Com. v. Bryant, D. ( 2020 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
DEONTE DEQUAN BRYANT :
:
Appellant : No. 1649 WDA 2019
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 9, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Criminal Division at No(s):
CP-25-CR-0000163-2018
BEFORE: MURRAY, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED AUGUST 14, 2020
Deonte Dequan Bryant (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of
sentence imposed following his conviction of receiving stolen properly. 1 On
appeal, Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of his suppression motion.
After careful review, we affirm.
Testimony from the suppression hearing reveals that shortly after
midnight, on October 8, 2017, Appellant along with three other individuals
were sitting in a vehicle parked at a Country Fair convenience store parking
lot in Summit Township, Pennsylvania. Appellant was sitting in the front
passenger seat. Police Officers Kyle Sweeney (Trooper Sweeney) and Nathan
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3925(a).
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Hartless (Trooper Hartless) were patrolling the area in full uniform and a
marked patrol car. N.T., 9/7/18, at 23.2 The troopers approached the vehicle
because of a strong odor of marijuana emanating from the car. Suppression
Court Opinion, 11/5/18, at 4.
Trooper Hartless asked each of the four occupants for identification.
N.T., 9/7/18, at 16. Initially, Appellant stated that he did not have
identification, but eventually provided his driver’s license indicating he was
from Ohio. See id. at 16-17.
After receiving identification from each occupant, Trooper Sweeney
asked whether anyone was armed. Id. at 23-24. Appellant responded by
pointing to his chest; and consequently, Trooper Sweeney ordered Appellant
from the vehicle. Id. at 24. As he removed Appellant from the vehicle,
Trooper Sweeney saw Appellant kicking two handguns on the floor of the car.
Id. Troopers Sweeney and Hartless handcuffed each of the four occupants
and recovered the two guns. Id. at 24-25. Trooper Sweeney determined that
both guns were loaded. Id. at 25. After communicating with dispatch,
Trooper Sweeney learned that one of the guns was stolen. Id. at 25-26.
Trooper Sweeney testified:
I wanted to further our investigation to determine whether
[Appellant] was actually the individual that possessed these
handguns because throughout the entire encounter they seemed
to be deceptive to us and they were very nervous. So the only
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2 Troopers Sweeney and Hartless were the only witnesses who testified at the
suppression hearing.
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place I could talk to [Appellant] alone away from the three other
occupants was at the back of our patrol vehicle, which at the time
I brought [Appellant] in the back of our patrol vehicle and spoke
with him.
* * *
. . . I informed him what was going on because he was standing
there in handcuffs, he seemed a little confused. I informed him
that one of the firearms . . . had come back stolen out of Toledo,
Ohio.
At this point in time, he stated that -- I asked him if the guns
were his because I wanted to further our investigation
before I determined whether he was going to be arrested
or not, he stated they were his.
Id. at 25-26 (emphasis added). At this time, Trooper Sweeney informed
Appellant “he was under arrest for possession of a stolen firearm[,]” and read
Appellant his Miranda3 rights. Id. at 27.
Appellant told Trooper Sweeney that he understood his rights and
continued speaking with Trooper Sweeney about the stolen handgun. Id. at
29. Appellant stated that the gun did not belong to him and the gun’s owner
“was not on the scene at the time.” Id. at 29. Trooper Sweeney testified:
After he informed me that the handguns were not his and the
person who was the owner of the handguns was not on scene, he
-- I asked him if he did not want to snitch on his friends and who
he got them from and he refused to answer. And I ask[ed] him
why he was lying to me about the handguns and he said, I don’t
know.
I asked him why they had handguns in the vehicle and
possessed them, he said because you understand what’s been
going on with all the recent shooting in the city. And him and his
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3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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friends in the vehicle were up here at the Metroplex for a rap
concert, and they had them for protection; that’s what he said.
And he informed me that he had an Ohio concealment permit,
but he did not have one with him. And that’s what he said in the
back of the patrol unit.
Id. at 30.
