Com. v. Aaron, C. ( 2023 )

J-S30024-22
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
CHRISTOPHER AARON :
:
Appellant : No. 2424 EDA 2021
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 27, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-23-CR-0000433-2021
BEFORE: STABILE, J., McCAFFERY, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.: FILED MARCH 24, 2023
Christopher Aaron (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas after his non-jury
convictions of simple assault, harassment, and disorderly conduct (engages in
fighting).1 On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for each
of his convictions. We affirm.
On December 29, 2020, Appellant physically assaulted Shakeema Taylor
(Victim), his then girlfriend, outside a train station in Delaware County,
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2701(a)(1), 2709(a)(1), 5503(a)(1). Appellant’s disorderly
conduct conviction was graded as a third-degree misdemeanor under
Subsection (b) of the statute. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 5503(b) (“An offense under
this section is a misdemeanor of the third degree if the intent of the actor is
to cause substantial harm or serious inconvenience, or if he persists in
disorderly conduct after reasonable warning or request to desist. Otherwise
disorderly conduct is a summary offense.”).
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Pennsylvania. N.T., 10/27/21, at 7-9. Immediately following the incident,
Appellant was arrested and charged with the above-mentioned crimes. See
id at 11, 31.
The matter proceeded to a bench trial on October 27, 2021. The trial
court summarized the testimony as follows:
[Victim] testified that on December 29, 2020, she was in an
ongoing relationship with . . . Appellant. On that evening, as
[Victim] was about to exit the train in Crum Lynne, Delaware
County, Appellant stepped on the train, snatched her cell phone
from her, and pulled her off the train by her arm. As [Victim] was
stepping off the train, a can was thrown in her face, making
contact with and splashing her in the face.
[Victim described Appellant as “harassing” her when she]
tried to separate herself from [him] and [she] began walking
towards the steps to exit the train platform. Appellant kept telling
[Victim] to walk with him while he was going through her cell
phone. As [Victim] and Appellant approached the steps, Appellant
grabbed her by the hood of her coat and slammed the back of her
head into a metal pole. She did not feel pain to her head right
away, but explained she felt pain later. [Victim] made it to the
bottom of the steps, ran across the street, and fell as Appellant
was coming after her. [Victim noted that a bystander must have
called the police because they “came right away[.”] Victim [then]
gave a statement [to police indicating that she] sustained some
injuries including a cut on her knee, ripped jeans, knee pain, and
pain to the back of her head.
Trial Ct. Op. 1/20/22, at 1-2 (record citations omitted & paragraph break
added).
Ridley Park Police Corporal Detective John Morris also testified at the
trial, stating he was responsible for Appellant’s October 28, 2020, video
arraignment and bail interview the morning after his arrest. N.T. at 31.
Corporal Morris stated that during the video proceeding, Appellant had an
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“outburst” and told the magistrate district judge that he “did not assault
anybody, he just threw a Diet Coke at [Victim.]” Id. at 36. Appellant then
stated that if he “assaulted [Victim], she would know it and . . . would have
definite injuries.” Id. Corporal Morris also recounted “[t]here was at least
one call to 911” related to this incident. Id. at 33.
At the conclusion of trial, the trial court found Appellant guilty of simple
assault, harassment, and disorderly conduct as a third-degree misdemeanor.
Upon Appellant’s request, the matter immediately proceeded to sentencing.
N.T. at 51. The court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of four and
one-half to 12 months’ incarceration, followed by one year of probation.2
Appellant did not file a post-sentence motion but did file this timely
appeal.3
Appellant raises the following claims:
1. Whether the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to
support the conviction for simple assault, 18 Pa.C.S. §
2701(a)(1), where the evidence at trial failed to establish that
Appellant intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly caused bodily
injury?
2. Whether the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to
support the conviction for harassment under 18 Pa.C.S. §
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2 The trial court sentenced Appellant to four and one-half years’ incarceration
for simple assault, followed by one year of probation for harassment, and one
year of probation for disorderly conduct. The terms of probation were ordered
to run concurrently.
