Com. v. Williams, K. ( 2020 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
KEITH MICHAEL WILLIAMS
Appellant No. 1990 MDA 2018
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence November 6, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County
Criminal Division at No: CP-40-CR-0001099-2017
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., STABILE, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED AUGUST 25, 2020
Appellant, Keith Michael Williams, appeals his judgment of sentence of
54—108 months’ imprisonment for voluntary manslaughter, 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
2503. Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that
Appellant did not act in justifiable self-defense or possess a reasonable belief
that he was in immediate and imminent danger of death or serious bodily
injury. We affirm.
The following evidence was adduced during trial. Appellant lived with
his girlfriend, Deidre DePiero, in a mobile home. Deidre worked as a certified
nurse’s assistant, and Appellant had been her boyfriend for two and a half
years. Appellant had a limp, needed a cane to get around, and suffered from
pain in his feet and legs. Despite taking a variety of medications, he
sometimes had trouble doing chores around the house. Tr. 195-99.
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On the night of January 11, 2017, DiPiero received calls from the victim,
Brock Earnest, whom DiPiero had met at a psychiatric hospital in October
2016. DiPiero had been in the psychiatric hospital suffering from anxiety and
depression, while Earnest was there due to a problem with alcohol. DiPiero
characterized their relationship as friendly, but nothing more. During the
calls, Earnest told DiPiero that he was dying from mouth cancer and asked her
to pick him up. Appellant initially objected to picking Earnest up and
complained that DiPiero did not know Earnest very well. Ultimately, though,
Appellant agreed to drive DiPiero to meet Earnest. Id. at 206-15, 226-28,
419-20.
After they picked Earnest up, he was rude, intoxicated and angry about
his cancer diagnosis. He insisted on getting a thirty pack of beer and
cigarettes and bragged about being tough, claiming that he wanted to beat
somebody up before he died. Earnest tried to hold DiPiero’s hand while
Appellant was sitting next to her in the passenger seat, which DiPiero claimed
made her feel “a little weird.” Id. at 211-15, 221-23, 409-12.
The group returned to Appellant’s mobile home. Appellant and Earnest
briefly went outside and shot guns recreationally, and they appeared to be
getting along. After returning inside, however, Appellant and Earnest began
wrestling in the living room, and Earnest started pushing and punching
Appellant. Earnest was larger and fitter than Appellant and was winning the
fight. DiPiero screamed at them to stop and stepped between them, and
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Earnest accidentally hit her. The fight ended, and Appellant walked back into
his bedroom. Earnest did not pursue Appellant into the bedroom. Id. at 223-
24, 231-37, 409-11, 413-16.
When the two men separated, DiPiero believed that the fight was over.
Earnest would not move from the couch or reply when DiPiero asked him what
the fight had been about. Instead, Earnest sat on the couch silently, looking
sad and confused. An autopsy would show that he had a BAC of .262%. Id.
at 235-37.
Humiliated by the fight, Appellant walked down the hallway to his
bedroom, retrieved a shotgun and loaded it. Appellant emerged from the
bedroom while Earnest continued to sit silently on the couch. Appellant shot
Earnest twice where he sat, and Earnest fell onto the floor and died shortly
thereafter. DiPiero testified that Earnest had been unarmed and seated; she
never saw him holding a knife, and had never felt any reason to fear for her
own safety around him. DiPiero called 911. She described Appellant’s
expression as “stunned [...] like a trance”. Id. at 229-32, 235-39, 259-61,
413-16.
Appellant told DiPiero that he had shot Earnest because he believed
Earnest was going to kill him. He claimed at trial that he believed Earnest had
a knife, despite DiPiero’s testimony that there was no knife in the victim’s
hands. Appellant claimed that Earnest was not silent or sitting down on the
couch when Appellant shot him. According to Appellant, Earnest was rising
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up from the couch, and he said to Appellant, “Are you ready to go now?” Id.
at 259-61, 417-20.
The police questioned Appellant and took photographs of his injuries,
which consisted of a small scratch on his lower back and another on his ear.
The police interviewer did not consider any of Appellant’s injuries to be
serious. The interviewer described Appellant as alert and coherent and
reported that Appellant declined any medical treatment. Id. at 131-32, 153,
337-40.
Appellant raises two issues in this appeal:
1. Did the Commonwealth prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the Appellant did not act in justifiable self-defense and/or that he
did not possess a reasonable belief that he was in immediate and
imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury?
2. Did the Commonwealth prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the Appellant’s belief that he was in danger of immediate and/or
imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury was
unreasonable or mistaken?
Appellant’s Brief at 2. We analyze these issues together, because they both
challenge whether the evidence was sufficient to disprove Appellant’s claim of
self-defense.
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine
whether the evidence admitted at trial and all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict
winner, were sufficient to prove every element of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Diamond, 83 A.3d 119, 126 (Pa.