Following this conversation, the troopers transported Appellant to their
barracks. See id. at 35. At the barracks, Trooper Sweeney again questioned
Appellant about the stolen handgun. Id. Trooper Sweeney could not recall if
he re-read Appellant his Miranda rights at the barracks. Id. During this
conversation, Appellant gave multiple differening accounts of how he acquired
the stolen gun. He told Trooper Sweeney that he bought the handgun from a
gun store, that he bought the gun from a friend, and that he bought it at a
gun show.
Trooper Hartless testified about problems with the mobile video recorder
(MVR) during the troopers’ encounter with Appellant and his three cohorts.
The trial court summarized Trooper Hartless’ testimony:
. . . The MVR consists of a visual and audio recording. The
visual recording was filmed by a camera mounted on the
dashboard of the police vehicle. The camera was activated when
the police cruiser lights were activated. The audio recording was
made from a microphone mounted on the shoulder of Trooper
Hartless’ uniform. While the audio recording was also activated
when the troopers’ vehicle lights were activated, it could also be
controlled by Trooper Hartless via a manual switch. Trooper
Hartless was the only officer who wore a microphone that evening.
The MVR was played at the suppression hearing. The audio
“cut out” briefly. Trooper Hartless testified he unintentionally
momentarily paused the audio recording or turned it off when he
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gestured with his hand to his shoulder to make sure the
microphone was turned on. Trooper Hartless testified the
microphone on his shoulder can only pick up audio a few feet from
the microphone. Trooper Hartless testified that during portions of
the MVR he was not always standing beside Trooper Sweeney.
Trooper Harless testified his own attention was focused on the
operator of the vehicle when Trooper Sweeney read [Appellant]
the Miranda warnings.
Suppression Court Opinion, 11/5/18, at 5-6. Because Trooper Hartless
paused the microphone, there is no audio of Trooper Sweeney reading
Appellant his Miranda rights. See N.T., 9/7/18, at 33-34.
As noted, Troopers Sweeney and Hartless were the only witnesses to
testify at the suppression hearing. The trial court found both troopers’
testimony to be credible. Id. at 47 (“Well, I believe the trooper. Both troopers
are credible here.”).
The trial court summarized the procedural history that ensued:
. . . Appellant was charged with one count of [r]eceiving
[s]tolen [p]roperty.
In April of 2018, Appellant filed an [o]mnibus [p]re-[t]rial
[m]otion, and an evidentiary hearing was held. In July of 2018,
Appellant filed an [a]mended [o]mnibus [p]re-[t]rial [m]otion,
and another evidentiary hearing was held. The motions included
a motion for writ of habeas corpus, and a motion to suppress
Appellant’s statements at the time of the traffic stop.
. . . In the suppression motion, Appellant asserted his
statements to the police were made in the absence of Miranda
warnings. On November 5, 2018, the [trial court] denied the
motions.
Following a three-day jury trial, Appellant was convicted of
[r]eceiving [s]tolen [p]roperty. On September 9, 2019, the [trial
court] imposed a mitigated-range sentence of restrictive
intermediate punishment for 36 months, to begin with nine
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months of electric monitoring, followed by three months of
intensive supervision.
Trial Court Opinion, 1/3/20, at 1-2.
On September 19, 2019, Appellant filed a post-sentence motion which
the trial court denied on October 15, 2019. On November 6, 2019, Appellant
filed a timely notice of appeal. The trial court ordered Appellant to file a
concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania
Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b). On December 6, 2019, Appellant filed
a Rule 1925(b) statement.
Appellant presents one issue for review:
I. WHETHER THE [TRIAL] COURT ERRED IN DENYING
[APPELLANT]’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS STATEMENTS[?]
Appellant’s Brief at 4.4
At the outset, we recognize:
[An appellate court’s] standard of review in addressing a challenge
to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining
whether the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by
the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those
facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before
the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the
Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as
remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as
a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are
supported by the record, [the appellate court] is bound by [those]
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4 In his Rule 1925(b) statement, Appellant challenged the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting his receiving stolen property conviction. Appellant has
abandoned and waived this issue on appeal by failing to argue it in his brief.
See Commonwealth v. Bullock, 948 A.2d 818, 823 (Pa. Super. 2008)
(finding appellant waived and abandoned issue he preserved for appeal by
failing to properly develop it in an appellate brief).