3 Appellant complied with the trial court’s order to file a concise statement of
errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The trial court
issued its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion on January 20, 2022.
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2709(a)(1), where the evidence at trial failed to establish that
Appellant, with the intent to harass, annoy or alarm another,
struck, shoved, kicked, or otherwise subjected another person
to physical contact?
3. Whether the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to
support the conviction for disorderly conduct — engage in
fighting under 18 Pa.C.S. § 5503(a)(1), where the evidence at
trial failed to establish that Appellant, with intent to cause
public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly
creating a risk thereof, engaged in fighting or threatening, or
in violent or tumultuous behavior?
Appellant’s Brief at 4 (some extra spacing omitted).
Each of Appellant’s claims challenges the sufficiency of the evidence.
We note the relevant standard of review:
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light
most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence
to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh
the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In
addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by
the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be
resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and
inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be
drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record
must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be
considered. Finally, the finder of fact while passing upon the
credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced,
is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 756 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation
omitted).
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In his first claim, Appellant argues there was insufficient evidence to
sustain a conviction for simple assault because the Commonwealth did not
prove that Appellant intended or attempted to cause bodily injury to Victim,
nor did it show that she sustained bodily injury. See Appellant’s Brief at 9.
Specifically, he contends, “Even when viewed in the light most favorable to
the Commonwealth, the evidence does not establish that [Appellant] acted
with the requisite mens rea. [Victim] did not sustain any bodily injury and the
evidence failed to show an attempt to cause bodily injury because his conduct
was negligent at best, and without the use of any deadly weapon.” Id. He
also maintains that he “did not leave any marks” on Victim, and that she “did
not need medical attention.” Id. at 10. Appellant further insists that there
was “no photographic evidence,” no testimony from police, and no testimony
from “any possible onlooker” to suggest Victim sustained any injuries. Id.
A person commits simple assault if they “attempt[ ] to cause or
intentionally, knowingly or recklessly cause[ ] bodily injury to another[.]”4 18
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4 Intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly are defined as follows:
(1) A person acts intentionally with respect to a material element
of an offense when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a
result thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in conduct
of that nature or to cause such a result; and
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Pa.C.S. § 2701(a)(1). Bodily injury is defined as “[i]mpairment of physical
condition or substantial pain.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2301. A person attempts to
commit a crime when they, “with the intent to commit a specific crime,
[perform] any act which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission
of that crime.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 901(a). We also note that “intent may be inferred
from the circumstances surrounding the incident if a specific intent to cause
bodily injury may reasonably be inferred therefrom.” In re C.E.H., 167 A.3d
767, 770 (Pa. Super. 2017) (concluding testimony from eyewitnesses
provided circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s intent to attempt to cause
____________________________________________
(ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he
is aware of the existence of such circumstances or he
believes or hopes that they exist.
(2) A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of
an offense when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the
attendant circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of
that nature or that such circumstances exist; and
(ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is
aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause
such a result.
(3) A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of
an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result
from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree
that, considering the nature and intent of the actor’s conduct and
the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross
deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person
would observe in the actor’s situation.
18 Pa.C.S. § 302(b)(1)-(3).
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bodily harm), citing Commonwealth v. Polston, 616 A.2d 669, 679 (Pa.
Super. 1992).
Here, the trial court determined there was sufficient evidence to support
Appellant’s conviction for simple assault, opining:
[Victim] testified credibly that Appellant grabbed her arm and
pulled her[ off the train before throwing] a soda can at [her],
making contact with her face[. Appellant] then proceeded to
follow her and push her head into a metal pole. [Victim] did not
needlessly embellish her injuries, but instead explained to the
court that her head did not hurt right away from the impact, but
did so later on.
Trial Ct. Op. at 4. We agree with the trial court’s conclusion.
The Commonwealth presented evidence that Appellant: (1) pulled
Victim off a train; (2) threw a can of soda at her face — which he admitted to
doing during his arraignment; (3) slammed her head into a pole; and (4)
caused her to experience pain because of those actions. See N.T. at 8-11,
36. Despite Appellant’s claims that Victim did not sustain bodily injury
because he “did not leave any marks[,]” and the Commonwealth did not
present photos or third-party testimony about her injuries, Victim testified
that she experienced pain as a result of Appellant’s attack. N.T. at 11, 23.