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2013). “[T]he facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth
need not preclude every possibility of innocence.” Commonwealth v. Colon-
Plaza, 136 A.3d 521, 525–26 (Pa. Super. 2016). It is within the province of
the fact-finder to determine the weight to accord to each witness’s testimony
and to believe all, part or none of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Tejada,
107 A.3d 788, 792–93 (Pa. Super. 2015). The Commonwealth may sustain
its burden of proving every element of the crime by means of wholly
circumstantial evidence. Commonwealth v. Crosley, 180 A.3d 761, 767
(Pa. Super. 2018). As an appellate court, we may not re-weigh the evidence
and substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder. Commonwealth v.
Rogal, 120 A.3d 994, 1001 (Pa. Super. 2015).
The voluntary manslaughter statute, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2503, prescribes:
(a) General rule.--A person who kills an individual without lawful
justification commits voluntary manslaughter if at the time of the
killing he is acting under a sudden and intense passion resulting
from serious provocation by:
(1) the individual killed; or
(2) another whom the actor endeavors to kill, but he negligently
or accidentally causes the death of the individual killed.
(b) Unreasonable belief killing justifiable.--A person who
intentionally or knowingly kills an individual commits voluntary
manslaughter if at the time of the killing he believes the
circumstances to be such that, if they existed, would justify the
killing under Chapter 5 of this title (relating to general principles
of justification), but his belief is unreasonable.
Id. Voluntary manslaughter is a first-degree felony. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2503(c).
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During trial, Appellant invoked the doctrine of self-defense in response
to the charge of voluntary manslaughter. The statute governing self-defense,
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 505, provides: “The use of force upon or toward another person
is justifiable when the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary
for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by such
other person on the present occasion.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 505(a). Section 505
further provides:
The use of deadly force is not justifiable under this section unless
the actor believes that such force is necessary to protect himself
against death, serious bodily injury, kidnapping or sexual
intercourse compelled by force or threat; nor is it justifiable if:
(i) the actor, with the intent of causing death or serious bodily
injury, provoked the use of force against himself in the same
encounter; or
(ii) the actor knows that he can avoid the necessity of using such
force with complete safety by retreating, except the actor is not
obliged to retreat from his dwelling or place of work, unless he
was the initial aggressor or is assailed in his place of work by
another person whose place of work the actor knows it to be.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 505(b)(2.1).
When the defendant claims self-defense in response to a charge of
voluntary manslaughter, the burden is on the Commonwealth to disprove the
defendant’s claim beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v.
Sepulveda, 55 A.3d 1108, 1124 (Pa. 2012). To successfully claim self-
defense, the defendant must meet three elements: (1) the defendant
reasonably believed that he was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily
injury and that the use of deadly force was necessary to prevent such harm;
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(2) the defendant did not provoke the incident which resulted in the victim’s
death; and (3) the defendant did not violate any duty to retreat.
Commonwealth v. Patterson, 180 A.3d 1217, 1231 (Pa. Super. 2018)
(citing Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 53 A.3d 738, 740 (Pa. 2012)).
Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence
was sufficient to disprove Appellant’s claim of self-defense. The trial court
reasoned:
In arguing at trial that he acted in self-defense, [Appellant] sought
to persuade the jury that the victim’s physical appearance,
behavior, and demeanor leading up to the shooting caused
[Appellant] to believe that he was in imminent danger of death or
serious bodily injury such that it was necessary to use deadly force
against the victim, and additionally, that such belief was
reasonable. The Commonwealth countered that not only was such
a belief not reasonable, but was, in fact, not even held by
[Appellant], who instead only asserted it after the fact, as a way
to avoid responsibility for his actions.
Clearly, the jury, as fact finder, was free to believe whatever
portions of the evidence it found credible. Viewed as a whole, the
evidence presented by the Commonwealth fully supports the
jury’s finding that the Commonwealth met its burden of proving
that the defendant was not acting in self-defense when he shot
and killed the victim, either through evidence that [Appellant] did
not actually believe that he was in imminent danger of death or
serious bodily injury, or through evidence that if such a belief was
held, it was not a reasonable belief. As such, [Appellant] is not
entitled to appellate relief on this issue. Of particular support for
these conclusions was the evidence presented that the altercation
between the victim and [Appellant] had ended prior to the
shooting; that the victim was seated, and remained seated, after
the altercation and prior to being shot; that [Appellant] was able
to remove himself from the victim without being followed, and
secure himself in another room; that [Appellant] nonetheless
chose to return to the victim; and that the victim was unarmed
and several feet away from [Appellant] when [Appellant] shot
him.
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Trial Court Opinion, 6/28/19, at 17-18. We agree with the trial court and
conclude that the evidence was sufficient to disprove Appellant’s claim of self-
defense beyond a reasonable doubt.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 08/25/2020
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