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findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are
erroneous. Where . . . the appeal of the determination of the
suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the
suppression court’s legal conclusions are not binding on an
appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression
court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions
of law of the courts below are subject to [ ] plenary review.
Commonwealth v. Jones, 121 A.3d 524, 526-27 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation
omitted). Importantly, our scope of review is limited to the evidentiary record
from the suppression hearing. In re L.J., 79 A.3d 1073, 1087 (Pa. 2013).
Appellant makes three arguments in support of his suppression issue.
First, Appellant asserts that he was subject to a custodial detention and
interrogation when Trooper Sweeney, prior to reading him Miranda warnings,
removed him from the car, handcuffed his hands behind his back, placed him
in the patrol car, and questioned him about ownership of the stolen handgun.
Second, Appellant contends that after Trooper Sweeney read him his Miranda
rights, Appellant exercised his right to remain silent and the troopers did not
honor this right when they continued to question him at the barracks. Third,
Appellant claims the troopers should have re-read Appellant his Miranda
rights before questioning him at the barracks.
There are three categories of interactions between police and citizens:
The first of these is a “mere encounter” (or request for
information) which need not be supported by any level of
suspicion, but carries no official compulsion to stop or to respond.
The second, an “investigative detention” must be supported by a
reasonable suspicion; it subjects a suspect to a stop and a period
of detention, but does not involve such coercive conditions as to
constitute the functional equivalent of an arrest. Finally, an arrest
or “custodial detention” must be supported by probable cause.
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Commonwealth v. Downey, 39 A.3d 401, 405 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation
omitted).
“To guide the crucial inquiry as to whether or not a seizure has been
effected, the United States Supreme Court has devised an objective test
entailing a determination of whether, in view of all surrounding circumstances,
a reasonable person would have believed that he was free to leave.”
Commonwealth v. Strickler, 757 A.2d 884, 889 (Pa. 2000). In evaluating
the totality of the circumstances, our focus is whether, “by means of physical
force or show of authority, the citizen-subject’s movement has in some way
been restrained.” Id. at 889. In making this determination, no single factor
dictates “the ultimate conclusion as to whether a seizure has occurred.” Id.
“An encounter becomes an arrest when, under the totality of the
circumstances, a police detention becomes so coercive that it functions as an
arrest.” Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 894 A.2d 759, 770 (Pa. Super.
2006). Courts analyze numerous factors to determine whether a detention
has become an arrest, including, “the cause for the detention, the detention’s
length, the detention’s location, whether the suspect was transported against
his or her will, whether physical restraints were used, whether the police used
or threatened force, and the character of the investigative methods used to
confirm or dispel suspicions.” Id.With respect to custodial interrogations, this Court has explained:
A law enforcement officer must administer Miranda warnings
prior to custodial interrogation. The standard for determining
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whether an encounter with the police is deemed “custodial” or
police have initiated a custodial interrogation is an objective one
based on a totality of the circumstances, with due consideration
given to the reasonable impression conveyed to the person
interrogated. Custodial interrogation has been defined as
“questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person
has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his [or her]
freedom of action in any significant way.” “Interrogation” is police
conduct calculated to, expected to, or likely to evoke admission.
When a person’s inculpatory statement is not made in response
to custodial interrogation, the statement is classified as
gratuitous, and is not subject to suppression for lack of warnings.
Commonwealth v. Schwing, 964 A.2d 8, 11 (Pa. Super. 2008) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Mannion, 725 A.2d 196, 200 (Pa. Super. 1999) (en
banc)).
Thus, there are two criteria of a custodial interrogation that trigger the
requirement that police issue Miranda warnings. First, the defendant must
be in custody, i.e., subject to the functional equivalent of an arrest. See
Stevenson, 894 A.2d at 770. Second, there must be questioning by the
police that is likely to evoke an incriminating response. See Schwing, 964
A.2d at 11.
Appellant asserts that his encounter with the troopers constituted a
custodial detention (i.e., functional arrest) because Trooper Sweeney removed
him from the vehicle, handcuffed him, and placed him in the patrol car.