The trial court, sitting as fact-finder, found her testimony credible. See Trial
Ct. Op. at 4. One can reasonably infer that Appellant’s actions demonstrated
a specific intent to cause bodily injury to Victim. See In re C.E.H., 167 A.3d
at 770.
Further, Appellant does not provide any authority to support his
contention that the Commonwealth was required to show evidence other than
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Victim’s credible testimony. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, it was reasonable for the court, as
factfinder, to infer from the attendant circumstances — throwing an object at
Victim’s face, then slamming her head into a pole — that Appellant either
attempted or intended to cause her bodily harm. See Antidormi, 84 A.3d at
756; see also In re C.E.H., 167 A.3d at 770. No relief is due.
In his second claim, Appellant argues there was insufficient evidence to
support his harassment conviction. See Appellant’s Brief at 11. He alleges
he did not intend to harass, annoy, or alarm Victim. Id. He further contends
Victim’s own testimony “established[ ] she was not harassed by [Appellant.]”
Id. at 12. He avers that, instead, he and Victim were a couple who “were
walking together” while having a “heated discussion[.]” Id. Appellant
concludes there was no evidence to support a finding that he had the requisite
intent for this conviction. Id.
Keeping the sufficiency standard of review in mind, “[a] person commits
the crime of harassment when, with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another,
the person[, in relevant part,] strikes, shoves, kicks or otherwise subjects the
other person to physical contact, or attempts or threatens to do the same[.]”
18 Pa.C.S. § 2709(a)(1). Thus, Section 2709(a)(1) contains two elements:
(1) subjecting another person to physical contact; and (2) with the intent to
harass, annoy, or alarm. Further, it is well established that “[a]n intent to
harass may be inferred from the totality of the circumstances.”
Commonwealth v. Cox, 72 A.3d 719, 721 (Pa. Super. 2013).
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Notably, Appellant only challenges the Commonwealth’s evidence
pertaining to the intent element. See Appellant’s Brief at 12. The trial court
rejected this contention, concluding it could reasonably infer Appellant’s intent
to harass Victim from his actions:
Appellant grabbed [Victim’s] arm; he pulled her off the train;
threw a soda can at her face; and took her phone. [Appellant]
then began going through [Victim’s] phone while following her as
she attempted to separate herself from him. This establishes that
[Victim] was clearly annoyed or alarmed by Appellant’s actions;
the required mens rea for [h]arassment. It also establishes the
second element of [h]arassment, subjecting another to physical
contact. As such, the evidence was sufficient to support [his]
conviction[.]
Trial Ct. Op. at 5.
We agree with the trial court’s determination that Appellant’s intent was
reasonably inferred from the totality of the circumstances. Victim testified
that she was attempting to get away from Appellant and he was following her.
The trial court found her testimony credible, and inferred that Victim was
“annoyed or alarmed” by his behavior, which it was permitted to do. See
Cox, 72 A.3d at 721; Trial Ct. Op. at 5. Moreover, other than a bald
statement, Appellant does not elaborate how Victim’s testimony “established”
that he was not harassing her. See Appellant’s Brief at 12. He merely states
they were a couple who were having a “heated discussion.” Id. A review of
Victim’s testimony contradicts Appellant’s allegations. In fact, Victim explicitly
described Appellant’s conduct as “harassing” as she attempted to “separate”
herself from him. N.T. at 10. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
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to the verdict winner, it established that Appellant initiated physical contact
with Victim for the purpose of annoying or alarming her. See 18 Pa.C.S. §
2709(a)(1); see also Antidormi, 84 A.3d at 756; Cox, 72 A.3d at 721. No
relief is due.
