes an assertion on which the Degree of Guilt
Panel and the Commonwealth placed significant weight. Because
the Commonwealth argued and the Degree of Guilt Panel accepted
the theory that [the defendant] murdered the victim while he
raped her and the DNA evidence refutes the assertion that [the
defendant] raped the victim, we find that [the defendant] proved
by a preponderance of the evidence that the DNA evidence would
likely result in a different verdict.
Id. at 302.
The after-discovered DNA evidence that invalidated the
Commonwealth’s theory of the case in Payne is distinguishable from the
newly-discovered evidence here. First, in the present case, there was no
irrefutable finding that the analyst’s testimony was wrong. Unlike the DNA
evidence in Payne, which excluded the defendant as the source of the semen
on the victim, here, the DOJ stated that, upon its review of the testimony in
Appellant’s case, there was no basis for relief. Rather, the IP/NACDL believed
the testimony was improper. Moreover, and significantly, mitochondrial DNA
testing established that Appellant could not be excluded as a contributor of
the hair recovered from the scene. Thus, Appellant, or someone in his
mother’s lineage, was the source of the hair. See Chmiel, 889 A.2d at 513
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n.9. Rather than exculpating Appellant, this evidence was inculpatory.28
Indeed, in its letter to the Commonwealth, the DOJ offered mitochondrial DNA
testing of the relevant hair evidence “[i]n the event . . . that further testing is
appropriate or necessary.” Commonwealth’s DOJ Letter, at 2.
Appellant insists, however, that Payne “established that the debunking
of junk science presented at a decades old trial entitles one to a new trial —
even if a defendant would have been convicted without the evidence — if the
Commonwealth’s reliance on the junk science fundamentally altered the fact
finder’s decision on guilt or innocence.” Appellant’s Brief at 19.
Fundamentally, he asks this Court to look at his trial through a narrow lens —
focusing on the exculpatory new evidence debunking the hair analysis
testimony, but ignoring the inculpatory mitochondrial DNA evidence. This is
not what Payne requires us to do. Accordingly, Appellant is entitled to no
relief.
Order affirmed.
____________________________________________
28 Appellant states in his brief that this “evidence does not establish that the
hair was [his] and would not now be admissible to do so.” Appellant’s Brief
at 19. While the mitochondrial DNA test did not conclusively establish the hair
was Appellant’s, it did narrow the culprits to a person in Appellant’s mother’s
lineage. That fact, coupled with the other evidence implicating Appellant,
strongly suggests he is the source of the hair. Moreover, Appellant provides
no explanation why the DNA results would not be admissible at a retrial.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/12/2020
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