Appellant further asserts that his interaction with Trooper Sweeney when
Appellant was in the patrol car was a custodial interrogation because Trooper
Sweeney questioned him about his ownership and acquisition of the stolen
handgun. Appellant maintains that this custodial interrogation was
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unconstitutional because he did not receive Miranda warnings until after he
said the handgun belonged to him.
After careful review of the record, we conclude that there was a
Miranda violation in this case. First, Appellant was subject to a custodial
detention for Miranda purposes. The record reflects that while on routine,
the troopers smelled marijuana emanating from the vehicle in which Appellant
was sitting, and approached the vehicle. When Trooper Hartless asked each
of occupants for identification, Appellant stated that he did not have
identification, but eventually provided his driver’s license. N.T., 9/7/18, at
16-17.
After receiving identification from each occupant, the troopers asked
whether anyone was armed. Id. at 23-24. Appellant replied in the
affirmative, and pointed to his chest. Id. at 24. Trooper Sweeney then
removed Appellant from the vehicle. Id. As he removed Appellant from the
vehicle, Trooper Sweeney observed Appellant attempting to cover with his feet
two guns that were in plain view on the floor of the vehicle. Id. After
Appellant exited the vehicle, Trooper Sweeney placed Appellant in handcuffs.
Id. Trooper Sweeney then learned from dispatch that one of the two firearms
was stolen. Id. at 25. At this time, Trooper Sweeney placed Appellant in the
back of his patrol car. Id. at 26. Without reading Appellant his Miranda
rights, Trooper Sweeney asked Appellant if the stolen gun belonged to him.
Id. Appellant responded that the gun did belong to him and that he bought
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it from a private owner. Id. Trooper Sweeney then informed Appellant that
he was under arrest and read Appellant the Miranda warnings. Id. at 27.
The record reveals that after removing Appellant from the vehicle and
handcuffing him, Trooper Sweeney placed Appellant in the back of his patrol
car. Thus, Appellant subject to the functional equivalent of an arrest before
Trooper Sweeney began questioning him about the stolen firearm. See
Commonwealth v. Sepulveda, 855 A.2d 783, 790 (Pa. 2004) (“[a]ppellant
was clearly deprived of his freedom of action when [t]rooper [] handcuffed
him, placed him in the back of the patrol car, and locked the door.”);
Commonwealth v. Turner, 772 A.2d 970, 976 (Pa. Super. 2001) (holding
that the combination of placing the appellant in the police car, shutting the
door, and the police officer questioning him while blocking the doorway
“compel[led] the conclusion” that the appellant was subject to a custodial
interrogation).
Next, we must determine whether Appellant was also subjected to a
custodial interrogation. Because Trooper Sweeney asked Appellant about the
ownership of the gun the trooper knew to be stolen, and how Appellant
acquired the gun, Trooper Sweeney’s questions likely to evoke admission to a
crime. See Schwing, 964 A.2d at 11. Thus, Trooper Sweeney’s questioning
of Appellant regarding the stolen firearm was a custodial interrogation, and
the trial court should have suppressed any statements Appellant made in the
patrol car prior to receiving Miranda warnings.
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Nevertheless, Appellant is not entitled to relief. We are compelled to
recognize that Appellant does not argue that the troopers did not have
probable cause to arrest him for being in possession of a stolen handgun.
Likewise, Appellant does not challenge the troopers’ decision to continue his
detention or transport him to their barracks. Importantly, although Trooper
Sweeney failed to advise Appellant of his Miranda rights before questioning
him in the patrol car, Trooper Sweeney read Appellant Miranda warnings as
soon as Appellant said that the firearms “were his” and that “he bought them
from a private owner.” N.T., 9/7/18, at 26.
Moreover, even without the statements Appellant made to Trooper
Sweeney in the back of the patrol car, the troopers clearly had probable cause
to arrest Appellant for possessing a stolen handgun. Probable cause exists
“where the facts and circumstances within the officers’ knowledge are
sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an
offense has been or is being committed.” Commonwealth v. Stultz, 114
A.3d 865, 883 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quotations and citations omitted).