In his final claim, Appellant argues his conviction for disorderly conduct
was not supported by sufficient evidence. See Appellant’s Brief at 13. He
contends that the testimony “clearly demonstrated that he did not engage in
fighting or tumultuous behavior[.]” Id. at 14. Instead, Appellant avers that
while he and Victim were engaged in a “heated discussion” and he “put his
hands on [Victim,]” he “never intended” to cause “any public disruption or
annoyance” that would justify his misdemeanor conviction. Id. at 12, 14.
A person is guilty of disorderly conduct, in pertinent part, if “with intent
to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a
risk thereof, he . . . engages in fighting or threatening, or in violent or
tumultuous behavior[.]” 18 Pa.C.S. § 5503(a)(1). Relevant to our analysis,
“public” is defined in the statute as “affecting or likely to affect persons in a
place to which the public or a substantial group has access; among the places
included . . . transport facilities . . . or any premises which are open to the
public.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 5503(c). Disorderly conduct is graded as a third-degree
misdemeanor when “the intent of the actor is to cause substantial harm or
serious inconvenience[.]” 18 Pa.C.S. § 5503(b). The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has explained that the statute does not require that an offender’s
conduct
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be directed at a certain number of persons that could qualify as
“the public.” Therefore, when an offender engages in fighting or
threatening, or in violent or tumultuous behavior in a public arena,
even when that conduct is directed at only one other
person, the offender may be subject to conviction for disorderly
conduct.”
Commonwealth v. Fedorek, 946 A.2d 93, 100 (Pa. 2008) (citation omitted;
emphasis added). When imposing this higher grading, we focus on
the offender’s behavior, not directly upon the public impact of that
behavior. Thus, when the Commonwealth proves that an offender
intended to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or
recklessly created a risk thereof, by, for example, engaging in
fighting or threatening, or in violent or tumultuous behavior, the
next level of inquiry, under Section 5503(b), is the degree of the
offender’s behavior. If the offender acted with intent to cause
substantial harm or serious inconvenience (and by so doing
potentially increased the threat to the public peace and safety),
the offense is graded as a third-degree misdemeanor.
Id. at 101. Further, we note that “intent is a subjective frame of mind, [and]
can be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence; it may be inferred from
acts or conduct or from the attendant circumstances.” Commonwealth v.
Bullock, 170 A.3d 1109, 1119 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citations & some quotation
marks omitted).
Here, the trial court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to
sustain Appellant’s conviction. Specifically, it stated:
Appellant in the instant matter engaged in fighting with [Victim]
in a public forum; in this instance, a train station during the
evening commute. Appellant grabbed her, threw a can at her,
and pushed her up against a pole, then continued to follow her.
[Victim] did not call the police, but someone else did; a member
of the public who witnessed the event a[nd] was inconvenienced
or alarmed enough to have called 911. This establishes that
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Appellant’s actions in fighting with [Victim] caused a public
inconvenience.
Trial Ct. Op. at 6. We agree.
The record supports the trial court’s inferences pertaining to Appellant’s
intent. It is beyond reason for Appellant to contend that attacking Victim on
a public train platform, throwing a can at her face, and slamming her head
into a pole is not “violent or tumultuous behavior[.]” See 18 Pa.C.S.
5503(a)(1). Further, Appellant initiated this attack while others were present,
which reasonably would “cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or
recklessly create[e] a risk thereof[.]” See id. As pointed out by the trial
court, his actions were alarming enough that a third party sought police
intervention. Corporal Morris confirmed there was “at least” one phone call
reporting the incident and it was not Victim. See N.T. at 11, 33.
Lastly, the trial court did not err in grading the offense as a third-degree
misdemeanor where the totality of the circumstances of the attack permit a
reasonable inference that Appellant intended to cause substantial harm or
serious inconvenience. See 18 Pa.C.S. 5503(b); Fedorek, 946 A.2d at 101;
Bullock, 170 A.3d at 1119. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, there was sufficient evidence that
Appellant engaged in disorderly conduct as defined by the statute and did so
with the requisite intent. See 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 5503(a)(1), (b); see also
Antidormi, 84 A.3d at 756. No relief is due.
Because Appellant failed to demonstrate any error on the part of the
trial court, we do not disturb the court’s findings on appeal.
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Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/24/2023
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