As stated above, the trial court found the officers’ testimony credible,
and we are bound by this determination. See Jones, 121 A.3d 524, 526-27;
see also N.T., 9/7/18, at 47. Troopers Sweeney and Hartless encountered
Appellant and his three friends late at night, in a vehicle parked in a Country
Fair store parking lot. The troopers initially approached the vehicle because
of a strong smell of marijuana emanating from the vehicle. When the troopers
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asked the vehicle’s occupants for identification, Appellant stated he did not
have any, but produced his driver’s license several minutes later. When
Trooper Sweeney asked the four individuals if anyone was armed, Appellant
responded by pointing at his chest. As Trooper Sweeney removed Appellant
from the vehicle, he observed Appellant trying to conceal with his feet two
firearms on the floor of the car. Trooper Sweeney then learned from dispatch
that one of the two handguns was stolen out of the Toledo, Ohio, the same
general area listed on Appellant’s driver’s license. After Trooper Sweeney read
Appellant his Miranda rights, Appellant continued to admit that the handgun
belonged to him and gave Trooper Sweeney several different stories as to how
he acquired it. Based on our review of the suppression hearing testimony, the
facts and circumstances within the troopers’ knowledge were sufficient to
warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that Appellant had
committed the crime of receiving stolen property.5 See Stultz, 114 A.3d at
883.
As this Court has explained, “where an unwarned statement is not the
product of police coercion, a careful and thorough administration of a
defendant’s Miranda rights will render any subsequent statement voluntary
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5 The Pennsylvania Crimes Code defines receiving stolen property as follows:
“A person is guilty of theft if he intentionally receives, retains, or disposes of
movable property of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that
it has probably been stolen, unless the property is received, retained, or
disposed with intent to restore it to the owner.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3925(a).
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and knowing, and therefore, admissible.” Interest of N.M., 222 A.3d 759,
772 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citations omitted), appeal denied, 749 MAL 2019,
2020 WL 1862072 (Pa. Apr. 14, 2020). Although a Miranda violation
occurred in this case, Appellant eventually received his Miranda warnings and
continued to make voluntary statements indicating that he was the owner of
a stolen handgun, and other inconsistent and incriminating statements
relating to how he acquired the firearm. Accordingly, the troopers had
probable cause to arrest Appellant for the crime of receiving stolen property,
and appropriately continued his custodial detention and interrogation at their
barracks.
Appellant raises two additional arguments in support of his challenge to
the trial court’s denial of his suppression motion: that Appellant exercised his
right to remain silent after he received his Miranda warnings and the troopers
did not honor this right, and that the troopers should have re-read Appellant
his Miranda rights before questioning him at the barracks. Appellant,
however, did not raise these arguments in his suppression motion. See
Amended Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion, 7/25/18. Thus, Appellant has waived
both of these arguments. See Commonwealth v. Malloy, 856 A.2d 767,
778 (Pa. 2004) (finding an argument “waived because appellant failed to raise
this particular challenge before the suppression court”); see also Pa.R.A.P.
302 (“Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal.”). Additionally, the record developed at the
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suppression hearing was devoted almost entirely to Appellant’s first argument
(i.e., the Miranda violation that occurred in patrol car). There is little
testimony relating to the troopers’ interactions with Appellant en route to and
at the barracks. Accordingly, Appellant has not preserved his second and third
arguments challenging the denial of his suppression motion for our review.
In sum, although Trooper Sweeney improperly conducted the initial
custodial interrogation of Appellant in violation of Miranda, Trooper Sweeney
had probable cause to arrest Appellant for receiving stolen property, Trooper
Sweeney subsequently advised Appellant of his Miranda rights, Appellant
waived those rights by voluntarily speaking with Trooper Sweeney, and
Appellant made incriminating statements during that questioning. Thus,
Trooper Sweeney’s subsequent actions cured the initial improper custodial
interrogation. See Interest of N.M., 222 A.3d at 772. Therefore, we discern
no error in the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s suppression motion.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
P.J.E. Stevens joins the memorandum.
Judge McLaughlin concurs in the result.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/14/2020
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